ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it
noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket

invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement
of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.

Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, 486

S 177
FACTS:
Norma and Eulogio were married in 1965 and had five children. On August 19, 1996,
Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage citing Eulogios psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. According to Norma, the
manifestations of Eulogios psychological incapacity were his: immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment
of his family since December 27, 1985. On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the
Public Prosecutor, Joven M. Maramba, to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the contending parties. Maramba found no collusion existed.
Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio had been a habitual alcoholic.
He sometimes slept on the streets when he was drunk. When he went to her office, he
uttered unwholesome remarks against her and dragged her home. He often scolded their
children without justifiable reason. When she would refuse to give him money for his
compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and threaten her. He remained
unemployed after he was dismissed from work, and he refused to look for a job such that
Norma was the one providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out of
her salary as a government employee. On December 27, 1985, because of unbearable
jealousy to her male officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then
beat her up. Her brothers came to her rescue and told Eulogio to get out of the house.
Since then, Eulogio had not visited or communicated with his family, making reconciliation

very unlikely. The RTC nullified the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed an appeal with the CA, contending that the evidence
presented were not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Was there a basis for the OSGs contention to necessitate the filing of the appeal with the
CA?
HELD:
Yes. It is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid
and happy families. The breakup of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. In connection
with this, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In
this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial
level other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation that no collusion existed between
the contending parties and the brief cross-examination. No pleading, motion, or position
paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given
the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. Only
the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of
the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.

Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

Austria v. NLRC

G.R. No. 124382

August 16, 1999

KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely secular in nature because it
has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws.
The Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.

Facts:

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA
for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer
of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the termination of
his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and backwages
plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the

separation

of

church

and

state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the
SDA.

Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of
the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with
the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes is
unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

(Political Law, Constitutional Law, E.O. 464)

FACTS
Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear
at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an
audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections
Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col.
Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to
attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.
Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by
Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to
attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably,
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.
However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `
While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which
noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a
Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the
time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of
A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes
that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from
testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending
preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military
justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive.
The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct
order of the AFP Chief of Staff.
ISSUE
Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY
CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?
RULING
The Petition is dismissed.
Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?
Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the
President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and
jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as
a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold
that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before
it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does
not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section
18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under house arrest
by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest,
that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court
unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:
to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties
under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be
followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the

matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be
considered.
As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the
military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier
desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a
soldiers ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one,
political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its
constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment
an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well
aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend
the Senate Hearing.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will
without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Judicial relief as remedy:
The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is
ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.
Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the
constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise
establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be
done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional
infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from
testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify
such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as
the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in
legislative inquiries.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative
and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule,
the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to

testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his
retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to
military law as, among others, all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out that he is no
longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated