Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1) G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007, ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, VS.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-ADMINISTRATRIXNature of money claim vs. estate
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot
even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein
petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the
trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an
estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in
fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees
because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such
filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, nonpayment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the
same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one
effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to real properties, the Court
in Bank
of
America
v.
American
Realty
Corporation pronounced:
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy
operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed
elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of
justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of
extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by
respondent in this case. However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of
foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the
estate. These precepts were discussed in the PNB case, citing Perez v. Philippine
National
Bank which
overturned
the
earlier Pasno
v.
Ravina ruling:
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by
the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies,
among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it
is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank, reversing Pasno vs. Ravina, we held:
The ruling in Pasno v. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have
carefully reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation have reached the
conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of
the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the
mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from
the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage
judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the
mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by
prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority
opinion in Pasno v. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out the
third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would
4) G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013,MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE- Application of Rule 108 in foreign divorce.
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a
foreign
citizen
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which
has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the
trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court
explained that [i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Moreover, Section
48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into
the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage,
but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported in keeping with the financial capacity of the family and
preserving the property regime of the marriage. Property rights are already
substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouses right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III (Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot diminish, increase, or modify the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wifeit refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus,
the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting
and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action to nullify the marriage. The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign
law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In Republic v.
Orbecido, this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in
the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared
that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may
file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment
is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage,
without
prejudice
to
a
criminal
prosecution
for
bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a
new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
5) G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008,ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, VS. LILIA
J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, AND ANTONIO J. HENSON-Rule 109
Matter appealed matter was the special administrator's commission, a charge that
is effectively a claim against the estate under administration, while the matter
covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who would
pass upon the special administrator's final account. By their respective natures,
these matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed separately
as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.
6) G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013, AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
8) G.R. No. 153820, October 16, 2009, DELFIN TAN VS. ERLINDA C.
BENOLIRAO, ANDREW C. BENOLIRAO, ROMANO C. BENOLIRAO, DION C.
BENOLIRAO, SPS. REYNALDO TANINGCO AND NORMA D. BENOLIRAO,
EVELYN T. MONREAL, AND ANN KARINA TANINGCO,
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 prescribes the procedure to be followed if within
two years after an extrajudicial partition or summary distribution is made, an heir
or other person appears to have been deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate, or some outstanding debts which have not been paid are discovered. When
the lawful participation of the heir is not payable in money, because, for
instance, he is entitled to a part of the real property that has been
partitioned, there can be no other procedure than to cancel the partition so
made and make a new division, unless, of course, the heir agrees to be paid
the value of his participation with interest. But in case the lawful participation
of the heir consists in his share in personal property of money left by the decedent,
or in case unpaid debts are discovered within the said period of two years, the
procedure is not to cancel the partition, nor to appoint an administrator to reassemble the assets, as was allowed under the old Code, but the court, after
hearing, shall fix the amount of such debts or lawful participation in proportion to or
to the extent of the assets they have respectively received and, if circumstances
require, it may issue execution against the real estate belonging to the decedent, or
both. The present procedure is more expedient and less expensive in that it
dispenses with the appointment of an administrator and does not disturb the
possession enjoyed by the distributees. [Emphasis supplied.]
An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the
distribution and partition of a decedent's real properties to warn third persons on
the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The
annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real
property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer
purchases the real property despite the annotation, he must be ready for
the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of excluded
parties. The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a)
the annotation clearly appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the
sale unlawfully interferes with the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an
action to question the transfer within the two-year period provided by law.
As we held in Vda. de Francisco v. Carreon:
And Section 4, Rule 74 xxx expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his
lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real
estate" and to "issue execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the
amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it
among the heirs has the authority to direct cancellation of such alienation
in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do
so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run
counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these summary settlements.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as
the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of
the settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the
effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or original distributees
of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in David v. Malay, although the title of the property had already been
registered in the name of the third party buyers, we cancelled the sale and ordered
the reconveyance of the property to the estate of the deceased for proper disposal
among his rightful heirs.
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pretrial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed
by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by
the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial x xx. (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land
being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be
more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding
for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio,
especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in
court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir
of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs
with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its
Decision,respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the
following facts during the pre-trial:
IV UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the PreTrial Order)
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the
following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be
sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only
surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria
Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a
portion of the subject property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco
Abarientos;
is
the
sister
is
of
Avelina
daughter
of
declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.
Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of
Severo in order to resolve petitioners Action for Annulment of Title and
Reconveyance of the subject property.
10) 1st Div., G.R. No. 188944, July 09, 2014, SPOUSES RODOLFO
BEROT AND LILIA BEROT VS. FELIPE C. SIAPNO- Rule 86, Sec. 7
permits a mortgagee to file an action for judicial foreclosure against the
heirs, executor or administrator of a deceased mortgagor. The general rule
is the estate cannot be impleaded as defendant, but if there was no
objection to such impleading, it amounts to a waiver because jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is waivable.
Facts:
On May 23, 2002, Macaria Berot (or Macaria) and spouses Rodolfo A. Berot (or
appellant) and Lilia P. Berot (or Lilia) obtained a loan from Felipe C. Siapno (or
appellee) in the sum of P250,000.00, payable within one year together with
interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from that date until fully paid.
As security for the loan, Macaria, appellant and Lilia (or mortgagors, when
collectively) mortgaged to appellee a portion, consisting of 147 square meters (or
contested property), of that parcel of land with an area of 718 square meters,
situated in Banaoang, Calasiao, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No.
1123 in the names of Macaria and her husband Pedro Berot (or Pedro), deceased.
On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.
Because of the mortgagors default, appellee filed an action against them for
foreclosure of mortgage and damages on July 15, 2004 in the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City (Branch 42). The action was anchored on the averment that the
mortgagors failed and refused to pay the abovementioned sum of P250,000.00 plus
the stipulated interest of 2% per month despite lapse of one year from May 23,
2002.
In answer, appellant and Lilia (or Berot spouses, when collectively [referred to])
alleged that the contested property was the inheritance of the former from his
deceased father, Pedro; that on said property is their family home; that the
mortgage is void as it was constituted over the family home without the consent of
their children, who are the beneficiaries thereof; that their obligation is only joint;
and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no
summons was served on her as she was already dead.
With leave of court, the complaint was amended by substituting the estate of
Macaria in her stead. Thus, the defendants named in the amended complaint are
now the ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT, represented by Rodolfo A. Berot (son of
Macaria), RODOLFO A. BEROT and LILIA P. BEROT.
Ruling:
It may be recalled that when the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint substituting
the estate of Macaria Berot in place of Macaria Berot as party defendant,
defendants made no objections thereto. Not even an amended answer was filed by
the defendants questioning the substitution of the estate of Macaria Berot. For
these reasons, the defendants are deemed to have waived any objection on the
personality of the estate of Macaria Berot. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
provides that, Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived. x x x. (Underscoring ours).
Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one
that may be waived by a party to a case. In order to avail of that defense, one must
timely raise an objection before the court.
The records of the case show that on 9 November 2004, a hearing was held on the
Motion for Leave to File filed by respondent to have her amended Complaint
admitted. During the said hearing, the counsel for petitioners did not interpose an
objection to the said Motion for Leave. On 18 March 2005, a hearing was held on
respondents Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, wherein counsel for petitioners
again failed to interpose any objection. Thus, the trial court admitted respondents
Amended Complaint and ordered that a copy and a summons be served anew on
petitioners.
In an Order dated 14 April 2005, the RTC noted that petitioners received the
summons and the copy of the amended Complaint on 3 February 2005 and yet they
did not file an Answer. During the trial on the merits that followed, petitioners failed
to interpose any objection to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the estate
of Macaria Berot. Clearly, their full participation in the proceedings of the case can
only be construed as a waiver of any objection to or defense of the trial courts
supposed lack of jurisdiction over the estate.
Xxxx
xxxxx
It should be noted that Rodolfo Berot is the son of the deceased Macaria [22] and as
such, he is a compulsory heir of his mother. His substitution is mandated by Section
16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Notably, there is no indication in the
records of the case that he had other siblings who would have been his co-heirs.
The lower and appellate courts veered from the real issue whether the proper
parties have been impleaded. They instead focused on the issue whether there was
need for a formal substitution when the deceased Macaria, and later its estate, was
impleaded. As the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real
party in interest in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for foreclosure, as well as the time it was
amended to implead the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo as heir who is the real
party in interest. He stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Rodolfo is also Macarias co-defendant in the foreclosure proceedings in his own
capacity as co-borrower of the loan. He participated in the proceedings of the case,
from the initial hearing of the case, and most particularly when respondent filed his
amended complaint impleading the estate of Macaria. When respondent amended
his complaint, Rodolfo did not file an amended Answer nor raise any objection, even
if he was also identified therein as the representative of the estate of the deceased
Macaria. The lower court noted this omission by Rodolfo in its Order dated 8
September 2006 ruling on his Motion for Reconsideration to the said courts
Decision dated 30 June 2006. Thus, his continued participation in the proceedings
clearly shows that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the heir of Macaria.
In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, this Court has
ruled that formal substitution of parties is not necessary when the heirs themselves
voluntarily appeared, participated, and presented evidence during the proceedings.
Xxx
xxx
xxx
In Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals we ruled that a formal substitution of the
heirs in place of the deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to
appear and participated in the proceedings of the case. In the cited case, we
explained the rationale of our ruling and related it to the due process issue, to wit:
We are not unaware of several cases where we have ruled that a party having died
in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the
deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered
after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the
persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily
appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased
defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all, are these particular circumstances
which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible claim of violation of her
rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the
general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be
bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not
because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal
representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those
who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in this light, the
Court of Appeals, in the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
thus expounded:
Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a
jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to
comply with due process requirements. The original party having died, he could not
continue, to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him.
For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the
deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the
judgment. It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs. In the instant
case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the opportunity
to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such
opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such
substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which
may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of
letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case
and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased.
This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural
rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect
to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the
substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may
he considered substantial compliance. Such is the situation in the case at bench
because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that
there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his
death:
1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd
to think that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying
him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial
court which lasted for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee.
With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was
allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to continue
appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was
rendered;
2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant
case, even testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased.
She knew therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that
somehow
her
interest
and
those
of
her
children
were
involved;
3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was
decided against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic)
after the decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's
manifestation that she was not aware that an appeal had been made);
4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as
jurisdiction by estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where
jurisdiction over the subject matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only
jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may
be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the
person in court as did herein petitioner appear;
5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de
Gonzales, et al.) cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention
relative to non-acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita
Gonzales was not served notice and, more importantly, she never appeared in
court, unlike herein petitioner who appeared and even testified regarding the death
of her husband.
In this case, Rodolfos continued appearance and participation in the proceedings of
the case dispensed with the formal substitution of the heirs in place of the
deceased Macaria. The failure of petitioners to timely object to the trial courts
exercise of jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria Berot amounted to a waiver on
their part. Consequently, it would be too late for them at this point to raise that
defense to merit the reversal of the assailed decision of the trial court. We are left
with no option other than to sustain the CAs affirmation of the trial courts Decision
on this matter.
11) G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, ANITA REYES-MESUGAS VS.
ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES and RTC 62, Makati- Upon approval of a
compromise agreement by the settlement court, it loses jurisdiction to act
on a motion to cancel notice of lis pendins, Moreover, even if it has still
jurisdiction, such court has no jurisdiction to enforce an alleged side
agreement to confer right of way because the same is not part of the
compromise agreement. Settlement court has a very limited jurisdiction.
12) G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012, NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D.
NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUTPIALA VS. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA * IBRAHIM UY- Excluded
heirs in an extrajudicial settlement are not bound by the 2 year period and
can ask for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement within the
prescriptive period (10 years in case trust). Sale made by a legal guardian
over minors property under such EJS is unenforceable and can be ratified by
the minors upon reaching legal age.
HABEAS CORPUS
13) G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015, IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO VS. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL
OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING
CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO- A person detained but has
proof that he is not the person charged in the information can avail habeas
corpus; CA granted writ of HC returnable to RTC, the latters decision in the
HC case is appealable to the CA. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a
person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not
under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
Facts:
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one
of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et
al. Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he
could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre
because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. To support his allegations, Salibo
presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and
other documents" tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in
Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he
was not Butukan S. Malang. Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended
Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi
Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police
Station for about three (3) days. The police officers transferred Salibo to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained
for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex,
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City,
where he is currently detained.
Salibo filed a habeas corpus petition with the CA and the latter granted the
writ, made it returnable to the Vice- EJ of RTC Pasig.
During the hearing, the OSG argued that SALIBO cannot avail habeas corpus
as he was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest was issued for
his detention.
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest,
and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao
Massacre.
Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" under any resolution,
information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an
accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias
Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was
not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang
charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National
Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has
not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate. A Philippine
passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the
country" from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported
by a Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure from
and arrival in Manila on board its flights. A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of
Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Alias Warrant of Arrest, "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"
According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information
and/or
Warrant
of
Arrest.
Salibo
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated July 6,
2011.
Salibo filed petition before SC.
Issues:
Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered
that Medina be released from detention. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for
Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the
Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion. This court ruled
that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to
the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis. The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority
to determine the merits of the case[.]" Consequently, the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the
Court of Appeals.
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a
returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
heard respondent Warden on his Return and
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and
authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on
the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of
the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the
appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Issue No. 2Called the "great writ of liberty[,]" the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The remedy of
habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty." Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The primary
purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal." "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to
entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a
post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied
autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional
right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other
processes.
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Mario Gumabon
(Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio
Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences
of reclusion perpetua. While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
were serving their sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez in 1956,
ruling
that
the
complex
crime
of
rebellion
with
murder
does
not
exist.
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition
for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of
the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the
writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even
if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" Although
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of
invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ itself may
not be suspended.
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of
the court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, elements of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by
virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National
Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's
arrest, from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty.
Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained. Among Atty. Ilagan's
visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however,
no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him
based on an unsigned Mission Order. Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys.
Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar
(Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp
Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave.
He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria,
Regional Unified Commander. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free
Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus
in
behalf
of
Attys.
Ilagan,
Arellano,
and
Risonar.
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based onpersonal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo
was
also
not
an
escapee
prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner
Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without
due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the
"disturbing"[143] case of Ilagan.[144] Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to
Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then
and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting
opinion in Ilagan,[145] Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of
preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan
and Arellano, of his right to due process of law a ground for the grant of a
petition
for
habeas
corpus:[146]
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without
preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and
Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is
erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The
petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal
could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985.
Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was
to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very
issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as
declared by the President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule
113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a
police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act
of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's
arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this
Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened
and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense
"has in fact just been committed."This connotes immediacy in point of
time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in
fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has
committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the
[arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an
information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due
process and preliminary investigation.[147] (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.
G.R. No.
PHILIPPINES
15)
2013,REPUBLIC OF
S.
LUGSANAY
THE
UY-
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar
but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected
by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.[37] A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. [38]Summons must, therefore, be served
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity
to
protect
his
interest
if
he
so
chooses. [39]
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties.[40] Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; [41] when there is
no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; [42] or
when
a
party
is
inadvertently
left
out. [43]
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe
Rules of Court is mandated.[44] If the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might
be
detrimental
and
far
reaching.[45]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 2302004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent
Dr.
Norma
S.
Lugsanay
Uy,
is NULLIFIED.
Facts:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the
Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.[4] She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof.[5] Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer,
at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati
working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having
known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named
witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a
certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. [6]Respondent also presented as
witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office,
but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
[7]
Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.[8]
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
Issue:
Whether the petition under Rule 108 could prosper.
Ruling:
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims
that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage
with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was
entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It
must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise
notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where
respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the
trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondents signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards.[23] The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was
forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v.
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics
Office[24] that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.[25]
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that
no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction
of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009
in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
17) G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014, FRANCLER P. ONDE, VS.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS CITYR.A. 9048 and Rule 108.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition[2] for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth
before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Pias City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of
his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate
stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mothers first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the
following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry
From
To
Not married
Tely
Matilde
Franc Ler
Francler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of
entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance.
Ruling:
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his
mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the
RTCs ruling on this point.[4] Indeed, under Section 1[5] of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of
first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a
judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of
birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,[6] we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,[7]we said that
under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative
remedy for the correction of his and his mothers first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to not married is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and
convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,[8] we
held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, orlegitimacy of marriage, involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings.[9]
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling
that the correction he sought on his and his mothers first name can be done by the
city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer
that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC be reinstated since the
same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mothers first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. As we said,
petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mothers first name. He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the
alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City:[10]
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x
xx
xxxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are
not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the
status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however,
are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling inRepublic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida,[11] we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the
proceedings underRule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,[12] we have similarly
ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his
new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties
since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last
issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents
were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the
purpose.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7,
2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pias City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial
Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.
18) G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. NORA FE SAGUN- Declaration and election of
Philipppine Citizenship not permitted under Rule 108.
Facts:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and
did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at
the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by
Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
Ruling:
For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established
by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. [13]
There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.[14] This was our ruling in Yung
Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines,
[16]
where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an
act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law,
for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement
relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
xxx
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father
and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and
follow her nationality.[20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself.[21] But in the case of respondent, for
her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV
of the1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order
to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection
(4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to
be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now
be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine
citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we
held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is
to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for
lack
of
merit.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a
petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdios estate
(Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).[1] The RTC granted the petition considering
that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued
on
September
7,
1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on
December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in
the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had left no real properties but
only personal properties worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at
P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares
of
stock
of
Cebu
Emerson
worth
P22,708.25. [2]
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and
to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas motion through the order of
January
8,
1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993,
[3]
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the
44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;[4] the deed of assignment executed by
Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par
value of P4,440,700.00;[5] and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979
for
300
shares
of
stock
of
Cebu
Emerson
worth
P30,000.00. [6]
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined
under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within
which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting
documents
Teresita
had
submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties
to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve
the
motion
for
approval
of
the
inventory.[7]
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave
of
court
to
examine
Teresita
on
the
inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on
the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory,
the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March
14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court
hereby denies the administratrixs motion for approval of inventory. The Court
hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including
therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs
hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of
this
order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her
possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice
hereof.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Ruling:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties (3 Morans Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).[18] (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,[19] where the Court declared
that a probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass
upon questions of title provisionally, and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals, that the patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership,
then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al.
to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,[21] which also governs appeals in
special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable may be
the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory
order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly
made
non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of
the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of
the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special
proceedings, viz:
Allows
or
disallows
will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive
share
of
the
estate
to
which
such
person
is
entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against
it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no
appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial
rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion
for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any
of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did
the
RTC
commit
grave
in
directing
the
inclusion
in the estate of the decedent?
abuse
of
of
the
discretion
properties
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having
been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third
party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was
the
CA
correct
in
its
conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed
orders
of
the
RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may
be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent
and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or theparties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
[27]
(Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive
for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14,
2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado
was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several
properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special
Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The
administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for the
petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the
shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said
properties constituting Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the
Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also
admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir
Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money
derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a
conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in
character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the
inventory
of
the
estate
of
her
husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted,
too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she
opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account
partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included
in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot
No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square
meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio
S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which
was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado
which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened
in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard
Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in
Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in
this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the
late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue
of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the
petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of
death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made
in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has
not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall,
p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the
inventory to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of
Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides,
the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio
S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification
issued by the Cebu City Assessors Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O). [28]
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include
the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and
thus
was
far
from
whimsical,
or
arbitrary,
or
capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact
about
the
shares
being
inherited
by
Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of
theFamily Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal
partnership of gains.[29] For purposes of the settlement of Emigdios estate, it was
unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did
not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and
that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical,
and convincing evidence.[30] In the absence of or pending the presentation of such
proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally
liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were, [31] and
which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of
Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No.
CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in
favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering
Lot 3353 was still in Emigdios name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March
14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
name
of
Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692.
Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various
interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have
already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This
interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In
other
words,
Mervir
Realty
appeared
to
be
a
family
corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir
Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.[32] As the Court has observed in Suntay v.
Court of Appeals:[33]
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary
public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the
parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the
true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir
Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired
into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was
a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the
exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of
cancer of the pancreas at the time.[34] In this regard, whether the CA correctly
characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be
validated
by
the
facts
to
be
established
in
court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system
of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud
or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is
to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or
that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of
January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the
parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve
the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the
properties arising from that deed, [36] but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate
court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and
limited jurisdiction, was still deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such
jurisdiction
to
make
it
effective.[37]
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for
the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement
to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the
surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided
that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir. Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of
properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.[38]
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the
RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include
all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn
out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent
to
lack
of
jurisdiction.[39]
In light of the foregoing, the CAs conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the
part
of
the
RTC
was
unwarranted
and
erroneous.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
for
review
20)1stDiv., G.R. No. 164255, September 07, 2011, SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN
AND ERLINDA LEBIN VS. VILMA S. MIRASOL, AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ILOILO, BRANCH XXVII.
BERSAMIN,
J.:
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Here, the although the notice of appeal of an order
covered by Rule 109-e of the ROC was filed within 30 days, the record on appeal
was filed beyond the 30 day period. Hence, appeal was dismissed.
=END=