Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 74 Filed 07/12/16 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 1974

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
JUDGE SHARON INGRAM
MARCHMAN
Plaintiff

*
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv-0515
*
*
JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS
*
VERSUS
*
MAGISTRATE PEREZ-MONTES
*
BRIAN E. CRAWFORD;
*
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
LAWRENCE W. PETTIETTE, JR.;
*
JAMES D. BUDDY CALDWELL;
*
JON K. GUICE;
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JUDGE CARL V. SHARP;
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JUDGE FREDERIC C. AMMAN;
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JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO;
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JUDGE BENJAMIN JONES; and
*
ALLYSON CAMPBELL
*
Defendants
*
**************************************************************************
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
I.

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION OF RULE 11 .............................................2

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION OF 1927 ..................................................4

IV.

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................5

V.

A.

Violation of Rule 11.................................................................................................5

B.

Violation of 1927 .................................................................................................12

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Page

Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1361, 1378 (4th Cir. 1991)...............................................3
Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios.
495 F.3d 169, 180-81 (5th Cir. 2007) ...............................................................................................4
Edwards v. General Motors Corp.,
153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................................4
F.D.I.C. v. Calhoun,
34 F.3d 1291, 1297, 1300-1391 (5th Cir. 1994) ...............................................................................4
F.D.I.C. v. Conner,
20 F.3d 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994) ..................................................................................................4
Gonzales v. Fresenius Medical Care North America,
689 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2012) ....................................................................................................4
Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist.,
948 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1991) ....................................................................................................2
LaSalle Natl Bank of Chicago v. County of DuPage,
10 F.3d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir. 1993) ..................................................................................................3
Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government,
14 F.Supp. 3d 760, 766 (W.D. La. 2014).................................................................................2, 3, 4
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp.,
280 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................4
Ratcliff v. Stewart, 508 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................4
Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 2006).....................................2, 3, 11
Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc.,
960 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................................................2
Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc..,
836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc) .................................................................................2, 3

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Statutes:

Page

F.R.C.P. Rule 11(b)......................................................................................................................2, 3

F.R.C.P. Rule 11(c)(2) .....................................................................................................................3
28 U.S.C. 1927 ...........................................................................................................................1, 4

Secondary Sources:
5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller
Federal Practice and Procedure 1336 (2d ed. 2003) .....................................................................4

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MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

I.

Introduction:
Defendant, Brian E. Crawford (Crawford), has filed a Motion for Sanctions against

plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel for alleged violation of FRCP 11 and counsels alleged violation
of 28 U.S.C. 1927 related to the filing of the Complaint (Doc.1) and Amended Complaint (Doc.
22). As he did in his 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Crawford speaks only in passing about these
pleadings and spends the bulk of his argument addressing other pleadings or activities in separate
state court proceedings. Primarily, Crawford is concerned about allegations he made against
Judge Sharon Marchman (Judge Marchman) on behalf of his client, Allyson Campbell
(Campbell), in a state court proceeding wherein he accused Judge Marchman of engaging in
criminal acts. Indeed, in a pleading filed on February 26, 2016, in a state court proceeding,
Crawford alleged that Judge Marchman illegally provided private information to third parties
regarding his client, Campbell, and that his proof was contained within twenty-two (22) distinct
paragraphs in an amended petition filed in state court against Campbell and others. Crawford
stated that the information contained in the twenty-two (22) paragraphs could only have come
from Judge Marchman. The plain truth is that the information in the twenty-two (22) paragraphs
was available publicly from multiple sources, including Campbells public statements, and did
not come from Judge Marchman. Crawford was fully aware of this fact at the time he made the
allegation. Even more unfortunate is the fact that Crawfords counsel has restated these false
allegations against Judge Marchman in this proceeding.

A conspicuous dissonance exists

between Crawfords argument that Judge Marchman has put forth false allegations and his
insistence that no discovery should be allowed.
Indeed, many material misstatements of fact have been presented to this Court by
Crawford, and these will be addressed below. Counsel believes the false statements must be
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addressed lest silence be taken for acquiescence. But the issue before the Court should be
whether the filing of the Complaint or Amended Complaint in any way was violative of Rule 11
or 1927. The merits of the pleadings have been discussed at length in several memoranda filed
by plaintiff in opposition to defendants motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs alleged facts are true and
her legal claims are based on solid authority.
II.

Legal Standards for Application of Rule 11:

Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney who presents

a pleading, written motion or other paper to the court certifies that to the best of his or her
knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or
lack of information.
Compliance with Rule 11 is judged by an objective standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.

Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 948 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1991).

Reasonableness is reviewed according to the snapshot rule, focusing upon the instant the
attorney fixes his signature to the document. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960
F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc)); Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 2006); Marceaux
v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 14 F.Supp. 3d 760, 766 (W.D. La. 2014).
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In determining whether an individual has complied with his or her obligations of

reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, the court may look to a number of factors:
The determination of whether a reasonable inquiry into the facts
has been made in a case will, of course, be dependent upon the
particular facts; however, the district court may consider such
factors as the time available to the signer for investigation; the
extent of the attorneys reliance upon his client for the factual
support for the document; the feasibility of a prefiling
investigation; whether the signing attorney accepted the case from
another member of the bar or forwarding attorney; the complexity
of the factual and legal issues; and the extent to which
development of the factual circumstances underlying the claim
requires discovery. As to the determination of whether a
reasonable inquiry into the law has been made, a district court may
consider the time available to the attorney to prepare the document;
the plausibility of the legal view contained in the document; the
pro se status of a litigant; and the complexity of the legal and
factual issues raised.
Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 14 F.Supp. 3d 760, 766 (W.D. La.
2014), quoting Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
at 875-876.
[T]he imposition or denial of sanctions of necessity involves a fact-intensive inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the activity alleged to be a violation of Rule 11. Skidmore
Energy, Inc. v. KPMG, 455 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas, 836 F.2d at 873).
Because Rule 11 is not intended to chill an attorneys enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing
factual or legal theories, an attorney need not advance a winning argument to avoid Rule 11
sanctions. LaSalle Natl Bank of Chicago v. County of DuPage, 10 F.3d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1378 (4th Cir. 1991)).
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must
describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). FRCP 11(c)(2). The Advisory
Committee Notes explain that a Rule 11 motion should not be employed as a discovery device

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or to test the legal sufficiency of efficacy of allegations in the pleadings; other motions are
available for those purposes.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory Committees Notes (1993

Amendments). Rule 11 should not be used to raise the issues of legal sufficiency that more
properly can be disposed of by a motion to dismiss, a motion for a more definite statement, or a
motion for summary judgment. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure 1336 (2d ed. 2003).
III.

Legal Standards for Application of 1927:

In Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 14 F.Supp. 3d 760, 766

(W.D. LA 2014), this Court succinctly set forth the legal standards for the application of
sanctions under 1927:
Under 28 U.S.C. 1927, sanctions may be imposed against
an attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously. In order to impose sanctions under
1927, the court must find evidence of bad faith, improper
motive, or reckless disregard of the duty owed to the court.
Gonzales v. Fresenius Medical Care North America, 689 F.3d 470,
479 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Edwards v. General Motors Corp.,
153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1998)). The court must make detailed
factual findings that the actions of counsel in multiplying the
proceedings were both unreasonable and vexatious, the latter of
which requires a showing of improper purpose. F.D.I.C. v.
Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291, 1297, 1300-1301 (5th Cir. 1994); F.D.I.C.
v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994). However, when an
attorneys conduct is so obviously unreasonable that a court can
infer an improper purpose from the fact that the attorney
persisted in it, it is unnecessary for the court to explain at length
why the vexatiousness prong has been met. Ratcliff v. Stewart,
508 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2007).
...
The courts factual findings must (1) identify sanctionable
conduct and distinguish it from the reasons for deciding the case
on the merits, (2) link the sanctionable conduct to the size of the
sanctions, and (3) differentiate between sanctions awarded under
different statutes. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280

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F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002); Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc.
v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 180-81 (5th Cir. 2007).
IV.

Argument:
A.

Violation of Rule 11:

Crawford states that the basis of his request for Rule 11 sanctions is that plaintiff and her
counsel filed this legally and factually baseless suit with the intent to harass Crawford, and the
other defendants, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation.1 He then goes deep into the
weeds about the case of Palowsky v. Campbell,2 a suit filed in state court in which Judge
Marchman is not a party. The core of Crawfords argument is that the sole reason that plaintiff
and her counsel have named him in this litigation is their false allegation against him that he
falsely accused Judge Marchman of illegally providing confidential information about Campbell
to Palowskys attorneys in Palowsky v. Campbell. He claims his proof comes from an admission
made by counsel in a hearing in the Palowsky v. Campbell litigation. A review of what was
actually said in that hearing shows that no such admission occurred and Crawford has
intentionally mislead the Court.
Palowskys First Supplemental and Amending Petition in the Palowsky v. Campbell
litigation was filed on July 31, 2015.3 Crawford has stated here and in other pleadings that the
information contained in twenty-two (22) paragraphs in the amended petition could have come
only from Judge Marchman. Judge Marchman categorically denies that she ever had any
communications with plaintiffs counsel prior to the filing of Palowskys petition or the amended
petition.

Doc. 60-1, p. 7.
Palowsky v. Cork is a suit involving business torts. Destruction of filed pleadings in that matter led to the filing of
Palowsky v. Campbell.
3
Doc. 32-6.
2

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Judge Marchman received a properly issued subpoena duces tecum from plaintiffs
counsel in the Palowsky v. Cork litigation and a hearing was held on August 20, 2015 regarding
that subpoena duces tecum.4 In that hearing, Judge Marchman appeared as a subpoenaed witness
and addressed the trial court at the end of the proceeding. She indicated that she had received a
motion to quash filed by Mr. Guice on behalf of yourself, Judge Winters, Ben Jones, the court
administrator, . . . .5 She advised that she did not seek a motion to quash and that she had had a
conversation with Judge Sharp the prior day and he advised that the language in his order
quashing certain subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum was not intended to cover her.6 Judge
Sharp indicated that Judge Marchman misinterpret or either misremember what I said.7 Judge
Marchman indicates that she attempted to obtain additional records from the court administrator
but was provided with a letter from the administrator advising that she had been instructed not to
produce any documents.

Judge Marchman attempted to place the letters into the record.

Subsequently, the following colloquy took place:

BY THE COURT:
One moment. Comply with the subpoena request if you
wish. Give it to the litigants.
BY JUDGE MARCHMAN:
Im sorry, give it to the litigants?
BY COURT THE COURT:
Im not sure, Im not sure Im going to allow you to file
anything into the record. If you wish to, if you wish you can
4

Doc. 32-14, p. 50. Counsel for plaintiff objected to proceeding with a hearing on the motion to quash because a
Motion to Recuse En Banc was pending. Doc. 32-14, p. 5. Subsequently, the Second Circuit issued a supervisory
writ of certiorari sought by plaintiffs in the Palowsky v. Cork litigation. In response, it was indicated that any order
issued by Judge Sharp after the motion to recuse had been filed (June 12, 2015) was null and void. See Exhibit 1,
Judgement of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, October 22, 2015.
5
Doc. 32-14, p. 50. Incidentally, the judges seeking an order to quash subpoenas were not parties to the litigation.
6
Doc. 32-14, p. 50.
7
Doc. 32-14, p. 51.
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supply the subpoena returns if you want to. Give it to Mr. Ward.
Mr. Ward, do with it what you will. All right, were adjourned. . . .
.8
The subpoena duces tecum to Judge Marchman was not limited to official Fourth JDC
records but included any records in Judge Marchmans personal possession as well. In response
to the validly issued subpoena duces tecum, Judge Marchman produced her personal file to
counsel, in addition to the two letters she attempted to place into the record to prove she was
refused a copy of court maintained records by the administrator of the Fourth Judicial District
Court.
After receiving the return from Judge Marchman, Palowsky had a much more detailed
understanding of the facts regarding the illegal acts of Campbell and others and the attempt to
cover up same and it largely confirmed the allegations made in the petition and supplemental
petition. In a memorandum filed by Palowsky on October 28, 2015, very specific statements
were given regarding the acts of Campbell and others and specifically the expected testimony
that would substantiate the acts, including the testimony of Judge Marchman. On November 2,
2015, Crawford responded to the memorandum on behalf of Campbell and, for the first time,
alleged that Judge Marchman had illegally provided information to Palowsky or his counsel. On
February 26, 2016 after confirming with the trial judge that no testimony would be allowed at an
upcoming hearing, Crawford filed a supplemental memorandum in support of sanctions and
listed twenty-two (22) paragraphs contained in plaintiffs first supplemental and amending
petition that he alleged could have only come from Judge Marchman. The factual information
contained in the twenty-two (22) paragraphs in question actually came from Campbell, public
newspaper articles or on the record statements made by counsel; all of which is easy to verify.

Doc. 32-14, p. 51.

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None of the information came from Judge Marchman. Now, Crawford states that his false
assertion was based on comments made by Palowskys counsel in a November 5, 2015 hearing.
The transcript of the hearing is attached to Crawfords 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss as
Exhibit 11.9 Relevant portions read as follows:
BY MR. GUICE:
. . . In one final point weve also filed a supplemental motion to
strike; Mr. Crawford has filed as well. Despite the fact that we put
the plaintiff on notice that all this is scandalous, all this doesnt
have anything to do -- we got the opposition to their motion which
expounded upon the scandalous, impertinent, and immaterial
allegations that just further warrant the relief that were requesting
here, Your Honor, and that being to strike not only this petition
and those spurious type allegations, but also in their opposition
ten or twelve pages of nothing other than the same type
material. And with that, Your Honor, if you have no questions
Im done. (Emphasis added).
...
BY MR. WARD:
Your Honor, I do believe the court has read everything
from our discussions. In fact, I know youve read everything, and
I know Your Honor is ready to rule on the matter, and Ill be very
brief. We basically rely on the brief that weve submitted.
Brief rebuttal Your Honor, all the allegations weve made are
allegations of fact. Theyre all connected by one thread that runs
through this case. Its a court employee who was not properly
supervised; a court employee who was out of control who did lots
of things. Under Code of Evidence Article 404 its all relevant. I
understand counsel saying its not relevant. Thats a matter the
court and I and counsel will have at the trial of this matter, the
relevance or not relevance of it. I know -- I understand their
argument. As far as scandalous, Ive told facts. These facts to my
knowledge are absolutely true. In this one case Ive gone far
beyond which I would normally do to interview to make sure what
Im putting in the pleading is accurate. Ive actually had a
judge inside the court confirm things to me or I wouldnt have
put them down to start with. Your Honor, I think everything is
relevant. Everything needs to come out. It proves motive,
9

Doc. 32-13.
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opportunity, and intent. Under these circumstances, Your Honor, I

request the motion to strike be denied in all respects. Thank you,
Judge.10 (Emphasis added).
Crawford uses the above quoted argument to allege that counsel admitted that the
allegations contained in his original petition and first supplemental and amending petition came
from Judge Marchman. It simply is not true. Undersigned counsel did not make such an
admission. In the above quoted argument, counsel for Palowsky is responding to Guices
argument that the October 28, 2015 memorandum should be stricken. Obviously, the comment
. . . We basically rely on the brief that weve submitted. . . Ive actually had a judge inside the
court confirm things to me . . . concerns the very specific allegations contained in the
memorandum of October 28, 2015, which was written after Judge Marchman made her return on
the subpoena in August. Guice had just expanded his argument to have plaintiffs opposition
brief stricken and the response was made in the context of that brief. The allegation that Judge
Marchman illegally provided documentation or information to plaintiffs counsel regarding
Campbell prior to making a return on a validly issued subpoena duces tecum is false.
Crawfords next argument in support of Rule 11 sanctions is that Judge Marchman failed
to mention in her Complaint:
[t]hat the Inspector General and Louisiana State Police conducted
an investigation of the payroll fraud and document destruction
allegations against Campbell that concluded before Plaintiff
Marchman filed suit. By letter of April 15, 2016, the Fourth
Judicial District judiciary and District Attorney were advised
by Stephen Street, Jr., State Inspector General, that the
allegations were unfounded and that the file would be closed
without recommending criminal action against Campbell.11
(Emphasis added).

10
11

Doc. 32-13, Exhibit 11, pp. 7-8.

Doc. 60-1, pp. 10-11. Incidentally, the letter does not say the allegations were unfounded.
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First, it comes as a surprise to Judge Marchman that the Inspector Generals letter was
forwarded to the Fourth Judicial District judiciary. The document contains no such indication.
Presuming counsels statement is true, the document was never presented to Judge Marchman by
any member of the court. She first saw the document after it was leaked to the newspaper and
published on May 12, 2016.12
With reference to the letter itself, it should be noted that the contents of the letter are
directly at odds with the finding of the report of the Louisiana State Police, with its attachments.
The August 18, 2014 letter from Cody Rials to Laura Hartt, for example, establishes the
complaint that Campbell destroyed court records.13 The letter from the Chief Judge of the Fourth
JDC to Campbell dated September 17, 2014 establishes the fact that Campbell hid fifty-two (52)
post-conviction relief petitions -- some for years.14 Contrast these documents attached to the
State Police report with the IGs letter wherein it is reported Ms. Campbell was interviewed and
denied destroying or hiding any court records or pleadings.15
The IGs letter is also at odds with internal documentation to which Judge Marchman was
privy, including Exhibit A to her amended complaint.16

This memorandum from Julie

Cunningham directly contradicts any assertion that there is insufficient evidence to prove
Campbell was being paid while away from the courthouse.17

Judge Marchman is conducting an investigation to determine why the Inspector Generals letter was not provided
to her if it was, in fact, delivered to the Fourth Judicial District judiciary on or about April 15, 2016.
13
Doc. 71, Exhibit C, filed under seal, Attachment 2, p. 4.
14
Doc. 71, Exhibit C, filed under seal, Attachment 4, p. 25.
15
Doc. 32-15.
16
Doc. 22-1.
17
Moreover, even if Judge Marchman had the Inspector Generals letter in her possession regarding the pursuit of
criminal charges against Campbell, the finding would not be relevant in this civil suit. The burden of proof in a
criminal prosecution and a civil suit is quite different. A criminal prosecutor has to prove facts beyond a reasonable
doubt and a civil litigant need only prove facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
12

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Moreover, according to the Louisiana State Police, criminal charges are still under
investigation as of June 13, 2016.18
Although Judge Marchman did not receive the State Police report until recently, a review
of the report with attachments confirms the allegations she has made. This may explain why
Crawford did not provide the report to the Court along with the IGs letter.
Crawford complains that Judge Marchmans allegations are false and then cites Skidmore
Energy, wherein the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, who found that there was a
puzzling lack of legal or factual support articulated for the pleadings, and that plaintiffs failed
to articulate any evidentiary support for their claims.19 Crawford fails to explain how Skidmore
Energy is relevant when his real complaint is that he disagrees with the articulated facts.
Essentially, Crawfords motion is an extension of his 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss where
he refuses to accept the well-pled allegations as true for purposes of the motion. He improperly
attached hundreds of pages of exhibits in order to argue a different set of allegations. As stated
in the Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 11, a motion for sanctions should not be used to
raise the issue of legal sufficiency . . . . An issue of fact should not be decided by a motion for
sanctions or by a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Moreover, when discovery is completed, the fact
that Judge Marchman did not illegally provide any information or documentation that was
included in the petition or amending petition in Palowsky v. Campbell will be an uncontested
fact. Crawfords public assertion to the contrary was false, made intentionally and in concert
with the other defendants to intimidate Judge Marchman.

18
19

Doc. 55, Exhibit B.

Id. at 568.
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Judge Marchman has painstakingly set forth the facts of this case and the law that
supports the causes of action against Crawford in her oppositions to the defendants motions to
dismiss. There is no violation of Rule 11 and no justification for filing this motion.
B.

Violation of 1927:

Crawford alleges that Judge Marchmans counsel has violated 1927 by unreasonably
and vexatiously multiplying these proceedings. Crawfords argument is predicated on his belief
that the IGs letter cleared Campbell of payroll fraud and document destruction and that Judge
Marchman had the IGs letter in her possession four days before suit was filed. First, Judge
Marchman did not see the IGs letter until May 12, 2015. Second, the IGs letter in no way
clears Campbell of anything. And third, the State Police report and its attachments contain more
than sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Campbell of the crime of payroll fraud and
document destruction. But again, this is Crawfords argument on his view of the facts of the
case.
Moreover, plaintiff has filed a complaint and amended complaint. Defendants have
responded with motions to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has in turn responded to these
motions. Plaintiff has undertaken no attempt whatsoever to multiply the proceedings. Plaintiff
has stated causes of action against the defendants and has presented the law supporting her
position in the opposition memorandums filed. Under existing law, the Court must find that the
actions of counsel in multiplying the proceedings were both unreasonable and vexatious, the
latter of which requires a showing of improper purpose. Here, there is no showing whatsoever
that counsel has multiplied the proceedings unreasonably or has done so for an improper
purpose.

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V.

Conclusion:
For the foregoing reasons, Crawfords Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 and 1927

should be denied.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Joseph R. Ward, Jr.
JOSEPH R. WARD, JR. (T.A.)(Bar #08166)
WARD & CONDREY, LLC
409 E. Boston Street, Suite 200
Covington, Louisiana 70433
Telephone: (985) 871-5223
Facsimile: (985) 871-5234
E-Mail: jward@wardandcondrey.com
-andSEDRIC E. BANKS #02730
Attorney at Law
1038 North Ninth Street
Monroe, La. 71201
Telephone: (318) 388-1655
Facsimile: (318) 388-0227
E-Mail: sedbanks@aol.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Judge Sharon Ingram
Marchman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 12, 2016, I presented the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Sanctions to the Clerk of Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF
system.
/s/ Joseph R. Ward, Jr.
Joseph R. Ward, Jr.

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