A.C. No.

10568
January 13, 2015
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy (Atty. Amboy) for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27, 2007 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with
the Retainer Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latters engagement, Soliman
paid her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were
amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said property from the coowners to the individual
owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to her was then treated as payment for her professional services.2
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that
there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then
told Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of P80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty.
Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00.3
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboys bank account as payment for the real property tax for the year 2009.
Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboys bank account as payment for the latters contact in the RD.4
On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property werethen only awaiting the signature of the authorized
officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property. 5 On January 6,
2010, Atty. Amboys secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said
certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty. Amboys secretary. 6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty.
Amboy for any update on the release of the said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty. Amboys
secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00as payment for
the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason why the
same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain documents.7
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the
property or give back the P50,000.00 that was already paid to her.8
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied having received any amount from the latter pursuant to
the said agreement. She claimed that the retainer agreement was not implemented since the partition case was not instituted. She claimed that she
merely undertook to research, gather and collate all documents required in the partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the
individual owners. She denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD which caused the delay in the processing of the said titles. She
likewise denied having asked Soliman for P50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said titles. 9
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation, 10 which recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of law for six (6) months. The
Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with
Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings for the issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 11 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, albeit with the modification that the period of Atty. Amboys suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to two
(2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration12 of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution13 dated March 21, 2014.
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP
Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his clientand that he should be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.14 A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence;to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. 15
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to submit
material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused
the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid to her
"contact" inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of P50,000.00,
Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title. Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty.
Amboy asked for an additional P10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a client. 1wphi1 Atty. Amboys acts undermined the legal
processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respectthe law and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of P50,000.00 which she paid inorder to facilitate the release of the
certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not
returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action.16 "A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment." 17
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. The respondent is further
DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her compliance within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy's personal record as an
attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10576

January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General
Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 1 2 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member
of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice
President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the
SEC a GIS for LCI for "updating purposes". The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty.
Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she
knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as
Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that
the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution
shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the
last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to
meet with her so hemay sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her
on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the
strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys Certificates dated May 16, 2006 6 , May 22, 20067 , and
June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are corespondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al. 9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that
the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
contradictory findings."11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was
dismissed as to Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment.1wphi1 She stated that merely presenting the GIS
does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended
from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently
making him ineligible tobe a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCIs
bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue. 15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was
aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified
that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins signature Atty. Limpin presented were
of no moment since inthese Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in totothe CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration 17 but was denied in
the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, ratherthan seek exceptions as loopholes. 19 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. 1wphi1 As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The
presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath."21
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the
corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. 23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a
stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment
is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in
fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her
oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.1wphi1

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD
and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has
transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six
months suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of
this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457

February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C.
No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No.
7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and
Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the
annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and
his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The
case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias children learned abouthis return, Sesbreo filed a Second
Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for
Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment
and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged
that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on
parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to
engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified
complaint against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by
law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice,
bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcias daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is
involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreo guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreo was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research
Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, 1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreo for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances
leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano
nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of
June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme
Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent
acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous
antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondents inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men
who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon 3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the
IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreo be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreo alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied
Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that
there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreo
alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he
already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreos motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the
Courts Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to
society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice Research Institute v.
NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. 1wphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the
cases are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum,
with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just
passed by Sesbreos house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them.
According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreo when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and
when they turned around, they saw Sesbreo aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness,
Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while
Sesbreo was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot,
then saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated
that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreo
that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreo cited In re Atty. Parcasio 10 to
bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon" 11 which restored his "full civil and political
rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation 13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The
accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in
stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and
Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an
indemnity of P50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an
indemnity of P50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. 16 Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason
he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge 18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of
the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment. 21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10579

December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution 1 of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated Bar of the Philippines (!BP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent)from
the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),received a complaint 2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful"3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and
complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order 5 setting the case for

mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of
which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner 7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be
informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 oclock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondents Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077
and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10
Complainants Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she
entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of
the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter 12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then
visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note 13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She
referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009,
respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount,
respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the
defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who notarized the document being
questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would takea collaborating counsel to handle
complainants case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in
the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the
complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case;and 4] the veryanomalies she complained of were not
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment of
urgency or emergency."16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange
for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered
by a receipt,17 stating that "it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster." On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December
14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of
the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went
to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional
facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that
the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be
included were mentioned therein.Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same
occasion, the driver also asked forP2,500.00 on respondents directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told thatoral arguments on the case had been set the following month. 19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, 20 after her friend
gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote
to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.
Respondents Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the
IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainants case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have
received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant,
at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was
declared as "no loan" and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent
claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the
case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainants husband approved of the
amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied
having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who
was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the
judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation
since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause
of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondentdemanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondents defenses by making reference to the receipts inher possession, all evidencing that
respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long
before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant
insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as "no loan."
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation
of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, 24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan ofP122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting
to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for reconsideration. 25 Complainant filed her opposition
thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution,the IBP-BOG denied respondents motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the
practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting toP127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Courts Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the
CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well established that
a lawyers conduct is "not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such
as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only
to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming
that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint withthe trial court, still, respondent should not
have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound
to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the "fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client." 28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act isa gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them.
Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client. 30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. 31 Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and
unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as "representation
expenses" allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing
that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the case
had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The
act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his
clientstrust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public inthe legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency.
As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act
that would damage the image of judges, lest the publics perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of
respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was
indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondents actuations would seriously erode the publics trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.1wphi1 At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent
in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only
guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal thathe likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR,
which states that "[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client." In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The
first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency" but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were
evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent
in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust
and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell
within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Respondents assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as "no
loan,"does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the
same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties tosociety, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. 32 Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined
to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit

unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondents "lawyering" for the opposing party, Tierra Realty. Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This
is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings
and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests." 33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling
the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainants case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint inCivil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court
cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear
admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or
the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainants case, knowing
fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating
counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited "not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers." 34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. 35 For the practice of law is "a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character." 36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of
the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the
public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the
Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less thanthe penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, 39 the
Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative
cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a memberof the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination
of respondents administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the
quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of
evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." 40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. 41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil
cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was co ITect in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from
complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyerclient relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent
received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge.
These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent's deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the
benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As
to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases
filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, "the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession." 43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of
justice by "purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney."44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00
and P2,500.00. Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con fidanl, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to ail courts.
SO ORDERED.
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on
the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar"
that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This
law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be
included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the
advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission
and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept
given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified
Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession,
pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the
Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and
prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and selfinterest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that
the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the
profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice,
and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power
to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated
to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys
be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary
right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a
question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end
of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation
and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not
be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result
from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be
opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely
affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to
understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were
to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation,
it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will
receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they
have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because

it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline
among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in
the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will
be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar
association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and
285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of
the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived
of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and
of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the
legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the
Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that
the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the

purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and
the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973,
were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and
all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision
of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all
cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society
at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court,
in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in
the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes
of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

13

and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to
state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the
proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of
the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.