GROUP 4 CASE DIGESTS

I AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC OFFICER

CARMEN FESTEJO vs ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas
G.R. No. L-5156
March 11, 1954

FACTS: Carmen Festejo, owner of 9 acres of surfacesugar landssued Isaiah Fernando Director, Bureau of Public Works.
It was alleged that on February 1951, the defendant, without authority obtained first from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without
obtaining first a right of way, without consent and knowledge of plaintiff and against her express objection, took
possession of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three
parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. The petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its
former condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19, 343.20 for the unlawful taking possession of
the defendant.

ISSUE: WON the defendant committed an act outside the scope of his authority.

HELD: YES. The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiffs land,
defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiffs
land southeasterly of the right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for
the right of way.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act. 49 Am. Jur. 289.
. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. 43 Am. Jur. 86.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without
authority.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff
varied causing her damages.
In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

2. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P.
VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. 67 SCRA 287 (1975)

FACTS: American Tobacco Company (ACT) was a party to a trademark case pending before the Philippine Patent Office.
ATC challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear inter partes proceedings.
ATC argued that the same set of Rules provides that all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him hence it is improper for the director to designate a
lower ranking official as hearing officers to hear the case; that it is clear that under the Rules, the Director must
personally hear the case otherwise, there will be a violation of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents is a violation of due
process.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of
subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same
officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no
question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.
In short, there is no abnegation of
responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is,
however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.
CAN DIRECTOR OF PATENTS DELEGATE A FUNCTION? It has been held that power conferred upon and administrative
agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.
SUB-DELEGATION OF POWER: A far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power
has been justified by sound principles of organization which demand that those at the top be able to concentrate
their attention upon the larger and more-important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as
possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail. Thus, it is well-settled that
while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to
him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. There is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give
the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes
the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

II INHIBITIONS/SALARY & PERQUISITES

Santos vs Ca
Facts:
In 1983, petitioner Antonio Santos, was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. After the military-backed
EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position. After 9 years he optionally retired from the Judiciaryand
received his retirement gratuityfor his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension.
In 1993, Santos re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation
Center of the MMA.
In 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). Subsequently thereafter, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order
No. 372 approving the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924, which, authorized the payment of
separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated
from the service his services would automatically cease and that he would be entitled to separation benefits
equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service.
In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petitioner asserted that since
the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his

government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation
benefits.

Held:
The last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of one and onefourth (1) months of salary for every year of service cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to
refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the
government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced
thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an
abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that
Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices.
However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of
the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus
affected.
To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC
Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services.
More important, it would be in violation of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect
compensation. Said provision reads:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law .

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of
government service outside of the MMA.

Laurel vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195

Facts:
In 1980, petitioner Jose P. Laurel V, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangasappointed his
brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor. In the same year, the position of
Provincial Administrator of Batangas became vacant. Allegedly for lack of qualified applicants and so as not to
prejudice the operation of the Provincial Government, petitioner designated his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Acting
Provincial Administrator effective 2 January 1981 and to continue until the appointment of a regular Provincial
Administrator.
In 1981, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a position which the
Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
Subsequently, private respondent Sangalang wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission to bring to its
attention the "appointment" of Benjamin Laurel. He alleged thatthe position in question is a career position and that
the appointment violates civil service rules.

Issue: WON the rule on nepotism apply to designation?

Held: Yes. Petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the
prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and
the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein.
P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading this section with
Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or
temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term
appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a designation is not to be deemed included
in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and
toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the
prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as correctly stated by public respondent, "what
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
CSC vs. Dacoycoy, GR No. 135805
Facts:
In 1995, George P. Suanfiled with the Civil Service Commissiona complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for
habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal
investigation, and, on January 28, 1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial
evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito
and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision
and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism?

Held:
Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments
or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT,
who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it
was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and
even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form
that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious.
Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He
authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under respondents immediate
supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.

To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Salvaa, G.R. No. 192074

Facts:
In 2006, Melquiades Robles, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, issued Office Order which
revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaas designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It
"directed her instead to handle special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to
her" by the Administrator.
Instead of complying, Salvaa questioned the order with the Office of the President. Subsequently, she applied
for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006.5 In support of her application, she
submitted a medical certificate issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen or
treated Salvaa on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate.
Issue:
Whether Salvaa was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only?
Held:
No. The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to
compensation only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled out and filed
accordingly. Respondents application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any
deductions from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries coming from
government funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly
filed, which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during this
period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would have received
compensation she was not entitled to receive.
This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information
falsified had no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a matter that
has no relation to the functions of her office.
Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Under
Section 4 of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:
a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify
under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances.
We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa is guilty of less serious dishonesty

III LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Tabuena v Sandiganbayan
Tabuena and Peralta were officers of the Manila International Airport Authority( MIAA) and were the ones only
authorized to withdraw savings or money from the accounts of the MIAA. They are now being accused of
misappropriating such fund. Tabuenaasserted that he only followed the orders of then former President Ferdinand
Marcos of withdrawing the cash and deliver it to his office so that the Philippine National Construction Corporation may
be paid. But PNCC declined of receiving such cash.
Issue:
Whether Tabuena may be held liable for following orders from his superior officer

Held:
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in embezzlement is not
based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no
embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.[13] The accused
may thus always introduce evidence to show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert.[14] And
this, to our mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum, we are swayed
to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum.
From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence of the crime of
malversation.
First.Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required
him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue
otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuenas superior the former being then the
President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC.[15] In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions,
such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith
should be read on Tabuenas compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by
a superior for some lawful purpose.[16] The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear.
And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial
payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

Correa v COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN

Facts:
Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento,former municipal mayor and former municipal treasurer of Norzagaray are
hereby convicted of being personally liable to pay herein private respondents for terminating them without just cause.
Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is
sued in his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon
the corporation, whether or not the same is included as party to the action. Petitioner thus came to this Court,
maintaining that he could no longer be required to pay the back salaries of the private respondents because payment
on his part presupposes his continuance in office, which is not the case. He contends that it is the Municipality of
Norzagaray that is liable for said payment, invoking Aguador v. Enerio. 3 and Sison v. Pajo 4 Further, petitioner alleges
that the fact that he is no longer municipal mayor of Norzagaray, constitutes a substantial change in the situation of
the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of execution inequitable.
Issue:
Whether Petioners are liable in their personal capacity
Held:
Yes. In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, the Court ruled that appellant Municipal Mayor BernabeSabillano was "correctly
adjudged liable" for the payment of the back salaries of appellee Police Corporal Joaquin P. Nemenzo because his act of
dismissing appellee "without previous administrative investigation and without justifiable cause ... is clearly an injury
to appellee's rights. Appellant cannot hide under the mantle of his official capacity and pass the liability to the
municipality of which he was mayor. There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective
officials, upon assumption of office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their
own proteges, regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be
taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts."
In the discharge of govermental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if
and when and only to the extent that , they have acted by authority of the law, and in comformity with the
requirements thereof."

A Public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not
protected by his office and is personally liable therefor lie any private individual. This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the
reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office,
the officials were acting outside their official authority

Ocampo v Office of the Ombudsman

Facts:
Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. On
March 21, 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT
requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development. NIACONSULT conducted the training
program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to March 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche
Gesselschaft ) TechnischeZusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid
to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. On April 1, 1991,
NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the
total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received] Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to
remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case
before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. Ombudsman filed a case
against petitioner, but petitioner faild to comply. After a year the Ombudsman sent again a letter, but then petitioner
failed to comply. There were two cases filed against petitioner. One a criminal case for estafa and the other an
Administrative case. The criminal case was dismissed, and thus petitioner asserts that the administrative must follow.
Issue
Whther the dismissal of the criminal case warrants that the administrative case must be dismissed too
Held:
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean
bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule
in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[18] Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.[19]

OCA v Enriquez
Facts:
That on or about May 12, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, a public officer, being then a Deputy Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 31, taking advantage of his official position and, committing the offense in relation to his official
duties, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified,
Sheriff's (sic) Certificate of Sale dated May 12, 1986, which is a public document, wherein he is legally bound to
disclose the truth, by stating therein that the payment for the properties which he levied and sold at public auction
was made on May 12, 1986, and that the amount of P1,325,000.00, representing the bid price for the aforesaid levied
properties, was paid to him on May 12, 1986, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the payment
thereof was actually made on May 23, 1986 to Genstar Container Corporation through its attorney-in-fact, to the
damage and prejudice of public interest.nstead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded
to the Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989 informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still

pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent) should not be held administratively
liable

Chavez v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan issued in
Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the
civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for
reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and crossclaim with damages.
Issue:
Whether Chavez could be impleaded as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile
Held:
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a shImmunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of
the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private
respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against
him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can
be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a
license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code
on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of
respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed
as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil
action for damages against the Solicitor General.

Dumduma v CSC
Facts:
Dumduma entered public service in 1979 as a patrolman in the then Integrated National Police. He steadfastly rose
through the ranks until he was promoted in 1991 as Senior Police Officer 4 (SPO4) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP). He was then designated as officer-in-charge of San Miguel Police Station in San Miguel, Leyte. On December 15,
1998, he took the Career Service Professional Examination in Quezon City. On March 7, 1999, Dumduma filled out a
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) pursuant to his promotional appointment as Police Inspector. On Item No. 18 of the PDS,
Dumduma stated that he passed the Career Service Professional Examination Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City
on December 15, 1998 with a rating of 81%. His appointment was then forwarded to the PNP-CSC Field Office on April
16, 1999 for verification and approval. It was then discovered that Dumduma did not have the proper civil service
eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His name was not included in the CSC-National Capital Region

(CSC-NCR) Regional Register of Eligibles for the Career Service Professional Examination conducted on December 15,
1998; instead, his name appeared in the Regional List of Passing/Failing Examinees with a rating of 25.82%.
Accordingly, the director of the CSC-NCR, Adoracion F. Arenas disapproved Dumdumas appointment on the ground of
spurious eligibility.On June 6, 2002, the CSC-NCR formally charged Dumduma with Dishonesty.Dumduma Asserts that
he was in good faith and that an unnamed personnel was the one who has given hime the forged grade or document
and thus he should not be held liable.
Issue:
Whether Dumduma was in good faith
Held:
Dumduma asserts that, despite the questionable circumstances, he is in good faith and that the blame is with the CSC
personnel who gave him a Certificate of Eligibility. Their actions should not be attributable to him, unless there is
evidence that he colluded with them. Dumdumas contention is in stark contrast to his admissions and does not merit
belief. The concept of good faith in administrative cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information,
notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render [a] transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a
question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a persons intention not from his own
protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.[40]
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances surrounding Dumdumas acquisition of the Certificate of Eligibility cast
serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official and accepted the Certificate of Eligibility
from her representative. These circumstances reveal Dumdumas knowledge that Dilodilo could have pulled strings in
order to obtain his Certificate of Eligibility and have it delivered to his residence. How else would a retired employee
obtain the said certificate? Dumduma cannot feign innocence given his unquestioning cooperation with Dilodilo.
Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held administratively liable for falsifying Dumdumas Certificate of
Eligibility is beside the point. The fact that someone else falsified the certificate will not excuse Dumduma for
knowingly using the same for his career advancement.

Araullo v Aquino III

Facts:
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law
that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP
contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and
unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under
Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within
the Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations
of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Issue:
Whether the officers acted in good faith to be held liable by implementing the DAP
Held:
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular performance of official duty", yet these
presumptions are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Many civil actions are
oriented towards overcoming any number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly be geared
towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability
of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a

given case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save perhaps for the
provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers, further enjoy the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because they are clothed with some
part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law.55 However,
the presumption may be disputed.56
At any rate, the Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend to the proponents and implementors of the DAP
the benefit of the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with the adoption of the
invalid acts and practices.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr.,

Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum
directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998.On
July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together
with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao,
Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President,
Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General
Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the
Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As government employees,
Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification
of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.The criminal and administrative
charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among
others.Andutan argues that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer in the public
service at the time the case was commenced. According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge Abieraand similar cases cited
by the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations against the respondents in those cases were
commenced prior to their resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he
had already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation from office
cannot be characterized as preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal charges
because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
Issue:
WhtherAndutan may be held accountable
Held:
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since he
knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him[44] is unfounded.
First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan
resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one
(1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping
assertions in light of these facts. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year
before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the
Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim
that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.

Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of Section VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of
conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x xx a public servants resignation
is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication.[45] If we agree with this interpretation,

any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still be subject to the disciplinary
authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation
of the law which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in the government, and
not the punishment of the public official concerned.[46] Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
Saez v Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the
petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary
appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and
monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). He claims that there were soldiers watching him and
asserts that the president Arryo must be held accountable and liable for she was the commander in chief.
Issue:
Whether former president Arroyo may be held liable
Held:
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held
liable for affront against the petitioners rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show
that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to
exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. The
Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents
incumbency.32 Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even
for acts committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34 The petitioner, however, is not
exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter
liable for either acts or omissions violativeof rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner
merely included the Presidents name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latters actual
involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations.

People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
That between November 15, 1996 to May 7, 1998 or some time prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Victorino A. Basco,
Romeo S. David and Rogelio L. Luis, all high ranking public officers, being then Chairman and President/Presidents and
Chief Executive Officers of the Bases Conversion Development Authority [BCDA], Clark Development Corporation/Clark
International Airport, [CDC /CIAC] and Philippine National Construction Corporation [PNCC], respectively, while in the
performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the offenses in relation to
their office, confederating and conspiring with one another, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into contracts/transactions for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark
Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road, without the benefit of public bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167%
than the typical roadway construction cost, thus, depriving the government of the opportunity of obtaining the most
advantageous construction cost, causing undue injury to the same and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to their preferred private contractors. The sandiganbayan during trial adopted the finding of the CA to
which the petioner contested being that the cases have different natures. One is criminal while the other
administrative.
Issue:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN CAN ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERING THAT
THE CASE BEFORE THE FORMER COURT IS CRIMINAL IN NATURE, WHILE IN THE LATTER IT IS ADMINISTRATIVE

Held:
Indeed, the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts subject of the administrative complaint. Neither does the disposition in one case inevitably govern the resolution
of the other case/s and vice versa. Administrative liability is one thing; criminal liability for the same act is another.[22]
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and
second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that
the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.Although the dismissal of the criminal case
cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required
to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold
true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the
criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional
evidence to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases.[24] However, if the criminal case will be
prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter
already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal
indictment,[25] then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.

IV TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

LECAROZ V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, his co-petitioner
Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, and
concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the
1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won as KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa
Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise as he was no longer qualified for
the position after having already passed the age limit fixed by law. Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Armed with the
telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the
meeting of the Sanggunian. Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council
until his appointment had been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque. Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on
different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of 26 sets of payrolls for the 26 quincenas covering the period 16
January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized
someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his
behalf. On 25 October 1989, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a confirmation of his
appointment as KB Sectoral Representative. Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints
against herein petitioners arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral
representative. The Sandiganbayan ruled against petitioners. It was also found that they conspired in committing the
crime of estafa.
ISSUE: WON Lenlie Lecaroz validly held the said position.
HELD: Yes. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide Unless sooner removed for
cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall
commence on the first Monday of March 1980. In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the
association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall
be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation . ; All incumbent officers of
the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the
newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution. The concept of
holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office
not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the
office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume
it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the

term fixed by law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to
occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is
proscribed from holding over.

ESTRADA V ARROYO

ISSUE: WON petitioner is deemed resigned.

HELD: Yes. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation
is clear, it must be given legal effect. Using the totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
COLLANTES V CA

FACTS: Petitioner Collantes was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility 1996. Then President Ramos accorded
him the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on February 1997. More than a year later, he was appointed
as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the DILG. With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received
word from persons close to then President Estrada to give up his position so that the President could unreservedly
appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG. President Estrada appointed Collantes to
the controversial post as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND. Collantes was supposedly ordered by then
Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee, General Soriano. In
deference to the Presidents prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new
assignment. Collantes was not given any other post in the government. Collantes requested the assistance of the
Career Executive Service Board relative to the termination of his services. Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus before the Court. He maintained that he was constructively dismissed from work, without any
cause and due process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was never vacated at all.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was constructively dismissed from work.
HELD: No. There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the
President, by himself or through another, requested for someones resignation does not give the President the
obligation to appoint such person to another position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other
resignation. There can be no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of
courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no
derogation of the discretion of the appointing power, and because its object is outside the commerce of man.

GENERAL MANAGER OF PHIL PORTS AUTHORITY V MONSARTE

FACTS: Respondent, started her government service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA,
Iloilo City. On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed respondent to the
position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On April 18, 1988, petitioner Anino, who ranked second to
respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against
respondents appointment. The PPA Appeals Board sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondents
appointment. Respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification. Pending resolution of
her appeal/request, she was officially reassigned to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner
Anino's former position and was lower than her previous position. Respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally
protesting against petitioner Aninos appointment and at the same time questioning the propriety of the August 11,
1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which the CSC dismissed.
ISSUE: WON such demotion is valid.

HELD: No. Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of
qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment
is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be
revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was
ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondents security of
tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of
abusive exercise of the appointing power. Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to her
legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it merely restored her appointment to the said
position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her position as Manager II never
became vacant since her demotion was void.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES V CA

FACTS: Private Respondent Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes in March
1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC). Pursuant to the LGC of 1983, he
was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres. Then
Secretary Santos of the DILG declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay
Councils of the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a
reorganization of the provincial council became necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private
respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes. In view of his
designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Nenito F. Aquino, then vice
president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
The Court held in a subsequent case that the appointment of private respondent as sectoral representative to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be
president of the federation of barangay councils. On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, advising them of his re-assumption of his "original position, duties and
responsibilities as sectoral representative" . Private respondent sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his
right to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Director Montesa opined that Antonio did not
relinquish or abandon his office; and that since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could re-assume his position
in the Sanggunian. The Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of private respondent to re-assume office.
ISSUE: WON private respondents act constitutes resignation.
HELD: No. The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondent's resignation was accepted by the proper
authority. While we agree with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any acceptance thereof by
the proper authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished his
membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post. Abandonment of an office has
been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his
possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general
is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Clear intention to abandon
should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express or inferred from his own conduct.
Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to abandon his position: (1) his failure to
perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration
for the position, (3) his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan,
(4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in theSangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had
nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXEC SEC

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members,
undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the
government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional
against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies
to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the

Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law which is
construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President
who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: WON such appointment and designation are valid.
HELD: No. The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of
public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that
is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void. The ex-officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right
to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already
paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.