People vs Dramayo

Facts: The incident started on the morning of January 9, 1964, Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecublin were accused for this gory incident. The incident happened at the
Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte. They murdered Estelito Nogaliza, all of
Barangay Magsaysay, saw its Chief of Police. The purpose was to shed light on a
robbery committed on the house of Nogaliza five days before being witnesses but they
were negatively accused as being the primary suspects as they confessed on the
incident. On the same day, at 7:00 in the morning they were in the house of Prilio
Billona, Dramayo invited all those present to have a drinking session at the back of the
school house and it was there and then where Dramayo brought up the idea of
murdering Nogaliza so that he will not testify on the robbery case. The idea was
Dramayo and Ecublin will ambushed Nogaliza while the other present will be standing
by. Soon Dramayo saw Nogaliza stopped him for a cigarette the Ecublin hit Nogaliza
with a piece of wood in side of the head near the right ear. And Dramayo repeatedly
stabbed with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecublin and
mentioned that the group stay quiet. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the
next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the, latter's widow
Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Noogaliza. The barrio lieutenant and the
chief of police were duly notified and noticed the blood stains on Dramayos trousers,
asked him to explain, Dramayo answered that the stain was from the skin ailment of his
daughter. And on this evidence, the lower court made their decision, its dispositive
portion found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation
aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin.

Issue: Whether the accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecublin should be
acquitted inasmuch of the other accused been acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

Held: NO. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence.
So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both
appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the
two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had
been more than amply demonstrated. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. The presumption of innocence could
not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was
offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the
facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would
have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons
above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus
clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first
time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the
defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present,

did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a
moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.

Dumlao vs COMELEC
Facts: Patricio Dumalo was a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, he filed a Certificate
of Candidacy of Governor in the upcoming election on January 30, 1980. But Dumalao
was already retired and was also receiving retried benefits. Dumalao questioned the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws,
which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law,
and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the
term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run
for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis
supplied)
Dumlao was directly insidiously against him, he stated that the validity of Sec. 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or
to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of
those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo
Salapantan Jr. (both taxpayers) assails the provision however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions
of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign,
and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against
them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

Issue: Are the provision stated are against the Constitution and should be declared
null and void.

Held: The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. Regarding the Unconstitutionality provisions SEC 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal

principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged

statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally
defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against
him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. And although the
filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Marquez vs COMELEC
Facts: Bienvenido Marquez was a defeated candidate at his province of Quezon
Province. In May 11, 1992 Marquez filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal
of the resolution of the Commission on Elections which dismissed his petition for quo
warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez,
for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time that the private
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts
of insurance fraud or personal theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court in Los Angeles, California. They issued a warrant of arrest for his arrest
it is claimed, has yet to be served on COMELECs account of his alleged flight from
USA. Marquez subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8,
1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against COMELEC. Marquez filed a
petition for Cancellation (SPA 92-065) before the May 11, 1992 election to the
COMELEC on the grounds of the candidates disqualification under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code but Eduardo T. Rodriquez (private respondent) was proclaimed
Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.

Issue: Does the Private Respondent whether or not who facing

criminal charges abroad before a foreign court and evading a warrant
of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.
Held: NO. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to it by
the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as
appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. I

agree. The constitutionality of the disqualification based on the presumption of

innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There are certain fundamental considerations
which do not support the applications of the presumption
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to
determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum
requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a qualified voter
Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution
expressly provides:
Sec. 1. Public office is public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
A public office is not property
Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of
presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is
presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is
disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought
within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The
disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine
that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged
disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the
disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt.
Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to cast doubt
on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4
of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact
establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal
complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.

Corpus vs People
Facts: Generoso P. Corpus was a Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya and he was designated to the office as a

Supervising Cashier. He was in charge of receiving the collections, disbursed funds and
made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. Then on April
13, 1981 his contract was terminated and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between Corpus and his successor. A Certificate of
Transfer revealed a shortage with the amount of PHP 72,823.08. A letter of Demand
was sent on the same day and required Corpus to produce the said shortage amount
but he only paid PHP 10,159.50 and a letter was sent again on October 12, 1981, it
stated that it lowered the amount by PHP 12,067.51 through the payment by Corpus of
temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal
from the service Then on September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand was sent for the
total deficiency of P50, 596.07 to the Corpus. The demand not having been met, an
information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the
respondent court on October 11, 1983

Issue: Whether or not the amount of PHP 50,000 is liquidated or not, is

Corpus guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds
Held: YES. There were four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the
corresponding vouchers dated are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December
22,1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 dated
December 23,1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December
22,1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December
29,1980.
And liquidated all four checks after the amounts thereof were disbursed, turning
over to Corpus the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and
payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ). And when this is happening
Corpus is not absent and was visiting his wife for a checkup. Corpus claim that
he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has
not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others
for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking
for a scapegoat. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the

constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the

accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous
claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused
must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must
be affirmed.

Feeder International Line vs CA

Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated
by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, the foreign vessel left Singapore
on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil
consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On May 14,
1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the
Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the
Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said
information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19,
1986 to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on
board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port
authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the
vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same
was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to
Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his
Order dated December 12, 1986. On March 17, 1987 and finds M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464),
as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found
guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. After the decision, Feeder
International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs, the Commissioner rendered a
decision on May 13, 1987 affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Customs in Ilo
Ilo in toto. Feeder International also filed a petition for review of the decisions of the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the
Commissioner from implementing his decision. Feeder International, on 19 January
1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the Supreme
Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the
disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's decision in
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final
judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its

questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder
International's motion for reconsideration having been denied on 4 July 1990, it
interposed the present petition.

Issue: Does a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature and if

corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent.
Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature,
contrary to the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive analysis of the
nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that
"seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in
nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the
penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533
of the code, seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the
main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of
goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and
separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or
possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that
proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since
they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a
penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of
the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a
criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently
established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been
committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of
said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Feeder International is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to
unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the
Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court finds no
compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are
entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.