Professional Documents
Culture Documents
April 4, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LINDA K. GREENSHIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
I-1016 OF PAYNE COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA, a political subdivision
of the State of Oklahoma, the
Stillwater School District; WALTER
SWANSON; CHRISTI WINKLE; GIL
EMDE; MIKE WOODS; MICHAEL
DICKS; CRAIG CARTER; JOSEPH
HANEY,
No. 04-6195
(D.C. No. 03-CV-00020-F)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendants-Appellees.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
I.
INTRODUCTION
Second-grade teacher Linda K. Greenshields became embroiled in a conflict
with the Stillwater School District (Stillwater) after Stillwater began requiring
teachers to use learning modules for science instruction. After a protracted
dispute, the Stillwater Board of Education (Board) voted not to reemploy
Greenshields. Greenshields brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming
Stillwater had retaliated against her for engaging in speech protected by the First
Amendment. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma granted summary judgment to Stillwater. Greenshields appeals,
alleging the district court erred by improperly weighing evidence and failing to
analyze certain elements of her claim. Greenshields further asserts the district
court erred when it determined she did not raise a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to the motives underlying Stillwaters decision not to reemploy her.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm.
II.
BACKGROUND
The Board approved a Comprehensive Local Education Plan (CLEP) for
the years 2001 to 2005. The CLEP set the curriculum and standards for the
school district. With respect to science education, it required elementary school
teachers to employ an inquiry-based approach using learning modules.
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instances when Greenshields did not comply with instructions issued by school
administrators and indicated additional insubordination was unacceptable. It also
noted failure to improve could result in Greenshields dismissal.
Contrary to directions contained in the June API, Greenshields failed to
return a signed copy of the API, failed to indicate a preferred teacher training
date, failed to attend teacher training, failed to meet with the assistant
superintendent, and failed to communicate with the assistant superintendent.
Citing these failures as examples of unwillingness to comply with reasonable
requests, Winkle issued Greenshields another API on August 6, 2001. The
August 6 API again warned Greenshields that failure to comply with the terms of
the API could result in her dismissal. From November 2001 to July 2002,
Greenshields filed several grievances with the Board regarding the dispute over
the use of the learning modules. The Board denied her grievances.
The next school year, Greenshields again refused to teach science using the
learning modules, and continued to disregard instructions given to her by her
supervisors. Among other things, Greenshields did not inventory the contents of
the Soils learning module when it was delivered to her classroom in the fall of
the 2002, 1 and refused to meet with Winkle to discuss the science learning
In a letter from Greenshields to Winkle dated September 18, 2002,
Greenshields explained she would not inventory the Soils learning module as
(continued...)
1
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modules. Winkle issued Greenshields two more APIs in October and November
of 2002.
On December 3, 2002, Winkle and Stillwater School District
Superintendent Dr. Walter Swanson met with Greenshields and her attorney to
discuss the October and November APIs. In a memorandum recapitulating the
meeting, Winkle cataloged a variety of instances when Greenshields did not
comply with administrative directives set forth in the APIs. In the memorandum,
Winkle noted that she considered Greenshields performance and conduct to be
unsatisfactory. Winkle directed Greenshields to instruct students using the
Changes learning module and requested that Greenshields advise her of three
specific times when she could observe Greenshields teaching the module.
Later that December, Greenshields filed suit against Stillwater in Oklahoma
state court. Greenshields sought a declaratory judgment that her teaching contract
and the United States Constitution guaranteed her academic freedom and that she
(...continued)
instructed. She told Winkle,
Since you requested the Soils Science Module, completion of
the check-out form and inventory is your responsibility, not mine.
Moreover, you are requested to immediately remove the science
module box from my classroom and return it to the Material
Resources Center. Your demands that I inventory science module
boxes, that I did not requisition, constitutes continued administrative
harassment and willful perpetuation of a hostile work environment
for me that has never been resolved.
ROA, Appellants App. vol. I at 198.
1
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was not required to teach science using the learning modules. Stillwater removed
the suit to federal court.
When the second semester started, Greenshields suggested Winkle conduct
a classroom observation either in the morning or early afternoon of January 9,
2003. Winkle observed Greenshields class at the suggested time, expecting to
see Greenshields teach her class using the Changes learning module. Instead of
teaching from the module, however, Greenshields administered a practice spelling
test to her students. After the classroom observation, Winkle wrote a
memorandum to Greenshields documenting Greenshields failure to teach from
the Changes module and stating that Greenshields had failed to meet many of
the conditions of her APIs. Winkles memorandum also asked Greenshields to
provide additional times when she could observe Greenshields teach the module.
Greenshields did not suggest any additional observation dates.
Despite the growing conflict between Greenshields and school
administrators in 2001 and 2002, Winkles evaluations of Greenshields for those
years indicate Greenshields met the expected standards in almost all categories
listed on Stillwaters Teacher Performance Analysis Report (TPAR) form. 2 In
March of 2003, however, in a TPAR based on the January 9 classroom
Greenshields 2001 report did indicate, however, that Greenshields needed
refinement in the category labeled Responds professionally to administrative
requests and direction.
2
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III.
ANALYSIS
This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, using the same
legal standard as used by the district court. Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d
1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barker, 215 F.3d at
1137. In First Amendment cases, an appellate court has an obligation to make an
independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression. Id. (quotations omitted).
A.
failed to establish a causal link between his speech and the adverse employment
action taken by his employer. Id. at 1393; see also Smith v. Dunn, 368 F.3d 705,
708 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting an employees failure to establish a genuine issue as
to the employers motivation was dispositive and rendered unnecessary an inquiry
into whether the employees speech was constitutionally protected). In short, in a
retaliation case, an employees failure to show that her protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in bringing about an adverse employment action
may be dispositive. If it is, a court need not perform an analysis under the first
two prongs of the four-part test.
Greenshields also contends the district court erred by weighing the
evidence in a summary judgment context. She asserts a district court cannot
determine questions of fact at the summary judgment stage. Because the third and
fourth prongs of the four-part test involve issues of fact, Greenshields claims
those prongs must be left for the jury to decide. Accordingly, she argues, the
district court erred when it granted Stillwaters motion for summary judgment
under the third and fourth prongs of the four-part test.
At the summary judgment stage, the courts function is not to weigh
evidence and find the truth, it is instead to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
A court must, however, enter summary judgment against a party who fails to
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lawsuit, and her refusal to teach the learning modules and to follow the terms of
the APIs. Although her First Amended Complaint arguably raised the argument
that Greenshields protected speech included her refusal to teach from the
learning modules and failure to comply with the terms of Winkles APIs, 4 her
arguments before the district court did not. Nothing in Greenshields response in
opposition to Stillwaters motion for summary judgment reasonably can be
construed as an argument that her speech included her refusal to teach from the
learning modules and her noncompliance with Winkles APIs. Instead, the
arguments contained in Greenshields response brief contend only that her
protected speech consisted of letters she wrote to school administrators and
members of the Board and her December 2002 lawsuit. 5
This court will not consider claims that have been waived or abandoned in
the district court. OConnor v. City & County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1214
(10th Cir. 1990). Because Greenshields response brief before the district court
Greenshields response brief makes clear her belief that her December
2002 lawsuit was the cause of the Boards decision not to renew her teaching
contract. Simply put, she writes, Greenshields received a very poor evaluation
and was terminated following her filing of a lawsuit in Payne County. ROA,
Appellants App. vol. I at 366.
5
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did not include arguments that the protected speech at issue included her refusal
to teach using the learning modules and her refusal to follow the terms of
Winkles APIs, this court will not consider such arguments for the first time in
this appeal. We therefore examine Greenshields argument that her protected
speech consisted only of her letters to school administrators and Board members
and her December 2002 lawsuit.
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Greenshields, the pleadings,
affidavits, and supporting materials do not support Greenshields contention that
she presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude the Board
voted to not reemploy her in retaliation for her allegedly protected speech. The
Board presented evidence demonstrating Greenshields speech played no role in
its decision not to renew her contract. When the Board voted to not reemploy
Greenshields, its findings of fact did not reference her letters or her lawsuit;
instead, the Board noted Greenshields unprofessional conduct, violation of
school policies, and insubordinate behavior. Affidavits from individual members
of the Board similarly reveal they voted not to reemploy Greenshields for the
reasons set forth in the Boards findings of fact, not because of Greenshields
letters or lawsuit.
Greenshields contends she has presented evidence sufficient to cast doubt
on Stillwaters explanation of its decision not to reemploy her. She argues the
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did not make such arguments before the district court, and this court will not
consider them here.
After a de novo review of the parties briefs and contentions, the district
courts order, and the entire record on appeal, we agree with the district courts
conclusion that Greenshields failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact
and thus failed to prove her protected speech was a substantial and motivating
factor in Stillwaters adverse employment action. This court affirms the entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendant Stillwater for substantially the same
reasons stated by the district court in its order dated May 24, 2004.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the United States District
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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