1nc cp

The United States federal government should substantially curtail its

domestic military surveillance with the exception of surveillance targeting
computer networks and systems
Network surveillance solves cyberattacks
Goldsmith 13 (Jack, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, a Senior
Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and co-founder of
Lawfareblog.com. He teaches and writes about national security law, presidential
power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and
conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and Special Counsel to
the Department of Defense from 2002-2003, We Need an Invasive NSA,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyberattacks)
The N ew
Y ork T imes has published more than a dozen editorials excoriating the
national surveillance state. It wants the NSA to end the mass warehousing of everyones data and the use of back
Ever since stories about the National Security Agencys (NSA) electronic intelligence-gathering capabilities began tumbling out last June,

doors to break encrypted communications. A major element of the Times critique is that the NSAs domestic sweeps are not justified by the terrorist
threat they aim to prevent. At the end of August, in the midst of the Times assault on the NSA, the newspaper suffered what it described as a malicious
external attack on its domain name registrar at the hands of the Syrian Electronic Army, a group of hackers who support Syrian President Bashar Al
Assad. The papers website was down for several hours and, for some people, much longer. In terms of the sophistication of the attack, this is a big deal,
said Marc Frons, the Times chief information officer. Ten months earlier, hackers stole the corporate passwords for every employee at the Times, accessed
the computers of 53 employees, and breached the e-mail accounts of two reporters who cover China. We brought in the FBI, and the FBI said this had all
the hallmarks of hacking by the Chinese military, Frons said at the time. He also acknowledged that the hackers were in the Times system on election
night in 2012 and could have wreaked havoc on its coverage if they wanted. Illustration by Harry Campbell Such cyber-intrusions threaten corporate

Relentless assaults on Americas computer

networks by China and other foreign governments , hackers and criminals
have created an urgent need for safeguards to protect these vital
systems, the Times editorial page noted last year while supporting legislation encouraging the private sector to share cybersecurity information
with the government. It cited General Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, who had noted a 17-fold increase
in cyber-intrusions on critical infrastructure from 2009 to 2011 and who described the losses in the United
States from cyber-theft as the greatest transfer of wealth in history. If a catastrophic cyber-attack occurs, the Timesconcluded, Americans
will be justified in asking why their lawmakers ... failed to protect them. When
catastrophe strikes , the public will adjust its tolerance for intrusive
government measures. The Times editorial board is quite right about the
seriousness of the cyber- threat and the federal governments responsibility to redress it. What it does
not appear to realize is the connection between the domestic NSA
surveillance it detests and the governmental assistance with cybersecurity it
cherishes. To keep our computer and telecommunication networks secure, the
government will eventually need to monitor and collect intelligence on those
networks using techniques similar to ones the Timesand many others find
reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends. The fate of domestic surveillance is today
America and the U.S. government every day.

being fought around the topic of whether it is needed to stop Al Qaeda from blowing things up. But the

fight tomorrow , and the more important fight, will be about whether it is necessary to

protect our ways of life embedded in computer networks. Anyone anywhere with a connection
to the Internet can engage in cyber-operations within the United States. Most truly harmful cyber-operations, however, require group effort and significant
skill. The attacking group or nation must have clever hackers, significant computing power, and the sophisticated softwareknown as malwarethat

The supply of all of these resources has

been growing fast for many yearsin governmental labs devoted to developing
these tools and on sprawling black markets on the Internet. Telecommunication
networks are the channels through which malware typically travels, often anonymized or
encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse the globe each day. The targets are the communications networks
themselves as well as the computers they connectthings like the Times servers, the computer systems that
monitor nuclear plants , classified documents on computers in the Pentagon, the nasdaq
exchange, your local bank, and your social-network providers. To keep these computers and networks secure , the
government needs powerful intelligence capabilities abroad so that it can learn about planned
enables the monitoring, exfiltration, or destruction of information inside a computer.

cyber-intrusions.

Extinction
Fritz 9 (Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Disarmament, Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a
master of international relations at Bond University, Hacking Nuclear Command
and Control, July,
http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf)
This paper will analyse the threat of

cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the

structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within

If access to command and control centres is

obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to
attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power.
This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force
equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed,
removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties
in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of
intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point
towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear
weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of
existing nuclear arsenals . All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control.
Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by
various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks,
wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and
maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have
access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open
network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on
the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts
by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including
experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have
multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry
points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier
task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by
established cyber terrorists capabilities, strategies, and tactics.

hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US
Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines . Additionally, the
alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch
nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet
leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear
weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the
possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network
operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced
through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be
engineered . Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use
them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it
was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible.
Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted , transportation
could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted,
thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction .
Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to
provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and
Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against
key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened
and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation.
Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack,
claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to
instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. Emails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials . A sophisticated and
all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could
be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for
compromising command and control centres directly.

1nc k
their politics create the enabling conditions for executive overreach and
permanent warfare
Jabri 6 (Vivienne Jabri , Director of the Centre for International Relations and
Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London, War,
Security and the Liberal State, Security Dialogue, 37;47 )
LATE MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS are often conceived in terms of the sociopolitical and economic manifestations of change emergent from a globalized arena. What is less apparent is
how late modernity as a distinct era has impacted upon our conceptions of the social sphere, our lived experience, and our reflections upon the discourses and institutions that form the
taken-for-granted backdrop of the known and the knowable. The paradigmatic certainties of modernity the state, citizenship, democratic space, humanitys infinite capacity for
progress, the defeat of dogma and the culmination of modernitys apotheosis in the free-wheeling market place have in the late modern era come face to face with uncertainty, unpredictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality
would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference. Progress came to be associated with peace, and both were constitutively linked to the
universal, the global, the human, and therefore the cosmopolitan. What shatters such illusions is the recollection of the 20th century as the age of extremes (Hobsbawm, 1995), and the
21st as the age of the ever-present condition of war. While we might prefer a forgetting of things past, a therapeutic anamnesis that manages to reconfigure history, it is perhaps the
continuities with the past that act as antidote to such righteous comforts. How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is
conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose
purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they become manifest in
every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the
defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war. Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow
render the narrative in measured tones, taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late
modern condition of the West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration
without due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and occupation, then

The critical scholarly take on the present is

then precisely to reveal the conditions of possibility in relation to how we got here,
to unravel the enabling dynamics that led to the disappearance of
distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security.
When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability
shifts beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control . We can
language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what is.

reveal the operations of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration raises fundamental
questions relating to the relationship of power and violence, and their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are
hence separable analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies with violence often targeted against
the latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the subtle workings of
power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above The article provides an analysis of the
place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the libertysecurity problematique in the context of the modern liberal
state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second section of the article reveals the con- ditions of possibility for a distinctly
late modern mode of war and its imbri- cations in politics. The final section of the article concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in
particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency. The aim through- out is to provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that might begin to meet the challenges
of the present and to open an agenda of research that concentrates on the politics of the present, the capacities or otherwise of contestation and accountability, and the institutional
locations wherein such political agency might emerge. The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a global war, transcend- ing
space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is dis- tinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the second world wars, in that the latter two have, in
historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinc- tions
from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly
global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the

war, rather
than being confined to its own time and space, permeates the normality of
the political process, has, in other words, a defining influence on elements
considered to be constitutive of liberal democratic politics, including
executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public sphere of discourse and inter- action,
equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and
equal communicative practices underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War
disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. A war that
has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional, inscribing emergency into the daily
routines of social and political life. While the elements of war conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion may run silently
through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the
persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to the fore,
and with them a call for a rethinking of wars relationship to politics. The distinctly
relation- ship between war and politics, war and the political processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that

global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in
undermining its own political institutions. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The

while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative

impact of the war against terrorism, it is equally as important to
appreciate the continuities in social and political life that are the enabling
conditions of this global war, forming its conditions of possibility. These
enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but incorporate local
practices that are deep-rooted and institu- tionalized. The mutually reinforcing
relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular
war distinctly all-pervasive, and poten- tially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to the
analysis provided here would argue that

spaces available for political contestation and dissent . Contemporary global politics is dominated by what
might be called a matrix of war2 constituted by a series of transnational practices that vari- ously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents,
bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by
the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of
practice, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both discursive
and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucaults use of the term, practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of production), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become
structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a war against terrorism confers upon these practices a
certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too
real and requires state responses, many of these responses appear to assume a wide remit of operations so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic
state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices. When security becomes the overwhelming imperative of the
democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a discourse of balance between security and liberty and in terms of the protection of liberty.3 The implications of the
juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of securitization (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with the power of
professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that of the latter is, paradoxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence. What is missing from the securitization literature is an analytic of
war, and it is this analytic that I want to foreground in this article. The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute differ- ent response mechanisms in the face of what
is deemed to be an emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in
camps from Afghanistan to Guantnamo and other places as yet un- identified, the use of torture against detainees, extra-judicial assassination, the detention and deportation again
without due process of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confine- ment in camps and detention centres, the construction of the movement of
peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European states are all represented in political discourse as
necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger.
It could be argued that the above practices remain unrelated and must hence be subject to different modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are
framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links
these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed taxonomy of dif- ferentiated practices. Rather, what links them is the element of antagonism directed against distinct

the politics of security, including the production of

fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, comes to service
practices that constitute war and locates the discourse of war at the heart
of politics, not just domes- tically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state are
and particular others. Such a perspective suggests that

monumental, for a perpetual war on a global scale has implications for political structures and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state in meeting the
claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural. The matrix of war is centrally constituted around the
element of antago- nism, having an association with existential threat: the idea that the continued presence of the other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to
its continued existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a threat to the idea

Herein lies a discourse of cultural and racial exclusion

based on a certain fear of the other. While the war against specific clandestine organiza- tions7 involves operations on both sides
of Europe and its Christian origins.6

that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set of diffuse practices, violence, disciplinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of operations that impact upon society as a whole. The
practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes, reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere,
where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and
South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the state of exception, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced
differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of
interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the
invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a discourse of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always
potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a profile to the state of exception and its
experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state
and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference. While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in
the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cul- tural signification.
Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that under- pins the measures highlighted above is one that is
now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identi- fication, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand
associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made
between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle
and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some pre- cautionary practice that targets all in the name
of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its indi- vidual
members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices.
When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the
present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a
distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures. Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no
boundaries as limits to its practices indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean
that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its
manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that
sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as
threats to security. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of direct war, in
the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following
Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 7093) suggests, a relation
of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the
population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacifica- tion of the Middle East as a political region. When legislative and
bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses

One option is to limit

policing, military and intelligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the
utilized in its legitimiza- tion are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations.

limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state.

In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates

discourses on politics , so that these come to be subject to the restraints
and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands
of security against an existential threat . The implications for liberal
democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,
for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also
a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public
life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external. One of the most
significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucaults writ- ings is that war, or the distant roar of battle (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so
distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and counter-terrorist measures come to be seen not as
discontinuity from liberal government, but as emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government and the modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucaults
renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that
wars happen at the outskirts of society and its civil order. The disciplinary society is not simply an accumulation of institutional and bureaucratic procedures that permeate the everyday
and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the constitutive elements of war as continuity, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed
enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional
continuities that structurate war in society. Reference to the distant roar of battle suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the ever-present construction of threat accrued to the
particular other; it suggests the immediacy of threat and the construction of fear of the enemy; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The

analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed pre- cision and
instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of institutional practices; both are
mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucaults (1998: 152) terms: the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly com- plex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their

the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and

political life. The matrix of war suggests both discursive and institutional
practices, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of analysis is to point out that war is
objective. What

not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present as
continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This implies a continuity of sorts between
the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.

The alternative is a refusal of the affs technical security politics in favor

of democratic scrutiny
Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B.,
Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012,
NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?, 44 Conn. L. Rev.
1417
But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a
higher status than information already present in the public realmthe shared collective information through which
ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq
War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these

This reality highlights the

importance of approaching security information with far greater collective
skepticism ; it also means that security judgments may be more Hobbesianmarked fundamentally by
problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority.

epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable factthan policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security

concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for
reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty
and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the
procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new
statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they
mistake a question of politics for one of law . In other words, such scholars
ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of
background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge ,
professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To
the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger
from hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the
average citizen to comprehend independently- it is inevitable that institutions
( regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in
those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any
systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship
between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying
assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political
arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the
validity of security expertise , its supporting institutions, and the broader
legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our
constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains
unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such

a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements

to become ever more entrenched.

1nc da
Hillary wins now
Page 4/25 (Susan, Poll: Trump, Clinton face divides in their parties even if they
win nominations,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/04/25/suffolk-polltrump-clinton-party-divides-president-republican-democrat/83487862/)
November showdowns . In general-election matchups, Clinton would defeat
Trump by double digits and Sanders would beat him by more. At the moment, Clinton leads Trump,
50%-39%; Sanders leads him 52%-37%. Clinton leads Cruz, 49%-42%. The edge for Sanders over Cruz is wider, 50%-38%. Among the
Republicans, only Kasich would defeat Clinton, 46%-41%. A Sanders-Kasich race would be close, 44%-43%. Regardless of which
candidate they support, 50% of those surveyed say Clinton is the most
likely victor in November, almost double the 26% who predict Trump will
win the White House.
Dems need to be strong on terror the plan swings the election its the
most important issue
Katulis 4/27 (Brian, Why Donald Trumps Foreign Policy Resonatesand How to
Respond, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/04/27/why-donald-trumps-foreignpolicy-resonates-and-how-to-respond/)
Donald Trump delivered a foreign policy speech just hours after his
victories in five states primaries
another important step toward
securing the Republican Partys nomination
he views foreign policy as
an opportunity and that he sees it as a vulnerability for his likely general
election opponent, Hillary Clinton Particularly in the wake of the Paris
attacks and the San Bernardino shootings
national security reemerged
as a core question in this election cycle In 2014
Republicans revived a
politics-of-fear approach on national security issues that worked to great
effect in 2002 and 2004 Trump has adapted that playbook
His speech
combined
his usual rhetoric about making America great again with criticisms of
Obamas presidency and of Hillary Clintons tenure
calling her
weak
mix of ideas Mr.
Trump put forward is unique
Mr. Trumps
calls
fit more with the views of right-wing neoconservatives
That

Tuesday night

suggests that

last year,

the

midterms,

had

. Mr.

to his in-your-face style. The disarray of

Republican foreign policy and the partys fracture into many different camps over the past few years helped create the opening that Mr. Trump has seized.

Wednesday

Barack

as secretary of state,

and ineffective. In that sense, his remarks resembled critiques other Republican leaders have made of the Obama administration over the past eight years. But the

, and it defies simple categorization because the package is so scattered. At some points, Mr. Trumps anti-globalization themes and criticism of

trade deals sound as if he is making a play for Bernie Sanders supporters who are skeptical about the impact globalization has had on ordinary Americans economic well-being. Conversely,
to invest more in the U.S. military

. (How Mr.

Trump would do this while also addressing the U.S. debt, another issue he raised, he did not specify.) Overall, Mr. Trumps foreign policy approach suffers from inconsistencies and in some cases inaccuraciespoints that will be picked
apart in detail because there is so much thats easy to criticize. For example: Mr. Trump said Wednesday that he would strive for stability but a few minutes later spoke of the need for unpredictability in global affairs. He pledged to

It would be a mistake to dismiss Mr.

Trumps foreign policy address
The man poised to secure
the Republican nomination has reached that point by simply and
powerfully presenting themes that resonate and connect with how swaths
of the American electorate view the world He speaks to those who want to
see the U.S. demand respec
The us vs.
reassure allies as president but also said he would criticize them if and when they dont do their share.

over its factual inaccuracies and incoherence.

t, who want to put U.S. needs first, and who think the U.S. cant change other countries and shouldnt try.

them mentality that Trump has offered particularly when talking about
immigrants and Muslimsis part of a
trend For Democrats
the best response would be to offer a clear alternative that reassures
Americans that the U.S. will defeat terrorism
the Obama administration
has spent more time arguing
Trumps foreign policy address
are likely to resonate
with many Americans
To defeat Trump
other
candidates have to win hearts and minds something that can be done only
by offering a
alternative
that can advance U.S. interests

Mr.

global

or Mr. Trumps remaining Republican

opponents,

and other threats and reduce economic inequality only by relying on values that Mr. Trump

emphatically rejects. This affirmative case and clear challenge to Mr. Trumps worldview would be sharper about what it seeks to achieve than

been; the presidents team, by contrast,

has

about what it would not do as opposed to what it has sought to achieve. Mr.

did not impress foreign policy experts, but its general themes

and almost certainly the swath of Republican primary voters who have been rabid Trump supporters for months. Its critical to keep that, and this, in mind: To win

the overall debate among the public, it wont be enough for anyone to just criticize Donald Trump and point out where he is wrong.

Mr.

politically,

clear, values-based

to Mr. Trump

in a messy world.

Trump goes rogue extinction

Feith 3/16 (Douglas Feith, Hudson Institute senior fellow, 3/14/16, Trump,
america's word, and the bomb, www.nationalreview.com/article/432746/donaldtrump-nukes-his-recklessness-would-increase-nuclear-threats)
We now have the
prospect of a Donald Trump presidency. That would aggravate the
problem. Eight years of left-wing American unreliability would then be followed by four (or eight) years of perceived right-wing unreliability.
Faith in American security commitments would plummet probably
irretrievably . In many countries, pressure to go nuclear would increase , perhaps
irresistibly . Nuclear weapons remain a life-and-death issue, though the candidates and the media are giving them little attention in the
The Obama-Clinton team originally promised to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. It wound up doing the opposite.

campaign. Americans shouldnt want nuclear weapons spreading around the world. When new states get them especially rogues such as North Korea

the risk of nuclear war increases . Even if America could avoid being
drawn into such a war, catastrophic harm wouldnt be confined to the
warring parties. Since World War II, efforts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading have been astonishingly successful. When China got
and Iran

the bomb in 1964, it became only the fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. No one but an extreme optimist at
the time would have predicted that, 50 years hence, the nuclear club would have only three (or maybe four) additional members. India, Pakistan, and
North Korea have all explosively tested nuclear weapons. Israel is widely believed to have them but hasnt said so. Why did non-proliferation work so well?
First, the United States and the Soviet Union actually shared interests in enforcing the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Neither wanted any other
country to obtain nuclear weapons. And most countries understood that they were actually safer if they renounced such weapons in return for a similar
renunciation by their neighbors. The second main reason is that our allies trusted U.S. security commitments. They felt confident sheltering under
Americas so-called nuclear umbrella. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, U.S. presidents took pains to preserve that trust and confidence. To do so,
they exerted leadership, showed loyalty to our allies, safeguarded U.S. credibility, and preserved American military power in particular, the quality of
our nuclear weapons. President Obama did speak passionately about reducing the risks of nuclear war, but his actions undermined his goals. He dithered
as North Korea expanded its nuclear arsenal and the range of its missiles. He freed Iran of economic sanctions without requiring dismantlement of its
nuclear-weapons facilities. Meanwhile, other policies leading from behind, courtship of Russias President Putin, setting and then ignoring that red
line in Syria, slashing defense spending, and neglecting U.S. nuclear-weapons infrastructure all communicated to Americas friends abroad a lack of
resolution, of loyalty, of understanding, and of power. The bad effects are plain to see. A May 7, 2015, Wall Street Journal headline reads, Saudi Arabia
Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran. In South Korea on February 15 this year, Won Yoo-chul, the ruling partys floor leader, spoke favorably in
parliament of peaceful nuclear and missile programs for the sake of self-defense. He explained, We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor

Around the world, officials foresee with dread

the possibilities of cascading nuclear proliferation. In the Middle East, not
only Saudi Arabia but also the other Gulf states in addition to Turkey and
Egypt could be candidates for going nuclear. In the AsiaPacific, it could be
Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, too . Its bad enough
that President Obama has sapped American credibility . If Republicans now put
Donald Trump into the White House, theyll abandon all hope of
recovering it . Which brings us back to Donald Trump, who has had a lot to say about Americas
commitments to friends. He scorns NATO. He praises President Putin as NATO quarrels with
whenever it rains. Similar statements abound elsewhere.

Russia over Ukraine. In his 2000 book The America We Deserve, Trump wrote that Europes conflicts were not worth American lives, and he touted the
money America could save by pulling back from Europe.

He scorns Japan. His statements on trade depict Japan as an enemy nation

rather than an ally of paramount importance. He scorns Israel. He promises to be neutral between the Jewish state and enemies trying to destroy it. He
scorns U.S. law-of-war obligations under the Geneva Conventions, as when he boasted he would mistreat detainees and kill civilians. He now recants those
boasts, but he cant erase the picture he has created of himself as intemperate and unprincipled. He has made an electoral strategy of contradicting
himself, purposefully devaluing the currency of his words (its ironic that he berates the Chinese for devaluing their currency). He scoffs at accuracy and
shows no shame when he says false things. His message is that, as a great man, he shouldnt be held to anything he says. Its bad enough that President

If Republicans now put Donald Trump into the White

House, theyll abandon all hope of recovering it. Friends around the world
would have to adjust to an America thats erratic to the point of
recklessness. Their loss of confidence in our reliability would make the
world more perilous and not just for them. Undermining our alliances will spawn
various ills, including the spread of nuclear weapons . Even if Americans
someday replaced President Trump with a responsible person of sound judgment, the harm would
probably be irreversible .
Obama has sapped American credibility.

1nc da
The NSA shares its information with the DEAs Special Operations Division
key to drug enforcement
Raycom 13 (Raycom News Service, subsidiary of WorldNow, a national software
news company, Dept. of Justice investigates DEA raids using NSA surveillance,
http://raycomgroup.worldnow.com/story/23079065/dept-of-justice-investigates-dearaids-using-nsa-surveillance?page=2&N=L)
The N ational S ecurity A gency is obtaining information via wiretaps and electronic
surveillance about common crimes involving Americans, which it then feeds to the D rug E nforcement
A gency and local law enforcement to make arrests. The Department of Justice, which controls the DEA, has said it is investigating the
drug agency's links to the NSA. The use of mass surveillance in drug crimes could help
explain why the DEA doubled the value of assets seized since 2001. According to a
report by Reuters released Monday, information obtained by the NSA is fed to a little-known
unit of the DEA, called the Special Operations Division . This unit is partnered with several other
government agencies as well, including the FBI, CIA, IRS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Department of Homeland Security. The NSA
is supposed to use its surveillance powers to target terrorism. But through its vast network
of wiretaps and email surveillance , it is able to acquire information about lesser crimes, including
drugs . That information is then tipped off to the SOD arm of the DEA, and
(RNN) -

sometimes local law enforcement agencies, who then go after the suspect. However, the techniques utilized by the NSA and DEA are potentially in
violation of a defendant's Constitutional right to a fair trial. The people who get targeted through this process are unaware how the investigation began,
which makes it difficult to "review potential sources of exculpatory evidence - information that could reveal entrapment, mistakes or biased witnesses,"
Reuters said. To avoid legal hassles, the agencies use a technique called "parallel construction," which can be described as burying how the information
was obtained and constructing a new narrative about how the initial arrest was made. An example of this practice is, after receiving a tip, the SOD alerts
local police to be at a certain place at a certain time and look for a certain vehicle. If drugs were found in the vehicle, an arrest is made, and local police
say it was simply the result of a routine traffic stop, rather than a mass domestic surveillance apparatus. "Parallel construction is a law enforcement
technique we use every day," an anonymous DEA official told Reuters. "It's decades old, a bedrock concept." Drug raids worth nearly $1 billion per year
The DEA is a worldwide organization with 86 foreign offices in 67 countries. And most of the press its SOD has received had to do with international busts,
such as the arrest of Viktor Bout, the convicted Russian arms trafficker who inspired the Nicolas Cage movie Lord of War. Bout was arrested by SOD agents
in Thailand and brought to the U.S., where he was convicted of selling arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC. However,

the SOD also has been active within the U.S., helping the DEA conduct
hundreds of raids , arrest thousands of people and seize millions of dollars every year.
If the DEA is using NSA intelligence, the questionably legal technique hasn't necessarily led to more arrests. The
number of domestic arrests by the DEA has remained steady since 2001, with an average of about 31,000 per year, according to the Department of

there has been a large increase in the value of seized assets from
drug busts and raids. In 2001, the total value of seized assets by all federal agencies was less than $400 million, with the DEA
Justice. However,

accounting for about $200 million of that. By 2010, the total value in assets was nearly $1.8 billion - the largest amount in U.S. history - with the DEA
involved in nearly $800 million. The current incarnation of the NSA surveillance program, in which phone records and emails have been stored, began in

In 2007, the SOD

arrested 30 people in Texas and confiscated $2.5 million in a 2-year investigation called "Operation
Puma." In addition to the money, the DEA confiscated 900 pounds of marijuana and 277 kilograms of cocaine In 2011, the SOD
divisions for the DEA and ICE teamed up for nationwide raids from New Jersey to California after an
ICE agent was shot and killed in Mexico. The busts resulted in more than 200 arrests, $8 million in
confiscated cash and an undisclosed value of jewelry, property and drugs. Under
2001, the Guardian reported. The program began less than a month after the Sept. 11 terror attacks.

asset forfeiture laws, law enforcement agencies can seize cash, cars, property and anything else believed to be connected to a crime, with drugs being the
most common crime. The value of these assets is split between various government agencies. If NSA intelligence was used to find targets, the DEA's
policy-mandated use of parallel construction could hide how it obtained its leads. "Remember that the utilization of SOD cannot be revealed or discussed
in any investigative function," said a document obtained by Reuters presented to agents.

The SODs key to stop drug trafficking and cartels theyre effective now
but continued access to every resource possible, including surveillance is
key
DOJ 14 (United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, FY
2014 Performance Budget Congressional Submission,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/16/deajustification.pdf)
DEA wages a battle that involves disrupting and dismantling significant
drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, attacking the economic basis
of the drug trade, and contributing to counterterrorism activities tied to drugs. The work is dangerous, time-consuming, and
multifaceted. DEA investigations are also becoming increasingly complex
and frequently require more sophisticated investigative techniques , such
as electronic surveillance . Furthermore, many of the crimes transcend standard
drug trafficking and are directly tied to issues of national and border security . Despite these
challenges, DEA has made great strides against the scourge of drug trafficking and
is proud of recent accomplishments. As an example, Project Below the Beltway targeted the Sinaloa
and Juarez Cartels and violent street gangs and their distribution network in America. This initiative began in May 2010 and culminated
Every day,

on December 6, 2012. The Sinaloa and Juarez Cartels are responsible for bringing multi-ton quantities of narcotics, including cocaine, heroin,

These cartels are also believed to be

responsible for laundering millions of dollars in criminal proceeds from illegal drug
trafficking activities. Project Below the Beltway , comprised of investigations in 79 U.S. cities and several foreign cities within
Central America, Europe, Mexico, South America, and elsewhere, resulted in 3,780 arrests and the seizure of
6,100 kilograms of cocaine, 10,284 pounds methamphetamine, 1,619 pounds of heroin, 349,304 pounds of
marijuana, $148 million dollars in U.S. currency , and $38 million dollars in other
assets. Individuals indicted in the cases are charged with a variety of crimes, including various felony provisions of the CSA; conspiracy to import
controlled substances; money laundering; and firearms violations. DEAs Special Operations Division (SOD)
coordinated Project Below The Beltway, which involved the participation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
methamphetamine, and marijuana, from Mexico into the United States.

(FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the United States Marshals Service, the Office of Foreign Asset Control, and numerous state and local law enforcement entities.

Cartels cause Mexican instability that destroys US military readiness and

operational capacity internationally
Haddick 10 (Robert Haddick, contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command,
managing editor of Small Wars Journal, "This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does
America Have to Win It?" FOREIGN POLICY, 9--10--10,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/10/this_week_at_war_if_mexico_is_at_war_d
oes_america_have_to_win_it)
a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect
America's role in the rest of the world . An increasingly chaotic American
side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars , corrupted government and media, and a
breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the
importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world.
Should the southern border become a U.S. president's primary national security
concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt
adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America , with potentially
Most significantly,

disruptive arms races the result . Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let's hope that the
United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.

Nuke war dozens of hotspots

Metz 13 (Dr. Steven Metz, Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute,
Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, and an MA and BA from the University of
South Carolina, A Receding Presence: The Military Implications of American
Retrenchment, World Politics Review, 10-22,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13312/a-receding-presence-the-militaryimplications-of-american-retrenchment)
M iddle E ast/ N orth A frica region, by contrast, is a part of the world
where American retrenchment or narrowing U.S. military capabilities could have extensive adverse
effects. While the region has a number of nations with significant military capability, it does not have a functioning method for
preserving order without outside involvement. As U.S. power recedes, it could turn out that American
involvement was in fact a deterrent against Iran taking a more adventurous regional posture , for
instance. With the United States gone, Tehran could become more aggressive, propelling the Middle East
toward division into hostile Shiite and Sunni blocs and encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons .
With fewer ties between regional armed forces and the United States, there also could be a new round of military
coups. States of the region could increase pressure on Israel, possibly leading to pre-emptive
military strikes by the Israelis, with a risk of another major war . One of the al-Qaida affiliates might seize control of a
So much for the regions of modest concern. The

state or exercise outright control of at least part of a collapsed state. Or China might see American withdrawal as an opportunity to
play a greater role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States has a number of security objectives in the Middle
East and North Africa: protecting world access to the region's petroleum, limiting humanitarian disasters, preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, limiting the operating space for al-Qaida and its affiliates, sustaining America's commitment to
long-standing partners and assuring Israel's security. Arguments that the U.S. can disengage from the region and recoup savings in
defense expenditures assume that petroleum exports would continue even in the event of domination of the region by a hostile
power like Iran or a competitor like China, state collapse or even the seizure of power by extremists. Whoever exercises power in the
region would need to sell oil. And the United States is moving toward petroleum self-sufficiency or, at least, away from dependence
on Middle Eastern oil. But even if the United States could get along with diminished petroleum exports from the Middle East, many

disengagement
from the Middle East and North Africa would entail significant risks for the U nited S tates. It would
other nations couldn't. The economic damage would cascade, inevitably affecting the United States. Clearly

be a roll of the strategic dice. South and Central Asia are a bit different, since large-scale U.S. involvement there is a relatively
recent phenomenon. This means that the regional security architecture there is less dependent on the United States than that of

South and Central Asia also includes two vibrant, competitive and nuclear-armed
powersIndia and Chinaas well as one of the world's most fragile nuclear states, Pakistan .
some other regions.

Writers like Robert Kaplan argue that South Asia's importance will continue to grow, its future shaped by the competition between
China and India. This makes America's security partnership with India crucial. The key issue is whether India can continue to
modernize its military to balance China while addressing its immense domestic problems with infrastructure, education, income
inequality and ethnic and religious tensions. If it cannot, the United States might have to decide between ceding domination of the
region to China or spending what it takes to sustain an American military presence in the region.

Central Asia is different. After

a decade of U.S. military operations, the region remains a cauldron of extremism and terrorism. America's future
role there is in doubt, as it looks like the United States will not be able to sustain a working security partnership with

Afghanistan and Pakistan in the future. At some point one or both of these states could collapse, with
extremist movements gaining control. There is little chance of another large-scale U.S. military intervention to
forestall state collapse, but Washington might feel compelled to act to secure Pakistan's nuclear
weapons if Islamabad loses control of them. The key decision for Washington might someday be whether to
tolerate extremist-dominated areas or states as long as they do not enable transnational terrorism. Could the United States allow a
Taliban state in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, if it did not provide training areas and other support to al-Qaida?
Most likely, the U.S. approach would be to launch raids and long-distance attacks on discernible al-Qaida targets and hope that such
a method best balanced costs and risks. The Asia-Pacific region will remain the most important one to the United States even in a
time of receding American power. The United States retains deep economic interests in and massive trade with Asia, and has been a
central player in the region's security system for more than a century. While instability or conflict there is less likely than in the
Middle East and North Africa, if it happened it would be much more dangerous because of the economic and military power of the
states likely to be involved. U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been described as a hub-and-spokes strategy "with the United
States as the hub, bilateral alliances as the spokes and multilateral institutions largely at the margins." In particular, the bilateral

"spokes" are U.S. security ties with key allies Australia, Japan and South Korea and, in a way, Taiwan. The United States also has
many other beneficial security relationships in the region, including with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.

America's major security objectives in the Asia-Pacific in recent years have been to discourage Chinese
provocation or destabilization as China rises in political, economic and military power, and to prevent the world's
most bizarre and unpredictable nuclear powerNorth Koreafrom unleashing Armageddon through some
miscalculation . Because the U.S. plays a more central role in the Asia-Pacific security
framework than in any other regional security arrangement, this is the region where disengagement or a
recession of American power would have the most far-reaching effect. Without an American
counterweight, China might become increasingly aggressive and provocative . This could
lead the other leading powers of the region close to Chinaparticularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwanto
abandon their historical antagonism toward one another and move toward some sort of de facto or even formal
alliance. If China pushed them too hard, all three have the technological capability to develop and
deploy nuclear weapons quickly. The middle powers of the region, particularly those embroiled in disputes with China
sort of

over the resources of the South China Sea, would have to decide between acceding to Beijing's demands or aligning themselves
with the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan bloc. Clearly North Korea will remain the most incendiary element of the Asia-Pacific system even
if the United States opts to downgrade its involvement in regional security. The parasitic Kim dynasty cannot survive forever. The
question is whether it lashes out in its death throes, potentially with nuclear weapons, or implodes into internal conflict. Either action
would require a significant multinational effort, whether to invade then reconstruct and stabilize the nation, or for humanitarian
relief and peacekeeping following a civil war. Even if the United States were less involved in the region, it would probably participate

security threats are plausible and

dangerous: protracted internal conflicts that cause humanitarian disasters and provide operating space for
extremists (the Syria model); the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; the seizure of a state or part of a state
by extremists that then use the territory they control to support transnational terrorism; and the old specter of major
war between nations. U.S. political leaders and security experts once believed that maintaining a full range of
military capabilities, including the ability to undertake large-scale, protracted land operations, was
an important deterrent to potential opponents. But the problem with deterrence is that it's impossible to prove.
in such an effort, but might not lead it. Across all these regions, four types of

Did the U.S. military deter the Soviet seizure of Western Europe, or did Moscow never intend to do that irrespective of what the
United States did? Unfortunately, the only way to definitively demonstrate the value of deterrence is to allow U.S. power to recede
and see if bad things happen. Until recently, the United States was not inclined to take such a risk. But now there is increasing
political support for accepting greater risk by moving toward a cheaper military without a full range of capabilities. Many Americans

The recession of American power will influence the evolution of

the various regional security systems, of which history suggests there are three types: hegemonic security systems
are willing to throw the strategic dice.

in which a dominant state assures stability; balance of power systems where rivals compete but do not dominate; and cooperative
systems in which multiple states inside and sometimes outside a region maintain security and limit or contain conflict. Sub-Saharan
Africa is a weak cooperative system organized around the African Union. Even if there is diminished U.S. involvement, the subSaharan African security system is likely to remain as it is. Latin America might have once been a hegemonic system, at least in the
Caribbean Basin, but today it is moving toward becoming a cooperative system with a diminished U.S. role. The same is true of

M iddle E ast/ N orth A frica region, South and Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific will probably
move toward becoming balance of power systems with less U.S. involvement. Balances of power can prevent major
Europe. The

wars with adept diplomacy and when the costs of conflict are high, as in Europe during the Cold War, for instance. But

catastrophic conflicts can happen if the balance collapses, as in Europe in the summer of
1914. Power balances work best when one key state is able to shift sides to preserve the balance, but there is no candidate to
play this role in the emerging power balances in these three regions. Hence the balances in these regions will be
dangerously unstable .

1nc da
Surveillance checks bioweapon attack now

Pittenger 14

US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism,

Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects both privacy and national security - Washington
Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittenger-bipartisan-bill-on-nsa-datacollection-protects-both-privacy-and-national-security/article/2549456?
custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&
utm_medium=referral
This February, I took that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the conference, I asked three questions: 1. What is the current

What role does

intelligence data collection play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack
worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is Americas role in addressing and mitigating this threat? 3.

including physical assets, cyber,

chemical,

biological , nuclear and the electric

grid? Each ambassador acknowledged the threat was greater today than
before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist terrorists stronger, more
sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East
and Africa. As to the role of the United States, they felt our efforts were
primary and essential for peace and security around the world. Regarding the
intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, We want privacy, but we must
have your intelligence . As a European foreign minister stated to me, Without U.S. intelligence, we are blind.
We cannot yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as
void of the deadly and destructive intentions of unrelenting terrorists. The number of
terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between 2012 and 2013, jumping from 10,000 to
20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down. Those who embrace an
altruistic worldview should remember that vigilance and strength have
deterred our enemies in the past. That same commitment is required today to
defeat those who seek to destroy us and our way of life. We must make careful, prudent
use of all available technology to counter their sophisticated operations if
we are to maintain our freedom and liberties.

Surveillance is vital to and effective at preventing large scale terrorism

Schoenfeld 15 (Gabriel Schoenfeld is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and is
the author, most recently, of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and
the Rule of Law. Schoenfeld writes frequently on national security and intelligence
for the Wall Street Journal and the Weekly Standard. Schoenfeld earned a B.A. from
Sarah Lawrence College, was an IREX Scholar at Moscow State University, and holds
a Ph.D. from Harvard University's government department, ARTICLE: IN DEFENSE
OF THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE STATE, Drake Law Review, 63 Drake L. Rev.
1121, Lexis Nexis, 2015)
The term "American surveillance state" is something that has come into
use by fierce critics of U.S. government counterterrorism efforts, efforts

that necessarily contain surveillance as a critical element . n1 A body of

opinion has emerged arguing that thanks to the ubiquitous eyes of the
National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
Homeland Security, and thanks also to the widespread distribution of myriad new
forms of surveillance technology , privacy in America is being destroyed and
George Orwell's dark vision of Big Brother is on its way to realization. n2 [*1122] A new genre of books appeared after 9/11
proffering variations on this argument. For example, 2003's The Soft Cage, by Christian Parenti, argues that government and private
surveillance today is a continuation of the system in place during slavery, only much more advanced. n3 The 9/11 hijackings, argues
Parenti, have themselves been "hijacked by the worst elements of the political class," who are using surveillance "to steer fear and
anger toward the destruction of traditional American liberties." n4 In the wake of the Snowden revelations, others have developed
similar arguments, only with greater passion and sometimes more exaggerated claims. Thus we have volumes like Dragnet Nation:
A Quest for Privacy, Security, and Freedom in a World of Relentless Surveillance by Julia Angwin; n5 The Watchers: The Rise of
America's Surveillance State by Shane Harris; n6 and Surveillance Nation, a collection of essays on the subject drawn from The
Nation magazine, collated by Richard Kreitner. n7 Glenn Greenwald, a journalist and Snowden collaborator, has probably been the
most prolific purveyor of this strand of thought, authoring numerous articles and books, including most recently, No Place to Hide:

With these works in circulation, this

line of thought has become widely accepted in some portions of American
elite thinking. Among many liberals and on the left it is taken as a given that, as the New York Times editorial page
Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State. n8

contends, we are suffering from the abuses of a "runaway intelligence [*1123] community." n9 The "mass warehousing of
everyone's data," n10 undertaken by what the Times calls the "surveillance state," is a danger to our civil liberties and the
Constitution itself. n11 Such views are not confined to the left. On the right, Senator Rand Paul, who is running for President, has
denounced government surveillance programs that he said have put our right to privacy under assault. n12 "I believe what you do
on your cellphone is none of [the government's] damn business," he told an audience at Berkeley to enthusiastic applause. n13
Senator Ted Cruz, also running for President, has joined in this chorus, explaining that the U.S. government is "implementing what

Advocates of this
line of thought advance four core arguments. First, surveillance in the
United States is dramatically expanding. n15 Second, the level of
surveillance is disproportionate to the threat faced. n16 Third, the [*1124]
surveillance operates without sufficient controls and outside the bounds of
law. n17 And fourth, the surveillance is ineffective. n18 In sum, opponents of the government's
appears to be an unprecedented and intrusive surveillance system on private American citizens." n14

surveillance efforts argue the efforts are ubiquitous, lawless, reckless, and unnecessary. What is one to make of these arguments?

distrust and suspicion of government snooping is a healthy

impulse in democracy and very much in line with America's best traditions. n19 The U.S. has seen abuses of
Without question,

surveillance in the past: from J. Edgar Hoover's depredations at the FBI; n20 to Richard Nixon's antics during Watergate; n21 to the

But in the case of current

counterterrorism methods, the suspicion of government surveillance is
wrongheaded and potentially - if acted upon - dangerous . The primary
source of that danger, of course, is the bleak security [*1125] situation the United
States currently faces. A decade and a half after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. is still at war in a
abuses uncovered by the Church and Pike Committees in the 1970s. n22

number of locations, including Afghanistan and Iraq. n23 Conflagrations in which the U.S. has significant interests are raging in the
Middle East and Africa: in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Nigeria; as well as in Europe, on the Russian frontier with Ukraine. n24
International terrorism continues to be a significant threat. n25 Indeed, the U.S. is seeing carnage around the world on a terrifying
scale, with massacres in far-flung locations arcing from Kenya n26 to Pakistan. n27 Terrorist outrages have also occurred in the heart
of Europe: in Norway n28 and in Paris. n29 In the U.S., the FBI has rolled up a long string of lone-wolf aspiring terrorists. n30 Some
they have not stopped in time. In 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on troops at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and maiming 32
others. n31 Two more terrorists whom the FBI did not succeed in apprehending in time, Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev, were able
to [*1126] explode a bomb at the Boston Marathon in 2013, killing four and injuring scores more. n32 Far from being decimated, as
President Obama asserted in 2012, al Qaeda remains an active force. n33 Not only does al Qaeda continue to enjoy a number of
different sanctuaries where it can plot, n34 the world faces the fanatics of the Islamic State, who are spreading death and
destruction indiscriminately in the areas of Syria and Iraq where they rule, while also making inroads in, among other locations,
Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, the Sinai peninsula, and the Gaza strip. n35 Given the record of these groups and their affiliates, there
can be little doubt that if they were to obtain weapons of mass destruction, they would not hesitate to use them to strike America if
the opportunity arose. During the 1990s, as terrorist attacks took place all over the world - including against American targets
abroad - a kind of complacency developed that such outrages could not happen here. n36 Of course, one did happen here and

The surveillance programs that we have in place are

designed to prevent a recurrence of what we experienced on 9/11 . It is axiomatic that
nearly 3,000 people died. n37

peacetime is different from wartime, and equally axiomatic that the balance between security and liberty shifts when the [*1127] country is under threat. n38 Sometimes it shifts very
far. During the Civil War, President Lincoln embraced a view of executive power that allowed him, under the rubric of "public necessity," to negate rights we take to be fundamental,
including jury trial, free speech, and private property. n39 He usurped Congress's power to raise an army and borrow money on the credit of the U.S. government. n40 He suspended the
writ of habeas corpus. n41 In the case of Ex parte Merryman, he brazenly defied an order from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to release a prisoner. n42 Yet, he is remembered as
one of America's greatest presidents. During World War I, the government infringed on free speech and free assembly in ways that are shocking now. The Sedition Act of 1918
(technically not an act but amendments to the Espionage Act of 1917) made it a crime when the United States is at war to, among other things, "willfully utter, print, write, or publish any
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States." n43 For violating speech provisions of the act, the trade union leader Eugene Debs
was sentenced to ten years in prison and disenfranchised for life. n44 When he appealed to the Supreme Court, it upheld his conviction. n45 His case was but one of many that sent
Americans to jail for what the government regards today as mere political advocacy. During World War II, President Roosevelt signed the notorious Executive Order 9066 authorizing the
internment of Japanese-Americans. n46 He explained that it was required for "the successful prosecution of the war," which demands "every possible protection against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and [*1128] national-defense utilities." n47 President Roosevelt also engaged in domestic wiretapping for
foreign intelligence purposes - in direct violation of statutory bans on the practice, which the Supreme Court has upheld. n48 Roosevelt wrote in a secret memo to Attorney General
Robert Jackson that he ""agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision relating to wiretapping in investigations' but he was "convinced that the Supreme Court never

intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the nation.'" n49 Yet there was no legal foundation for the exception
Roosevelt invoked here. n50 He violated the statute. n51 Roosevelt, too, is remembered as one of the great presidents. During the early Cold War, America experienced the excesses of
McCarthyism, wherein thousands of people were accused of being Communists or Communist sympathizers, and some were hauled before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and accused of disloyalty and subversion. n52 Although Communist infiltration of the U.S. government was a genuine concern, as the cases of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs
illustrate, innocent people were also dragged into the net and suffered the destruction of their careers and, in some cases, imprisonment. n53 During the Vietnam era, there were
extensive abuses by the CIA and FBI that included the unauthorized opening of mail, warrantless interception of telegrams, harassment of civil rights activists, and other offenses that
were brought to daylight by the Church and Pike Committees in the 1970s. n54 This history is presented not to justify any of the egregious things that have occurred in the past, but to
provide a kind of benchmark. What is significant about the current state of affairs is that, in the aftermath of the deadliest and most destructive attack ever on America, the government
has not engaged a periodic wartime descent into extra-constitutional behavior. [*1129] If the Constitution has been infringed in the post-9/11 era, it has been on the margin where
reasonable people can disagree, and where one can find good lawyers and good federal judges on both sides of the dispute. America has learned a great deal from the dark spots of the
past. If anything, what is salient is how restrained, and careful to adhere to constitutional norms, the U.S. government has been in the face of genuine danger. The critics of surveillance
today charge lawlessness, but even if one were to accept their view, today's alleged transgressions cannot be compared to any of the darker episodes of the past. To begin with, in
responding to 9/11, Congress was at pains to avoid measures that would infringe on Americans' basic rights. n55 The act establishing the Department of Homeland Security came
complete with a statutorily mandated privacy officer and a civil liberties officer, both responsible for insuring that privacy and civil liberties are lawfully protected. n56 The intelligence
community statutorily established a privacy officer with similar responsibilities. n57 U.S. surveillance programs have been authorized by Congress; n58 subjected to Congressional
oversight; n59 repeatedly reauthorized by Congress; n60 and subjected to approval and oversight by independent Article III judges. n61 To be sure, the Patriot Act has been subjected to
numerous administrative and legal challenges. n62 And it is true that the Bush administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program, at least in its initial [*1130] configuration, appears to have
been in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In March 2004, this led to dramatic hospital bedside confrontation between acting Attorney General James Comey and White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales in the intensive care ward where Attorney General John Ashcroft was recovering from serious illness. n63 Comey and other high-ranking Justice
Department officials threatened to resign en masse unless the violation was cured. n64 They prevailed. n65 What is significant here is that the system righted itself and the program was
brought under the rule of law. It is also true, of course, that in May 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in ACLU v. Clapper that the National Security
Agency's bulk collection of telephony metadata, one of the surveillance programs exposed by renegade NSA contractor Edward Snowden, went beyond what Congress intended when it
enacted Section 215 of the Patriot Act. n66 But the court was careful to skirt any arguments that the program itself was unconstitutional. n67 It is also important to note that, in
contradistinction to, say, the imprisonment of Debs and others under the Sedition Act of 1918 or the internment of Japanese Americans, Section 215 did not generate a class of victims,
and it did not establish the dragnet nationwide surveillance of Americans the critics described. n68 The NSA established "minimization" procedures to ensure that a human being only
ever examined a minuscule fraction of what the government collected for counterterrorism purposes, and only in those cases where there existed reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the telephone numbers in question were connected to terrorist plotters. n69 Out of the millions upon millions of calls made in a recent year, the NSA only looked at some 300
telephone subscribers, and only because evidence suggested that a terrorist plot was afoot. n70 This is hardly a number that justifies calling America a "surveillance [*1131] state." It is
not without significance that the world's leading critic of the "American surveillance state," Edward Snowden, has chosen to accept political asylum in Russia and appears to be settling in
for a prolonged stay. n71 Russia may no longer be the totalitarian communist state it once was, but over the past decade, under the tutelage of Vladimir Putin - a former KGB officer - it
has been sliding ever deeper back into authoritarianism. n72 That authoritarianism is maintained in part by a domestic surveillance system that, in terms of scope and effectiveness,
puts ours to shame. n73 The FSB, the successor organization to the KGB, has invested in technology that allows it to collect and to store not just metadata but also the content of
communications. n74 The FSB uses that technology to engage in essentially unchecked surveillance of telephone calls, e-mail traffic, blogs, online bulletin boards, and websites. n75
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two Russian journalists who put their lives at risk to write about this subject, conclude that over the past two years, thanks to technology, "the Kremlin
has transformed Russia into a surveillance state - at a level that would have made the Soviet KGB ... envious." n76 Of course, Russia is not a liberal democracy, and it certainly should
not set any sort of benchmark for America. But even when we compare the United States to other democracies, it becomes apparent how restricted and controlled the surveillance
practices of the U.S. government are. As Stuart Baker pointed out in a prepared statement before the U.S. Senate [*1132] Committee on the Judiciary, the Max Planck Institute conducted
a study that estimated the number of surveillance orders per 100,000 people in a number of Western countries. n77 While the figures are not directly comparable given different
definitions and methods of counting, the trend lines are starkly revealing. n78 "An Italian or Dutch citizen is over a hundred times more likely to be wiretapped by his government than an
American." n79 France, Germany, and Great Britain also conduct domestic surveillance in numbers that dwarf American practices. n80 There is thus a great deal of hypocrisy in the
criticism emanating from Europe about American surveillance practices. As Baker indicated, some of this is the result of the fact that, thanks to leaks and the fact that the U.S. reveals
much of what it is doing in laws that govern intelligence collection, Europeans know a great deal more about American surveillance than they do about their own practices. n81 The
Europeans engage in those practices for precisely the same reason the United States does: not to establish an Orwellian surveillance state, but to gain intelligence about a real and

The critics say the surveillance is not only

illegal but also unnecessary. n83 Yet, actual experience says something else .
Admittedly, the public record is somewhat sparse when it comes to linking
communications intelligence to actual successful interdiction of terrorist
plots. n84 That sparseness follows in large part from the reluctance of U.S.
intelligence agencies to disclose their [*1133] sources and methods. n85 The Privacy
present danger that threatens them even more than it threatens us. n82

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in its critical 2014 report about bulk collection of data, made a point of stressing that the
program was responsible for interdicting only a single case. n86 And the subject arrested in that case, the report stresses, was not a
violent terrorist but someone who was merely transmitting funds to a terrorist group. n87 But downplaying the significance of this
case seems inappropriate. It involved providing material support for the Somalia-based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, an
Islamic terrorist organization responsible for repeated incidents of mass slaughter in Kenya - this is not an insignificant arrest. n88

In any event, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is not the last
word on the subject of effectiveness. The National Research Council , responding
to a directive from President Obama, issued a study entitled Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence Technical Options. n89 It

points to not one, but four cases in which the interception of signals
intelligence was critical to apprehending terrorists or intercepting plots . n90
Those include, in addition to the al Shabaab case: (1) he case of David Coleman Headley, who was one of the planners of the 2005
Mumbai attack; n91 (2) the case of Khaliz Quazzanni, who was arrested in 2010 for providing material support to al Qaeda and was
also suspected of plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange; n92 and (3) the case of Najibullah Zazi, who was arrested in 2009

There are almost certainly

more cases that the world does not know about . Yet, foiling just one
terrorist attack holds the potential to save large numbers of lives . The
measures taken to interdict terrorist communication deserve applause,
not condemnation. The American surveillance state is working pretty well .
It is strictly limited in scope and has been effective thus far by the best
indicator we have: There has not been a reprise of 9/11.
for planning a suicide bomb attack on the New York City [*1134] subway system. n93

Extinction

Mhyrvold 13 (Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD,
Princeton Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action, Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series
Research paper NO . 2 2013)
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First,

of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology

most

because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the

United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly
committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and

the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous

advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades . High school
most important,

biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that

would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded
program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The
biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the
lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrows terrorists will have
vastly more deadly bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian
researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that
a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even
those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing
vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late
2003, found a way to improve on it: Bullers variation on mousepox was 100% lethal , although
his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals

the genetically altered virus is no

longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with
the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that
the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and
possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another
from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that

poxvirus that infects humans

to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is

resistant to any known antiviral therapy? Ive asked this question of experts

many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldnt
be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific
journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of
WisconsinMadison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make

Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is

hard to keep track of all the new potential threats . Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In
addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played
with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties ,
it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14

including the length of the latency period during which a person is

contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each
new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This
dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with
smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing
factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take
many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of
opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million

A virus genetically engineered to

infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowlysay, only after weeks or monthsand to
spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more
people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15

devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its
deadly effects suddenly . This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to
combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became
obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such
a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop
it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which
biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system , at

some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that

could drive the human race to extinction . Indeed, a detailed specieselimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal.
The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria
mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When Ive talked to
molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with
biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of
ideas.

Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing

about the demise of the human race or at least of killing a sufficient

number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back
1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem farfetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this
potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has
frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism
throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agentslethal enough to exterminate Homo sapienswill be available to anybody
with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.

1nc finance

banking high now

no threat of banking collapse energy, manufacturing
Street 1/19 [CHRISS W. STREET, 1/19/16, Devaluation: U.S. Dollar Strength
Signals Gains For U.S. Banks, Breitbart, http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2016/01/19/devaluation-u-s-dollar-strength-signals-economic-miracle]
According to the latest Fed data, foreign central banks sold $12 billion in the first week of the year and another $34.5 billion in the week ending January
13. As a result, total foreign central bank holdings fell to just $2.962 trillion. Foreign holdings are now below the prior low in November when China was

The U.S. dollar strengthened

by +6.2 percent over the last year against a basket of world currencies and +6 percent against the Chinese yuan
currency. Most people assume a strong U.S. dollar means Chinas
manufacturing will be more competitive. But that assumption fails to consider the
dumping U.S. Treasuries to try to stem crashes in both their yuan currency and stock markets.

fact that multi-national operating in China and their state-owned-enterprises have been borrowing in U.S. dollars to lock in interest rates that were about 4
percent cheaper than from China banks. Chinas 6 percent devaluation means dollar-loans must be paid off with 6 percent more in Chinese yuan. China
has a habit of announcing annual growth rates that have miraculously been at a +7 percent compounded rate since 2008. But during the same period,
Chinas debt grew by about 12 percent compounded and doubled to over $30 trillion. That means that debt in China grew at about $5 trillion faster than
the official growth rate. Breitbart News reported that Lombard Street Researchs estimates that recalculating Chinas growth indicates that the real growth
rate has fallen to a 2.3 percent rate since mid-2014. That would mean Chinas debt grew by $7 trillion faster than the economy since 2008. Nobody knows
just how much companies operating in China have borrowed in U.S. dollars, but it is believed to be at least $3 trillion. That would mean every 1 percent
devaluation in the Chinese yuan, costs companies in China about $30 billion. Chinas economic miracle was powered by a 65 percent devaluing of their
yuan currency in the mid-1990s. But that was when the communist nation had a small economy, little debt, and iron fisted control. Chinas economy today

The strength of the United

States dollar is not due to the weakness of China and other nations. The
U.S. oil and natural gas boom has made America the cheapest location for
heavy manufacturing . It will take years to build the infrastructure, but the strength of the U.S.
dollar means America is beginning to have its own banking economic
miracle as the extra interest-payments flood into New York and the U.S.
economy.
is 15 times larger and their debt to GDP leverage is similar to economic basket-case called Greece.

inev
Global de-dollarization inevitable their Zarate and Maund ev is too
outdated, doesnt assume recent policies
a) BRICS
Simha 16 [Rakesh Simha, New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs
analyst and former news editor for Financial Express, 1/21/16, U.S. currency
dictatorship: The struggle to end it, Independent Australia,
https://independentaustralia.net/business/business-display/us-currency-dictatorshipthe-struggle-to-end-it,8594]
India, the worlds third largest economy, and
Iran have agreed to settle their outstanding oil dues in rupees. Whats more, the
two countries may conduct all future trade in their national currencies. This
THE LAST time a country decided to dump the dollar in the oil business, the U.S. destroyed it. Now

follows an agreement between Iran and India in mid-2011 in which both sides decided to settle 45 per cent of Indias oil import bill in rupees and the
remaining 55 per cent in euros. In March 2012 the two countries inked the Rupee Payment Mechanism that allowed India to buy crude oil in its national

the U.S. itself which is

responsible for the dollars elimination from India-Iran trade. The Rupee Payment
currency. Iran then used the funds to buy products from Indian manufacturers. Ironically, it is

Mechanism was set up to skirt American economic sanctions on Tehran. Iranian oil forms a significant portion of Indias energy requirements. Similarly, the

India and the U.S. may have

come closer in recent years, but that hasnt blinded New Delhi to the toxic
nature of Americas currency as well as manipulation by Britain. The U.S. is literally writing
its own cheque with its unrestrained printing of the dollar , the bedrock of Americas postIranians rely upon India for steel, medicines, food and chemicals. Replacing the dollar

war hegemony. It is the reserve currency status of the dollar that allows the U.S. to fund its endless wars and topple governments with impunity. Across
the Atlantic, the Bank of England is involved in interest rate fixing of an order of magnitude that makes corruption in developing countries look puny by

it suits
the West to have periodic booms and busts because it keeps the emergent
economies in turmoil. It keeps poor countries poor and the emergent ones
stuck in whats known as the middle income trap. In his luminary piece, Geopolitics of
comparison. Such financial manipulations and currency debasements are negatively and cyclically impacting the global economy. In fact,

Technology, Professor Anis Bajrektarevic very accurately diagnoses: the hydrocarbons and its scarcity phychologization, its monetization (and related
weaponization) is serving rather a coercive and restrictive status quo than a developmental incentive. That essentially calls not for an engagement but
compliance. It finally reads that the fossil fuels consumption (along with the policy of currency-choice and prizing it) does not only trigger one CC
Climate Change, but it also perpetuates another global CC planetary Competition and Confrontation (over finite resources) to which the MENA
calamities are only a tip of an iceberg. Therefore, this highly addictive petrol USD construct logically permits only a (technological) modernization which
is defensive, restrictive and reactive. No wonder that democracy is falling short. Indias central bank has invested a significant proportion of its
approximately $500 billion reserves in dollar denominated assets. Any sharp depreciation in the value of the dollar entails significant losses to this

the idea of de-dollarisation has resonated with the

countrys leadership in recent times. In 2010, the Reserve Bank of India proposed floating the rupee as an
alternative global currency. In a study titled Internationalisation of Currency: The Case
of the Indian Rupee and the Chinese Renminbi, the bank said the dollar
was likely to lose its predominance as the global reserve currency in the
foreseeable future . 'The Indian rupee is rarely being used for invoicing of international trade,' the study pointed out. It argued that
India needs to proactively take steps to increase the role of the rupee in the region. Also, the strength of the growing Indian
economy has raised the issue of greater internationalisation of the Indian
rupee. Group remedy Indian negotiators have actively pushed dollar-free
trade at the annual meetings of the BRICS group. This group of five major economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa is
actively engaged in speeding up the process of increasing mutual trade in
national currencies. The $100 billion BRICS New Development Bank ( NDB ) and a reserve currency
pool worth over another $100 billion are both aimed at weakening the western chokehold
on global financial flows. According to Indias K.V. Kamath, the first president of NDB, exchange rate
massive holding. In this backdrop,

differences increased the cost of hard-currency loans to emerging and

developing countries by 15-20 per cent. In his view, using local currencies would
eliminate that risk and ease the burden. The BRICS have already launched a
Contingency Reserve Arrangement to enable the five member states to
swap currencies. Another key advantage of using national currencies in trade and investment is that businesses do not have to hedge
against two different currencies. Transition to trade in national currencies will also protect countries from the volatility of a particular currency.

b) china

Simha 16 [Rakesh Simha, New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs

analyst and former news editor for Financial Express, 1/21/16, U.S. currency
dictatorship: The struggle to end it, Independent Australia,
https://independentaustralia.net/business/business-display/us-currency-dictatorshipthe-struggle-to-end-it,8594]
the Chinese have surprised everyone with the speed with which the
renminbi has acquired global acceptance. In a paper titled The Renminbi Bloc is Here, Arvind Subramanian
and Martin Kessler of the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics provide a dramatic picture of how the renminbi is
growing in strength while the U.S. dollar weakens. Firstly, they say the renminbi is
already the dominant reference currency in India and South Africa. Secondly,
since mid-2010 the renminbi has made dramatic strides as a reference
currency compared with the dollar and euro. The renminbi has now
become the dominant reference currency in East Asia, eclipsing the dollar
and the euro.The currencies of South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand now more closely track the
RMB than the dollar. The dollars dominance as reference currency in East Asia is now limited to Hong Kong (by virtue of the peg),
Meanwhile,

Vietnam and Mongolia.

c) russia

Uatkhanov 15 [YERBOLAT UATKHANOV, 9/7/15, National Bank Says

Dedollarisation Is Inevitable, Astana Times,
http://astanatimes.com/2015/09/national-bank-says-dedollarisation-is-inevitable/]
National
Bank Chairman Kairat Kelimbetov noted he considers dedollarisation
processes inevitable and doesnt expect any depreciatory expectations, while
ASTANA Kazakhstan transitioned to a free-floating exchange rate and Aug. 20 the tenge dropped 26 percent against the dollar.

there are different opinions concerning worsening conditions for business, low demand for real estate and opportunities for domestic producers. The
interest rate is still 10 percent for deposits in tenge and 3 percent for deposits in foreign currency. Besides, the warranty for deposits is five million tenge if

we
consider that in the medium term, of course, dedollarisation processes will be
started . We expect that there wont be any depreciatory expectations. I think that dedollarisation is inevitable, he said, as reported by
you have deposits in foreign currency and 10 million tenge if you have deposits in tenge. In general, everyone makes their own decision, but

Zakon.kz. Kelimbetov stated that the Kazakh people are used to the $100 price for a barrel of oil, but today fewer amounts of monetary funds go into the
budget due to the decrease of the cost of goods exported by the state. He noted all social programmes were saved to the fullest extent, prices for social

Putin put
forward a bill which is to create conditions removing the U.S. dollar from
Russias trade exchanges with countries in the former Soviet Union and
creates a single financial market in the territory of Russia, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other former Soviet
countries. A special mechanism would enable the nations to forego using dollars and euros as transaction currency.
goods are under control and the inflation rate in Kazakhstan wont exceed 8 percent in the medium term. Russian President Vladimir

1nc alt causes

alt causes bitcoin, rogue actors their author
Zarate 14 [Juan. Senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), the senior national security analyst for CBS News, a visiting lecturer
at the Harvard Law School, and a national security and financial integrity
consultant. The Coming Financial Wars Parameters, Winter 2014]
The current economic environment involves three significant trends that
undercut Americas use of its financial power. The use of new cur- rencies
and technologies outside the formal financial system , through the
Internet, and with less and less accountability and transparency, undercut the
ability to track money flows with traditional means. At the same time, rogue
actors are coalescing around a common goal of cir- cumventing and
undermining US financial pressure and using financial weapons themselves.
Finally, the US dollarand its predominanceis a target for competitors and those
who bemoan the worlds reliance on the dollar as the accepted reserve and trading
currency as the central element of US financial power.

1nc dollar defense

Reading uniqueness evidence about status quo investments and market
confidence from 5 years before the 08 recession should be punishable by
loss. Heres a characterization from their Selden evidence that should be
drastically reinterpreted in light of 08

Selden

[R. Colgate Selden 2003, attorney, LL.M. in securities and financial

regulation from Georgetown University Law Center, Alston and Bird, LLP, JD,
Vermont Law School, former senior counsel in the CFPB Office of Regulations, The
Executive Protection: Freezing the Financial Assets of Alleged Terrorists, The
Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U.S. Markets, Fordham Journal of
Corporate and Financial Law, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2003,
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180andcontext=jcfl]
Currently, foreign investment in the United States is a significant part of
total nationwide investment.99 Much of this capital inflow is due to the
comfort foreign investors feel about the security and stability of the U.S.
markets and the country as a whole
Empirics prove dollar decline has no broader impact on the economy
Kenny 14 (Charles Kenny, senior fellow at the CGD, 1-17-2014, Washington post,
"America is No. 2! And thats great
news"http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-no-2-and-thats-greatnews/2014/01/17/09c10f50-7c97-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html)
There are some real economic costs related to losing the top spot in the GDP
rankings, but they are small and manageable . The dollar might lose its dominance as the
currency of choice for central bank reserves and trading, and some predict that will increase the cost of U.S.

the dollar share of global reserves has already fallen

from about 80 percent in the 1970s to about 40 percent today, with the euro and the
renminbi gaining ground, but there isnt much sign that that has spooked global
markets. Meanwhile, businesses in the rest of the world still manage to
export, even though they must go through the trouble of exchanging currencies.
borrowing and exporting. In fact,

1nc econ defense

No impact to economic decline prefer new data
Drezner 14 (Daniel Drezner, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global
Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66.
Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164)
a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on
cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple
analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase
their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic
downturn would lead to an increase in conflict whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict.
The final significant outcome addresses

Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy

The aggregate data suggest

otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average
level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the
financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies
confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent
conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we
consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with
the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the
crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or
ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43
movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.

Their studies are inconclusivethis card beats Royal

Brandt and Ulfelder 11*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from
Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of
Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. **Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political
science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research
interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011,
Economic Growth and Political Instability, Social Science Research Network]
statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic
crisis of 20082010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid
and profound effects on countries political stability. When economies grow at a healthy
These

clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be
flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the

When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are

presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end
of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an
increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime
breakdown.
type of regime they inhabit.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries economic growth

rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a
great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science
research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of

specify slow economic growth

as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of
economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results.
Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence
of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical
civil wars, coups detat, and transitions to and from democracy often

analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of
protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of
short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several
forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few
decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim
to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The
goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political

We do so with
statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for
nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an
instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data.

instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political

ours is the first statistical study of this

relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of
endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the
most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.
instability and economic growth. To our knowledge,

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that
social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup
attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship
between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes
contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we

the
relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as
uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think
these findings also help explain why the global recession of 20082010
has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that
some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent
uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.
would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that

1nc pca

Impact
Is ridiculous their ev says we need more positive control measures on
nukes they dont solve that

alt causes
Too many alt causes
PAGE 7 (Erin, Senior Fellow in Terrorism and Homeland Security at the Institute for
Global Security, Law & Policy at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and
Presidential Management Fellow, Balancing Individual Rights and Public Health
Safety during Quarantine: The U.S. and Canada, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law // AKONG)
Posse Comitatus has greatly diminished since the time it was passed. It has been
" repeatedly circumvented by subsequent legislation" and diminished or
disregarded by the actions of several presi- dents .79 Congress has
authorized military use in law enforcement for drug trafficking,
immigration, the Civil Disturbance Statutes, natural disasters, and
homeland defense .8 While the Posse Comitatus "remains a deterrent to prevent the
The strength of

unauthorized deployment of troops at the local level in response to what is purely a civilian law enforcement

is a "hollow shell in place of a law that formerly was a real

limitation on the military's role in civilian law enforcement and security
issues." 81 The number of exceptions and policy shifts in regards to Posse
Comitatus over the "past 20 years strongly indicate" that it is not a major
barrier to the use of military forces in the battle against terrorism.
matter," it

Local cops are an alt cause

turn
Military in domestic law enforcement involvement solves WMD terror
Trebilcock, Major in the U.S. Army Reserves 153rd Legal Services Organization,
2000 (csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/trebilcock.pdf)
These early steps at injecting the

military into domestic law enforcement were perhaps misguided, primarily due to
missions
have a value

the fact that they injected the military into

that they are not trained to perform. They
, however, in creating a
precedent for the use of the military in homeland defense. For decades the primary threat to U.S. security interests have been overseas, in Europe or the
Middle East. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the increase in technological capabilities in hostile Third World nations, however, the focus on the

The most effective use of military personnel in

preserving domestic security and order in the next century is not as narcotics police or border patrol agents, but rather as
defenders against terrorism and w eapons of m ass d estruction. The military possesses
unique training and equipment advantages in this arena that cannot be
duplicated by civilian law enforcement. The fact that the National Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act
threat of terrorism aimed at the U.S. has increased.

while in its state status also provides a great deal of flexibility to planners for homeland defense. National Guard troops may be actively employed in law
enforcement activities in addition to their military specialty. While to the untrained eye the distinction between a BDU13 clad Army Reservist and a BDU
clad National Guardsman may be nonexistent, the legal distinction between them is significant. During a natural disaster Army reservists or Guardsman
may both provide logistical aid such as water purification, medical assistance, and communications.14 However, due to the Posse Comitatus Act, it is only
the Guardsman in his/her State status that can take an active role in suppressing looting and in providing general security for an area that has lost
effective law enforcement control.15

1nc
No impact empirics prove

Feaver and Kohn 5 - Peter Feaver, professor of Political Science and Public Policy and the director of
the Triangle Institute for Security Studies at Duke University, and Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the
University of North Carolina, 2005, The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and Their Mutual Misunderstanding, in American
Defense Policy, 2005 edition, ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, Collins G. Shackelford, p. 339

Concerns about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve
are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic . Writing in
the 1950s, Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating, if not embracing, the
conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a
substantial degree of cultural autonomy. Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy,
military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and dictates of its civilian masters.2 The
end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate.
The contemporary

heirs of Janowitz see the all volunteer military as drifting too far
away from the norms of American society, thereby posing problems for civilian
control. They make tour principal assertions. First, the military has grown out of step
ideologically with the public, showing itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious
(and fundamentalist) than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the Republican Party.
Second, the

military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted with, and

sometimes even explicitly hostile to, civilian culture . Third, the armed forces have
resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and have generally proved
reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control and military effectiveness will
both suffer as the militaryseeking ways to operate without effective civilian oversight and alienated from the
society around itloses the respect and support of that society . By contrast, the heirs of Huntington
argue that a degenerate civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it intends to eradicate healthy and
functional civil-military differences, particularly in the areas of gender, sexual orientation, and discipline. This camp, too, makes
four key claims. First, its members assert that the military is divorced in values from a political and cultural elite that is itself
alienated from the general public. Second, it believes this civilian elite to be ignorant of, and even hostile to, the armed forces
eager to employ the military as a laboratory for social change, even at the cost of crippling its warfighting capacity. Third, it
discounts the specter of eroding civilian control because it sees a military so thoroughly inculcated with an ethos of
subordination that there is now too much civilian control, the effect of which has been to stifle the military's ability to function
effectively Fourth, because support for the military among the general public remains sturdy, any gap in values is
inconsequential. The problem, if anything, is with the civilian elite. The

debate has been lively (and inside the Beltway,

sometimes quite vicious), but it has rested on very thin evidence (tunneling anecdotes and claims
and counterclaims about the nature of civilian and military attitudes. Absent has been a body of systematic
data exploring opinions, values, perspectives, and attitudes inside the military
compared with those held by civilian elites and the general public . Our project provides
some answers.

Alt causes
Schake 13 (Kori Schake, Ph.D., fellow at Stanford Universitys Hoover Institution,
formerly worked in the Departments of Defense and State, was the director of
defense strategy and requirements on the NSC, and held the distinguished chair in
international security studies at West Point, THIS QDR IS A BUDGET DOCUMENT,
NOT A STRATEGY DOCUMENT, War on the Rocks, 3-6-2014,
http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/this-qdr-is-a-budget-document-not-a-strategydocument/)
Secretary Hagel claims that the fiscal year (FY) 2015 defense budget matches our strategy to our resourcesOur
updated defense strategy, that is. Updated because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorably said the
defense strategy could not be executed if a single dollar was cut from the budget, right before Congress cut about
$50 billion of them. The only update in this Quadrennial Defense Review from earlier strategic guidance looks to

consist of narrowing the force-sizing demand to defeat a regional adversary while imposing unacceptable costs on
another. Otherwise its all the usual about the world becoming more volatile, global connectedness, building partner
capacity, rebalancing to Asia without diminishing effort anywhere else, the need for exceptional agility in our
forces and efficiencies in the defense effort. Theres lots of talk about innovation, but little evidence of itthe QDR
details forces that would be cut if sequestration goes into effect, but does not explore different ways of achieving
our defense objectives. Even this updated strategy is, by Hagels own admission, unexecutable without $115 billion
more than the top line legislated in 2010 (separate from the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and Security
Initiative submitted as a wish list along with the budget itself). That completely negates the $113 billion in cuts
that the Presidents budget imposes. So, theyre actually cutting nothing. The Defense Department has had three
budget cycles to bring its spending into line with the law, andeven with an $80 billion annual slush fund of war
operationsit has not complied. Hagel says it would have been irresponsible not to request these additional
resources. That twists the argument: it was irresponsible not to develop a strategy consistent with available

the central issue this QDR

should have addressed in detail is where to accept risk as resources
become less plentiful: in what areas can we afford to reduce our margin of error, and where would
resources. This QDR has failed in its fundamental purpose. Perhaps

unacceptable dangers be incurred? What missions ought we to stop doing and stop preparing for in order to ensure
we are able to meet our highest priorities? Where do redundancies exist that can be eliminated to free up
resources? The Department of Defense claimed that the QDR would initiate a serious debate about risk. While the
press statements emphasize greater risk in carrying out the strategy, theres no actual discussion in the QDR about
how risk is assessed. The QDR does say we continue to experience gaps in training and maintenance over the near
term and will have a reduced margin of error in dealing with risks of uncertainty, but does not explain how different
choices might aggravate or mitigate those risks. If DOD actually wants a debate about where to accept risk
instead of simply brandishing it as a threat to budget hawksit will need to establish a metric for evaluating risk.
Secretary Hagel claims that the QDR prioritizes Americas highest security interests by focusing on three strategic
pillars: defending the homeland against all threats; building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and
deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. It is
difficult to discern how these three fundamental purposes of defense activity constitute prioritiesthey comprise
the entirety of the defense effort. What program or activity could not be justified on their bases? The purpose of

where is the politicking with Congress

to gain adoption of this approach? The Hagel budget has zero probability of
being adopted by either authorizers or appropriators on the Hill . By
neglecting his own fundamental responsibility, which is to be the
Department of Defenses interface with the political processes of
governance, Secretary Hagel has set the DOD up for another year of
ineffectual bleating by the service chiefs that the end is nigh. It didnt
change a single vote in the past two years of sequestration and absent a
serious effort, it wont change a single vote this year. Where is the private horsepriorities is to allow apportionment of resources. And

trading and, if need be, public shaming, to get Senator Kelly Ayotte off her hobby horse about the A-10s? Where is

Where
is the orchestration of presidential involvement to raise the political
stakes? That ought not be the uniformed militarys job; and in any event,
the Obama White House has selected service chiefs who demonstrably
cannot deliver that kind of political heft. If Congress is to be cajoled into doing the right
the flinty insistence that continuing the galloping pace of military entitlements is creating a hollow force?

things, it needs to be confronted politician-to-politician. That Secretary Hagel sent the third echelon and a press

the administration is going to mail it in, which

will result in attaining neither the top line it seeks nor the latitude to
implement its priorities. Hagel has failed in the essential work of gaining
support for his strategy and his budget among the people with the
constitutional responsibility for making it into law. This is not only bad
politics, it is bad for civil-military relations because DODs civilian
leadership is already busy blaming Congress rather than getting on with
the business of effectively programming the worlds largest defense
budget. The Obama administration is encouraging the uniformed military
statement to announce this tells us that

to attack the legislative branch for any shortfalls of funding they have no
right to expect receiving. Secretary Hagels press release sternly intones that it would be dishonest
and irresponsible to present a QDR articulating a strategy disconnected from the reality of resource constraints. A
strategy must have the resources for its implementation. This is a welcome acceptance of responsibility, overdue
from a department submitting its first budget consistent with the law that has been in force for nearly three years.
It would be a lot more persuasive if Hagel had submitted a budget consistent with the top line or had done the hard
political work of ensuring legislative support for his priorities. The QDR itself gives the right refutation to DODs
strategy: the longer critical decisions are delayed in the hope that budget caps will be raised, the more difficult
and painful those decisions will be to implement, and the more damaging they will be to our ability to execute the
strategy. Exactly.