1 | Page

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador
B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to
inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived
of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the
Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia
had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered
from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to
him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.

2 | Page

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships
and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after
reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and
is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application
that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it
has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise,
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract
of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license
due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1wphi1.nt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as
the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

3 | Page

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his
act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes
in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as
the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this
nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone
a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair
the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

259 SCRA 129 (1996).

Id., pp. 135-136.

Id., p. 136.

C.A. O.G. 4079.

Farrales vs. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000).

Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).

4 | Page

Aranes vs. Judge Occiano

AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17,
2000 at the couples residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000
but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of
the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the
absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage
on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon.
Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

5 | Page

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers
that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone
else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge
and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act
of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued
by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and
his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the
second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have
not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and

6 | Page

respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a
joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with
the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

7 | Page

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of
his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the
point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover,
the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due
to a lack of comprehension of the law.

8 | Page

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a
six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
2 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v. Collado,
A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ,
August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.
3 Rollo, p. 12.
4 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
5 Article 4, Family Code.
6 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263
citing Ubongan v. Mayor, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
7 . . . . Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978 October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 771.
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the
law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja
on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage
with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their

9 | Page

conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven
years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter
was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the
written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the
Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDABAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo
Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October
5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of
filing fees from exempted entities. 1

10 | P a g e

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective

Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case
was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court,
Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however
transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval
inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon,
Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence
of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that
he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were
not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses
and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the
employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon
Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that
it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in
the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently
Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.
Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were
kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow
up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his
duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano
and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the
marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to
furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing
their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other
five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized
because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio

11 | P a g e

Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize
them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the
parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not
sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of
marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that
there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that
month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document,
although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages
celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of
complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for
the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments
made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further
avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she
cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees
because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that
the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged,
P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development
Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo
considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated
was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages
solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all
the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were
actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with
the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in
charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely
in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly
report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent
judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon
Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning
unit to respondent judge.

12 | P a g e

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an airconditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to
Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the
same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was
with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk
of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and
that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the airconditioning
unit
was
bought
from
his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had
been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the
public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al.,
"bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property
bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a
receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid;
that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman;
and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of
court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a
corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should
the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure
therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the
bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has
nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in
his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent
judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact,
the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6,
1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention
prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case
archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused
therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment
of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy

13 | P a g e

failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in
her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket
fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not
allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed
to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the
same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the
Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994,
together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and
we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of
the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his
industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply
substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and
hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage.
Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage
license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano
Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh.
C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by
Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties
and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did
not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims
that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent
either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the
Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay
himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon
solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were
advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife
believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He

14 | P a g e

declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no
date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not
have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they
merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a
simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened
because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that
he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the
marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already
prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from
the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone
that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not
bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a
copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not
solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over
the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that
Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his
table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to
show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may
convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those
pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would
allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a
mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged
reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow
himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that
Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did
not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge
Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it
was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not
required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they
have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as
they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than
thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this

15 | P a g e

is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when
he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification
of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage
license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he
did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did
not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage
certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and
Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to
the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only
made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there
was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the
marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage
under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why
did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he
solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and
Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the
date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties
were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as
they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no
one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is
still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just
absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not
the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code
it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage
contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C),
and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and
Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario
testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On crossexamination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared
their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon,
and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared
before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f),
their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses,
Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other

16 | P a g e

aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by

a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and
Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part,
respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When
she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness
she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN,
p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She
signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal
sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know
that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very
difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their
witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee,
but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack
of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William
Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14).
Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that
before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order
to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the
parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened
to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was
to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate
of
three
(3)
to
four
(4)
times
everyday
(TSN,
p.
12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular,
if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked
by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband
and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2)
witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his
alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as
shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who
declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the
contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was
really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary
his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only

17 | P a g e

twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7)

marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for
September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages
during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent
Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage
contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed
affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage
contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is
not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not
charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the
monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in
the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing
the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven
by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July,
1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were
six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the
said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report
of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents
that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however,
present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee
for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases
with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based on
how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the
number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and
checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies
on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to
have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report
when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required
to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of
which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's
Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of
the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly

18 | P a g e

assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation
and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial
register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo
duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number
of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly
report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that
he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still
it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other
things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was
supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records
including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for
Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was
already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN,
p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for
what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized
during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this
case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did
not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only
issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said
month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported
as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there
were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy
and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and
P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to
the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized
and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This
should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that
some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy
considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the
marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he
did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the
marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.

19 | P a g e

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her
some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because
Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the
personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that
date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her
were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already.
Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some
notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any
memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has
been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court
(Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and
8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond
deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond
she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash
bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own
cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash
bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned
cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was
already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that
actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March
26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos
(Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the
initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after
keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of
the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she
withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It
was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she
withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary
receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a
bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties
in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case
amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge
Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October
21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits

20 | P a g e

and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that
some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number
of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of
the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was
already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed
Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The
evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991
Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six
Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought
to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was
still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty
Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt
was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought
by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of
Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed
in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a
witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court
and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to
suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond
deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without
issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that
Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she
deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did
not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has
been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody
and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused
was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with
respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled
People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal
jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The

21 | P a g e

evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the
municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in
custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David
Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants
should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that
Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was
under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge
Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case
No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states:
"this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant
of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no
return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh.
0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that
Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving
Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at
large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused,
Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an
order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was
supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did
not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived
was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation
is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed
to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in
writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only
later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only
heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a
suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that
the complainants could not present records or other documentary evidence
to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on
collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which
was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and
that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her
personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February
4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection
against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic
Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of
filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on
loans they obtained.

22 | P a g e

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing
fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received
them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part
Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records,
however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the
bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by
respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac
was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act
720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be
submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of
the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March
12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr.
had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he
did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has
been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with
respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully
recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely
dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license,
there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage
contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a
marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites
of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply
with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of
the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he
only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already
signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her,
to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of
court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take
refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).

23 | P a g e

In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy,

the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months
of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents
notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for
said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of
temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving
the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on
March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and
after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or
authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond
of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case
No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an
unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it
with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and
for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the
service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court
who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer
for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by
order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec.
183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also
provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt
upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the
collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits,
can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ
Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme
Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be
deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof
with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and
that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful
order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her
conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable
officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M.
No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not
authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her

24 | P a g e

shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal
or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25,
1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit
the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent
Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than
a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the
judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course,
within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of
misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly
require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio
P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses
in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

25 | P a g e

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes

1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA
635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act No. 3613.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite
of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin;
Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay &
Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte.
As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually
several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of
the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him,
he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do

26 | P a g e

so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized
because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of
marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in
the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias
& Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he
refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not
sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with
the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after
the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started
living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to
the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and
not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The
court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already
before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been
less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe.
Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the
marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

27 | P a g e

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he
was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of
the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage
was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the
consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer,
Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of
Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

28 | P a g e

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M.

CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970
under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24,
1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She
affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate
to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate
the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It
declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it
ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182
was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued.
Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification
and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the
legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer,
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the
solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.

29 | P a g e

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer
having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of
"due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by
a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil
marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be
held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the
proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings.
There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not

30 | P a g e

discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the
absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.
2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano,
Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.
3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices
Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision
dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.
4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.
5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.
6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out
that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation
lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was
adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that
there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by
the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro
is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:

31 | P a g e

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did
not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony
of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly
served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

32 | P a g e

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered
the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as
a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the fiveyear common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence

33 | P a g e

of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath.
...
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and
his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

34 | P a g e

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable.
Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and
44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of

35 | P a g e

either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
Puno
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

and

Kapunan,

JJ.,

concur.

Footnotes
1

The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59, Toledo City, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby
granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6;
Rollo, p. 21).
2

Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
7

Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of

this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
9

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10

Sec. 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010,
December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

36 | P a g e
11

Sec. 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12

Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal or family life. . . .
13

Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14

Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
15

Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16

Rollo, p. 29.

17

Art. 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.

18

Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years. . . .
Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years. . ."
19

Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after
attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached
the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who
had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or
person having legal charge of the insane, at anytime before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining
sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the marriage.
21

Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board,

272 III. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
22

In re Conza's Estate, 176 III. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited
in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
23

Art. 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24

Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
(1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25

35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

37 | P a g e
26

18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

27

Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge
Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).
28

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29

Art. 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further
amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.

38 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.
Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036
declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and
appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana
Geronimo.
The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the
estate of Graciana Geronimo-Esman.
On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the
heirs oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as "husband of
the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner
naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing
the latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the
marriage between oppositor and the decedent was a "nullity for want of a
marriage license".
It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo,
her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . . However, the
husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being
questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between
oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license.
The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a
judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman was valid.

39 | P a g e

Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and
oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage
license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact,
petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
Pateros shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the
marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that the marriage contract itself does now
(sic) show the number of the marriage license issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover,
marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the
oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to
Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959.
On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by
petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned
documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for the phrases "not
stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the
Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified copy of the
marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named
the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked
that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the
omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the
Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no
marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued
to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of Printing with
serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or municipalities thru
proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing
of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing
of the same forms in the succeeding years.
Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the
deceased and oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of
the National Archives & Records Section, testified that a copy of the marriage
contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated on
January 7, 1955, is on file with their office.
Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified
that he was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed
in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate Concepcion from
1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spouses Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman whom he attended to spirituality, conducted mass for,
gave communion, and visited them socially. He had occasions to go to the
couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the couple
were quite close with each other and with the people working in their
business.
Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business
testified that she was aware of the marriage which took place between
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as
husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the
oppositor who has been successfully supervising the lingerie business after
the death of Graciana Geronimo.

40 | P a g e

Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in
charge of all accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14)
municipalities of the province of Rizal which include marriage licenses; and
pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken
by the Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9, 1953.
Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila,
testified that in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no.
23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no column for the marriage license;
that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that they have a
copy of the questioned marriage contract in which the marriage license
number is recorded; and that the records of 1959 were lost during a typhoon,
but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the archives section.
Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana
Geronimo on January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage
license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the deceased to the
public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3) 2
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:
It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do
not bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of
Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such nonindication of the number could only serve to prove that the number was not
recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the
required marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage license number
(No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does appear in the certified
archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-markings). The
non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the
petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the
validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which
requires that the marriage license number would (sic) be indicated in the
marriage contract itself. 3
Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the
marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the
latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the former, the
petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the following question
in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites
license is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently present
a question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that there was no marriage
license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the public
respondent found and ruled otherwise.
In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases on
the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the
exceptions thereto, we stated:
Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over

41 | P a g e

again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion,
they must stand.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of endings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above
exceptions.
On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the
mind of the petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged
absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman
because the copies of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not
state the marriage license number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious.
Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the marriage
contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where the
marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner
tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued
on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was
sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus:
It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable
forms of the Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A)
come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers.
These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal
treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular
year are the same numbers used in the succeeding years when the same
forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the
serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.
This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the
appellant refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage
License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of
Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of

42 | P a g e

Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and
"2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their
marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the same
number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in
October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage license
bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June
29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and
Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32) 5
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the nonrecording of the marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the
license itself.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Entitled "Ireneo Geronimo vs. Antonio Esman." Per Associate Justice Serafin
V.C. Guingona, concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and
Jaime M. Lantin; Rollo, 24-35.
2 Rollo, 25-27.
3 Id., 30.
4 204 SCRA 601, 608-609 [1991]. Footnotes citing cases are omitted.
5 Rollo, 32-33.

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993
Facts:
Graciana Geronimo and private respondent were married. Graciana died without a
will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers
Tomas and petitioner, her nephew Salvador and her husband. The husband was
appointed as the administrator of the estate of the deceased.
However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the
decedent is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the
marriage between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage
license. Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses

43 | P a g e

Esman because the copies of the marriage contract he presented did not state the
marriage license number
Issue:
Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites license is
absent?
Ruling:
Yes. The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by
the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of
the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which requires that the
marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision 1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment 2
dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal
Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.

44 | P a g e

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the
Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020.
The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed
by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9
which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in
which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has
no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce
granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense
of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following
People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not

45 | P a g e

know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually
took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 12 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13
of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16
However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original
decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of.
Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT
IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.

46 | P a g e

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in
the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is
presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his
act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CAG.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423
of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration
of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and

47 | P a g e

purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio
to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of
the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the
time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of
the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained
after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

48 | P a g e
1

Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred
in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
2

Records, pp. 114-119.

Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices
Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and
Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
4

Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. "B,"
the copy of their marriage contract. Records, p. 10.
5

The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:

"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete
on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial.
"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code."

Rollo, pp. 38-40.

Records, p. 119.

G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

10

58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11

Rollo, p. 43.

12

ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
13

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
14

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

49 | P a g e
15

G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

16

Rollo, p. 51.

17

Id. at 20-21.

18

G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

19

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
20

Supra.

21

CA Rollo, p. 38.

22

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

23

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
24

Rollo, p. 54.

25

G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

26

Id. at 124.

Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in
1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992,
Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged
with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that
his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.

50 | P a g e

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.
Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.