Republic vs Dayot

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint
on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage
is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised
any time.

Alcantara
vs
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

Alcantara

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he
has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the
Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for
them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor
the Rosita was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.

ISSUE:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
HELD:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties
are residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that
does not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract
from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which
he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly

and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went
through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle (Alcantara vs Alcantara, G.R. No.
167746, August 28, 2007).

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22677

February 28, 1967

PEDRO III FORTICH-CELDRAN, JESUS, MANUEL, MIGUEL and VICENTE, all

surnamed
FORTICH-CELDRAN;
SANTIAGO
CATANE
and
ABELARDO
CECILIO, petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIO A. CELDRAN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

San Juan, Africa & Benedicto

Casiano U. Laput for respondents.

and

Eduardo

B.

Sinense

for

petitioners.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of properties and for accounting was
filed on February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No. 3397-R).
Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose, Francisco, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all surnamed
Abuton-Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro Celdran by the first nuptial) and, as the
administratrix of Francisco Celdran (another brother), Modesta Rodriguez. Defendants
were: Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased by the first marriage who refused to join as
plaintiff), Josefa Vda. de Celdran (spouse of the deceased by the second marriage),
Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III, Jesus, Vicente and Miguel, all surnamed Fortich Celdran
(children of the deceased by the second nuptial.
After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiff
was filed on May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran. This motion has been
marked as Exhibit B-Josefa.1wph1.t
Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs (excluding Ignacio) filed an amended
complaint impleading Ignacio Celdran as defendant. Ignacio Celdran filed an answer
with counterclaim and cross-claim.
After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran had the document Exh. B-Josefa (the
motion to withdraw) examined by the Police Department of Cebu City. The police were
of the view that the same (signature therein) was falsified. Alleging newly discovered
evidence, Ignacio Celdran asked for new trial, which the court denied.
All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran, thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into an
amicable settlement, recognizing as valid the aforementioned extrajudicial partition.
Regarding Ignacio Celdran, the court rendered judgment on July 19, 1961, declaring the
same extrajudicial partition as valid for having been ratified by him (Ignacio).
Specifically, the court found among other things that Ignacio signed the motion to
withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa) after he received P10,000 of the agreed P20,000 and two
residential lots to be given to him in return for his aforesaid ratification of the partition.
Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and
Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of P20,000
aforestated and to deliver to him the promised two parcels of land.
Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. And said appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record before Us as still pending.
Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an information for
falsification of a public document that is, Exh. B-Josefa or the abovementioned

motion to withdraw in the civil case was filed by the City Fiscal of Ozamis in the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Accused therein were: Pedro III, Antonio,
Manuel, Vicente, Miguel, and Jesus, all surnamed Celdran (defendants in the civil
case); Santiago Catane, as subscribing officer; Abelardo Cecilio, as the person who
filed the motion.
As private complainant, however, Ignacio Celdran on December 12, 1962, moved
before trial to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial
question. The reason given in support thereof was that the alleged falsification of the
same document is at issue in the civil case pending in the Court of Appeals.
Declaring that there was no pre-judicial question, the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the motion to suspend the prosecution. It ruled
that the alleged forgery was not an issue in the civil case.
Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed in the Court of Appeals on February 21,
1963, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. 31909-R) to enjoin
the CFI of Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal of Ozamis from proceeding with the
prosecution of the criminal case.
On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals decided said petition for certiorari, ordering
the suspension of the criminal case due to pre-judicial question.
Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran; Santiago
Catane and Abelardo Cecilio accused in the criminal suit and respondents in the
petition for certiorari appealed to Us from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 18, 1964.
Appellants would contend that there is no pre-judicial question involved. The record
shows that, as aforestated, the Court of First Instance ruled that Ignacio Celdran ratified
the partition agreement; among the reasons cited by the trial court for said ruling is that
Ignacio Celdran received P10,000 and signed the motion to withdraw as plaintiff in the
suit. Disputing this, Celdran assigned as error in his appeal the finding that he signed
the aforementioned motion (Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains that the same is a forgery.
Since ratification is principal issue in the civil action pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals, and the falsification or genuineness of the motion to withdraw presented
and marked as evidence in said civil case is among the questions involved in said
issue, it follows that the civil action poses a pre-judicial question to the criminal
prosecution for alleged falsification of the same document, the motion to withdraw (Exh.
B-Josefa).
Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to withdraw; its
authenticity is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the civil
case will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal suit pending in another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question which
should first be decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case.

A pre-judicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal; that is, it is determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction
to pass upon the same is lodged in another tribunal. 1
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by
respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of
the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until
that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the
Court about such decision. (Supreme Court minute resolution of April 27, 1962 in
Adm. Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) .
Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio Celdran's right as private offended party
to file through counsel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the same exists where, as
herein, the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the prosecution, did not object to the
filing of said motion. And its filing in this case complied with Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for the
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial
question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the
trial of the criminal action.
Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution was therefore attended with grave
abuse of discretion; and the issue having been squarely and definitely presented before
the trial court, a motion for reconsideration, which would but raise the same points, was
not necessary. Neither was appeal the remedy available, since the order denying
suspension is interlocutory and thus not yet appealable.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review ordering suspension of
Criminal CASE No. 5719,People vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran, et al., pending before the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after Civil Case, CA-G.R. No. 30499R, Pedro A. Celdran, et al. vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran III, et al., shall have been decided
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diaz, L-15315, Aug. 26, 1960;
Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, L-16874, Feb. 27, 1961; Zapanta vs. Montesa, L-14534,
Feb. 28, 1962.

EN

BANC

[G.R.

No.

L-14534.

February

28,

1962.]

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, v. THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET

AL.,Respondents.
Pedro

Santos

and

Jorge

Salonga

for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Dewey G. Soriano for Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS; DEFINITIONS. A prejudicial question is one that
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (People v. Aragon, 94
Phil.,
357;
50
Off.
Gaz.,
[10]
4863).
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE DEEMED A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court. (People v. Aragon, supra.) Hence, where the defendant in a
bigamy case in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan claims that the second marriage is
void on the ground that he entered into it under duress, force and intimidation, and, as a
matter of fact a case is pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the
annulment of said marriage, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before
the action for bigamy can proceed.
DECISION

DIZON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P.
Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial
of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Pampanga.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for
Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously
married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved,
contracted
a
second
marriage
with
said
complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case
No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the
ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent
Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year.
On September 2, 1958, Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to
suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved
in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial
question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a
plea
of
not
guilty,
petitioner
filed
the
present
action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930,
February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question we further said must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court (People v. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the
case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the
evidence, petitioners consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the
second marriage is determinative of petitioners guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioners
marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for

bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is
vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the
contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered
into
it
because
of
duress,
force
and
intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO
G.
GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.
Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036
declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and
appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana
Geronimo.
The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of
the estate of Graciana Geronimo-Esman.
On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the
heirs oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as "husband of
the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by
petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now
describing the latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding
out that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was a "nullity
for want of a marriage license".
It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo,
her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . . However, the
husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being
questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between
oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license.
The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a
judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman was valid.
Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister
and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no
marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was
celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license number
was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that the marriage
contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage license
issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was
issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros,
Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated
but to Pasig in October 1959.

On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by

petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the
aforementioned documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for
the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the
marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now
Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the
certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original
petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that
petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his
ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on
the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself
and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed
on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that
the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed
by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to
various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial
numbers even if already used in the printing of the marriage license forms
in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the
succeeding years.
Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the
deceased and oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of
the National Archives & Records Section, testified that a copy of the
marriage contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo
celebrated on January 7, 1955, is on file with their office.
Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan,
testified that he was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary
and stayed in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate
Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spouses
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he attended to
spirituality, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them
socially. He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business,
Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the couple were quite close with each
other and with the people working in their business.
Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business
testified that she was aware of the marriage which took place between
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as
husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the
oppositor who has been successfully supervising the lingerie business
after the death of Graciana Geronimo.
Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in
charge of all accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14)
municipalities of the province of Rizal which include marriage licenses;

and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was
taken by the Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9, 1953.
Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila,
testified that in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no.
23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no column for the marriage
license; that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that
they have a copy of the questioned marriage contract in which the
marriage license number is recorded; and that the records of 1959 were
lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the
archives section.
Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana
Geronimo on January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage
license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the deceased to the
public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3) 2
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:
It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do
not bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of
Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such
non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number
was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of nonissuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand, the
marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does
appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7
and sub-markings). The non-indication of the license number in the
certified copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed
as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question
because there is nothing in the law which requires that the marriage
license number would (sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself. 3
Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the
marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the
latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the former, the
petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the following question
in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites
license is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently
present a question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that there was no
marriage license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the
public respondent found and ruled otherwise.
In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases on
the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the
exceptions thereto, we stated:

Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such
evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of
law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore,
a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion, they must stand.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) When the findings of endings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above
exceptions.
On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the
mind of the petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged
absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman
because the copies of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not
state the marriage license number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious.
Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the
marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7")
where the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear.
Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770
was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz.
This was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus:

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable

forms of the Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A)
come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial
numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the
city/municipal treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers printed or
used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding
years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However,
the distribution of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same
pattern.
This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the
appellant refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage
License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by the Municipality
of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer
of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1"
and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in
their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the
same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig
in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage
license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay
City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G.
Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3132) 5
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the nonrecording of the marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the
license itself.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American
citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of
a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it
only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA,
however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared
null and void.
RULING:
No, respondents marriage is not void.
The court said:

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements
of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since
it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
The court also explained that There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

Veronico Tenebro vs Court

of Appeals
November 11, 2010
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423 SCRA 272 (467 Phil. 723) Civil Law Family Code Bigamy Exists even if one
marriage is declared void
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain
Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas

countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record
of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void
ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second
or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Read full text
Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug
Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages (except those falling under the
principle of psychological incapacity) should be allowed to be used as a valid defense for
bigamy. Void ab initio marriages require no judicial decree to establish their nullity. It is true
that the Revised Penal Code does not require the first or second marriage to be declared
void to avoid a criminal case of bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable
marriages because again, void ab initio marriages really do not need such judicial
decree.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994236

SCRA 257FACTS
:Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in
a civil ceremony without the knowledge of the formers
parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage which
includes procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated
in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The
cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which
they parted ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment of
her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the States to follow her daughter
who was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar
of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castro and Cardenas were allegedly
married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged marriage license
no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located
since it does not appear in the records. It was then that she found out that there
was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage with
Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It
ruled that inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification
from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license. The respondent appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court
declaring that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract. However, the
Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony
of Castro are not sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the
validity of a marriage.
ISSUE

:Whether or not the documentary and testimonialevidence presented by private

respondent are sufficient toestablish that no marriage license was issued prior to
thecelebration of marriage.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due searchand inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasigenjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged underthe law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuanceof a
marriage license.Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion andpursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, acertificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficientlyproved that his office did not issue marriage license
no.3196182 to the contracting parties.The fact that private respondent Castro
offered only hertestimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not aground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any otherwitness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to thepeculiar circumstances of the case.The finding of the
appellate court that the marriagebetween the contracting parties is null and void
for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed,a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by thecivil registrar of Pasig, may have
been presented byCardenas to the solemnizing officer.It was held that under the
circumstances of the case, thedocumentary and testimonial evidence presented
byprivate respondent Castro sufficiently established theabsence of the subject
marriage license.Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showingof any
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria

Goo-Abbas
February 12, 2014

689 SCRA 646 (109 OG 7469) Civil Law Family Code Bigamy Void Ab Initio
Marriage Lack of a Marriage License
Remedial Law Evidence Probative Value Public Records
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of
Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to
welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the
ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by
Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage
contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the
marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued
to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license

issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the
issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local
civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor
Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there
was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage
license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning.