ALAYLAYAN VS NPC

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend

Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and
Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of
NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA
3043 provides that:

an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully

index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study
and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an

annual profit of 12%;

CITY OF BAGUIO VS MARCOS

b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;

c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts
with franchise holders for the supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development
Company (PPDC) assailed the said provision.They averred that
Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title
of the amending law nor was it included in the amended law.
Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3
was not germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of

FACTS: On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of

First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of the cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the
land here involved was amongst those declared public lands by
final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land
he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his name. On
December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin,
Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered
opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned the
cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside

the 40 year period preceding the approval of Republic Act 931.

HELD: Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened
were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered
on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July
25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes
"the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared
public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of
the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land
that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus
appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted
by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself.
R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should receive
blessings of liberal construction. The court says that lingual
imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be
permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent,
which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims of
title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land
that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the

approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25,

1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral
court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on
November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the
People of the Philippines charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the
accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state
one essential element of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are
sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of

illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No.

9.

HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be
alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute
a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is
determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts
are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the
quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit
of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem
of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the
decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or,
whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists

a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of
which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil, and injurious consequences.
PEOPLE VS ECHAVEZ
FACTS:
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower
court separate information against sixteen persons charging them
with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The
information provides that sometime in the year 1974
continuously up to the present, the above-named accused, with
stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of
a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, accused's entrance into the area has
been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and
cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has
rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant
from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been
intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the
whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said
applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Five of the information were raffled to Judge Vicente B.
Echaves, Jr. who dismissed the five information on the grounds
(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through
"stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should

be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or

taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner",
and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does
not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not by Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to
agricultural lands.
HELD:
No. The court agrees to the lower court that the decree does not
apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves
pasture lands in rural areas. It should be noted that squatting on
public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this
case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947. The rule of ejusdem
generis invoked by the trial court, however, does not apply to
this case. The decree is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of
ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which
is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Agcaoili v. Suguitan

Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the

municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the
25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the
said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the
conditions prescribed by law. The conditions prescribed by law"
to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his
appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 which
provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices
shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."
On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature
adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203 provides for
That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five
years."
On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent
a to Agcaoili which provides that the former has the honor to
advise the latter that he has ceased to be a justice of the peace by
operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.

G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

ISSUES:
FACTS:

(1)

Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and

auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior
to the passage of said act.

peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just

cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without
delay.

(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:
(1)

No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of

section 3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No.
3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act
contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices
of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, the court is forced to
the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and
contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law,
and that said law cannot be applied to justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior
to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio
Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and
intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the

(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation,

in the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon
must have relation to the same matter which precedes it.
A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a
new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of
continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater
than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for
the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to
divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only
difference being that the semicolon makes the division a
little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation
used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose
of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It
follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions
of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to
corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has

reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a

corporation.

The present case is anomalous under American

sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with
the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior."
After he had faithfully and honestly served the
Government for a number of years the legislature
adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any
reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be
such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law
contained no express provision or method for its
enforcement. The Executive Department, through its
Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in
said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer
an officer in the judicial department of the Government
and must vacate his office and turn the same over to
another, who was designated by said Undersecretary.
When the officer protested against such arbitrary action,
giving reasons therefor, and without answering said
protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if
he did not immediately vacate his office.
US VS HART

Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge
of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and
presented evidence showing that each of t hedefendants was earning
a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to support
themselves. However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by
arguing that in Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means
of support only applies to the clause tramping or straying through the
country and not the first clause which states thatevery person found
loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, thus
making the 3 appellants guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been
intended for without visible means of support to qualify the first part of
the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.
Issue:WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the
Attorney-General s argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.
Held: An argument based upon punctuation alone is not
conclusive and the effect intended by theLegislature should be the
relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When t he meaning of
a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give ite ffect. Moreover,
ascertaining the consequences flowing from such a construction of the law
is also helpful in determining the soundness of the reasoning.Considering
that the argument of the Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logical
classification on the part of the legislature of the various classes of vagrants
and since it was proven that all three of the defendants were earning a living
by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and
Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
GR 148560, Nov 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails the RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),as amended by
RA 7659 on the grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard
in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague.
HELD:
No. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the

accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is

sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conducts and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of
the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as
the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
court discerns nothing in the law that is vague or ambiguous as
there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable
him to prepare for an intelligent defense. As regards the assailed
statutory definition of the terms combination" and "series" in
the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in the law, the court ruled that a statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression
of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in
the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of legal

hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their

natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless
it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.
A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of

P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss
of P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the
Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for
refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid
income tax. This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue on the ground that "granting, without
admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner is
already barred from claiming the same considering that more
than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the
filing of the claim in Court.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales

G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously

collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the National Internal
Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly
income tax was paid or from the date the filing of the Final
Adjustment Return?

Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income

tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of
P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of
P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters,
however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed
on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year

HELD:

Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time
of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to
the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole
text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.
Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative
intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to
inconvenience and absurdity.

In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private

respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment Return
required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid during the
first quarter. A literal application of Section 292 would thus pose
no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from
the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily
determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is
made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section
292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.

The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be

to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing
the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return,
when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay
additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid
income tax.
AISPORNA VS CA

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident

Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its
authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months
with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against

Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of
Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on
21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting
insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the
office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that

being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him
in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and
was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and
at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a
note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971,
the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August
1974, the trial courts decision was affirmed by theappellate
court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed
on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the
Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted
that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within

the scope or intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a

consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the

first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as

agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the
second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the
intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation. Theappellate courts
ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second
paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a
reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph
2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any
person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within
the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation,
directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or
contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Under the Texas Penal Code
1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a
certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In
the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750,
Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to
penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without
license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and
concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be
noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that

the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with

EugenioIsidro was one for compensation. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused
could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that
to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved. After going over the records of this case, we
are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that
accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
David v COMELEC
Panganiban, 1997
FACTS: David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as
president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed
apetition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.Meanwhile, Liga
ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition to
seek a judicial review by Certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887fixing the date of the holding of
the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities
related thereto; and,(3) The budgetary appropriation of P400
million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General
AppropriationsAct of 1997) intended to defray the costs and
expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections.

Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of

barangay officials is 5 years. Although the LGCreduced the term
of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials.

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges

the Court to deny the petitions.
ISSUES & HELD: Which law governs the term of office of
barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 71603 years)
Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
constitutional? (YES)
Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that
provided under RA 7160? (YES)
RATIO: Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term
to Three Years
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case
of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws,the later
enactment prevails. (
Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant .)

During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second

Monday), the voters actually and directly electedone punong
barangay and seven kagawads (as in the Code).

In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress

appropriated the amount of P400 million to coverexpenses for
the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec.
7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters
shall be held immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. These are
clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, inaccordance with
Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that the next regular election

involving the barangay office concerned is barely 7 months away, the

same having been scheduled in May, 1997. This judicial
decision Is part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8).
RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to
local government units. It specifically and definitivelyprovides
in its Sec. 43c that the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three years. It is a
special provision that applies only to the term of barangay
officials who were elected on the second Monday of May1994.
With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a
general law.
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution

The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing

any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the
determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition,thereby leaving to the
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of publicservice. It must be remembered that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
Thepetitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden
and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.

Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay

officials is:As may be determined by law; moreprecisely, as
provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their
term to 3 years) .
Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year
Terms
Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other

than that which they ran for and were elected to,under the law
governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners belated claim of ignoranceas to what law governed their
election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under NCC
3,ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

People v. Lidres (108 Phil. 995)

FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their

applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez. The
Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an agreement,
wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over Echavez
position on a 50-50 basis, e.i that is the period from January to
March 1954, would be equally divided between them. Diotay
then took over and began teaching.
However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the
school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it,

the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it or
not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954. True to
his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to take over.
He held class with the half of the class and erased Diotays name
from the attendance chart and place his own. Diotay informed
the principal and the following day they were summoned by the
supervising teacher, ordered Diotay to continue her teaching and
advised Lidres not to go back to the school. Without heeding the
said instruction Lidres without any authority whatsoever, again
took over Diotays class against the latters will. Lidres was
charged and prosecuted with the crime of Usurpation of official
functions as defined and penalized in R.A. No. 10.

Granting, arguendo, that R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art.

177, and not merely an implementation thereof, the subsequent
enactment of R.A. 379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute
an amendment thereof restoring the element of pretense of
official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions.
Under R.A. 379, the law in force at the time of the commission
of the alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential
element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the
information specifically charges that defendant committed the
offense without pretense of official position. Under the
circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to
constitute an offense.

ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of

subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities.

SONG KIAT VS CENTRAL BANK

HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion of

House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses
indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency
measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the
subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its
passage in September 1946. Hence, the elimination of the
element of pretense of official position required under Article
177 of the RPC. And since it is neither alleged in the information
nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of a
seditious organization engaged in subversive activities, he could
not be liable or found guilty under said provision of R.A. No. 10.

Facts: During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9,

1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for
which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling
P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2
of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment;
and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the
Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that
the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.
Issue: Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as
"chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign
exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
Held: No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not
include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict

construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the

opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the
above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw
material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is
ready for human consumption; the former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197
amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for
"chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the
amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's
cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953,
i.e. before the exemption decree which is after September 3,
1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.
PEOPLE V MANANTAN
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54,
Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as
"justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers
enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the
purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural
police force and no classified civil service officer or employee
shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in
a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto,
or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section
449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of
the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or

assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the

Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice
of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to
exclude justices of peace from its operation.
Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of
the Revised Election Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section
54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices
of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had
availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.",
which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer,
who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the
word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as
averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice

of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature

omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it
had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the
broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise
invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if
the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just
called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not
proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not
the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws;
instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to
be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal
laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who
were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are
now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been
erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were

not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for
the term "justices of peace".

Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

1991FACTS:San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. are the two major
stockholders of Neslte.Nestle increased its authorized capital stock and was
approved by SEC. Thereafter,some unissued stocks were sold to San
Miguel and Nestle. Nestle filed a complaintwith the SEC, seeking to exempt
the firm from the registration requirement of Section4 of the Revised
Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c). The
provision states that a corporation may be exempted from the
requirement of registration if its issues additional capital stock among its
own stockholdersexclusively. Nestle argued that issuance of additional
capital stock means issuance of increased authorized capital stock. SEC held
that for purposes of granting a general orparticular exemption from the
registration requirements, a request for exemption anda fee equivalent to
0.1% of issued value or securities or stocks are required.ISSUE:Whether or
not Nestle is entitled to exemption.RULING:Nestle is not exempted from
the fee provided for in Section 6 (c) of the RevisedSecurities Act.Section
6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory
objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of
capital stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and
prospects of thecorporation. When capital stock is issued in the course of and
in compliance with therequirements of increasing its authorized capital stock
under Section 38 of theCorporation Code, the SEC as a matter of course
examines the financial condition of the corporation. Under the ruling issued
by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still unissued capital
stock may, in a particular instance, be held to bean exempt transaction by the
SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds thatthe requirements of

registration under the Revised Securities Act are "not necessary inthe public
interest and for the protection of the investors" by reason, inter alia, of
thesmall amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or because the
potential buyersare very limited in number and are in a position to protect
themselves. Theconstruction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government is entitled to greatrespect and should be accorded great weight
by the courts.
Case of Regalado vs. Yulo No. 42935 15February1935 FACTS
OF THE CASE: This case was brought about by the action quo
warranto to determine the respective rights of the petitioner
Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to
the office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Felipe
Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of
Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934
Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the
judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/
instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated Esteban T. Villar,
Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the
office to Villar under protest.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: Whether or not under the provisions of
section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by the Act
No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to
the approval of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs
after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching
the age of 65 yrs. No, Because justices appointed prior to the
approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of age on
September 13 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act which
was on November 16 1931 and who by law is required to cease
to hold office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said act.

HELD: RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED

FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF
MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FELIPE
REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME.
STAT CON LESSON: The intent of the law is to be ascertained
from the words used in its construction. (If legislative intent is
not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by
interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not
found in the phraseology of the law.)
Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission [G.R.
No. L-16704. March 17, 1962]
28AUG
FACTS
The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of
the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the
premiums due the System, will take into consideration and
include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2%
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any
one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling

Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, expressly excluding
overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers
and employees respective monthly premium contributions, and
submitting, In order to assist your System in arriving at a
proper interpretation of the term compensation for the purposes
of such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161
and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words
compensation, remuneration and wages. Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the
part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without
the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.
ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering
the Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal
subject to the approval of the President such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act.

RULING

No. The Commissions Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation

that needed the approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy
or opinion as to how the law should be construed. The Circular
purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should
include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should
be based. The Circular neither needs approval from the President
nor publication in the Official Gazette.