PSM REGULATORY UPDATE OSHA

MARCH 2016
RobertJ.Weber,P.E.
President/CEO

+Houston+Bogota+ Kuwait+Lagos+Singapore

PRESENTATIONOUTLINE
IndustryIncidents&LessonsLearned
IntroductiontoPSMAuditing
PSM CommonDeficienciesfromAuditing
KeySuccessFactors:Whatdoesgoodlooklike?
Conclusion

INDUSTRYINCIDENTS
&
LESSONSLEARNED

INDUSTRYINCIDENTS&LESSONSLEARNED
Itshouldnotbenecessaryfor eachgenerationto
rediscoverprinciplesofprocesssafety whichthegeneration
beforediscovered.Wemustlearnfrom theexperienceof
othersratherthanlearnthehardway.Wemustpassonto
thenextgenerationa recordofwhatwehavelearned.
~JesseC.Ducommun
VicePresident,ManufacturingandadirectorofAmerican
OilCompanyin1961;ProcessSafetyPioneer

FLIXBOROUGH,U.K.(1974)
NyproU.K. Cyclohexane
releasefromtemporary
bypasspipeandsubsequent
explosion
28fatalities,36onsiteinjuries
Offsiteconsequencesresulted
in53reportedinjuries
1,800nearbyhomesdamaged
$425MMUSDpropertyloss

FLIXBOROUGH,U.K.(1974)
CAUSES/LESSONSLEARNED
Lackofplantmodification/changecontrol.
Managementoftemporarychanges.
Managementofchangefororganizationalchange.

Lackofdesigncodesforpipework.
Lackoflanduseplanningandsitingconsiderations
relativetolocationoftheprocessversusplant
buildingsandthelocalcommunity.

SEVESO,ITALY(1976)
ICMESA(IndustrieChimiche
MedaSocietaAzionaria)
Tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin
(DIOXIN)release,a
poisonousandcarcinogenic
byproductofuncontrolled
exothermicreaction
25kmNorthofMilan
Nofatalities.Morethan600
peopleevacuated;20people
treatedforDioxinpoisoning.
Longtermhealthimpacts.
Ledtodevelopmentofinitial
EUSevesodirective.

MEXICOCITY(1984)
PEMEXLPGTerminal
BLEVE(BoilingLiquidExpansionVaporExplosion)
andfireafterlossofcontainmenttolocalsewer
system
650+fatalities,mostlyoffsite
$20MMUSDpropertydamages
ContributingFactors:

Plantlayout
Active/passivefireprotection
Emergencyisolation
Emergencyresponse/spill
control

BHOPAL,INDIA(1984)
UnionCarbideIndiaLtd.(UCIL) insecticideplant
Methylisocyanaterelease
3,000+fatalities;100,000+injuries
Accidentaresultofpoorsafetymanagementsystems,poorearlywarning
systems,andlackofcommunitypreparedness.
Consideredworldsworstindustrialdisaster
Eventually,resultedindemiseofUnionCarbide,oneoftheworldslargest
integratedchemicalcompanies

PIPERALPHA(1988)
OccidentalPetroleum
Platform NorthSea
167fatalities
$3.4BUSDinsuredloss
ContributingFactors
Firewatersystem
bypassed
Lackofadequate
emergencyevacuation
andegress

PHILLIPSPASADENA(1989)
Vaporcloudexplosion
85,000lbs.flammablegas
release;explosionwithforce
of2.4tonsTNT
23fatalities;130injuries
Propertyloss~$750MMUSD
ContributingFactors
Humanerror(manualvalve
inadvertentlyleftopen)
Facilitysitingandplantlayout
ofprocess,buildings

HISTORYOFPROCESSSAFETY
Process Safety Management was initiated by
U.S. OSHA in 1992 as a way to respond with
government regulations / oversight of industries
using highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs).
Several other countries have followed since.

ProcessSafetyManagement
DEFINITION
A management system design to
PREVENT
the Release of
OR
MINIMIZE
the Consequences of Release
of
Highly Hazardous Chemicals (HHCs)

ProcessSafetyManagement
ELEMENTS
Process Safety
Information

Process Hazard
Analysis

Trade
Secrets

Operating
Procedures

Employee
Participation

Training

PROCESS SAFETY
MANAGEMENT

Compliance
Audits
Emergency
Planning and
Response

Contractors

Pre-Startup
Safety Review

Incident
Investigation

Mechanical
Integrity
Management
of Change

Hot Work
Permit

HISTORYOFPROCESSSAFETY
PERFORMANCE-based regulation, Not
Prescriptive
Regulation sets forth minimum requirements for
compliance (based on 14 Elements)
Regulation specifies WHAT TO DO, Not HOW
TO IT

HISTORYOFPROCESSSAFETY

IS IT WORKING?

BPTEXASCITY(2005)
Vaporcloudexplosion
15fatalities;170
injuries
BothBPandU.S.
ChemicalSafety&
HazardInvestigation
Board(CSB)identified
numeroustechnicaland
organizationalfailingsat
therefineryandwithin
BPcorporate

WESTFERTILIZER(2013)
Retailfertilizeroperationinrural
Texas
Ammoniumnitrateexplosion
15fatalities;160+injuries
Manyfatalitieswereemergency
responders.
Morethan150nearbybuildingsand
homesdamagedordestroyeddue
toblast
USGSrecordedexplosionasa2.1
magnitude

HISTORYOFPROCESSSAFETY
U.S.regulationshaveNOT changedsincetheir
promulgation,but.
OSHAPetroleumRefineryProcessSafetyManagementNational
EmphasisProgram(NEP)Directive 2007
OSHAPSMCoveredChemicalFacilitiesNationalEmphasis
Program(NEP)Directive 2011
ExecutiveOrder13650(August2013)
PendingchangesbyOSHAandEPAtoPSMandRMPregulations
toexpandcoverage,respectively
Morechemicalscovered,morefacilitiescovered,lowerthreshold
quantities

PSM AUDITING
OVERVIEW

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COMPLIANCEAUDIT
OSHA29CFR1910.119(o)
Performauditatleasteverythree(3)years.
Conductedbyatleastonepersonknowledgeablein
theprocess.
AReportofthefindingsshallbedeveloped.
Theemployershalldocumentaresponsetoeachof
thefindings.
Theemployershalldocumentcorrectiveactionsto
eachofthefindings.
Employershallretainthetwo(2)mostrecent
complianceauditreports.

Audit

PreAudit
Activities

Assemble
Audit
Team

COMPLIANCEAUDIT

Post
Audit
Activities

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COMPLIANCEAUDIT WHY?
Excellenttooltoassessyour
organizationsProcessSafety
effectiveness writtenprogramand
implementation
Assesscompliance;benchmark
performancewithindustry
Identifyandmitigateearlywarning
signsbeforeapotentialincident
IntegraltoPLAN DO CHECK ACT
cycleofcontinuousimprovement
Meticulousverificationrequiredto
preserveLicensetoOperate,whichis
aprivilege,notaright

PSM AUDITING
COMMON DEFICIENCIES

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CommonDeficiencies
BASIS
350+audits/assessmentsperformed
2005 2015
Large,majorOPCOstosmaller,nichespecialty
chemicalcompaniesandindustries
Varietyofindustries:

Oil&Gas
PetroleumRefining
GasProcessing
Petrochemicals
Chemicals
Pharmaceuticals
NH3

CommonDeficiencies
EMPLOYEEINVOLVEMENT
Lackofwellarticulatedmanagementexpectations
anddefinedgoals;leadingtoweakemployeemorale
anddecreasedemployeeparticipation.
EmployeesdonotknowhowtoaccessPHAsand
otherPSMinformation.

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CommonDeficiencies
EMPLOYEEINVOLVEMENT
EXAMPLESOFGOODEMPLOYEEPARTICIPATION:
Assignment of PSM Champions (by Element, by Unit, etc.)
Plant safety steering committee
Toolbox safety meetings
Employee participation in PHAs, PSM audits, incident investigations,
development of SOPs, etc.
Regular communication of action items from PHAs, audits, incidents to
affected employees
Employee feedback; suggestion for improvement boxes
Management consultation with operators on the frequency and content
of training
Regularly-planned emergency action plan drills and exercises with
follow-up and response critique
Behavioral-based safety programs (BBS)

HSSE

Engineering &Construction

PSMSupervisor

Operators

Maintenance

AllEmployees

Contractors

Applicability (a)

EmployeeParticipation (c)

ProcessSafetyInformation (d)

R/A

ProcessHazardsAnalysis (e)

Operating Procedures (f)

Role

PSMActivity

Operations

COO

RACIMATRIX

Training (g)

Contractors (h)

PreStartup SafetyReview (i)

Mechanical Integrity (j)

R/A

HotWorkPermit (k)

ManagementofChange (l)

Incident Investigation (m)

EmergencyPreparedness & Response (n)

Compliance Audits (o)

TradeSecrets (p)

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CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSSAFETYINFORMATION
Hazardouseffectsofinadvertentmixingofdifferent
chemicalsthatcouldforeseeablyoccurnotaddressed
LackofcompleteElectricalAreaClassification
documentationandfieldsurvey
Designbasisinformationforemergencyrelief/PSVand
flaresystemsincomplete(e.g.,PIRP520/520RVsizing
contingencyanalysis)

CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSSAFETYINFORMATION
Designbasisinformationforsafeguards,which
preventormitigateapotentialrelease,incomplete
(e.g.,firewatersystems).
Materialsofconstructioninformationnotonfilefor
allequipmentinthecoveredprocess.
LackofreferencePlantdesigncodesandstandards
identified(RAGAGEP).

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CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSSAFETYINFORMATION
MOSTFREQUENTLYREFERENCEDRAGAGEPsINRECENT
OSHAINSPECTIONS
API520:Sizing,Selection&InstallationofPressure
RelievingDevicesinRefineries
API521:PressureRelievingandDepressuringSystems
APIRP752:ManagementofHazardsAssociatedwith
LocationofProcessPlantPermanentBuildings
APIRP753:ManagementofHazardsAssociatedwith
LocationofProcessPlantPortableBuildings

CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSSAFETYINFORMATION
MOSTFREQUENTLYREFERENCEDRAGAGEPsINRECENT
OSHAINSPECTIONS
API510:PressureVesselInspectionCode Inservice
Inspection,Rating,RepairandAlteration
API570:PipingInspectionCode Inservice
Inspection,Rating,RepairandAlterationofPiping
API574:InspectionPracticesforPipingSystem
Components
ANSI/ISAS84.01:FunctionalSafety Safety
InstrumentedSystemsfortheProcessIndustrySector

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CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSHAZARDSANALYSIS
PHAfailstocomprehensivelyidentifyallhazardsof
theprocessbecause:
Selectionofthewrongmethodologybasedoncomplexity
oftheprocess
IncompletesetofGuidewords+Parameters(Deviations)
utilized
FailuretoreviewStartup/Shutdownissues,Abnormal
Operations

CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSHAZARDSANALYSIS
Safeguardsnotindependentoftheinitiatingevent/
cause.FailuretoperformLayerofProtectionAnalysis
(LOPA)toassesseffectivenessofsafeguards.
Consequencesnotbasedonfailureofengineering
controls,buttakingintoaccountsafeguards.Failure
toassessconsequencestoultimatelossevent
assumingsafeguardsarenonexistentorineffectiveas
designed.

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CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSHAZARDSANALYSIS
FailuretoaddressFACILITYSITINGissues.
FailuretoaddressHUMANFACTORSissues.

CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSHAZARDSANALYSIS
FailuretoaddressFACILITYSITINGissues.
FailuretoaddressHUMANFACTORSissues.
USE INDUSTRY-STANDARD CHECKLISTS!!!

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CommonDeficiencies
PROCESSHAZARDSANALYSIS
Previousincidents,includingnearmisses,not
consideredbythePHAteam.
OverduePHArecommendationswithnomanaged
scheduleforresolution,completion.
IncompletecompilationofProcessSafetyInformation
priortoperformingthePHA.

CommonDeficiencies
OPERATINGPROCEDURES
SOPsnotwrittenforALLphasesofoperation(esp.,
nonroutineoperations,e.g.,purging,cleaning,
sampling,emergencyoperations,etc.)
Safeoperatinglimitsandconsequencesofdeviation
fromtheselimitsnotwelldefined.Stepsto
correct/avoiddeviationsnotdocumented.
NowrittenproceduresforShiftChange/Handover
operations.
Proceduresnotreviewedoftenenoughforaccuracy;
lackofannualcertification.

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CommonDeficiencies
SAFEWORKPRACTICES
Nodocumented
Equipmentspecific
proceduresforLOTO,
ConfinedSpace.
Lackofperiodictraining
forLOTO,ConfinedSpace

CommonDeficiencies
TRAINING
Missingrecordsofinitial
trainingforqualified
operators.
Refreshertrainingnot
conductedatleastevery
three(3)years.
Lackofverificationof
personnel
comprehensionof
trainingprogram.

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CommonDeficiencies
TRAINING
Nowrittenproofthatoperatorsconsultedon
frequencyorcontentofrefreshertraining.
Refreshertrainingtoomuchfocusedonnormal
operations.

CommonDeficiencies
CONTRACTORS
Lackofduediligencequalification,certification
recordsforcontractoremployeeswhoperform
specializedskillorcraftwork,e.g.,

Craneandriggingwork
Forkliftdriving,mobilelifts/JLGs
Certifiedwelding
Instrumentcalibration
Other

Lackofperiodicsurveillanceofcontractorspost
selection;contractorsonlydisciplinedwhen
somethinggoeswrong

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CommonDeficiencies
PRESTARTUPSAFETYREVIEW
PSSRnotperformedanddocumentedfornewplant
facilitiesorprocessmodificationspriorto
introductionofhighlyhazardouschemicals
PSSRnotperformedanddocumentedforeach
MOC
Weak,shortformPSSRchecklistusedformajor
changes

CommonDeficiencies
MECHANICALINTEGRITY
FIXITWHENITBREAKSmentality
Failuretoidentifycriticalequipmentrelativeto
thePSMcoveredprocess
Lackofwrittendeficiencymanagementprogramfor
nonconformancesidentifiedduringinspectionand
testingactivities
Overdueinspections
FailuretoidentifyandimplementRAGAGEPfor
inspectionsandtests

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CommonDeficiencies
MECHANICALINTEGRITY
FailuretoreviewPHAandincludeallsafeguards
inMechanicalIntegrityprogram.
Focusonstationaryequipment;lessemphasison
RotatingEquipmentandInstrumentation&
Controls.
Lackoffitnessforservicedocumentationfor
processequipment.
MOCprocessnotusedforchangestoinspection
frequency.

CommonDeficiencies
HOTWORK
Hot work permit does not clearly identify object
on which hot work being performed.
Pre-job Hot Work Checklist not completed.
Missing signature authorizations on hot work
permit form.
No documentation of fire watch
training/qualifications.
Hot work training not performed annually.
Permit-required hot work areas inconsistent
with definition of electrically classified area.

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CommonDeficiencies
MANAGEMENTOFCHANGE
MOC process not applied for:
Installation of temporary equipment
Decommissioning or taking equipment out-ofservice
Changes to alarm setpoints
Procedural-only changes (e.g., conversion from
paper-based to electronic systems)
Changes in shift work; workforce reductions

CommonDeficiencies
MANAGEMENTOFCHANGE
MOC process not institutionalized may be
strong in Operations; but weaker by
Maintenance.
PSI, SOPs, M.I. not updated when affected by
the MOC.
MOC forms completed and signed off before
PSSR completed.

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CommonDeficiencies
INCIDENTINVESTIGATION
Near misses not documented;
possibly due to:

Level1
Incidentsof
greater
consequence

Lack of good, uniform

understanding of what the definition
of a near miss
Lack of positive culture that
promotes reporting of near misses

Focus on reporting and

investigation of personnel safety
incidents (a lagging indicator)
versus near misses (a leading
indicator)

Level2
Incidentsoflesser
consequence
Level3
Challengestosafetysystem
Level4
OperatingDiscipline&ManagementSystem
PerformanceIndicators.
(NotreportedyetinRCI)

CommonDeficiencies
INCIDENTINVESTIGATION
Incident investigations not commenced within
48 hours of the incident.
Incident investigation team composition does
not include a contractor employee for incidents
involving the work of a contractor.
Failure to identify root causes leading to
repeat of incidents.
Failure to communicate the findings and action
items resulting from incident investigations.

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CommonDeficiencies
EMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS&RESPONSE
Emergency action plan not up-to-date.
Emergency evacuation maps with routes and safe
distances not posted.
No written process for testing and servicing plant
alarms; no documentation that alarm testing was
completed
Lack of documented drills and exercises
Lack of coordination of EAP with local community,
responders.

CommonDeficiencies
COMPLIANCEAUDITS
Compliance audits performed; but not certified
in writing.
Audits incomplete.
Audit action items not tracked or completed in
a timely manner.

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CommonDeficiencies
OSHAREFINERYNEP
ENFORCEMENTSTATISTICS
20072011
Mechanical Integrity

202

Process Safety Information

189

Process Hazard Analysis

188

Operating Procedures

184

Management of Change

92

Incident Investigation

71

Compliance Audits

47

Contractors

33

Training

29

855
79%

CommonDeficiencies
OSHAREFINERYNEP
ENFORCEMENTSTATISTICS
20072011
Emergency Planning and Response

17

Employee Participation

15

Pre-Startup Safety Review

13

Hot Work Permits

Trade Secrets

Total PSM Citations

1088

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CommonDeficiencies
CHEMICALNEPPSM
ENFORCEMENTSTATISTICS
20112015
Mechanical Integrity

156

Process Safety Information

140

Operating Procedures

114

Process Hazard Analysis

106

Management of Change

44

Compliance Audits

35

Training

21

Incident Investigation

19

Employee Participation

16

516
76%

CommonDeficiencies
CHEMICALNEPPSM
ENFORCEMENTSTATISTICS
20112015
Contractors

14

Emergency Planning and Response

Pre-Startup Safety Review

Hot Work Permits

Trade Secrets

Total PSM Citations

678

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PSM
KEYSUCCESSFACTORS
1.
2.
3.
4.

Process Safety Leadership

Process Safety Competency
Process Safety Culture
Clearly Defined Expectations and
Accountability
5. Leading and Lagging Indicators
6. Audit and Continuous Improvement
7. Community Outreach

PROCESSSAFETYLEADERSHIP
The executive leadership must provide and
demonstrate effective leadership and establish
clear process safety goals and objectives.
Management and leadership must clearly
demonstrate their commitment to process
safety by articulating a consistent message on
the importance of process safety.
Policies and actions should match that
message.

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PROCESSSAFETYCOMPETENCY
Company must establish and implement a
system to ensure that its executive
management, its line management, and all
employees including managers,
supervisors, workers, and contractors
possess the appropriate level of process
safety knowledge and expertise to prevent
and mitigate accidents.
Avoid falling subject to the Peter Principle.
[Dr. Laurence J. Peter, 1968.]

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PROCESSSAFETYCULTURE
Company must involve employees at all levels
in order to develop a sustainable, positive,
trusting, and open process safety culture.
Company must promote a culture of individual
ownership of the Process Safety program.
Process Safety should be EVERYONEs
responsibility; not just the responsibility of the
Process Safety Manager or HSE Department.

CLEARLYDEFINEDEXPECTATIONS
&ACCOUNTABILITY
Company must clearly define expectations and
strengthen personnel accountability for process
safety.
At all levels of the organization the executive
leadership, management, supervisors, line
employees, contractors, etc.

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LEADING&LAGGINGINDICATORS
Company should develop and implement an
integrated set of Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs), including leading and lagging metrics for
more effectively monitoring the performance of
the process safety management system.
KPIs should be realistic and measurable.
KPIs should also be regularly monitored and
periodically updated to reflect industry changes,
best practices, and lessons learned around the
world.

AUDIT&CONTINOUS
IMPROVEMENT
Company must establish and implement an
efficient and effective system to periodically
audit and continuously improve process safety
performance relative to regulatory requirement
and international peers.
Plan-Do-Check-Act
Documentation Documentation Documentation

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COMMUNITYOUTREACH
Company should out and work closely with
local community leaders to promote its
Process Safety image.
Will lead to increased reputation and goodwill,
improved safety and quality performance of
workers and suppliers.
More adequate preparedness and response
in case of a catastrophic emergency,
Part of corporate social responsibility.

PATHFORWARD
REALIZE THE BENEFITS: SEVEN (7) KEY STEPS
1. Assign personnel who will be accountable.
2. Adopt a personalized Company philosophy of
process safety.
3. Learn more about process safety.
4. Take advantage of strong synergy process safety
has with your other business drivers.
5. Set achievable process safety goals.
6. Track your performance.
7. Revisit your process safety program / continuous
improvement.

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GRACIAS!

Houston

Bogota

Singapore

WWW.PSRG.COM

PSRG OVERVIEW
Established, 1997 (Houston)
Member: ARPEL, CCPS
More than 80 professionals worldwide
averaging 28+ years experience
Diverse industry experience on
1,000+ projects with more than 750
customers in 76 countries
Hands-on plant operations
experience
Single source, one stop shop for
comprehensive PSM/RMP, and HSSE
consulting and training services
Tailored solutions to meet and exceed
customer expectations
Highly qualified resources enable
customers to receive value that far
exceeds cost of our services

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