Connecting Second-Order

Cybernetics Revolution
with Genetic Epistemology
Gastn Becerra

Universidad de Buenos Aires,

Argentina gastonbecerra/at/
sociales.uba.ar

Philosophical Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

>UpshotConnecting Umplebys article

468

with Piaget and Garcas genetic epistemology, I will argue that the revolution
the former discerns is more comprehensive. Additionally, since the latter differ
from cybernetic and radical traditions in
their philosophical assumptions about
society and its conditioning on knowledge, I will suggest that these assumptions must be considered to explain each
constructivist programs achievements
and challenges.

1 In this commentary, I will discuss

Stuart Umplebys target article about the
scientific revolution he attibutes to Heinz
von Foersters work. I will draw some parallels with another constructivist stream that
the author does not mention, at least not in
the references listed in 46. I am referring
to Jean Piagets genetic epistemology, both
in its original version (preceding the radical and cybernetic constructivism) as well as
the most recent reformulation, proposed by
Rolando Garca.
2 A few words are necessary to introduce this last author. Garca (19192012)
was an epistemologist who collaborated
with Piaget at the end of his work (e.g.,
Piaget & Garca 1982, 1988). After Piagets
death, Garca sought to create a new synthesis that could organize the different aspects
considered by genetic epistemology (Garca
1987, 1992, 1999, 2000) as well to expand its
scope by presenting it as a tool to interpret
current problems and challenges of science
(Garca 1997, 2006). In my understanding,
Umpleby has similar intentions towards von
Foersters work.
3 Here, I seek to broaden both the
context and the image of the revolution
that Umpleby offers. Specifically, I will show
that the movement propelling it was a more
comprehensive constructivism than the
cybernetic-radical tradition. I also suggest

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vol. 11, N3

that the different philosophical assumptions from these variants of constructivism

continue to condition its achievements and
challenges when it comes to reflecting on
science. All this will allow me to introduce
Garcas work to the readers of Constructivist
Foundations.

A broader approach towards

epistemology

4 In Table 1 and 5, Umpleby situates von Foersters view on science versus

the more classical view in its normative (Karl
Popper) or sociological (Thomas Kuhn)
aspects. The main element of this revolution, in the authors opinion, is the inclusion of the question of how an individual
constructs a reality, which von Foerster addresses by reflecting on neurophysiological
research from the 1960s. If we go back to the
program posed by Piaget, this is where we
can draw the first parallel.
5 As is well-known, the main focus
of Piagets work is epistemological:
Genetic epistemology attempts to explain

knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, on the basis of its history, its sociogenesis,
and especially the psychological origins of the
notions and operations upon which it is based.
(Piaget 1970: 1)

For Piaget, such a project entails integrating several disciplines and methods: on the
one hand, it resorts to formalizing analysis
to deal with matters of knowledge validity,
and on the other, to historical-critical and
genetic analysis in the fields of history of science and developmental psychology to deal
with the issue of knowledge constitution.
Genetic epistemology holds that the explanations constructed around the development of individual knowledge can shed light
on the development of scientific knowledge.
The core hypothesis is that there is a functional continuity between both domains
that would enable their transformation to be
explained by resorting to the same constructivist processes and mechanisms (Piaget &
Garca 1982: 31).
6 The underlying question furthering Piagets project can be grasped via
a terminological clarification. As Garca
(2000: 25f) recalls, Piaget used the term
pistmologie in its French sense, which

designates the critical study of scientific

knowledge, i.e., the analysis of its logical
foundations and fields of action. The definition of genetic epistemology maintains this
original sense of the term although it traces
its genesis back all the way to the most elementary individual forms, thus broadening
the terms sense towards a general theory of
knowledge. In Garcas opinion, this move
deserves to be described as revolutionary.
Such clarification is important for us because it shows how different objectives that
are usually grouped under the same epistemology tag are connected. Jeremy Burman
(2007: 722) provides a clear summary when,
turning away from the ambiguity of such a
tag, he suggests understanding Piaget as a
meta-epistemologist or a philosopher of
knowledge who, based on the empirical
consideration of cognition, is interested in
making philosophy of science a scientifically
informed analysis.1
7 The parallels between Piagets and
von Foersters project can be found not only
in their respective views on science but also
in their concurrence on some questions regarding the theory of knowledge, something
that both authors acknowledged (see von
Foersters 1981 contribution to Piagets festschrift and the honorees answer in Inhelder,
Garca & Voneche 1981). This basic concurrence is found in the common denominator
of constructivism of the epistemic and cognitive theory, which could also be applied to
Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana,
Francisco Varela and Siegfried Schmidt,
to name the authors pointed out by Karin
Knorr-Cetina (1989) and Niklas Luhmann
(1990), from whom I am adopting the denomination. All of them made their contribution in a wider movement in favor of the
1| Coincidentally, there are reasons to believe Thomas Kuhn also used epistemology in
an analogous sense, associated to the theory of
knowledge (see, e.g., Kuhn 1970: 96, 126), although, instead of a constructivist standpoint, a
certain empiricism and psychological behaviorism can be observed (Becerra & Castorina 2015).
In any case, what distinguishes epistemologists
such as Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld or von Foerster from philosophers of science such as Kuhn
and Popper is that the former thematize cognitive
mechanisms, which would eventually influence
how the social dimension is understood.

Second-Order Cybernetics

Genetic Epistemology Gastn Becerra

naturalization of epistemology and science

analysis.
8 In considering this wider constructivist tradition, I do not want to ignore
the significant differences that can be found
in terms of philosophical assumptions, such
as the characterization of the cognizant
subject or they way they understand society. Here, it is my interest to suggest these
assumptions should be considered when
evaluating the constructivist philosophies of
sciences accomplishments and challenges.
Specifically, by including two professed realists such as Piaget and Garca, I seek to
introduce a difference in Umplebys considerations, whose analysis seems to focus only
on the less conflictive dialogue between von
Foerster and radical constructivism authors.

Challenges and achievements

9 Among the significant advantages

in relation to the traditional approaches to
analyzing science, Umpleby points out that
there is a preeminence of the social aspect:
50 deals with shifts from theoretical problems to practical ones e.g., social and environmental ones as well as with action
research; 56f address the social contexts
of applied knowledge; 59 calls for giving
academic value to these operations; 61 calls
for contemplating the ethical dimension of
research. Such preeminence is sustained in
the new horizons the author sets out for
second-order cybernetics: in 76, the step
towards endo-research that is referred to can
be understood as considering the context of
knowledge production; and 77 points out
the importance of comparing objectives and
assumptions to evaluate prospective dialogues and risks when integrating contexts
and disciplines. This is where we can draw
a second parallel with genetic epistemology.
10 In Psychogenesis and the History
of Science, Piaget & Garca (1982) sought to
reevaluate the role that social context plays
in the field of knowledge. In their conclusions, they propose the existence of invariant mechanisms explaining the emergence
of knowledge, along with social, cultural and
historical contexts of meaning conditioning
the directionality these mechanisms take.
Piaget & Garca refers to this conditioning as
an epistemic framework (1982: 228). In his
later works, Garca re-defined the epistemic
framework as the boundary conditions

modulating the intrinsic activity of a cognitive system (Garca 1992: 31). According to
this view, knowledge evolves by reorganizations fed by the exchanges between the (cognitive) system and its (social) environment
(Garca 1999: 179).
11 Eventually, with Garcas revision
(2000), the scope of his analysis of constructivist theory was widened, which makes it
possible to state different ways of analyzing
the epistemic framework (Becerra & Castorina 2015).
12 A first type of analysis is the one
Piaget & Garca (1982) called sociogenetic,
which is intended for the history of science
field. Here, the epistemic framework refers
to a worldview (Weltanschauung) resulting from philosophical, religious and ideological factors that influence the contents of
theorization by enabling or inhibiting our
questions (Piaget & Garca 1982: 228234).
Garca provided an example:
Ohm, in Germany, discovered the first quan
titative law in electricity The reaction of the
Naturphilosophers was very consistent: What was
the point of measuring such phenomena? Electricity is something very immaterial how can
one measure it? Experiments and mathematics
were considered entirely irrelevant to obtaining
a true understanding of Nature. This was the
Weltanschauung involved in the Romantic movement In this case, a particular cultural pattern
enters in a very concrete way into the shaping of
science in a particular society at a particular time.
In the case we are considering, it acts as an epistemological obstacle, to use Gaston Bacherlards
expression. Here, the social component is not
merely providing directionality to scientific research; it enters deeply into the conceptualization
of science. (Garca 1987: 136)

This raises the question of whether a similar conceptualization has been developed by
second-order cybernetics.
13 A second analysis relates to the
psychogenetic field covering the development of knowledge from childhood to adult
thinking. The epistemic framework here
refers to the social meaningfulness and cultural practices that make certain phenomena or objects visible or invisible in a shared
social world (for a similar idea, see Overton
1994). Surprisingly, Umpleby has not given
further consideration to social context and

social meaningfulness when arguing about

the cognitive sciences (72f).
14 Two further analyses may be more
in line with the Umplebys intentions. One of
them is the metatheoretical analysis, i.e., the
analysis of assumptions underlying a theory,
which Piaget (1979) used to include in the
internal epistemology of the sciences. The
epistemic framework lies here in the history of a specific theoretical or disciplinary
field, which conditions future developments
through the dialectic relations among the
different levels of theorization, data selection and interpretation, explanatory models,
etc. This type of analysis can also be applied
to contemporary scientific problems, thus
becoming a fundamental tool for enabling
interdisciplinary research of complex issues such as the societal and environmental ones (for a brief review of these research
programs in contact with the sociocybernetics approach, see Becerra & Amozurrutia 2015). The epistemic framework here
is expressed through the researchers set of
social and political values making up the
multidisciplinary team, say, in the way the
social and political need emerges, marking
off the intervention direction (Garca 2006).
Only recently, the interdisciplinary literature has started to consider the sociopolitical element as a key factor in succeeding in
this type of endeavor (Boix-mansilla 2006).
I think these projects bear a spirit in terms of
challenges and achievements that is similar
to the ones Umpleby highlights in 50, 61,
and 76f.2
15 Garca suggests that if the approaches used to address complex issues
are to be improved, then actions must be
taken to integrate knowledge and to coconstruct the study object among the multidisciplinary team members. A mere call
to interdisciplinarity is not enough. What is
needed is a new methodology, explicit lines
of work, and new tools and techniques easing such integration. Garca proposes this
2| It is worthwhile mentioning that Umpleby
provides a deepened elaboration on the organizational dimension of science, which has been
poorly elaborated in Garcas work. A special note
must be given to the ethical considerations found
in von Foerster and Piaget, which Garca seems
to have replaced with political and strategic considerations.

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Philosophical Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

methodology by reflecting on his research

experience on climate change, drought and
famine through a constructivist lens (Garca 2006). As far as I know, cybernetics and
radical constructivism have not made much
progress in designing this kind of proposal
(although Hugo Alre and Egon Noe 2014
provide a good discussion that, in many
aspects, is in line with Garcas considerations). Perhaps the lack of greater integration with empirical social research presents
an obstacle. I think Umplebys remarks in
6569 suggest a similar diagnosis. I can
only hypothesize as to what extent such lack
of integration is due to an unclear stance on
societys reality status, and subsequently,
its effective conditioning on knowledge
(Glasersfeld 2008; Mller 2008). In any
case, Garcas work could be a fine case for
observing how a constructivist perspective
that acknowledges social forces and social
structures can indeed make a contribution
on this matter.
Gastn Becerra is an assistant professor at
the Universidad de Buenos Aires. His research
focuses on the emergence of complexity as an
object of study for the social sciences and the
constructivists traditions, with special attention to
Rolando Garcas and Niklas Luhmanns ouvres.
Received: 7 June 2016
Accepted: 11 June 2016

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Shed the Name to find SecondOrder Success: Renaming

Second-Order Cybernetics
to Rescue its Essence
Michael R. Lissack

Institute for the Study of Coherence

and Emergence, USA
lissack/at/isce.edu

>UpshotBuried in the jargon of con-

structivism and cybernetics lies the essence of what second-order cybernetics

can do for its practitioners. The labels and
names get in the way; to move forward
we must refocus on that essence which
is to ask always how context matters.

1 Stuart Umplebys target article

highlights the intellectual progress of
second-order cybernetics and its related
branch of constructivism while at the same
time making note of (and slightly bemoaning) its lack of implementation in both
contemporary academic thought and practitioner practice. His hopeful expressions of
the paths second-order cybernetics might
take contrast with the fields lack of progress for the past two decades or more. In
this commentary, I will rephrase Umplebys
proposed pathways by making explicit the
main obstacle to their implementation: the
very words, labels, history, and jargon that
cyberneticians use to define their field and
to encourage the uptake of its perspective by
others.
2 The reader should take careful
note of an important irony here. In my role
as the President of the American Society for
Cybernetics I am tasked with preserving,
evangelizing, and promulgating the essences
of the field. To do this successfully, I believe
that we need to recognize the context in
which the very label cybernetics functions.
The word has shifted in its meaning. The
two-syllable conjunction cyber is now associated with computers and computation.
While the old meaning of steering remains
in the dictionary, it is lost on those who
practitioners in the field need to reach. If
we are to further cybernetics, and especially
second-order cybernetics, as a field of intellectual inquiry, I believe we as a community

need to accept that we have lost the battle of

the word. What matters in successful communication is how the listener receives the
signals being transmitted and then converts
those signals into personal meaning. Our
insistence on making use of the 1950s and
1960s meaning of words such as cybernetics is getting in our way. Our desired listeners struggle to grasp our intended meaning.
To save cybernetics so that it may live and
prosper, I believe that its very name needs to
be relegated to historic label and that we,
as a community, need to find new ways to
express our essential thoughts.
3 It is on one of those essences that
I will focus herein the role of always asking about how context matters. Context here
must be viewed in its broadest sense. Not
just the material, social, and physiological
opportunities, boundaries, and constraints
that may serve to describe a given situation,
but also the intellectual, semiotic, and lexical triggers that affect how any given participant or observer mentally processes that situation. As Umpleby quotes Thomas Kuhn:
different participants/observers
see different things when they look from the

same point in the same direction. [] Both are

looking at the world, and what they look at has
not changed. But in some areas they see different
things, and they see them in different relations
one to the other. (4)

4 In response to the Kuhn quote,

second-order cybernetics and constructivism would also add that indeed what they
look at has changed. Each participant and
observer has their own set of mental constructs, and they can only see what they
possess the constructs for. In 7, Umpleby
notes:
Since people have different experiences lan
guage, home life, culture, religion, academic
training, and job experiences each persons reality is in some respects unique, though our knowledge of the physical and social world has many
common features.

As Kuhn (1970: 48) put it: You dont see

something until you have the right metaphor [model] to let you perceive it. And
as Daniel Kahneman (2011: 87) elaborates:
We often fail to allow for the possibility that