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Case: 13-15378
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Jamel Melvin appeals his 84-month sentence for possessing a firearm and
ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). For the
first time on appeal, Melvin argues that the district court erred in treating his prior
conviction under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a) as a controlled substance offense as
defined in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) and enhancing his base offense level under
U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3) because, unlike its federal statutory counterparts, the
Florida statute does not include knowledge of the illicit substance as an element.1
Melvin also argues that his above-guideline sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable, partly because the district court improperly considered
his prior arrest record.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties briefs, we
affirm.
I.
We review sentencing issues not raised before the district court for plain
error. United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 125152 (11th Cir. 2006)(per
curiam). To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is
plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 1253. When the
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explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there
can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this
Court directly resolving it. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for a defendant
convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon is 22 if the offense involved a
semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine and the
defendant has a prior felony conviction for a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense. U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3). The guidelines that are in effect at
the time of a defendants sentencing should guide a district courts sentencing
calculations and findings. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4). As used in 2K2.1, the term
controlled substance offense means
an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense.
U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b); see id. 2K2.1, cmt. n.1 (providing that 4B1.2(b)s
definition of controlled substance offense applies to base offense level
enhancements under 2K2.1).
Under Florida law, it is a crime to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess
with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance. Fla. Stat.
893.13(1)(a). Knowledge of the illicit nature of a substance is not an element of
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3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. Irey, 612 F.3d at
1187 (internal quotation marks omitted). Extraordinary justification is not
required, but the district court should explain why the variance is appropriate, and
the justification must be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
variance. Id. at 118687.
Furthermore, [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. 3661. When a defendant fails to object to
allegations of fact in the PSI, he admits those facts for sentencing purposes.
United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006).
Melvins sentence is procedurally reasonable. The district court explicitly
indicated that it considered the parties arguments, the PSI, and the 3553(a)
factors in finding an upward variance to be appropriate, and directly responded to
Melvins argument that his sentence was unduly harsh. See Sanchez, 586 F.3d at
936.
Melvins sentence is also substantively reasonable. The district court was
free to consider Melvins entire criminal history, including his unobjected to
conduct described in his PSI that did not result in conviction or prosecution. See
18 U.S.C. 3661; Wade, 458 F.3d at 1277. The district court explained why the
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variance was appropriate, and Melvins criminal history and record of threatening
others with a firearm was sufficiently compelling justification, as this implicated
3553(a) factors such as the need to promote respect for the law, protect the public
from Melvins future crimes, and deter criminal conduct. Although the district
court may not have weighed Melvins history of mental problems or purported
non-blameworthy role in the offense as much as he desired, its decision to weigh
other factors more heavily was within its sound discretion. See Clay, 483 F.3d at
743.
AFFIRMED.