PHILLIPA FOOT: VIRTUE ETHICS

"Morality is internal. The moral law. . . has to be expressed in the

form, 'be this,' not in the form 'do this.' . . . The true moral law says
'hate not,' instead of 'kill not.' . . . The only mode of stating the
moral law must be as a rule of character."
--Leslie Stephen, The Science of Ethics
Traditional philosophy has misinterpreted Greek ethics as a moral
rationalism and objectivism. There is no ethics of duty or obligation
there, but only an ethics of virtue.
One of the "virtues" of virtue ethics ("virtue" in the broad sense of a
"function" or "excellence") is that it offers bridges across the
traditional dualisms of ethical objectivism and subjectivism, between
moral rationalism and voluntarism, between the head and the heart
(both are important), between intention and consequence (both
have value), and between intellectual and moral virtue. We will see
that Phillipa Foot believes that wisdom is both an intellectual and a
moral virtue.
The motto for virtue ethics is: "Be this sort of person" rather than
"Follow this rule." Kant's "What is my duty?" becomes instead
"What sort of person shall I become?"
Foot will describe virtue ethics as the art of charting a course among
various temptations, those dispositions of a lower order. The
navigation tools are the virtues, "corrective" dispositions to those
which lead us astray.
A definition of virtue: "The virtues are sentiments, that is, related
families of dispositions, and properties regulated by a higher-order
desire. . . .--John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
J. S. Mill's criticism of a duty-based morality in Christianity: "Christian
morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great
part, a protest against paganism [viz., Greek ethics]. Its ideal is
negative rather than positive, passive rather than active; innocence
rather than nobleness; abstinence from evil, rather than energetic
pursuit of the good; in its precepts 'Thou shalt not' predominates

unduly over 'Thou shalt.' Whatever exists of magnanimity,

highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is
derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our
education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in
which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience"
(On Liberty [Penguin ed.], p. 112.)
PROBLEMS WITH A DUTY-BASED ETHIC
(First two focuses on duty ethics which have a theological basis, and
the last two deal with Kant.)
The Problem of Ethical Motivation. In its religious form, the
sanctions of a duty-based ethics are primarily external: rewards for
those who do good and punishment for those who do evil. This
leads to mere moralism rather than a genuine morality based on
internal sanctions and the view, drawn from the Greeks, that virtue
is its own reward. Only the latter is an acceptable form of ethical
motivation. Only Kant escapes this criticism, but only to end up
facing even more serious problems.
The Problem of Legalism. True morality should be the foundation
of law, and virtue should precede moral rule. In fact, moral rules are
abstractions from the practice of virtue. A duty-based ethics
reverses this order. It speaks of law, usually divine law, first, and
moral rules comes directly from the mouth and mind of the
lawgiver. True morality should always serve as a check for the
possibility of unjust laws. If law and morality are the same, then this
crucial idea of morality as the guardian of law is undermined. The
example of Job and Divine Command Morality. The example of Huck
Finn and his refusal to turn in the slave boy Jim.
The Problem of Character. Kant's duty-based morality generates
counter-intuitive claims about the value of character, motivation,
and inclination in performing moral actions. See the example of Jack
and Jill and embezzling money from their bank later in the chapter.
Overemphasis on Rational Autonomy. Kant's ethics is overly
atomistic and places impossible demands on the individual. The
atomistic individual is in fact an abstraction from the community at

large. In deemphasizing Kant's rational autonomy, virtue ethicists

also bridge the gap between reason and the passions. They deal
with the whole person as s/he is situated in society.
ENABLING VS. SUBSTANTIVE VIRTUES
Philosophers have generally distinguished between two types of
virtues: "enabling" virtues and the "substantive" virtues. The
substantive virtues have moral content or "substance," i.e., the right
desire to tell the truth or help the needy, whereas the enabling
virtues simply help us resist one temptation or another. The
substantive virtues require proper motivation towards the good,
while the enabling virtues require sufficient will power to counter
evil.
One psychological test by which one can distinguish the two is
Aristotle's requirement that one must take pleasure in the virtues.
Another criterion is that the enabling virtues are not done for their
own sake, but for the sake of the substantive virtues.
Let us do the virtue of nonviolence as an example. It seems that
nonviolence should be classified as an enabling virtue. We all need
a nonviolent disposition if we are to overcome desires to injure,
retaliate, and to verbally abuse. This virtue are obviously part of the
will to resist rather than a direct desire for the good. Using the tests
above, we can see that a nonviolent thief is not only possible but
also probably the most successful. Using Aristotle's test of taking
pleasure in virtue, we see that this is not required of nonviolent
action. Resisting the temptation to retaliate while enduring the
attacks of an aggressor would obviously not be a pleasant activity.
As an exercise determine the type of each of these virtues:
pride
rationality
honesty
loyalty
optimism
benevolence
self-control
charity

nonviolence
fairness
kindness
courage
resoluteness
industry
sympathy
patience
compassion
conscientiousness
endurance
foresight
gratitude
fortitude
FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES
(From the Greeks)
wisdom
courage
justice
temperance
THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
faith
hope
charity
humility
piety
THEOLOGICAL VICES
(seven deadly sins)
lust
sloth
greed
envy
pride
jealousy
spite

FOOT VS. ARISTOTLE ON WISDOM

1. Foot believes that wisdom is both an intellectual and a moral
virtue; it is both a state of mind and a determination of character. It
deals with both knowing something and willing something. A person
might know what the proper goals of life are, and may even know
the means to achieve these goals, but this same person may lack
the will to do anything about them.
2. Foot believes that, contrary to Aristotle, wisdom is achievable by
any person who wants it? Note two important qualifiers to this
claim: (1) only persons can be wise; (2) and one must be able to
form a desire to be wise. Also the cognitive elements as stated
above must be conscious in the mind. What do you think of Foot's
claim? What about Charlie Brown? What about a political prisoner?
What about the tradition in ancient societies that the elders are all
wise?
3. Against Aristotle, Foot believes that wisdom does not depend on
social status, political power, or intellectual power.
4. Connected with Foot's more egalitarian view of wisdom is also a
rejection of pride as a virtue. (Aristotle, of course, thought pride
was one of the highest virtues, resting, as Richard Taylor claims,
right under wisdom in value.) Foot tends to follow the Christian
tradition of virtue ethics on this point and others.
Note: Foot does not want to imply that the cognitive elements of
virtue are not as important. (Balance is one of the geniuses of this
view.) Obviously, vice is never just a problem of weak will, but also,
and always, ignorance as well.
ARISTOTLE'S THREE TYPES OF PERSONS
The sophron is the one who naturally and without effort lives in the
mean. She is not even tempted to do wrong. Such a person is the
embodiment of the Greek's great virtue sophrosyne, moderation,
self-mastery, or more literally "having a sound mind." Such a person
as "natural" virtue.

The enkrates (lit. "having the will") is one who does not naturally live
in the mean and is always tempted. But he always has the will to
overcome temptation. Such a person has "duress" virtue.
The akrates (lit. "no will") is one who does not naturally live in the
mean and is always tempted. But the akrates does not have the will
to overcome temptation.
"NATURAL" VS. "DURESS" VIRTUE
Let us take the example of Jack and Jill, who work in a bank at the
same position. Each have the same opportunity to embezzle money
from their tills. Jill never thinks about doing it, and thus can be said
to have "natural" virtue. However, Jack is always tempted to take
some money for himself, but he always overcomes the temptation.
Let us call Jack's virtue "duress" virtue.
Which person has highest moral worth? Kant's answer is clear: Jack,
because we are sure that he is not stealing out of duty. We are not
sure about Jill, because of her natural inclination not to steal. (As
Kant reminds us: we don't praise people for preserving their lives
when they have every inclination to do just that.) Kant's view seems
unsatisfactory, because we definitely want to give Jill moral worth.
Indeed, if after a probationary period, the bank managers have to
decide whom to keep--Jack or Jill--it is obvious that they will not want
to keep Jack on. (Let's assume for the sake of argument that Jack
confesses his daily temptations to his superiors.)
One might argue that "duress" virtue is not virtue at all. One might
argue that we praise Jack for his efforts in overcoming
temptation, not for his virtue. If the virtues are habits, as Aristotle
says, then it is clear that honesty is not yet completely ingrained
Jack as it seems to be in Jill. If virtue is a "corrective" disposition, as
Foot claims, then Jack is not fully inclined to be honest. Recall that
Aristotle said that the virtuous person not only wants to what is
right, but also takes pleasure in it.
On the other hand, as one of my former students argued: "duress
virtue is the father of natural virtue and must be praised as such. A
utilitarian may even point out the utility of praising duress virtue, for

it is that which brings about natural virtue as it is exercised" (David

Austin, 103 student, Fall, '89). This is certainly true if you think of
how children learn the virtues: their natural disposition is to think of
themselves before others, and the virtues are taught as correctives
to "nature." So "natural" virtue does not turn out to be so natural
afterall. So the difference between Jack and Jill is that Jack has not
matured in his moral development, whereas Jill's natural inclinations
to be tempted have completely overcome.
As another test of our intuitions on this matter, review the trial and
death of the two great heroes of Western culture, Jesus and
Socrates. What kind of virtue does each have in the face of death?
Even though it might be offensive to some, we need to think of Jesus
as a human being for purposes of this exercise. Thinking of him as
God skews the possibly of any instructive comparison.
Think of another scenario. A radical environmentalist lives on 40
acres outside of Moscow, next to a person who runs a manufacturing
plant on the adjoining property. The county passes stiff new
pollution laws, with which the "green" happily complies. (Let us say
that it does not cost him anything to comply.) The owner of the
plant reluctantly complies with the new rules, although it means that
he cannot give his employees a raise and predicts a big fall in
profits. Whose virtue is greater?
RICHARD TAYLOR ON PRIDE (Ethics, Faith, and Reason, p. 105)
"Pride is a justified love of oneself; a justified perception that one is
better than others. Pride is highmindedness (megalopsychia; lit.
"great soulness"); it is a high and correct opinion of one's own
worth. The only judge who can determine this is oneself, but one
must have the qualities of excellence that are required. One must
adhere to one's own standards of excellence and not give in to
fashion or peer pressure. A proud person does not go by what
people say is "right" or "wrong," but is guided by worth, honor, and
the deterrent effect of shame. The greatest vice is to shame or
dishonor oneself."
But pride, according to Taylor, is not the highest virtue--wisdom is. It
is the knowledge of what the good ends of life are and the ways in
which the virtues can be developed as established habits. But

contrary to Foot, Taylor would agree that wisdom is not available to

all those who want it.