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[1938]1LNS32
[1938]1MLJ63

KAMARUDDINBINOMARv.PUBLICPROSECUTOR
HIGHCOURTMALAYA,IPOH
WHITLEY
IPOHCRIMINALAPPEALNO.71OF1937
11JANUARY1938

MOTORVEHICLESENACTMENT(CAP168),S(II): intoxication while in charge of motor vehicle previous

acquittalonchargeofcausingdeathbyrashactnoevidenceofintoxicationadducedinformerproceedingsres
judicatainapplicable.

Counsel:
FortheappellantRoianaBraddell
FortherespondentMCHay,DeputyLegalAdviser

JUDGMENT
WhitleyJ:
ThisappealfromaconvictionbytheTaipingMagistratecameonforhearingbeforemeatIpohon17December
1937.Beingsatisfiedthattheconvictionwasaproperone,Idismissedtheappeal,butinviewoftheimportance
ofsomeofthepointsraised,IintimatedthatIwouldgivemyreasonsinwritinglater.
Theappellantwaschargedwith
(i) being intoxicated while in charge of a motor car an offence under s. 45(ii) of the Motor Vehicles
Enactment(Cap.168).
(ii)failingtostopafteranaccident,anoffenceunders.45(iii)ofthatEnactmentand
(iii)failingtoreportanaccident,anoffenceunderss.42(ii)and45(iii)ofthesameEnactment.
Hepleadedguiltytothesecondandthirdcharges,andclaimedtrialonthefirstcharge.Hewasconvictedand
sentencedtoonemonth'srigorousimprisonment.Thisappealisagainstthatconviction.
Thefactsasestablishedbytheevidencefortheprosecutionwereshortlyasfollows:At11.55onthenightof4
July1937theappellantwasdrivinghismotorcaralongtheStationRoad,Taiping,inthedirectionofthestation.
Thecar,whichaccordingtoapolicewitnesswastravellingfairlyfast,ranintoarickshawwhichwascrossingthe
road,severelydamagingitandkillingtherickshawpuller.Withoutslowingdownitwentonandcrashedintoa
stationarymotorcaronthegrassontherighthandsideoftheroadsome240feetfurtheron,andthenwenton
in a zigzagging manner at a speed which the driver of this other car estimated at 30 miles per hour. The
appellantinhisevidencestatedthatheonlyfeltaslightbumpanddroveontohishouse.Hewasarrestedathis
house,sixmilesfromthesceneoftheaccident,at12.50a.m.byMr.PowellEvans,theTaipingTrafficOfficer.
The appellant smelt strongly of alcohol, and was examined by two doctors. I shall deal more fully with the
evidenceonthispointlater.
The appellant was tried on a charge of causing death by a rash act not amounting to culpable homicide, an
offenceunders.304AofthePenalCode.Hewasconvicted,butwasacquittedonappeal,PedlowJexpressing
theopinionthattheevidenceestablishednomorethanabaderrorofjudgment,andintimatinghisviewthatthe
appellantshouldbechargedwithfailingtostopafteranaccidentandfailingtoreport.Duringthewholeofthese
proceedingstherewasnosuggestionthattheappellantwasinanywayundertheinfluenceofliquor,andno
evidencewasadducedonthepoint.
Thefirstgroundofappealarguedbeforemewasthat"ThelearnedMagistratewaswronginconsidering
theevidenceconcerningtheactionsoftheappellantwithregardtotheaccidentexceptinsofarasthose
factshadbeenfoundbytheJudgeinthepreviousproceedingssincethematteroftheaccidentwithallthe
relevantcircumstancesrelatingtheretowascompletelyresjudicata.
MrBraddell(fortheappellant)submittedthatinviewoftheacquittalinthepreviousproceedings,thepresent
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prosecution was vexatious and improper, and amounted to persecution on the part of the State that it was
wrong to call again the evidence as to the accident and the events leading up to it, which had already been
considered and adjudicated upon in the previous proceedings and that if at the time of those proceedings
CounselfortheStatehadbelievedhimselftopossessanyreliableevidencethattheappellantwasunderthe
influenceofliquor,itwashisobviousdutytohaveproduceditthen.SubsequentlyMr.Braddellaftertheposition
hadbeenexplainedtohimbytheDeputyLegaladviserveryfairlywithdrewanysuggestionofimproprietyonthe
partoftheofficersdirectingtheprosecutionbutasthequestionisoneofconsiderableimportancewhichislikely
toariseagain,IthinkitisdesirablethatIshouldsayafewwordsonthepoint.
The position in the Federated Malay States as regard prosecution for this type of offence is similar to that in
England. Here there may be a charge under s. 304A of the Penal Code or one or more charges under the
Motor Vehicles Enactment. In England there may be a charge of manslaughter under the Common Law, or
chargesundertheRoadTrafficAct,1930.TheproprietyorotherwiseofjoiningachargeunderthisActwitha
chargeofmanslaughterhasbeenconsideredintwocasesbytheCourtofCriminalAppeal.InRv.Stringer,24
CrAppealReports,p.30(1933,1KB704):
Theappellantwaschargedonanindictmentcontainingtwocounts,thefirstofwhichallegedmanslaughter
andthesecondthedrivingofamotorvehicleinamannerdangeroustothepublicatthesametimeand
place.Thechargeof
manslaughter arose from the alleged negligence of the appellant in the driving of a motor lorry, and the
charge of dangerous driving was based upon the same facts. The jury found the appellant not guilty of
manslaughter,butguiltyofdangerousdriving.
It was held that the verdict was not bad in law as, upon the count which charged manslaughter, the
appellantcouldnothavebeenconvictedofdangerousdriving,andthereforeiftherehadbeentwoseparate
indictmentstriedattwoseparatetimeshecouldnot,onthegroundofhisacquittalofmanslaughter,have
successfullyputforwardapleaofautrefoisacquittothechargeofdangerousdriving,becausehewould
never have been in jeopardy on that charge. The proper procedure, however, when charges of
manslaughteranddangerousdrivingaretobemadeagainstanaccusedperson,isthattheoffencesshould
bechargedinseparateindictments.
InRv.Carr,24CrAppealReports,199,itwasheldthatachargeofdrivingamotorvehiclewhenunderthe
influence of drink contrary to s. 15(i)(b) of the Road Traffic Act should not be tried together with a charge of
manslaughter,eventhoughCounselforthedefenceconsenttosuchacoursebeingtaken.Onthoseauthorities
itisclearthattheprosecutioninthepresentcasehaveactedwiththeutmostpropriety.Eveniftherehadbeen
nosuchcasestobefollowedasprecedents,itseemstomeonlyfairandreasonablethatunlessapersonis
actuallychargedwithbeingintoxicatedtheissueoughtnottobeconfusedbyintroducingthefactofhishaving
takendrink.Similarlyinthetrialonthechargeofbeingintoxicatedwheninchargeofthecar,theprosecution
acted properly in making no mention of the fact that the rickshaw puller had been killed. That fact was only
referredtobydefendingCounselforhisownpurposes.
Inmyopinionitwasclearlyproperfortheprosecutiontoadduceagaintheevidenceastothemannerofthe
appellant'sdrivingatthetimeofandaftertheaccident,insofarasitwasrelevanttothepresentcharge,and
tendedtoshowwhetherhewasintoxicatedatthetimeandIcannotseehowthedoctrineofresjudicatacan
applytoshutoutsuchevidence.Inthepreviousproceedingsthequestionofintoxicationwasnotinissueand
was never considered. All that the Court was called upon to decide then was whether the evidence was
sufficienttoestablishacaseofcriminalrashnessornegligence.ThelearnedJudgefoundthattheaccidentwas
causedbyabaderrorofjudgmentonthepartoftheappellant.Tothatextentbutnofurtherthemattermustbe
regardedasbeingresjudicata.TheJudgewasnotaskedtodirecthismindtothefurtherquestionwhetherthat
baderrorofjudgmentwasduetotheappellant'sjudgmentbeingimpairedthroughhisbeingundertheinfluence
ofliquor.Thisquestionofliquorhadquiteproperlybeenkeptoutofthattrialentirely.Itsintroductionwouldonly
haveservedtoobscuretherealissue,andwouldcertainlyhavetendedtobeprejudicialtotheappellant.The
prosecution were entirely within their rights, in view of the evidence which they had available in subsequently
bringingthepresentchargeofbeingintoxicatedwhileinchargeofthecar.Ishalldeallaterwiththedefinitionof
"intoxicated."Forthemomentitwillsufficetosaythatoneelementtobeconsideredindecidingwhetherornota
person is intoxicated is whether he was so under the influence of liquor as to impair his judgment. The
appellants driving and his behaviour before, at the time of, and after the accident, are clearly of the utmost
relevanceasbearinguponthatpoint,anditwouldbeunreasonableandabsurdtoexcludeevidenceastosuch
drivingandbehaviourmerelybecausethesameevidencehasalreadybeencalledandconsideredinitshearing
uponatotallydifferentissue,namelythequestionofcriminalrashness,ornegligence.
ThesecondgroundofappealarguedwasthatthelearnedMagistratedidnotspecificallyfindthattheappellant
wasintoxicated.Thiswasnotoneofthegroundsputforwardintheformalgroundsofappeal,butnoobjection
wastakenonthataccount.Icouldseenosubstanceinthisground.TheMagistratecommencedhisshortoral
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judgmentwiththesewords:"Charge1:Beingintoxicatedwhileinchargeofamotorvehicle."Aftersettingout
hisreasonsheconcludedwiththewords:"OnthischargethereforeIconvicttheaccused."Thiscanonlymean
"Iconvictonthechargeofbeingintoxicated,"andthatmustinvolveafindingthattheappellantwasintoxicated.
ItwasobjectedthatfromthereasonswhichtheMagistrategaveitwouldappearthathetreatedthechargeasa
chargeofbeingsoundertheinfluenceofalcoholastoaffecttheappellanttoadangerousextentincarryingout
oftheoccupationinwhichhewasengagedandnotasachargeofbeingintoxicated.Itisclearthatthatisthe
testwhichtheMagistrateappliedinconsideringwhethertheappellantwasintoxicatedandinmyopinionthat
wasapropertesttoapply.Thereisnodefinitionof'intoxicated'intheEnactment,andnocaseswerecitedto
showwhatdefinitionhasbeengiventothewordbytheCourts.Thatbeingso,theCourtisentitledtolooktothe
ordinarymeaningoftheword.Websterdefines'intoxicated'as"undertheinfluenceofanintoxicatingliquoror
drug,"and'drunk'as"beingundertheinfluenceofanintoxicantespeciallyalcoholicliquorsothattheuseofthe
facultiesismateriallyimpaired."Itwouldaccordinglybepropertodirectajurythatintryingtodecidewhethera
manwasintoxicatedwhileinchargeofamotorcar,theyshouldaskthemselvesthequestionwhetherhewasso
undertheinfluenceofalcoholthattheuseofhisfacultieswassoimpaired.Thatispreciselyhowthelearned
Magistrate, who was performing the function of a jury as well as those of a Judge, directed himself. Having
indicatedtheevidencewhichledhimtoanswerthatquestionintheaffirmative,therewasnonecessityforhimto
goontosay"Ithereforefindthathewasintoxicated."Suchafindingfollowsasaninevitablecorollary.
Mr Braddell's final submission was that there was no evidence upon which the Magistrate could properly find
that the appellant was intoxicated. In my opinion there was ample evidence to support this finding, and this
ground of appeal also failed. Whether or not a person was intoxicated at any particular time is essentially a
questionoffactforajury(seeRv.Presdee,20CrAppealReports,p.95)andaMagistratesittingasajuryis
entitledtoviewtheevidenceasawholeinforminghisopinion.Herethecumulativeeffectoftheevidencewas
overwhelming,andIdonotseehowtheMagistratecouldhavearrivedatanyotherconclusion.Westartoffwith
thefindingofPedlowJthattheaccidentwascausedbyabaderrorofjudgmentonthepartoftheappellant.
Followingupontheaccidentwehavetheevidenceofeccentricdriving.Theappellantdidnotstoptoseewhat
hehadstruck.Hedidnotslowdown.Hewentonfor240feet,collidedviolentlywiththecarparkedonthegrass
on that was his (the appellant's) wrong side of the road, rebounded into the road, swerved again on to the
grass, and after finally regaining the road drove six miles home with a flat tyre. When the traffic officer Mr.
Powell Evans saw him at the house one hour after the accident, he smelt strongly of alcohol, appeared very
unsteady and nearly fell into a drain.At 130 a.m. about 1'bd hours after the accident he was examined at
Taiping Hospital by the Assistant Medical Officer Dr. Lim Eng Cheang. At a distance of one foot he smelt
stronglyofalcohol,andthedoctorformedtheopinionthathewasundertheinfluenceofalcohol.AlittlelaterDr.
Shelleyexaminedhim.HetoldDr.Shelleythathehadhadsomesortofaccidentthathehadfeltaslightbump
andthoughtthathemusthavehitsomething.Thatapparentlywastheonlyimpressionwhichtheaccidenthad
madeuponhim,althoughfromthestateofthecaritmusthavehadamostviolentimpact.Thewindscreenwas
broken,thebumperandbothrightmudguardsbadlybent,halftherightrunningboardhadbeentornoff,andthe
rimofawheelwasbadlybuckled.Dr.Shelleyalsonoticedthathisbreathsmeltstronglyofstalealcohol,and
thathedidnotspeaknaturally.Hestaggeredslightlywhenwalkingalongastraightlineandstumbledonachair.
Dr.Shelleyformedtheopinionthattwohourspreviouslytheappellantmusthavebeeninadangerouscondition,
andthattheeffectsofalcoholwereonthewane.
Even if no direct evidence had been procurable as to the appellant having in fact taken drink that evening, it
seems to me that whilst making every allowance for the effects of shock and other points in the appellant's
favourtheonlyreasonableconclusiontowhichonecouldcomeontheevidencewhichIhavejustoutlinedwas
thattheaccidentandtheappellant'sactionswereduetohisbeingundertheinfluenceofalcohol.
It is not incumbent on the prosecution in such a case to prove what drink has been taken, but in this case
evidencewasavailabletoshowthattheappellanthadatahotelandaresthousedrunktwosmallbeersand
twohalfbrandyandgingerales.Thismaynotappeartobemuch,buttheappellantadmittedthathehadtaken
thisdrinkonanemptystomach,andastheDeputyLegalAdviserpointedout,therewasapossibilitythatother
drink had been taken in private as to which no evidence was available. But, as I have already indicated, the
questionfortheCourtinacaselikethisisnotthequantityofdrinkwhichhasbeentakenbuttheconditionofthe
accusedpersonastheresultofwhateverdrinkhehadtaken,theobjectofthesectionunderwhichthecharge
waslaidbeingtoprotectthepublicfromtheriskofinjuryatthehandsofmotorcardrivers,whobyreasonofthe
effectsofalcoholarenotinafitstatetoexerciseduefareintheirdriving.
It was objected that no witness actually stated in so many words that in his or her opinion the appellant was
'intoxicated.'ButaswaspointedoutinthecaseofRv.Presdee,towhichIhavealreadyreferred,thequestion
astowhetherapersonwasdrunkorintoxicatedisonefortheCourt,notthewitnesses,todecide,andjustasin
caseswherethedefenceofinsanityhasbeensetupitisgenerallynotpropertoaskawitnesswhetheraperson
wasinhisopinion'insane'similarlyitseemstobepreferablewhenitisaquestionofintoxication,toavoidasfar
as possible the use of that word and to question the witnesses as to actions and symptoms which they have
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actuallyobservedaswasdoneinthiscase.FromtheanswerstosuchquestionstheMagistrateorjuryasthe
casemaybecanformtheirownopinionastowhethertheaccusedpersonwasinfactintoxicated.Asispointed
outbyMr.TaylorinhisPrinciplesandPracticeofMedicalJurisprudence,8thEdn.,Vol.2,atpp.624and625,
theterm'drunk'isincapableofreceivingageneraldefinition.
Byitwemeanthatapersonwassoaffectedbytheactionofalcoholthathisconductwassufficientlyabnormal
to lead to his arrest in the particular circumstances charged.This definition obviously includes vastly different
stagesintheintoxicationbyalcohol,foramandrivingamotorcarintrafficmightbeconsidereddrunk,wherea
personundertheinfluenceofalcoholtothesameextent,butdrivingahorsevehicle,mightnotbeconsidered
drunk,andfurtherthestateatwhichthehorsedrivermightbeconsidereddrunkwouldbynomeansbeheld
reprehensibleinthecaseofapedestrian.
Theeffectofthealcoholontheconductoftheindividualistheimportantissueandthepointatwhichthe
influenceexertedbyalcoholmaycausedangertoothersvarieswiththeparticularoccupationoftheperson
atthetimeofarrest.
The learned author accordingly recommends that in giving evidence about the condition of such a person a
medicalpractitionershouldnotusetheword'drunk'ifitcanbeavoided,butshouldstatewhethertheperson
had taken alcohol or not, and whether in his opinion the alcohol was taken in sufficient quantity to affect the
patient to a dangerous extent in carrying out the occupation in which he was engaged when arrested. In my
opinionthatrecommendationisawiseone.
There was no appeal against the sentence of one month's imprisonment, and I do not think it could be
reasonablysuggestedthatthatsentencewasexcessive.IwouldgosofarastosaythatIshouldnothavefelt
disposedtointerfereifaheaviersentencehadbeenimposed.TheCourtsinEnglandaretakingaveryserious
viewofthistypeofoffenceandseveresentencesarebeingregularlyimposed.Apersondrivingamotorvehicle
when in such a state is a public menace, and upon a conviction drastic punishment is called for both as a
warningtohimandadeterrenttoothers.
Appealdismissed.
[1938]1MLJ63

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