SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737. February 9, 2011.]

LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE LAURO G. BERNARDO, Municipal Trial Court, Bocaue,
Bulacan, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law filed
by Lydelle L. Conquilla (complainant) against Judge Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.
The Facts
In a verified complaint dated 30 July 2008, complainant Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation of
authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before the MTC
of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police
Station.
On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the
complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest dated 8 July
2008, with the bail fixed at P12,000.
On 10 July 2008, upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for complainant's
provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date, complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court
judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant avers that respondent
judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the
preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant
of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty. Complainant
submits that respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to comment
on complainant's Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about the warrant of
arrest, she called respondent judge's wife, who said "she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and
would have the case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the
wife's debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00." 1
DaHSIT
In his Comment, respondent judge states that he issued the warrant of arrest in good faith because he was convinced
that there was probable cause and that it was necessary to place the complainant under immediate custody to prevent a
frustration of justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already amended Rules 112 and 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of the preliminary investigation from judges of
first level courts, he argues that the power to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power to determine probable cause was indeed revoked by the
amendment, respondent judge submits that technical rules can be relaxed if their implementation will result in
injustice.
Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the prosecutor when he reduced the bail
considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.
Lastly, respondent judge denies any knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between complainant and
his wife.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 12 February 2009, the OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for his
patent and unjustified violation of the provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The OCA stated that the
Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, removed the conduct of investigation from
the scope of authority of first level courts judges. Had respondent judge been more prudent in understanding the

pertinent provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which are very clear and concise, no administrative
complaint would have been filed against him.
The OCA, however, found the charge of usurpation of authority without merit. The OCA agreed with respondent
judge that the power to determine the amount of bail is vested in the judge.
The OCA recommended (a) that the administrative complaint against respondent judge be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
The Ruling of the Court
In this case, respondent judge makes it appear that he merely conducted a preliminary examination for the purpose of
determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. However, the records of the
case clearly show that respondent judge indeed conducted a preliminary investigation on 8 July 2008. After finding
probable cause to hold complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault, respondent judge then issued a warrant for
her arrest. That respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and not just a preliminary examination to
determine existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is evident in his Order dated 8 July 2008,
which reads:
ORDER
The undersigned, after personal examination of the witnesses in writing and under oath, finds that a probable cause
exists and there is sufficient ground to hold the accused LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA for trial for the crime of
DIRECT ASSAULT as charged in the complaint. In order not to frustrate the ends of justice, there is a need to place
the accused in immediate custody. Let warrant immediately issue for his [sic] arrest hereby fixing bail in the amount
of P12,000.00 for his provisional liberty. 2
SO ORDERED.
Bocaue, Bulacan, July 8, 2008. cCSDaI
(signed)
HON. LAURO G. BERNARDO
Judge
Furthermore, after complainant posted bail on 10 July 2008, respondent judge then issued an Order dated 10 July
2008, ordering the complainant's release and setting the case for her arraignment on 3 September 2008.
The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,
which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by
removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule
112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City
Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be
authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor.
The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public school teacher, who is a person
in authority under Article 152 3 of the Revised Penal Code. 4 Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
assault is committed against a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the
occasion of such performance, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The
duration of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to
6 years. Thus, the offense charged against complainant requires the conduct of preliminary investigation as provided
under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing
of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and (1) day without regard to the fine. (Emphasis supplied.)
It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial
office. 5 Section 3, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct 6 requires judges to maintain and enhance their
knowledge and skills to properly perform their judicial functions, thus:
SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities for
the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which
should be made available, under judicial control, to judges. EScAHT
When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of
the law. 7 Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, 8 and
should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence. 9
On the alleged promise of respondent judge's wife that the bail would be reduced provided her P35,000 debt will be
cancelled and that complainant grant respondent judge's wife an additional loan, we find that complainant did not
substantiate her allegation. Nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent judge denies knowledge of such
transaction between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did not categorically deny his wife's debt to
complainant. In his Comment, respondent judge states: "Assuming arguendo that there really was a loan made by his
wife, he did not know of such transaction between his wife and the complainant and given this, he did not allow such
transaction to take place." 10
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance of propriety to
the performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. 11 Furthermore, judges and members of their
families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to
be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with the performance of judicial duties. 12
On respondent judge's issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of bail, we find such acts void for
want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to
increase or decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge
conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of arrest. Thus, these acts are void
for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in the first place, respondent judge had no
jurisdiction over the case itself.
The Court notes that this is respondent judge's third offense. In 2003, the Court found respondent judge
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions and fined him P19,000, with a stern warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. 13
More importantly, in the 2008 case of Santos v. Bernardo, 14 the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and basic rules of procedure and fined him P20,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. 15 The Court found no merit in respondent judge's
supposition that grave coercion is an offense not subject to preliminary investigation. The Court, however,
emphasized that when the complaint was filed on 3 January 2006, respondent judge no longer had authority to

conduct preliminary investigation by virtue of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Thus, the Court held that respondent judge
should have referred the complaint to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor instead of issuing the subpoena directing
complainants to appear before the Court.
Under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge, for which the imposable penalty is any of the following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporation:
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 16
Considering that this is respondent judge's third offense, the second of which was also for gross ignorance of the law,
we hold that the penalty of six (6) months suspension from office without salary and other benefits is in order. 17
DHacTC
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Lauro G. Bernardo GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and SUSPEND
him from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Conquilla v. Bernardo, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737, [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 289-302)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative
Norma Tan, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES",
respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage
the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the
City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally
parked. 1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading
to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents
in I.S. No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang.
Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and [left] unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of
the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines
of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No. 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan

alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan
Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure
to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After
forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell[,] its use and value
which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not
paid by the respondents. 2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two
cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually
identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto
Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935. cCHETI
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged
further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of
evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4
In the Resolution 5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor
Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding
the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of
Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars
involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or
Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby
file the corresponding informations against them in Court. 6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July
25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left
front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier
rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City Ordinance No. 0032600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which
owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or

Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of
charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the
crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides:
"Section 1.. . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003.
5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on
October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability
of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. 9
In an Order 10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order 11 to
argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on
May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period. 12
Respondents filed their Opposition 13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply 14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution 15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents'
Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion
to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the
date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992,
En Banc). SCEDAI
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT
TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid.).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case
was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously
saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of
the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
. . . "[c]riminal actions shall be instituted . . . [i]n . . . other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office
of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "[t]he institution
of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws." 17

Petitioner contended further that:

[the] filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal
action in these cases had prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a
City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and
procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as
required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by
information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this
case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is [a] violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have
been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand,
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced
only by information." 18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment, 19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They
held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes 21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the
Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F.
Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only
be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in
court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent
judge's Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on
May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia,
Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not
apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any
case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless

otherwise provided in their charters.

In their Comment, 22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely,
that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were
sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the
Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was
contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the
civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply, 24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription,
since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated
but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
AaCTcI
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved . . .
may file a verified petition" 26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the
prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue
that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted. 28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged
under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91.Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
B.Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances

(Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent
component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 29
this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the
charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the
rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues
with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May
30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This
Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and
two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that. STECAc
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"

under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan 31
categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred
to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special
laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in
the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They
had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the
subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information.
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of
the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime
charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime[,] e.g., in a
prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a
"polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged[,] e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of
domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or wit[h] the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its
merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only
by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxx xxx xxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of
the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).
Presidential Decree No. 1275 32 reorganized the Department of Justice's Prosecution Staff and established Regional
State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions
where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located
in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan,
and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information
within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended. AECacT
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this
to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until
it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious
intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but
a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, [October 7, 2013])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175939. April 3, 2013.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not. The
right is not transgressed if the information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes
the offense established to have been committed by the accused.
The Case
Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) 1 affirmed with modification his conviction for the illegal possession and control of 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed down through its decision dated February 1, 2000, 2
sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment."
Antecedents
The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:
That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less
750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited

drugs, found in his possession and control.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.
On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and
obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search
for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala's residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East
Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. 4 SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of Manansala's house at around
5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the
information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount
of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used
during the test buy. 5 HDCAaS
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect, along with his
father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. 6 The certification listed the following seized articles, to
wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money amounting to
P655.00.
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned over the seized
articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the seized
articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative
examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94, 7 to wit:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Spmn "A" One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2) rectangular bricks of dried suspected
MARIJUANA fruiting tops having a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755) grams.
Spmn "B" One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 9.045
grams. . . . .
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in the above-stated specimen. . . . .
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result for MARIJUANA, a
prohibited drug. . . . .
CONCLUSION: AcHEaS
Spmns "A" and "B" contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. 8
Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994. 9
On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended
information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. 10 But the RTC did
not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized.
In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. His version follows.
On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any warrant,
and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City

known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and possession of
marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital for the treatment of the injuries he thereby
sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his captors and whoever had
maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at the trial. 11
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6425, holding thus:
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully and knowingly . . .
engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing . . . falling under the more embracing term
known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused
was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the
illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the
effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a member of the team
acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay. aDHCAE
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find marijuana leaves in the
custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the search warrant and has been
established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused, which
like alibi, is the weakest defense, this Court is convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or
dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. In light of these circumstances, this Court has no option that
to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved is
October 19, 1994, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will find
application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY of Violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the
fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 12
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following issues, namely:
1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of an invalid warrant, was erroneous;
2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited drug on the misplaced and
inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 was necessarily included in the
offense in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425; and DCcHIS
3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and misrepresented facts and evidences of substance and
importance that, if weighed, assayed and considered were enough to acquit the accused. 13
On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject to modification, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of seven hundred fifty thousand pesos (P750,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment.
Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are hereby ordered transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned before the CA.
Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to
another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box
inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control." acCETD
The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, 15 which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of the crime
charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, which states:
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in
convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of
illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8 under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4 was proper,
giving its reasons as follows: HEDSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that
the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a
conviction. In the case before Us, the trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less
adduce proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond
doubt that he was found in possession of the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the
established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further
apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and
which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it has been
satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited
drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, We find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in
convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425
necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has been sufficiently proven
beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams
marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the
prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed
and that accused-appellant was the author of the same. 16
xxx xxx xxx
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of Manansala for a
violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the
information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation brought against him. HcSDIE

For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the illegal sale of
marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8. In
the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna, 17 the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana
absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of
another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana
was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that the
illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale. The Court observed
thusly:
In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the
accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of
the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the
prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant's culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the prohibited drug. 18
In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however, the involvement of a single object in
both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that
only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent
evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is either
deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other hand, any other illegal
substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted
under a distinct and separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated. ASEcHI
It is true that there was an error in the information's statement of the facts essential to properly describe the offense
being charged against Manansala as that of illegal possession of marijuana; and that the error became known to the
Prosecution, leading Prosecutor Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission of the amended information
dated January 3, 1995. 19 In the motion, Prosecutor Manalansan manifested that the information as filed charged a
violation of Section 4; and that during the preliminary investigation, he had concluded that Manansala should have
been charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of Section 4 as far as the 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves seized from his possession during the implementation of Search Warrant No. 8-94 was concerned.
The distinct and separate nature of the 750 grams of marijuana leaves from the quantity of marijuana worth P100.00
that was the object of the test buy became all the more evident in Prosecutor Manalansan's letter dated December 28,
1994 addressed to City Prosecutor Prudencio B. Jalandoni. 20 There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750
grams of marijuana dried leaves had been seized from the possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the
search warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994 during the test buy
conducted to support the application of the search warrant. The letter specifically stated:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19 October 1994 are separate incidents giving
rise to two distinct offenses;
4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of prohibited drugs" on 19 October 1994 because he
was engaged in it before. There is no evidence to show that the accused was engaged in the sale, administration,
delivery, distribution and transportation of drugs as provided under Section 4;
5. The two (2) P50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was engaged in selling the 750 grams of
marijuana leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but cannot qualify his possession of the 750 grams of
the drugs. ECaTAI
xxx xxx xxx
Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.

The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in the
crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution 21 was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering,
giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently
given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves.
As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of
illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged. 22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006; and ORDERS accused CHAD
MANANSALA y LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Manansala y Lagman, G.R. No. 175939, [April 3, 2013])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164538. August 9, 2010.]
10:55 A.M.
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C.
ADRANDEA,** respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise, for
it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion, even though
complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the private offended party. Since a criminal offense
like estafa is committed against the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability
that the law imposes for the commission of the crime." 1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
(CA's) Decision 2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further Resolution 3 dated July 12, 2004
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.In
the affidavit 5 of petitioner's audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that the special audit conducted on
the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the
only voting members of the branch's credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to
P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only
P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 6
against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner's Port Area branch; that, consequently,
Universal was able to utilize petitioner's funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired;
that Universal's withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioner's
head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed";
and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence. ISDHEa
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they
only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement 7 whereby the
latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 8 as of February 4, 1997 and

undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered
by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any,
on December 31, 2001." 9
Findings of the Prosecutor
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her
Resolution 10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioner's evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa.
According to Prosecutor Edad:
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is
criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties [have]
change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents. 11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be dismissed. 12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of Justice (DOJ) by
means of a Petition for Review. 13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its employees and treat
with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who benefited from this transaction and instead, agreed
that it should be paid on installment basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will result in
grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction
with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents
whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the
P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored.
Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank
were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it
agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal. 14
A Motion for Reconsideration 15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by then Acting
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero. 16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus. 17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision 18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Citing
jurisprudence 19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of
such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. 20 Hence, according to the
CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation,
private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions." 21
The CA added that "[s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, public respondents may not be
compelled by mandamus to file an information in court." 22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment 23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where the latter,
despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing
the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution
negate the offense already committed. 24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible
individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their
inclusion in the information. 25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the resolutions
dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court. TcIaHC
On November 8, 2004, we required 27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the petition within
10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment 28 while respondent Jose C.
Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment 29 on the petition. The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required
comment on the OSG's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado)
did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause order 30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent noncompliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a
fine of P1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda, the instant
petition was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did not absolve
private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only the civil
obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in
sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the
appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioner's claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
v. Tonda, 31 the "negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution
for the offense already committed." 32
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the sole responsibility to
his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent documents being the head of petitioner's Port
Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be held liable for
estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA to give due course
to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.33
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal
liability for estafa not affected by
compromise or novation of contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinguishment of criminal liability." 34
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of
contract. In Firaza v. People 35 and Recuerdo v. People, 36 this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement
or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal
liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno 37 and in People v. Ladera 38 that "criminal liability for estafa
is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the
damage suffered by the offended party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda 39
cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal
liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into after the
commission of the crime does not extinguish accused's liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of

said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against respondents should not be
dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at
the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between petitioner and
Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latter's liability as a corporate entity but
not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank. . . .
40
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body of the assailed
Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement did not prevent the incipience
of criminal liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition absolving the
respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous. aIcETS
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law." The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that "contracts can only bind the
parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof." 41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention of the parties
thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are
not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge
therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that
the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of
confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a
contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on
subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed to the end of extinguishing
their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only
demonstrates that the execution of the agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or
guilt of the respondents.
Determination of the probable cause, a
function belonging to the public
prosecutor; judicial review allowed
where it has been clearly established that
the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 42 The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor.
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." 43 Generally, a public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 44 Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case
falls under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad's Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily reveals that were it not
for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged.
From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner's auditor, her preliminary finding is that
"Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established." 45 Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and
declared that the agreement altered the relation of the parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of
any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not
have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing
petitioner's petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the
P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored.
Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank
were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it
agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal. 46 DCATHS
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to
the trial court's deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A
full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof." 47 A "finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged." 48 So we held in
Balangauan v. Court of Appeals: 49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the dismissal of the
criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or not it committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a
finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of,
the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is,
or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is,
the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more
than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if
no evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were teeming; or it
discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable
mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the
DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its
resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against respondents. As perused by
her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that
respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas 50 we had occasion to rule
that the "presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." 51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to
rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal
not a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioner's appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another ground failure
to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will result in
grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction
with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents
whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal. 52
The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents rests upon the
same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the latter's conspiratorial participation, the
non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be charged with
what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth
before the law those who have transgressed it.

Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court 53 mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible
therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the
evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who
ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the
complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have
been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in
defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not
indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to
justify desistance by the public prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are
probably guilty thereof were charged. HTASIa
Mandamus a proper remedy when
resolution of public respondent is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station." 54 The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to
compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which
persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it
becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule
loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the
evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he
abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of
Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the
crime of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter's finding and
proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of
probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. 55 The present case calls for the application of the exception.
Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548
promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary
of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information for estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, [August 9, 2010], 641 PHIL 208-227)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197291. April 3, 2013.]
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be
compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may
not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in
Civil Case No. 10-124777 1 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner's petition
for mandamus. 2

Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacred
in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted
against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to
Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the
Maguindanao massacre. 3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. DEScaT
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder
against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder
were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. 5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the
transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon
City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the
transfer of venue. 7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila,
the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in
Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. 8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in
the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was arraigned
on January 5, 2010, 10 February 3, 2010, 11 and July 28, 2010. 12
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. 13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010
the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009. 14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. 15 On September 7,
2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, 16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution
witnesses. 17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.
18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 2010 19 and November 2, 2010. 20 EcATDH
By her letter dated November 2, 2010, 21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner's request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No.
10-124777), 22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011, 23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 2011 24 and February 18, 2011, 25 respondents questioned the
propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the RTC in Manila granted
on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011, 27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. 28 Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the subpoena
on April 15, 2011. 29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011; 30
petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011; 31 and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011. 32 TEHDIA

On June 27, 2011, 33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition
for mandamus. 34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1.WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE
AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE
MURDER IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION
THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC;
and,
2.WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION
PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY
IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART
IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION. 35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused
for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit. TAcSaC
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. 36 The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the
determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate
criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal
cases should be filed in court. 37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound
judicial doctrine policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review
may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is,
when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law." 38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in
identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner
does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but
only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own
admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as
an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
requires that "the complaint or information shall be . . . against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by
discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of
his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No.
6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). 39 These modes are intended to encourage a person who has
witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial
body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic
dislocation. DEIHSa

These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused
with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting
its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed
witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by
Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated
in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10.State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted
into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a.the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;
b.there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c.there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; cTSHaE
d.his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e.he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f.he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness
pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an
accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules are essentially
the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section
17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must
be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused
and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his coaccused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. 40 The discharge is expressly
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions
prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. 41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he
may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, 42 such discretion is not
absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. 43 Anent the
requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial
court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious
the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several
accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also
supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, 44 as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the 'most guilty' one,
and the like. 45 CIDaTc
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in
court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The
admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot

subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the
state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an
accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection
Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. 46 The Court shall then order the discharge and
exclusion of said accused from the information. 47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August
13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal
charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted
his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness
Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his
admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement
that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercised, 48 or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
judgment or discretion. 49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of
Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse. ADETca
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27,
2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ampatuan Jr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, [April 3, 2013])