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as an autonomous being. The term "chec" here means just that: "check," as
one nds their king in a vulnerable situation with limited options as to where
to go. The freedom of movement is over; the king must either move to a safe
square or have a dierent piece block the check. Granted, human relations do
not seem to ever reach a point in which the other can truly say "checkmate,"
but the chess analogy, as far as being in "check" applies, wonderfully serves as
an illustration of what Levinas means by heteronomy. Heteronomy is not
merely the presence of the other in my life, but it interrupts my life; it cries to
me the injustice of my autonomy. The other (autrui) is that which, although to
me could be merely one more thing to be absorbed into my eld of perception,
speaks to me, and in so doing, invites me into an ethical relationship with him
or her that falls exterior to my autonomous grasp. The face of the other, the
interface for ethics in Levinas, cannot be the physical face, but that which is
irreducible ("ce qui est spciquement visage, c'est ce que ne s'y rduit pas").
Why is it that the other cannot be reduced? The egological intersubjectivist
claims that it is because of such reduction that the ego is able to identify the
other as a "fellow intentional ego" and make way for her co-existence.
However, Levinas promotes a radical intersubjectivity, claiming that the other
(autrui) is not a reducible thing; it is an enigma. It surprises my
consciousness, and just as I am about to reduce it to the same it is already
gone. In short, to use Husserlian terminology, I had a nonintentional
experience, which in itself rocks the foundation of my autonomous being as an
intentional being.
Heteronomy also brings an end to one's personal contingency, and therefore,
helps lead the autonomous being away from her dogmatic and/or naive world
view: ". . . la relation avec autrui qui met en question la brutale spontanite de
sa destine immanente . . . cette action' sur ma libert met prcisement n
la violence et la contingence et, dans ce sens aussi, instaure la Raison." The
end of contingency, that which plagues Rorty's private world, works toward a
resolution in the face of the other. Reason becomes the goal, which means the
removal of all personal rhetoric and the adherence to the other's teaching. As
Wirzba comments, what the other does best is that it "teaches distance, the
insuiciency and the injustice of autonomous life."
This leads us to a sense of guilt, not about a particular deed or action, but of
our autonomous desires. We nd ourselves as the guilty party; we are
ashamed of our autonomous desires when we are caught in the other's gaze,
an apprehending that we would never do to ourselves, therefore external to
ourselves. We repent to the other through radical responsibility and docility.
Levinas reminds us of Dostoevsky's lament of responsibility from The Brothers
Karamozov: "Nous sommes tous coupable de tout et de tous devant tous, et
moi plus que les autres."
7. Rorty: The Other Speaks to Me and Questions My Vocabulary and
Self-Creation
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The ironist [1] has radical and continuing doubts about the nal vocabulary
she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies,
vocabularies taken as nal by people in books she has [en]countered . . . [2]
realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither
underwrite nor dissolve these doubts . . . [3] does not think that her
vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not
herself.
I propose that the ironist is the heteronomous being in Rorty. The ironist, due
to coming across dierent vocabularies than her own, immediately has
"radical and continuing doubts" about her vocabulary, which, as stated in an
earlier stage, forms the autonomous worldview. Not only does the ironist
realize that her vocabulary is being attacked, she then realizes that she cannot
use her own vocabulary to counterattack, for she knows that she would then
be appealing to common sense. This is a prime example of what Levinas
meant by saying that the other does not hinder my powers, but my ability to
exert such power. Her entire worldview becomes shaken instantly, and the
enigmatic other has escaped again. Rorty claims that this otherness can come
not only in discourse with other people, but by reading book and magazines,
watching docudramas and movies: anything that shows the contingency of
one's world view.
This irony leads us to move toward liberalism, which has as its foundation the
idea that cruelty to others is the worst thing that we do. The ironist cannot
give an account for the existence of cruelty, cannot list the possibilities or
conditions under which cruelty happens, but must be immediately responsive
to the cry of injustice. Rorty argues that novelists like Nabakov show us how
we ourselves can be cruel, and novelists like Wright, Dickens and Orwell show
us all the many faces of cruelty, some of which we had never previously
imagined possible.
Heteronomy, by restricting brutal freedom, leads to an opening of the self to
the other. This oers the heteronomous being a new sense of freedom: that
she will not be bound by her vocabulary in light of others. Rorty writes that
"[the ironist] will not produce a reason to care about suering. What matters
for the liberal ironist is not nding such a reason but making sure she notices
suering when it occurs. Her hope is that she will not be limited by her own
vocabulary when faced with the possibility of humiliating someone with a
quite dierent vocabulary."
Solidarity, Rorty argues, comes when we remove such egological concepts as
"the core self" that everyone should have and replace it with the enigmatic
face of suering. Freedom from the rhetorical classications of people
become apparent here. Rorty's outrage about the concentration camps is that
rhetorical descriptions like "She is a Jewess" outweighed more personal
nonrhetorical descriptions like "She, like me, is a mother of small children."
Although Rorty is not going to accept a concept of "the core self," there are
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ways to see the similarity between human experiences, and therefore the
guards at Auschwitz were cruel not because they viewed the Jews as being
non-human but that they were the wrong kind of humans. The Holocaust
shows how the idea of "core humanity" can easily be jettisoned, therefore not
as transcendentally signicant as at rst thought.
8. Conclusions: Descriptions, Rhetoric, Violence and Cruelty
I conclude these comments by saying that there have been great strides
toward civil heteronomy, undoing the tangling knots of autonomy that have
plagued the modern political world. I want to address briey some cases in
which descriptions hinder our worldview, and what can be done about it. The
basic question is this: How can we nd otherness so that I can be
interrupted? Our society has played a "it is not where I live" game for too
long; this leads to naivety and community dogmatism.
Afrocentricity, and race theory in general, have forced the birth of "White
studies," the analysis of Whiteness. In a society in which White rhetoric is the
norm, Black rhetoric is oppressed, degraded and cruelly treated. We still see
this today in American literature textbooks that exclude Black writers, saving
them for an "African-American Literature" course which Whites can optionally
avoid. However, the American project has slowly brought us to the portal of
an age in which it will seem impossible to not understand the variety of races
in America without resorting to the nonempowered to explain them. Black
rhetoric cannot be stated in White terms, and the attempt to do so has yielded
disastrous results.
Feminism has forced masculinism to review what being a man is about, and
the violence of the rhetoric that empowers them. In May and Strikwerda's
Rethinking Masculinity: Maleness in Light of Feminism we see this analysis, as
masculinity is placed under rhetorical scrutiny by the feminists who
challenged the men to think about being other as being a man. The
signicance of the book is that interruption for the exterior can indeed
strengthen the concept of the interior, but it does so in ethical resistance,
hindering the freedom of the empowered.
Queer theory challenges the sexuality of our society, forcing it to deal with
what is, probably out of all these distinctions being made here, the most
autonomous, one's own sexual preferences and desires. The homosexual
community is forcing the heterosexual constituency to put their own sexuality
(or more appropriately, their self-righteousness about sexual activity) into
question, separating biological sex from sexuality and gender roles.
Finally, class struggles, which have appeared all throughout history. It is here
where we see the most cruelty, as the wealthy nations ignore their poor, who
cry out for hope and opportunity. For example, Rorty writes that the reason
why we should be disturbed about a young black man without hope in the
intercity ghetto is not because the young black man has a "core self" that
shouldn't have to endure such indignities, but rather because an American
should not suer such indignities. We see the face of the poor all the time in
the land of hope and opportunity, yet no one does anything about it.
In conclusion, ethics and liberal political action can indeed go hand in hand.
To demonstrate this concept, I have used two thinkers that are often viewed as
being strictly ethical or strictly liberal-political. I think both deal with the
same issue, although from dierent ends of radical intersubjectivity.