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22. De La Paz vs.

IAC,
GR No. 71537, September 17 1987
FACTS
In a dispute over the ownership of a land, Loreto dela Paz contends ownership over herein petitioners.
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement on pretrial, trial on the merits followed. On April 25,
1984 when Loreto took the witness stand, cross examination was not completed by petitioners counsel after the
same moved in open court for the continuance of the cross examination on the ground that he still had to conduct a
lengthy cross examination. On May 18, 1984 Loretos motion for the correction of transcript prompted the
petitioners to manifest further postponement of cross examination to examine the corrected transcript twice. During
the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared despite due notice.
Loretos request to present evidence ex parte was granted by court. Despite this development, the petitioners upon
their motion were allowed to examine Loreto. On the scheduled hearing on Sept. 18, 1984, the petitioners counsel
failed to appear, and the cross examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth time. Finally, on November 7, 1984
the petitioners counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross examination of Loreto. The cross examination was
however cut short and rescheduled again on the motion of the petitioners counsel. Loreto died on December 1, 1984
and was substituted by her heirs as the respondents in the case. The petitioner never finished cross examining the
former, they filed a motion to scraped of Loretos testimony. The same was denied.
On February 11, 1985 the trial court issued two orders at the same date the first one giving the petitioner
10 days to file their objections after which the case will be submitted for resolution and a subsequent order that
already deemed the case submitted for resolution.
The Appellate court sanctioned the trial courts orders denying the striking out of Loretos testimony., hence
this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the trial courts
orders which denied the striking out of the testimony of original plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the record.
Wheteher or not the trial court Judges decision deprived the petitioners of their right to present evidence
by virtue of the second version which was the basis for the promulgation of the decision.
HELD:
No. The appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. A motion to strike off testimony from the
record is an interlocutory order that may not be subjects of a petition for certiorari unless issued in patent abuse of
discretion. Also, the right of a party to confront and cross examine opposing in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right of
the due process. However, the same is not an absolute right which the petitioner can demand at all times. In the case
at bar, the petitioners failure to cross examine Loreto was through no fault of the respondents. The petitioners not
only kept on postponing the cross examinations but at times failed to appear during scheduled hearings. Under these
circumstances, the court ruled that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their own
fault, they lost their right to cross examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
Yes. In the issuance of the second order prejudiced petitioners cause. They were deprived of their right to
present evidence in their behalf. Hence must be declared null and void.
Wherefore, the amended petition is partly denied in that the questioned decision and resolution of the IAC,
now CA are affirmed. The petition is granted in part.

23. People vs. Monje


GR No. 146689, September 27, 2002

FACTS
Ferdinand Monje, herein respondent is charged with rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15
year old Imee Diez Paulino. Nobody saw the actual commission of the crime. But death now lurks upon accusedappelant Monje after being sentenced to death on the basis alone of the following circumstantial evidence put
together by the court a quo:
(a) Testimony of Cordero when he saw the victim backriding with Monje and three other men heading
towards the rice field and shortly later on that day, Monje with his previously seen companions but
without the victim.
(b) Testimony of Vasquez, that at around 2AM of April 25, 1997 he saw the accused and his unidentified
companion in the house of Alvin.
(c) The fact that the decomposing body was found in the ricefield naked expet for a brassiere.
(d) That the accused went home to Cagayan two week after he learned that an information had been filed
implicating him on the crime.
After Corderos initial cross examination, he refused to return to court for the continuation of his cross
examination despite court notice and warnings that the testimony of the same will be stricken off. The contention of
the Respondent is primarily based on the fact that evidence against him is weak and cannot be relied on for a
judgment since the testimony of Cordero did not delve into details to further prove that the accused is guilty. The
same applies to Vasquez since the same subsequently failed to appear before court as well.
ISSUE
1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering a decision sentencing herein respondent with death
penalty based from the evidence deduced from the testimony of Cordero and Vasquez.

2.

When will a circumstantial evidence be enough to support conviction.

HELD
1. Yes, the trial court committed an error with its verdict. The verdict in a criminal case can be sustained
only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction of the accused must come from the strength of the prosecution evidence
and not from the weakness of his defense never upon possibilities. Proof, to sustain conviction must must withstand
the test of reason and the constitutional right of confrontation. Mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong, cannot
be permitted to sway judgment.
Conceding arguendo that indeed Imee was last seen alive at 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1997
in the company of the accused, yet, there was no other circumstance tending to prove that he was the one who raped
and killed her. In fact, the time of the rape as well as the killing was not even satisfactorily established. The medicolegal officer did not give a categorical answer as to the exact time of death of the victim. On the contrary, he merely
gave an approximation. In fact, this approximation is of no help at all because if we reckon it from the time when the
decomposing body of the victim was found, i.e., on 27 April 1997, the three (3) dates when the victim supposedly
died would be 25 April (counting two (2) days from 27 April), 24 April (counting three (3) days from 27 April), 23
April (counting four (4) days from 27 April), and 22 April backwards (counting more than four (4) days). This
would have been absurd and in no way coincide with the date when the victim was supposedly last seen alive.
Notably, no mention was made of the circumstances leading to the discovery and retrieval of the
decomposing body of the victim. Plainly, there is no basis to deduce, much less conclude, that the victim was
brought to and later recovered from the same ricefield.

So much time elapsed from the moment Imee was last seen alive on 24 April 1997 and when her
decomposing body was found on 27 April 1997. Possibilities abound as to what actually happened between 24 and
27 April 1997. The prosecution miserably failed to fill the void with satisfactory and convincing evidence.
Accused-appellant allegedly "fled" to Cagayan after the filing of the Information, supposedly when he
learned he was included therein, which the trial court considered as evidence of a guilty conscience. Although as a
general rule flight is an indication of guilt, the same should not be flippantly considered. "Flight" is a circumstance
from which an inference of guilt may be drawn only when it is unexplained and with an evident purpose of evading
prosecution. The accused-appellant adequately explained that he went home to Cagayan upon the prodding of an
uncle after a quarrel with his cousin who chided him as one they had to feed or "palamunin" since he was allegedly
jobless. Accused-appellant went to his home province after more than two (2) weeks from the filing of the
Information. Thus, he did not leave the place immediately after learning he was being implicated in the crime. There
was no indication whatsoever that he intentionally made his presence scarce in his community to evade prosecution.
Admittedly, the evidence for the defense is weak and that the facts established do not entirely rule out the
possibility that the accused could be responsible for the crime.
2. Circumstantial Evidence; a reasonable inference about a matter in issue, more specifically, about the
likely existence of a fact in issue is necessary to achieve sufficient circumstantial evidence to support not only a
conviction but a death sentence. The test in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence; (a) is the
evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving innocence, except the guilt of the accused, given
the circumstances of the case.
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four (4) basic guidelines must be observed:
(a) It should be acted upon with caution;
(b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
(c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and,
(d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt
that he was the perpetrator of the offense.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony
is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1)
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing
to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.
Under the rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if the following requisites
concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and,
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence finds application in crimes such as rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of
rape, where usually only the victim and the rapist are present at the crime scene, makes prosecutions for the complex
crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the
crime. Circumstantial evidence must form a complete and unbroken chain which, taking the evidence as a whole,
leads directly to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt excluding any reasonable inference other than that
of guilt.

24. People vs De Leon


GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002
FACTS
Conrado de Leon, herein respondent is sentenced by the RTC to reclusion perpetua after the same was
found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murdering Crispin Aguilar.
In the version of the prosecution, Crispin dela Pena was allegedly ganged up by and stabbed by three
persons while the same was urinating. From the time Crispin was brought to her mother and on board the tricycle, he
was repeatedly mentioning the names of the persons who assaulted him without any apparent reason. Apparently,
Crispins brother witnessed as the same was being held in both hands while the accused Conrado de Leon grabbed
him by the chin and stabbed Crispin. He knew the assailants of his brother since he was once a fisherman like them.
He remembers an incident that transpired before the murder when his brother denied the request of the respondent
some fish catch. Accused threatened Crispin that should see each other again, he would kill him.
On the other hand, denial and alibi are alleged by the appellant. He faults the trial court for having given
probative value to the supposed dying declaration of the victim. The common law husband of De Leon testified that
on the day of the murder he was in Montalban with her, her mother, and their children. The trial court ruled in favor
of the relatives of the victim, giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the prosecutions witness and to the
dying declaration of the deceased.
Appellant faults De la Pea for having made an assertion in his Sworn Statement that was inconsistent with
his court testimony. In his Affidavit, the question Bakit talo-talo na ba tayo? Supposedly came from him; in his
testimony, he said that these words were uttered by his brother, the victim. Also, the respondent claims that the trial
court erred in giving probative value to the supposed dying declaration of the victim despite the fact that the same
was not made under the consciousness of an impending death. Lastly, The trial court erred in not giving any
probative value to the defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellant

ISSUE
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not the statement of Reynaldo De La Pea holds credibility despite the disparities during the
trial.
Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the respondents alibi.
Whether or not the antemortem statement of the victim is valid.

HELD
1. Minor disparities in the narration of witness do not detract from their essential credibility, as long as their
testimonies are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole, particularly when there is consistency in narration
of the principal occurrence and in the positive identification of the accused. Neither does the alleged conflict
between the Sworn Statement and the testimony of De la Pea in open court vitiate his credibility. It has been held
that affiants are not necessarily discredited by discrepancies between their testimonies on the witness stand and their
generally incomplete ex parte statements. Basic is the rule that affidavits taken ex parte are considered to be
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for their
accurate recollection. Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations, because the
former are often executed when affiants mental faculties are not in such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to
narrate in full the incidents that have transpired. Moreover, testimonial evidence carries more weight than an
affidavit.
What is clear is that the responsibility of appellant for the victims death was indubitably established by both
his Sworn Statement and his testimony.

2. In the light of the positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, his denial and alibi
cannot be sustained. Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the accused, when categorical and
consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defenses are negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. In any event, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. For it to prosper, proof that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed
is insufficient; he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time.
3. A dying declaration, also known as an antemortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is one that
refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death and is made under the consciousness of
impending death. Because of its necessity and trustworthiness, it is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Necessity, because the declarants death makes it impossible for him to take the witness stand; and
trustworthiness, for when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.
An antemortem statement is admissible, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
(2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;
(3) the declaration relates to a fact that the victim is competent to testify to; and
(4) the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
Appellant disputes the victims antemortem statement for not having been made under the consciousness of
impending death. This issue is a matter of evidence. It must be shown that the declaration was made under a
realization that ones demise or at least its imminence, not so much its rapid occurrence, was at hand. This may be
proven by the statement of the victim or inferred from the nature and the extent of the victims wounds or other
relevant circumstances. The attendant circumstances in this case point to no other conclusion than that the victim
must have realized the seriousness of his condition and was therefore under an impression of impending death. This
was borne out by his physical condition, especially the nature and the extent of his wounds.

25. People vs. De Jesus


No. L-39087, April 27, 1984

FACTS
Rogelio de Jesus is a 19-year old farmer accused of raping Clara Mina a 28 years of age feeble minded and
unmarried woman. In the afternoon of March 21, 1974, Clara Mina was left alone in their house when Rogelio
suddenly entered the house, carried her in his arms and laid her on the floor. He lay on top of her and performed the
sexual act despite of Clara Minas objection of what was being done to her. Pastora Simon upon returning home to
get something found Rogelio on top of her daughter, she rushed to the kitchen to get a club but Rogelio spotted her
and ran away. The next day, Clara Mina accompanied by her parents denounced Rogelio to the police officers. Clara
Mina was examined in a hospital where evidence sexual abuse was noted. Subsequently, Rogelio de Jesus was
surrendered by his brother in law to the Police Department where he executed an affidavit admitting that he had
sexual intercourse with Clara Mina, but denying that he raped her.
Later on, Rogelio De Jesus testified that he admitted having sexual intercourse once with the complainant
because of the maltreatment by the jail guards. Rogelio de Jesus also assails Clara Minas competence as a witness
in the case.
ISSUE
1.

Whether or not the affidavit of the accused admitting sexual intercourse with the complainant can be
admitted as an evidence.

2.

Whether or not the Complainant can be considered as a competent witness despite being considered
feeble-minded.

HELD
1. Although the affidavit of the accused admitting sexual intercourse with the complainant is not admissible
as evidence as the same was not apprised of his constitutional rights under Article IV, Sec. 20 during custodial
interrogation, still there is sufficient evidence on record that the accused had performed the sexual act.
2. There is no showing that the Complainant could not convey her ideas by words and signs. It appears in
the records that the complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and
the counsels. The court is satisfied that the Complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own
perceptions to others. Hence, she is a competent witness.

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