U. S.

Chemical Safety Board

SONAT INVESTIGATION

Presentation Of Findings to the Board

Public Board Meeting
September 15, 2000

Sonat Investigation

INTRODUCTION
March 4, 1998, near Pitkin, LA
Startup of Oil / Gas Separation Equipment
Natural Gas Purge of Vessels and Pipeline
Oil / Gas Separator Overpressurized
Catastrophic Vessel Failure
Four Operators Killed

Aerial View of Sonats Temple 22-1

Common Point Separation Facility

Aerial View of Sonats Temple 22-1

Common Point Separation Facility

Block Flow Diagram of the Separation Process

Well
Gas Cooler

Gas
Scrubber

Natural Gas

Gas Meter

Gas Sales
Pipeline

Gas
Compressor

High-pressure Fluid
(Oil, Natural Gas
& Water)

Natural Gas

Gas
Compressor
Natural Gas

First Stage
Separator

Second
Stage
Separator

Third Stage
Separator

Crude Oil
Storage
Tanks

(via tank truck)

Oil
Cooler
Water
(brine)

Crude Oil
Sales

Water
(brine)

Filter
Water
Disposal
Well

Water
Storage
Tanks

Water
Disposal
(via tank truck)

Third Stage Separator Schematic

Liquid Level
Sensor

Mist Extractor

Gas
Outlet Line

Oil
Inlet Line

To Oil
Storage Tanks

Oil
Outlet Line

To Gas
Compressor

Oil Outlet
Line from
Second Stage
Separator

Bypass
Line
Sight
Glasses

To Drain Line

Automatic Liquid Level Control

Valve and Two Ball Valves
not to scale

Sonat Investigation

TERMINOLOGY
Sonat referred to the failed vessel as a

Vapor Recovery Tower or storage tank

CSB determined that the vessel actually fit

the definition of an oil and gas separator

Sonat Investigation

TERMINOLOGY
Separator had a single inlet line for oil/gas

mixture but two separate outlet lines

Separator was not designed for permanent
oil storage
Separator was positioned upstream of the
storage tanks in series with the 1st and 2nd
stage separators

Sonat Investigation

INCIDENT TIMELINE
EARLY AFTERNOON

- Separation vessels purged using

well fluids
LATE AFTERNOON
- Valves realigned to purge pipeline,
through a bypass line and two water
storage tanks, out a tank roof hatch to
the atmosphere

Intended Valve Positions after the Final Alignment

Closed
Ball Valve

Open
Ball Valve

Open
Pneumatic Valve

Gas
Outlet
Line

14

Closed
Roof Hatch

Open
Roof Hatch

Gas
Compressor

Oil Storage
Tanks

19
15

Third Stage
Separator
E

Bypass
Line

Oil
Inlet
Line

Oil
Outlet
Line 16

Bypass
Line

18
20
17

21

Water Storage
Tanks
F

11 12 13
not to scale

Sonat Investigation

INCIDENT TIMELINE
5:10 PM - Pipeline purge initiated using

well fluids
5:15 PM - Supervisor initiated monitoring
oxygen content in pipeline near
header
5:35 PM - Pressure into pipeline increased
for the third and final time
(approximate times)

Sonat Investigation

INCIDENT TIMELINE
6:00 PM - Pressure reading downstream

of well and flow control valve

was recorded as 800 psig
6:10 PM - Final oxygen reading taken
indicating purge nearly
completed
(approximate times)

Sonat Investigation

INCIDENT TIMELINE
6:15 PM - Bulk Train third stage separator

failed, natural gas released and

ignited producing large fireball
- Four operators killed instantly
- Damaged tanks and piping
leak oil and gas which ignites
(approximate times)

Damaged Vehicles and Storage Tanks

Sonat Investigation

INCIDENT TIMELINE
10:05 PM - Sonat supervisors and LA State

Police investigated incident site

and discovered two bypass
valves for the failed third stage
separator in the closed position,
which should have been open

(approximate times)

Comparison of Valve Alignments

as Planned and as Found
Closed
Ball Valve

Gas
Outlet
Line

Open
Ball Valve

14

Open
Pneumatic Valve

Closed
Roof Hatch

Open
Roof Hatch

Gas
Outlet
Line

Gas
Compressor

14

Gas
Compressor
Oil Storage
Tanks

Oil Storage
Tanks

E
15

Oil
Inlet
Line

Bypass
Line

Bypass
Line

19

Oil
Outlet
Line 16

19
15

18
20
17

Oil
Inlet
Line

21

Oil
Outlet
Line 16

Bypass
Line

11 12 13

Bypass
Line

18
20
17

11 12 13

Third
Stage
Separator

Water
Storage
Tanks

Third
Stage
Separator

Water
Storage
Tanks

Planned Valve Lineup

not to scale

21

As Found Valve Lineup

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 1:
The third stage separator that failed could
not be isolated from an adjacent bypass line,
because there was no inlet valve. Two
valves on the bypass line and all other outlet
valves were closed allowing high-pressure
purge gases to overpressurize and rupture
the separator.

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 2:
The third-stage separator was only rated for
atmospheric pressure service (0 psig).
The purge gas stream to which the
separator was exposed to had a pressure
potentially as high as 800 psig.

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 3:
The third stage separator was not equipped
with any pressure-relief devices as specified
by API Specification 12J which states all
separators, regardless of size or pressure,
shall be provided with pressure protective
devices. The vessel that failed falls within
the scope of this specification.

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 4:
Why the bypass valves were closed or when
they were closed could not be conclusively
established

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 5:
Management did not perform effective
engineering design reviews or hazard
analyses prior to or during the construction
of the facility.

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 6:
Workers at the facility were not provided
with written operating procedures
addressing the proper alignment of valves
for purging operations.

Sonat Investigation

KEY FINDINGS
# 7:
Sonat operated similar third-stage
separators that lacked pressure-relief
systems at other oil and gas production
facilities for over a year prior to the incident.