PALE

A. REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

B. LAWYERS OATH- IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYERS
OATH
1. In Re: Al C. Argosino
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 712 . July 13, 1995.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING
OF
SUCCESSFUL
BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, AL C.ARGOSINO, petitioner.
Benedicto Malcontento for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL
PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER. The practice of law is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands
it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good
moral
character,
with
special
educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of
good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS
BROADER IN SCOPE
THAN IN A
DISBARMENT
PROCEEDING. It has also been stressed that the
requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may
be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral character of a
lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The requirement of good moral
character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of
conduct expected from members of the general public. There
is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would
signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J p:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with

the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul

Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of
university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application
for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a
Petition
for
Admission
to
Take
the
1993
Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
BancResolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to
allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him
to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago
had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated
11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since
then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personalprivilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we
regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
"xxx xxx xxx
This 'upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license
to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes
all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the
good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have

acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he

must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses
itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if
it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx" 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a
high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and
the board of bar examiners, as an arm of the court, is required
to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral
standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It
needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a
far more difficult situation is presented to the court when
proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling
and annulment of his license."
In Re Keenan: 6
"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only
to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair
to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only
those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain init."
Re Rouss: 7
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,
and a fair private and professional character is one of them; to

refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him

for past offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness."
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
"Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so
that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character,
so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are,
may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those
who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted
to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice."
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral
character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:
". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
'The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become
a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a
curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.'" 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired

into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader
than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings
for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
"The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding
for
his
admission
to
practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding."
Re Wells: 11
". . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and
the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and

general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon

proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment."
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral
qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal
the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their
courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect
the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation inthe prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial
court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation
for
truth
and
who
have actually
known Mr. Argosino for asignificant period of time, particularly
since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to
make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large.
Mr. Argosinomust, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession
of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court,

by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) days
from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished
to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
2. Olbes v. Deciembre
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5365. April 27, 2005.]
Spouses
FRANKLIN
OLBES, complainants, vs.
DECIEMBRE, respondent.

and
Atty.

LOURDES
VICTOR
V.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of
respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as
security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had
not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the
loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition 1 for the disbarment of Atty.
Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes
Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court.
Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts
of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment 2 on the Petition, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During
those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12,
2003, 3 the parties were able to present their respective
witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the
parties' respective formal offers of evidence, as well as
petitioners' Memorandum, 4 the case was considered
submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner
rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30,
2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30,
2004. aCTHEA
The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were

government employees working at the Central Post Office,
Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a
monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000. 5
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her
application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of
P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to
respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks
(Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved
loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the
future. 6
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of
P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges,
penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a
receipt, 7 herein quoted as follows:
"August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan
of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241-8/15/99" 8

minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy

traffic conditions in those places. 12
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates among
them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia
Mendoza had suffered the same fate in their dealings with
respondent. 13
In his Comment, 14 respondent denied petitioners' claims,
which he called baseless and devoid of any truth and merit.
Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by
not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999
transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had
allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were,
however, subsequently dishonored due to "ACCOUNT
CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He
claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when
petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed
that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the
checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with
them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay. SICDAa
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and
personal transactions, which were not in any way connected
with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against
petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate
his rights against their deception and violation of their
obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not
be curtailed by this administrative action.

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled

up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241,
0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000
each, with different dates of maturity August 15, 1999,
August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999,
respectively. 9

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial

Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against
petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22.
He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in
the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him
and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their
postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling
P100,000. 10

The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts

was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following
analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed

against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and
violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same
day, July 15, 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at
Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that
he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244 totaling P100,000. 11
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they
never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to
transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their
office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it
would have been physically impossible for them to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

"In his affidavit-complaint . . . executed to support his complaint

filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal
respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal,
both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES . . .,
personally met and requested me to immediately exchange
with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling
P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their
business venture.
"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his
complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES . . ., personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their
postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately
used by them in their business venture.

"The above statements executed by respondent under oath are

in direct contrast to his testimony before this Commission on
cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the
complainant issued to you, you filed two separate criminal
cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon
City, is that correct?

Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. That's why I am

asking your client. . .
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that
he said it was issued here in Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at

different banks.

COMM. DULAY:

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the

complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct? caCEDA

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's

office? aSIDCT

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a

long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in the
morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

COMM. DULAY:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he

is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor, according to the
respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?

Which are the first two checks?

COMM. DULAY:

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

Your answer.

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in
the morning. And Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the
afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that
these two checks with number 0046241 and 0046242 . . . have
been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the
morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig
City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, it's not my house.
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the
afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there
were four checks issued in the place of your client in Pasig
City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of
the transaction with the complainants. As between his version
as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of
complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly
distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction
involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very
material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the
transaction with complainants.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the
question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility
because according to you these checks have been issued in

"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the

transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made
before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack
of credibility of respondent's version of the transaction.
"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to
respondent as security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00
plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in

amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible.

Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from
respondent and which has since been paid . . . Respondent
does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only
previous transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants
were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that
they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them
once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be
used for a business and immediately release the amounts
under the circumstances described by respondent does not
appear credible given the background of the previous
transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That
respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from
complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother
to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the
money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of
respondent's version. These circumstances really cast doubt
as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction.
The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we
believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with
the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed
as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal cases.
Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar
cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central
Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the
IBP for his actions." 15

"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and

dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

The Court's Ruling

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to

the story of petitioners, who said that they had given five blank
personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in
Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted.
Found untrue and unbelievable was respondent's assertion
that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with
his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful
review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these
findings. DACTSH

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner

Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than
what the IBP recommended. HEcSDa
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege
burdened with conditions. 16 It is bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess
good moral character. 17 "A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or
she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader." 18
By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in
the fair and impartial administration of justice. 19 Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's
faith in the legal profession. 20
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates
the following:
"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and
required of members of the bar. 21 Such conduct of nobility
and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their
public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and
keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor. 22
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them
the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness
and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a
sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all
times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct,
whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court. 23

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's

imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent
does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by
petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes' testimony on crossexamination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after
the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to
bring the checks with him, 24 he was not able to return them.
He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the
confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high
regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust
him with their blank checks. 25
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional
Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent
act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had
not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks
had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of
a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were
dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the temerity to

initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby

exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of
liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to
foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners
(Franklin) was detained for three months 26 because of the
Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty
and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of
moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a
member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally essential
to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. 27 Good moral
character includes at least common honesty. 28 No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness and candor. 29 The rigorous ethics of the
profession places a premium on honesty and condemns
duplicitous behavior. 30 Lawyers must be ministers of truth.
Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith. 31
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely
unacceptable
practices
that
are
disgraceful
and
dishonorable; 32 they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards
of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely
enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. 33
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by
respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of
suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too
mild.
His
propensity
for
employing
deceit
and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up
checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 34 the forging of a special power of
attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that he
was authorized to sell another's property, as well as his
fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to
the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is
even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously
indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of
them. DHCcST
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of
gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely
SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a
copy to respondent's personal record. Let another copy be
furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio

Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Azcuna,
Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Tinga,

Chico-

3. DE GUZMAN v. DE DIOS
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4943. January 26, 2001.]
DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES
I. DE DIOS, respondent.
Homobono A. Adaza for complainant.
Lourdes I. De Dios for herself.
SYNOPSIS
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondent for
representing conflicting interest and for acquiring property in
litigation. Evidence disclosed that complainant engaged the
services of respondent in forming a hotel and restaurant
business. Thereafter, Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) came
into being. Complainant became the majority stockholder
having subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to P2,980,000
and her paid subscription amounted to P745,000.00.
Respondent, thereafter, received a monthly retainer fee of
P5,000 from the former whom she even represented in a case.
The unpaid 745 subscribed shares of complainant was later
declared delinquent, sold and acquired by Ramon del Rosario,
one of the company's incorporators. Out of the 745 shares
conveyed to Del Rosario, respondent purchased 100 shares.
She later became the president of the company. Respondent
denied the existence of attorney-client relationship between
her and complainant. The IBP ruled in her favor.
The Court found that there was an attorney-client relationship
between the parties and there was evidence of collusion
between the board of directors and respondent in ousting
complainant from the corporation. Respondent's purchase of
shares of stock originally owned by complainant constitutes
conflict of interest. Respondent as a lawyer is bound by her
oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to
conduct herself according to the best of her knowledge and
discretion. Her acts clearly violated her oath. She was
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; MUST CONDUCT
THEMSELVES WITH HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN A
MANNER BEYOND REPROACH. Lawyers must conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.
2. ID.; ID.; COUNSEL SUSPENDED FOR 6 MONTHS FOR
REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTEREST. Clearly,
respondent violated the prohibition against representing
conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The acts of respondent
Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a

lawyer that this Court will not tolerate. The Court finds
respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in her sworn duty to
her client, and to the bar and hereby SUSPENDS her from the
practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition
of the charges will be dealt with more severely.
3. ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S OATH; SOURCE OF OBLIGATION AND
VIOLATION THEREOF IS GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY
SANCTION. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath
to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct
herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and
discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or
other disciplinary action.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J p:
The case before the Court is a complaint 1 for disbarment
against Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios on the ground of violation
of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and
of Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation.
In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as
counsel in order to form a corporation, which would engage in
hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City.
On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. de Dios,
complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2 Complainant paid
respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00.
On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant
to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two
million two hundred and thirty five thousand pesos
(P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30,
1997.
On January 29, 1998, 3 complainant received notice of the
public auction sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a
board resolution dated January 6, 1998 authorizing such
sale. 4 Complainant soon learned that her shares had been
acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of
SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation
completely. While respondent rose to be president of the
corporation, complainant lost all her life's savings invested
therein.
Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of
Atty. de Dios and believed that as the majority stockholder,
Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of the
corporation.
Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her
counsel and signed pleadings in a case where complainant
was one of the parties. 5Respondent, however, explained that
she only appeared because the property involved belonged to
SBHI. Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the
role of respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc.
Respondent manifested that her appearance as counsel for

complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights and

interest of SBHI since the latter was the real owner of the land
in controversy.
Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was
established belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to
complainant. The relationship of the complainant and the
Japanese investors turned sour because complainant
misappropriated the funds and property of the corporation. To
save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised all
concerned stockholders that it was proper to call for the
payment of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the
delinquent shares. These led to the auction of the unpaid
shares of complainant and hence, the ouster of complainant
from the corporation. aAcHCT
Meantime, Mr. del Rosario transferred one hundred (100)
shares to respondent in payment of legal services as
evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Corporate
Shares of Stock.
On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued a resolution 6 finding that the acts of respondent were
not motivated by ill will as she acted in the best interest of her
client, SBHI. The IBP found that complainant failed to present
convincing proof of her attorney-client relationship with
respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in the
trial court where complainant was one of the parties.
We disagree.
We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts
presented before us that created doubt on the propriety of the
declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent sale of
complainant's entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to
29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine hundred and
eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority
stockholder. Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up seven
hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the
stage of incorporation.
How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering
the amount she had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that
the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to
her original shares? This, at least, should have been
explained.
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client
relationship between her and complainant. The claim has no
merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a
corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of
complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of
directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of directors now
included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as
secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as
treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director. 7 The present
situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the
respondent.

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings

with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 8

RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed

at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

We said:

RULE 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or

interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.

"To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the
law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
overemphasized. Considering that, 'of all classes and
professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the
law,' it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly,
lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct
have no place in the legal profession. " 9
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.10
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no
falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself
as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and
discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, 11 or
other disciplinary action. 12 The acts of respondent
Atty. de Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a
lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes
I. de Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar.
The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for
six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records
of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

C.J.,

Puno,

Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago,

4. RULE 138, SEC 3

5. RULE 138, SEC 20
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER I
The Lawyer and Society
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

RULE 1.04 A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end

or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
1. SPS VILLANUEVA v. BERADIO
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6270. January 22, 2007.]
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA
VILLANUEVA, complainants, vs.
ATTY.
SALUD
P.
BERADIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio
(respondent), filed by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and
Francisca Villanueva (spouses Villanueva), namely: Ardenio M.
Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M.
Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V. Nazarro,
Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi
(complainants).
The Facts
During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several
parcels of land in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in
1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona,
Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them.
On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication 1 (affidavit of adjudication) stating that as "the
only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)" of the spouses
Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of land
under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale 2 (deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the
property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as
notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed
of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister
Florencia was still alive at the time he executed the affidavit of
adjudication and the deed of sale, as were descendants of the
other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants
claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent
had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the
time of their birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their
family. Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "true
facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties

of the spouses Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to

deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the property.

core of the ritual that effectively convert a private document

into a public document . . . ."

In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required

respondent to comment on the complaint.

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which designated
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner
Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his report and
recommendation on, the complaint.

In her Comment, 3 respondent admitted that she notarized the

affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by
Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that she
conspired with Alfonso to dispose of fraudulently the property.
Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two documents
under the following circumstances:
That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been
divided equally among their compulsory heirs, but said old
couple left for themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the
complaint . . . That said titled property was the only property
left by the old couple, to answer for their needs while they are
still alive until their deaths . . . Alfonso [and his wife] were
tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were the
ones living in the same compound with their late parents.
This fact was and is known by the other compulsory heirs,
and they never questioned the said act of their parents, as
they already had their own share on the estate of the late
[spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me
because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from
our house and I was requested to the house of the old
man when he gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his
wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were still alive at the
time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in their
old house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the
parents died, it was [Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of
the funeral and all other acts relative thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after
the death of the old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and
Tomasa] needed money to finance the schooling of their
children, it was then that they thought of disposing the
land . . . and said land was sold by them to one Adriano
Villanueva of which in both documents, I notarized the
same (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I
notarized said documents, it was done in good faith, to do my
job as expected of me, to help, assist and to guide people who
come to me for legal assistance, as contained in my oath as a
lawyer when I passed the bar. . . . 4 (Emphasis supplied)
According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonso's coheirs filed their objections at the time he executed the affidavit
of adjudication proved that most of the properties of the
spouses Villanueva had earlier been distributed to the other
heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide by the
intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to
Alfonso. Respondent asserted that "the personal appearances
and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the

The IBP's Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner
Villadolid found that respondent violated the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the spirit and intent of
the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit knowing that
Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the spouses
Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent
on respondent's part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held that
respondent "engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in
the legal system." Thus, he recommended suspension of
respondent's notarial commission for one year. He further
recommended that respondent be reprimanded or suspended
from the practice of law for up to six months.
The Court's Ruling
We sustain partly the IBP's findings and recommendations.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial
acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and
affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of
such notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document. The
notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof
of its genuineness and due execution. 5 Thus, notarization
should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary
act. 6 As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo, 7 we held that
notaries public must inform themselves of the facts to which
they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions.
They must guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. 8
On its face, Alfonso's affidavit does not appear to contain any
"illegal or immoral" declaration. However, respondent herself
admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso's statement that
he was the "sole heir" of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent
therefore notarized a document while fully aware that it
contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso's assertion of
status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised on
this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a
portion of his parents' estate all to himself, to the exclusion of
his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized the deed
of sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the unlawful
affidavit of adjudication.
Respondent never disputed complainants' allegation of her
close relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several
decades. Respondent even underscored this closeness by
claiming that Lucas himself requested her to come to his house

the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522,

allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them.
Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because
at the time Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had
already received their respective shares from the estate of the
spouses Villanueva. However, we are not concerned here with
the proper distribution of the spouses Villanueva's estates.
Rather, respondent's liability springs from her failure to
discharge properly her duties as a notary public and as a
member of the bar.
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of
a false statement or information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it,
the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process
may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent's conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. DTAIaH
We also view with disfavor respondent's lack of candor before
the IBP proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that
respondent denied preparing or notarizing the deed of
sale, 9 when she already admitted having done so in her
Comment.
WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the
commission of respondent Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary
Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY her from being
commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective upon finality of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. DIHETS
Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales,

Tinga and Velasco,

Jr.,

2. SAMALA v. VALENCIA
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5439. January 22, 2007.]
CLARITA J. SAMALA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D.
VALENCIA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before us is a complaint 1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J.
Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a)
serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending
parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in
exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution
of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree
Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their
respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found
respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the
penalty of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as
to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City,
entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of
rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for
defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants
Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an
Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez
and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband"
for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against
Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the
controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272,
Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
decision dated May 2, 2000, 8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela
Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of
being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba,
Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as
counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract
with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in

Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the

former client. 23

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14,

2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK,
he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and
Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent
also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 986804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and
her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although
the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two
were the owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who
signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that
respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the
latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of

the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the
client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the
expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a
lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with
his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences
acquired in the previous relation. 26

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not
also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than
he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It
springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of
trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. 17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. 18
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs
from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well
as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney
as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in
which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting
professional employment from the client's adversary either in
the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A
lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present
controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with

Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not
turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804,
in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination
of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his
former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact
that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante
and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is
protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said
case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client
relationship between him and Alba has long been severed
without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is required. aCIHcD
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao
v. Bamba, 28 we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is
of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for
the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage
of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients. 29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care. 30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's

representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another
case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have
withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK
upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not
exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting
interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting

professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and
acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict
of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his
clients. 32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before
MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No.
273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that
a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba
on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137
on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as
evidence
of
Valdez's
ownership
of
the
subject
property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval,
respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said
case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was
already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed
the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things
were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was
filed in 2002. SACHcD
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil
Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and
cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November
27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus
belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of
Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed.
It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval
that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on
the same date, although in different courts and at different
times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the
title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title
issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any

artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8,
2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is
decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead
the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that
said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas, 37 we held that a lawyer must be a
disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that
he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients." 38 He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession
to which society has entrusted the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice. 40As such, he should make himself
more an exemplar for others to emulate. 41
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment
of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases:
(a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b)
Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c)
I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v.
Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the
Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed
against Lagmay docketed as I.S.No. 00-4306 for estafa and
I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for
trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer
agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he
was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the
same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both
entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant
who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and
I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to
dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of
respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest
of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other,
cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it

can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,

effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for

protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be
putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to
defend and prosecute the right of his client.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land,

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be
entered in respondent's personal records.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring

illegitimate children.

SO ORDERED.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring

illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three
children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of
age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that
he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is
over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he
married Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that
Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by
complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with
Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter
as his second family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying
with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa
and another in Marikina. 52
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more
than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.
During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not
have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he
sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as
his second family. It is noted that during the hearing,
respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two
houses in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in
Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of no moment that
respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his
first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up
to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of
the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to
specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act
as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral
conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the
community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not
hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in
defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay
in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first
infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10
and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

3. ADVINCULA v. MACABATA
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7204. March 7, 2007.]
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M.
MACABATA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia
Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant
[Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent
[Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway
Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated
December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in
Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing
the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because
they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the
dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is
about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning,
she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue,
Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in
Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride,
which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where
in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic)
her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding
her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic)
succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately
manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to
respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case
with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder

from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her

cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant-forget the case.
At 5:33:46 pmrefer it with other lawyer

decided

to

replied by respondent-"does this mean I can not c u

at
6:16:11
pmanymore"
(Does
this
mean
I
cannot
see
you anymore)
sent by complainant-I feel bad. I can't expect that u
at
6:17:59
pmwill
take
advantage
of
the
situation.
Follow-up message-wrong to kiss a girl especially
Sent by complainantin the lips if you don't have
At 6:29:30 pmrelationship with her.
Replied by respondent-"I'm veri sri. It's not tking
At
6:32:43
pmadvantage
of
the
situation,
2
put
it
rightly
it
s
an
expression
of
feeling.
S
sri"
(I'm
very
sorry.
Its
not
taking
advantage
of
the
situation,
to
put
it
rightly
it
is
an
expression
of
feeling)
Follow up message-I'm s sri. Il not do it again.
by respondentWil u stil c me s I can show u
at
6:42:25
pmmy
sincerity"
(I'm
so
sorry.
I'll
not
do
it
again.
Will
you
still
see
me
so
I
can
show
you
my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another
message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don't know
wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I
don't know what to do so you may forgive me. I'm really sorry.
Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then
another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying
"Ano k ba. I'm really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba.
I'm really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a
clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2
In his answer, 3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide
legal services to the complainant; that he met with complainant
on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the
relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was
intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and
Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions,
complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him;
and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue,
where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to
commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there
was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by

complainant against respondent pending before the Office of

the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains
married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the
nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the
Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant
never bothered to discuss respondent's fees and it was
respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met
and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP
Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.
B.
Funa
submitted
his
Report
and
Recommendation, 4 recommending the imposition of the
penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117
dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the
norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or
relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent
committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which
we deal with respondent's actuations shall have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. CcEHaI
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and

dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession
of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve
their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for
remaining in the practice of law. 6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte,
Jr., 7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and
good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not
only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from
its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality. 8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol 9 that, "as
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. 10
In Bar Matter No. 1154, 11 good moral character was defined
as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place

where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but

one which corresponds to objective reality. DcCASI

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral

character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect
the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers
from themselves. 12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on
the lips.
In his Answer, 13 respondent confessed, thus:
27.When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with
my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and
kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got
off the car.
xxx xxx xxx
35.When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic)
her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand
slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light
kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation
made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done.
Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from
her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP
Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent
candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met . . . I fetched her I should say,
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it
was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my
car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I
was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so
I said . . . she opened my car and then she went inside so I
said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she
said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along
Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her
case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it
be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I
ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing
matters about her case, so I said . . . it's about 9:00 or beyond
that time already, so I said okay, let's go. So when I said let's
go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my
car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her
where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where
you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had
and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue.
So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight?
She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight
use of my right hand, I . . . should I say tilted her face
towards me and when she's already facing me I lightly

kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went
down the car, that's it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let's go because I have
an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I
said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same
corner. So before she went down, before she opened the door
of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her
again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her
again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little
bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips
and that's it. . . . . 14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment. 15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo, 16 we reiterated the definition
of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency. SAHIDc
The following cases were considered by this Court as
constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Dantes v. Dantes, 19 respondent's act of engaging in illicit

relationships with two different women during the subsistence
of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 20 it was ruled that it was highly
immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case
she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 21 respondent lawyer was
disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and
misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 22 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct
by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of
our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can
be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay, 23 respondent contracted marriage with
another married woman and left complainant with whom he
has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts
constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession," warranting respondent's disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 respondent married complainant
while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and
subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting
the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required
by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being
admitted to the bar.

In Toledo v. Toledo, 17 a lawyer was disbarred from the

practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Cabrera v. Agustin, 25 respondent lured an innocent woman

into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We
held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality
and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the
bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 18 a lawyer was disbarred after

complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman.
This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member
of the bar.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but

includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing

or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship
and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and
customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head
of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive
and
undesirable,
cannot
be
considered
grossly
immoral. aSIETH
Complainant's bare allegation that respondent made use and
took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree
to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The
burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must
establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a case that is free from
doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power. 29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who
denies, must prove." 30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden
of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations ei
incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum
naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. 31 In the case at
bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. 32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed
complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the
complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately
extended
an
apology
to
complainant
also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text
messages between complainant and respondent bears this
out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where
there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent's

acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to
warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be
imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon
the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the
primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the
public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the
integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from
similar misconduct. 34Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who
carry out this important function to be competent, honorable
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. 35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to

impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against

an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever
be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with
great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only
on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of
moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while
those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character
of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they
are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation
which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out.
The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered. 36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act
of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some
minor infraction of the lawyer's duty to the court or the
client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams, 38 a lawyer was
publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her,
and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law. aICHEc
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and
considering that this is respondent's first offense, reprimand
would suffice.
We laud complainant's effort to seek redress for what she
honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was
difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her
own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and
partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by
more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more
severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
4. DIZON v. LAMBINO
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6968. August 9, 2006.]

ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, complainant, vs.

MARICHU C. LAMBINO, respondent.

ATTY.

6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No.

373.

ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, complainant, vs.

ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondent.

ATTY.

The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino,

consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), the issues were defined as follows:

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University
of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina,
the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration
Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman
Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI).
Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando
Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of
the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col.
Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December
12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan
and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col.
Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody.
Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who
repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty.
Dizon's move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for
their arrest.
Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario
Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of the colonel, joined
Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty.
Dizon, despite the latter's claim that under its Charter the NBI
was authorized to make warrantless arrests.
The suspects' lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up
at the office of Col. Bentain and after what appeared to be a
heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the
students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty.
Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the
following morning. AScTaD
The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.
Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against
Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against
Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice
Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the
Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful
for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and

1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the

suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the studentsuspects constitutes violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of
Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating
Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that
she "acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the
rights of the students in accordance with the school's substitute
parental authority" and "within the bounds of the law as the NBI
agents had no warrants of arrest."
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the
Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility in "recklessly tr[ying] to
arrest" the suspects without warrant. CDHacE
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22,
2005, adopted and approved the Commissioner's Report. The
IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution,
together with the records of the cases which this Court noted
by Resolution of February 1, 2006.
As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether
she violated the Canons of Professional Ethics in "refusing to
turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon."
When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman
against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and
Atty. Lambino was elevated onCertiorari and Prohibition, this
Court addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein,
to wit:
(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by
the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2)
Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner
for violation of P.D. No. 1829. . . ., 1
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of
the students "cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No.
1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional," 2 they
having "a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time
because their attempted arrest was illegal." 3
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against
the turn over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there
being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty.
Dizon's administrative complaint against her must then be
dismissed. IcDCaS

Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also

in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that "[f]or the failure of the
NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural
requirements, . . . their attempt to arrest [the two studentsuspects] without a warrant was illegal." 4
In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act
157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI "to undertake
investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of
the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest
may require" 5 and to make arrests. The invocation does not
impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to
make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the
power to make arrests to be "in accordance with existing laws
and rules."
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of
Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such have the
following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance
with existing laws and rules. 6
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students
without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system. (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C.
Lambino is DISMISSED.
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of
violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and isREPRIMANDED and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely. TSDHCc
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the
Department of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
5. PAGCOR v. CARRANDANG
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5700. January 30, 2006.]
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
represented
by
Atty.
Carlos
R.
Bautista,

Jr., complainant, vs.

ATTY.
CARANDANG, respondent.

DANTE

A.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
against Atty. Dante A. Carandang.
The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the
president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a
private corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a
"Grant of Authority to Operate Bingo Games." Article V of this
document mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross
sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR
and 5% franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears
amounting to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001. Instead
of demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo
Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said
amount in monthly installment of P300,000.00 from July 2001
to June 2003.
Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of
Commerce checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by
respondent.
However, when the checks were deposited after the end of
each month at the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila,
they were all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royale's "Closed
Account."
Despite PAGCOR's demand letters dated November 12 and
December 12, 2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed
to pay the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints
for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
respondent.
PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks,
respondent is liable for serious misconduct, violation of the
Attorney's Oath and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. SEDaAH
In his "Opposition" to the complaint, respondent averred that
he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they were
drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so "is not related to
the office of a lawyer."
Respondent explained that since the start of its operations,
Bingo Royale has been experiencing financial difficulties due to
meager sales. Hence, it incurred arrearages in paying
PAGCOR's shares and failed to pay the amounts of the
checks.

On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of

Bingo Royale. This prompted the latter to file with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, a complaint for damages
against PAGCOR, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1671.

thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent

now maintains that the dishonor of the checks was caused by
circumstances beyond his control and pleads that our power to
disbar him must be exercised with great caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and the
legal processes. It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01). By issuing the
bouncing checks in blatant violation of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent
clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the
rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility
(Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang
deserves to be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this Castillo case,
suspension for one year is the deserved minimum penalty for
the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for the
property rights of others nor for the canons of professional
responsibility. Moreover, conviction for the offense of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for disbarment (De Jesus
v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619). ACDIcS

On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. 1
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila,
the Investigating IBP Commissioner, made the following
findings and observations:
Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a
voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for an individual (especially
one learned in the law), whether in a personal capacity or
officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and weighing
the consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI,
he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the
company he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to
cover the checks as they fell due. The desire to continue the
operations of his company does not excuse respondent's act of
violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover,
inability to pay is not a ground, under the Civil Code, to
suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent
contends that because of business reverses or inability to
generate funds, BRI should be excused from making good the
payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will
merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and,
consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially,
their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with
this contention.
As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg.
22 is an offense that involves public interest. In the leading
case of People v. Taada, the Honorable Supreme Court
explained the nature of the offense, thus
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment . . . . The thrust
of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as
an offense against property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a

Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2003-177 adopting and approving
Commissioner Aguila's Report and Recommendation with
modification in the sense that the recommended penalty is
reduced to suspension of six (6) months, thus:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,
and considering that the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect of law and the legal processes, and also prohibits a
lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A.
Carandang is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months. 2
Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check on behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still
respondent is liable.
In People v. Tuanda, 3 we explained the nature of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment . . . . The thrust
of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.

Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied
a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially
B. P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of
this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. In Camus
v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 4 we defined misconduct as
follows:
Misconduct has been defined as "wrong or improper conduct;"
and "gross" has been held to mean "flagrant; shameful"
(Webster). This Court once held that the word misconduct
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
In Lizaso v. Amante, 5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined
not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity,
thus:
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good
moral character. . . . So it is held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the principles which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Underscoring
supplied) SEIcAD

Respondent likewise violated the Attorney's Oath that he will,

among others, obey the laws; and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically the following provisions:
Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,

whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous

manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY
of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
in the land for their information and guidance. The Office of the
Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to spread a copy of this Decision
on the personal record of Atty. Carandang.
SO ORDERED.
6. RE: KHO
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-06-2177. April 13, 2007.]
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON
THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO,
CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS,
EASTERN SAMAR
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel
G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for
his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his
custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93. 1 We ordered
him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter
did not end there, however. Because his malfeasance prima
facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 2 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause
why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer
of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in compliance
with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter
and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a
government lawyer.
In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a
timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was
inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money
in the court's safety vault and never once used it for his own
benefit.
Atty. Kho's apparent good faith and his ready admission of the
infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact
that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a
year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular
8A-93. That omission was a breach of his oath to obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities 3 and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: HcaDIA

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the
Code of Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyer's
foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that,
although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an
obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer's responsibilities
under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with
the law. As servants of the law and officers of the court,
lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. 4This, in fact, is
what a lawyer's obligation to promote respect for law and legal
processes entails.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to
refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. 5 By definition, any
act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. 6 It does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad
enough to include it. 7 Thus, the presence of evil intent on the
part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or
omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Kho's conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was
unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account.
However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his
lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense
should temper his culpability considerably. Under the
circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice. ICcaST
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of
unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath, Section
20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to
pay a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from receipt of this
resolution.
The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Kho's
accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed
in this resolution and in the resolution dated June 27,
2006. CcTIAH

PER CURIAM p:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a
Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath." CcHDSA
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or
"Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very
late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents'
house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and
respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned
the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's
birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment,
anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following
that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off
all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share
of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded
social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which
card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from
walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may
find meaning in what you're about to do. HCDAac

SO ORDERED.
7. GUEVARRA v. EALA

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find

fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us
to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because
there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007.]
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs.
EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

ATTY.

JOSE

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I

have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today,
as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first
time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the
final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will
love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together
again.

still known to be legally married to Mary

Tantoco. 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Anne

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though
that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

15.Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's

wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him
morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are. 6 (Underscoring supplied),

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE

YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

5.Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph

15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and
that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship
with his own family: SCEDaT

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS

LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene
constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where,
as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER, 3 respondent admitted having sent the I
LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten. aTICAc
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14.Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine
All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip
of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was
reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24
September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene
with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C. 4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4.Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was

5.1Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful

relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxx xxx xxx
5.5Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to
the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage
a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his abovequoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with
respect to the formality of the marriage contract. 7 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted 8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT
reading:
18.The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19.Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn
to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage,
commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession. 10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7.Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the

circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his

purely personal and low profile special relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a
ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules
of
Court. 11 (Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied) CSTHca
To
respondent's
ANSWER,
complainant
filed
a
REPLY, 12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's
father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex "A," a
copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene's signature
and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION
TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in
which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate
of
Live
Birth
attached
to
the
complainant's
Reply." 15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint
for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as
his testimony on direct examination. 16 Respondent's counsel
did not cross-examine complainant. 17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION 18 dated October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended 19 that respondent be
disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilityreading:
Rule 1.01:A lawyer
dishonest, immoral or
supplied),

shall

not engage in unlawful,

deceitful conduct (Underscoring

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03:A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit
of
the
legal
profession.
(Underscoring
supplied) DTIcSH

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside

the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating
Commissioner,
and
to
APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit. 20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition 21 of complainant before this
Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the
Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor
as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment 23 on the present
petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him. 24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000
(Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently
prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship
with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on
record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having
[ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19
of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his
purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . ." HaAIES
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship
between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted
that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that

the respondent admitted his special relationship with

Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the
child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's ANSWER, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery"
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as
that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even
if the marriage be subsequently declared void." 26 (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies ishaving flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent' denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in
the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the
fact itself is admitted. 27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having
"personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise
Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene
named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's
father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the
desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A
comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate 28 with
her
signature
on
the
Marriage
Certificate 29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted,respondent never denied being the father
of the child. HTCISE
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's
Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which he
identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father
is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and
a lawyer. 31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent
and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by
one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their

own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant
evidence"
is
all
that
is
required. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie
because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated. IDTcHa
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances. 34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334.Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
xxx xxx xxx,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man
has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized
as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding

circumstances." 35 The case at bar involves a relationship

between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this
Court in Vitug v. Rongcal: 36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree. aDcHIC
xxx xxx xxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact
of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations
are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. 37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay: 38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is
enough that the records of this administrative case
substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as
well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative
of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon
him. 39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took
before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice
of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The

Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2.Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. SAEHaC
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209),
which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the
husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation 41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD
that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent
and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant
case," which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion
of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004
granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same
at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has
been taken." 42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void. 43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In carrying on an extramarital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer. ECaAHS
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before
the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to
Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already

promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing

the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part
of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text
messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje
and Eala having
a
rendezvous
on
two
occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to
be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had
once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm
the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes
all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No.
71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.
Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the
said address whereas Eala asserts that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that
both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one,
the said address appears to be a residential house, for that
was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation
from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put
short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the
certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information
that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of
the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of
the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement
of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha
Irene
Louise
Moje. 45 (Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no
choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his
petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery
were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the
present administrative complaint. IDATCE
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos, 46 viz:

. . . The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge

is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of . . .
criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings
is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza, 48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be
made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately. AEaSTC
SO ORDERED.
8. GARRIDO v. GARRIDO & VALENCIA
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6593. February 4, 2010.]
MAELOTISEA
S. GARRIDO, complainant, vs.
ANGEL
E. GARRIDO and
ROMANA
VALENCIA, respondents.

ATTYS.
P.

DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a
supplemental
affidavit 2 for
disbarment
against
the
respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.Garrido) and Atty.
Romana. P. Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of
our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church,
Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel
Cortes . . .
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six
(6) children, namely, Mat * Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine

Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all

surnamed Garrido;
3. . . .
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our
children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that
sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May
Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson's
Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and
a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona * Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively . . .
5. . . .
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able
to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating
among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty.
Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia
were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.HITAEC
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and
joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence . . .
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing
to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our
children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.
xxx xxx xxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his
mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered
not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; . . .
In his Counter-Affidavit, 3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea's
charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea.
He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia
parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she
married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.
Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family.
Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to
his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6)
children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special
secondary course. 4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had
not been employed and had not practiced her profession for
the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were
contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11,

1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of

Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit, 5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was
the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea
was not the legal wife of Atty.Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then
existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic
relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea
and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about
her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped
Atty. Garridobuild a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia
alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit
because of her silence; she kept silent when things were
favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following
motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of
Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal complaint for
concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petitions
for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit. THaCAI
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the
complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
declared the marriage between Atty.Garrido and Maelotisea
"an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife
of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The
respondents also alleged that they had not committed any
immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already
a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before
his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion. 9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is
the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. 11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her
Report and Recommendation for the respondents'
disbarment. 12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and
adopted this recommendation with modification under
Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This
resolution in part states:
. . . finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garridoexhibited conduct which lacks the
degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel

E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross

immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint. TcICEA
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under
Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the
present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that
would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on
humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is
already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to
lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his
situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty.
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the
petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from
disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment
is very harsh considering that the 77-year-old Atty. Garrido took
responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty.
Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has
ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT'S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings
of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to
reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such
as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. 13 We have so ruled in the past and
we see no reason to depart from this ruling. 14 First, admission
to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. 15 The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through
this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case
is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between
the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not
material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when

he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his

continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession.
From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was
admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo, 17 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the
practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this
may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar. 19 cAHIST
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's
exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law.
Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and
the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot have the
effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings.
As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she
filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented
her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court's
examination and consideration, and their merits are not
affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or
refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of
compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal
financial interest in continuing friendly relations with
Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion
of the upright and respectable members of the
community. 20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. 21 We make these distinctions
as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering
lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 23 the respondent lawyer entered

into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies
to sever them. We ruled that the respondent's pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival
and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and

convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he
was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not "valid."

In Villasanta v. Peralta, 24 the respondent lawyer married the

complainant while his marriage with his first wife was
subsisting. We held that the respondent's act of contracting the
second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the
Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to
the Bar.

Eighth, after
admission
to
the
practice
of
law,
Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his
wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families
for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v.

Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly contracted a second
marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found
that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that
demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of
contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. EaTCSA
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence
and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of
gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue
his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had
romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to
represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually
exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a
bachelor, when in truth he was already married to
Constancia. 26 This was a misrepresentation given as an
excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with
Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal
liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with
Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and
without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives
and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage
with
Maelotisea
upon
the
death
of
Constancia,
Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Seventh, as
the
evidence
on
record
implies,
Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent
attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to

Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an
attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his
past actions by having his second marriage declared void after
the present complaint was filed against him. EHTADa
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to
the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar
admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and of the ethical rules of
the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a
lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. 27 As a lawyer,
he violated his lawyer's oath, 28Section 20 (a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, 29 and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly require
him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he
committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was
subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his
petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code,
which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the
expectation and that he would set a good example in
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When
he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal
needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession
and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy
personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law
to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live
up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession
by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality,
including
honesty,
integrity
and
fair
dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation. 33Needless to state,
those whose conduct both public and private fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San
Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under
the circumstances for gross immorality:
. . . The contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not
afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition precedent to admission to
the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional
capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage
to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents
from responsibility . . . Although the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that
degree of morality required of them as members of the
Bar. 35 TECIHD
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristics of
being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a
person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public
in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3)
to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers
from themselves. 38 Each purpose is as important as the
other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to
becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that
Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to
Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As
Atty. Garrido's admitted confidante, she was under the moral
duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a
romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married
Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding
second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support
the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even
without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral
values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with
respect to the latter's family problems, would not aggravate the
situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person

seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other

person's feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's marriage with
Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a
man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children.
Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off
Atty. Garrido's advances, as he was a married man, in fact a
twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time;
she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving
him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than
this, because of Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness,
Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a
third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality
even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief that
Atty. Garrido's second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid;
hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be
correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married
in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage
transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's
second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a
clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of
celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia's claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only
after he showed herproof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted
to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help
but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use
her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband."
Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did
not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his
second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another
woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia's
perverse sense of moral values. SHTEaA
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find
Atty. Valencia's actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so
corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man
who, in all appearances, was married to another and with
whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and
reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of
Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a
romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia's
conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point
of shocking the community's sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the
second family build a house prior to her marriage to

Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with
the woman of his second marriage.

of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility; and

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly
to
the
highest
standards
of
morality. 40 In Barrientos v. Daarol, 41 we held that lawyers, as
officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must
lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she
became a member of the legal profession.

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law

for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Conclusion

SO ORDERED.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.

As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this
reason.

9. LINCO v. LACEBAL

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents,

we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a
legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 42

DECISION

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand

that the present case is one of them. The records show the
parties' pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that
demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and
moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of
the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido's plea for
compassion and his act of supporting his children with
Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The
extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of
Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides
what under other circumstances are commendable traits of
character. CAIaHS
In like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long period of
time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in
her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without
undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without
placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a
love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for
gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer's Oath; and violation

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records

of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel
E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of
Attorneys.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7241. October 17, 2011.]
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JIMMY D.
LACEBAL, respondent.

PERALTA, J p:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative
Complaint 1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco
(complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his
failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in
the violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty.
Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of
land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters,
located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View
Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent),
a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of
donation 2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of
Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial
acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P.
Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally
appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact
that complainant's husband died on July 29, 2003. 3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001
on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT No. 29251 5 in the
name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She
claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with

Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights
but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty
and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer, 6 respondent admitted having notarized and
acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty.
Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as
represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by
Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire JueleAlgodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at
Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City.
Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and
wanted to discuss something with him. ISCDEA
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be
physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full control
of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and
the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent
claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the
deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that
he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his
notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon
and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation
anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize
and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon
went to his law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had
passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to
notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have
consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow
lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which
was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7,
2005, it was established that indeed the deed of donation was
presented to respondent on July 8, 2003. 7 Respondent,
likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared
the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization
of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.
Linco died. 8
On
November
23,
2005,
in
its
Report
and
Recommendation, 9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear
that because the donor appeared before him and signed the
deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on
his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed
of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the
deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since
the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the

said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that

Atty. Linco "personally came and appeared before me" is false.
This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath
"to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period
of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215, 10 the
IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied. 11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review
dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215
dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678
dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court
resolved to require complainant to file her comment. 12
In her Compliance, 13 complainant maintained that respondent
has not stated anything new in his motion for reconsideration
that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the
IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public;
thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's
motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is
now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records
sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead when
respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003.
Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco
died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take
note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of
more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly
asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of
time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him
on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the
notarization of the deed of donation. cCaSHA
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial
procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a
colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared
before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the
deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very
day the document was notarized. In the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested
that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on
July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have
appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died

on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement

and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

shall be dealt with more severely. He isDIRECTED to report

the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when
his suspension shall take effect.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of

the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct. 14Respondent should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. 15

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of the respondent. DTcHaA

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public

of the importance attached to the act of notarization.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. 16

SO ORDERED.
10. SPS FLORAN v. EDIZA
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5325. October 19, 2011.]
NEMESIO
FLORAN
FLORAN, complainants, vs.
EDIZA, respondent.

and
ATTY.
ROY

CARIDAD
PRULE

DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. 17 Hence, again, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public
is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by
reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with
public interest. 18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a
notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's
rights over the property subject of the donation but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should,
therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon, 19 respondent having failed to
discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem
it proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of
Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of
respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit/Complaint filed

by spouses Nemesio (Nemesio) and Caridad (Caridad) Floran
against Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza) for unethical
conduct.
The Facts
Spouses Floran own an unregistered 3.5525 hectare parcel of
land, particularly described as Cad. Lot No. 422-A, Pls-923 and
situated in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The land
is covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal
(Epal), a relative, who gave the property to the Spouses
Floran.
On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera filed an
action 1 for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on the house
situated on the land owned by the Spouses Floran with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 41.
The action for foreclosure involved an amount of
P7,500. TcIHDa
Spouses Floran sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza. On 24
September 1996, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 23
October 1996, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case
without
prejudice
based
on
non-compliance
with barangayconciliation procedures under the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare or
10,910 square meters of their 3.5525 hectare land to Phividec
Industrial Authority (Phividec) for P25 per square meter totaling
to the amount of P272,750, payable in three installments (1)
P55,132; (2) P120,000, and (3) P97,618. The installments
were paid and released within the months of June to July 1997.
The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of Lot

Owner executed by Nemesio and Phividec's representative

and notarized by Atty. Ediza on 31 March 1997.
Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver in
Phividec's favor. The Spouses Floran again sought the help of
Atty. Ediza for the preparation and notarization of the waiver.
Atty. Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to have the original
owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in their
favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents
for Epal to sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del
Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent to the
conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale made
by Epal in favor of Nemesio for P2,000.
On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Out of the total amount of
P272,750, which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses
Floran, Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38 for the
titling of the remaining portion of the land, other expenses and
attorney's fees.
Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to
follow-up on the title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his
promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still
unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty. Ediza for the
return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus, Spouses
Floran presented their complaint before the chapter president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis
Oriental. TEAcCD
The IBP called the Spouses Floran and Atty. Ediza to a
conference. During the dialogue, Atty. Ediza refused to return
the money but promised to tear a document evidencing sale by
the Spouses Floran to him of one hectare land of their property
for P50,000. The Spouses Floran claimed that they
had noknowledge that they executed such document in favor
of Atty. Ediza and suspected that they might have signed a
document earlier which Atty. Ediza told them not to read.
Afterwards, the Spouses Floran filed their formal complaint
before the Supreme Court.
In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad
alleged that Atty. Ediza gave them certain documents,
including a Deed of Absolute Sale, for Epal to sign in order to
transfer the land in their name. However, the Spouses Floran
later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty. Ediza
is a deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property
executed by Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza for a consideration of
P2,000. When the Spouses Floran confronted Atty. Ediza, he
initially denied the document but then later promised to tear
and destroy it.
In his Comment dated 23 January 2001, Atty. Ediza claimed
that the Spouses Floran voluntarily gave him one hectare of
the 3.5525 hectare land as payment for handling and winning
the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza explained
that the Spouses Floran did not find the lot interesting, lacking
in good topography. He also stated that the property only had
an assessed value of P23,700 at the time it was presented to
him.

Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned

that Phividec was interested to buy a hectare of the Spouses
Floran's land, and considering that he has a hectare of
undivided portion in the property, he suggested to the Spouses
Floran that both of them sell half a hectare each and equally
share in the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full
payment, Atty. Ediza gave fifty percent of the proceeds to the
Spouses Floran and he kept the other half. Thereafter, Atty.
Ediza wanted his remaining share in the land consisting of
4,545 square meters be titled in his name. Atty. Ediza
conveyed this to the Spouses Floran and volunteered to take
care of titling the land, including the Spouses Floran's
remaining share, with no cost to them.
Atty. Ediza stated that since Phividec had not yet applied for a
separate tax declaration which would segregate its portion
from the remainder of the property, he thought of holding in
abeyance the separate survey on the remainder of the land.
Also, Atty. Ediza was in a hurry to have the land titled with the
intention of selling it so he informed the Spouses Floran to just
follow up with Phividec.
At the IBP conference, Atty. Ediza stated that he only agreed to
return the 4,545 square meter portion of the land to amicably
settle the case with the Spouses Floran. He asserted that the
Deed of Sale signed by the Spouses Floran in his favor served
as payment for the dismissal of the case he handled for the
Spouses Floran. Atty. Ediza denied that the money he received
was intended for the titling of the remaining portion of the land.
Atty. Ediza claimed that the complaint against him stemmed
from a case where he represented a certain Robert Sabuclalao
for recovery of land. The land was being occupied by the
Church of the Assembly of God where Nemesio Floran serves
as pastor. CIAacS
In a Resolution dated 7 March 2001, the Court resolved to
refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 14 August 2008, the investigating commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP submitted his Report
and found that Atty. Ediza (1) failed to meet the standards
prescribed by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 15, and (2)
violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be
imposed the penalty of six months suspension from the
practice of law.
In finding Atty. Ediza guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
After careful evaluation of the claims of the parties vis-a-vis the
documents available, the version of the complainants appear
to be credible while that of the respondent is shot through with
inconsistencies.
xxx xxx xxx
b. The foreclosure case of complainants involved only
P7,500.00 and respondent Ediza filed only a single motion and

attended only two hearings. Thus, it is highly incredible [that]

complainants whom respondent Ediza claims were destitute
will voluntarily and generously donate to him 1 hectare of their
land valued at P50,000.00. As it turned out, the 1 hectare
portion is worth not only P50,000.00 [but] more than
P200,000.00. DCcAIS
c. The deed of sale of a portion of complainants' land to
respondent Ediza is admittedly simulated because while it
states that the consideration for the sale is P50,000.00, neither
party claims that any money was paid by respondent Ediza to
complainants.
d. As a lawyer, Atty. Ediza must be aware that a deed of sale
involving real property must be notarized to be enforceable.
The document was unexplainably never notarized.
Thus, this Commission finds that respondent Ediza must have
caused the complainants to unknowingly sign the deed of sale
of a portion of their property in his favor. It may further be noted
that in their complaint, complainants allege that they saw in the
files of respondent Ediza a copy of deed of sale of a property
executed by Sartiga Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza which he
promised to destroy when confronted about it by complainants.
This was never denied by Atty. Ediza.
Such conduct fails to come up to the standard prescribed by
Canon 1.01 that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct" and Canon 15 that
"A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transaction with his client."
On the second issue, . . . the claim of the complainants that
they agreed to give P125,000.00 of the proceeds of the sale of
their property to respondent Ediza to register the remaining
portion also appears to be more credible for the following
reasons:
1. There is no credible reason for complainants to expect and
demand that respondent Ediza undertake the registration of
their property except that they have paid for it. If they were
aware that they gave 1 hectare of their property to respondent
Ediza for handling their civil case and that they are not paying
respondent Ediza to register their property, it is not likely that
simple folks like them would be so bold to demand for such
valuable service from him for free. AcTDaH
2. There is no credible reason for respondent to willingly
undertake for free for complainants the not so simple task of
registering an untitled property.
3. As previously stated, the P125,000.00 given to respondent
Ediza by complainants is obviously too generous for simply
having handled the civil case involving only P7,500.00. There
must have been another reason for complainants to willingly
pay the said amount to respondent and the registration for their
remaining property appears to be a credible reason.
It should also be noted that respondent Atty. Ediza does not
even allege that he has taken any step towards accomplishing
the registration of the property of the complainants prior to the
filing of this complaint. Whether or not he agreed to do it for

free or for a fee, respondent Ediza should have complied with

his promise to register the property of complainants unless he
has valid reasons not to do so. He has not also given any
credible explanation why he failed to do so.
Such conduct of respondent Ediza violates Canon 18.03 that
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 26 June
2011, in Resolution No. XIX-2011-433, the Board of Governors
of the IBP affirmed the findings of the investigating
commissioner. The resolution states:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason to
disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008401 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. TcEDHa
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with
the findings of the IBP and find reasonable grounds to hold
respondent Atty. Ediza administratively liable.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. . . .
CANON 15
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS. TcEaDS
CANON 18
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

HIS

CLIENT

WITH

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they

had no knowledge that they signed a deed of sale to transfer a
portion of their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist that
Atty. Ediza failed to comply with his promise to register their
property despite receiving the amount of P125,463.38. On the
other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land
from the Spouses Floran because of their "deep gratitude" to
him in the dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of
mortgage. Atty. Ediza further claims that the amount of
P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful share from the
sale of the land.

Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision. He isDIRECTED to return to the Spouses Nemesio
and Caridad Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he
misled the spouses and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is
further ORDERED to pay Spouses Nemesio and Caridad
Floran, within 30 days from receipt of this Decision, the amount
of P125,463.38, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until
fully paid. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the

Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a
deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza.
Atty. Ediza also did the same to Epal when he gave Caridad
several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made it appear
that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the
Spouses Floran. Moreover, when the sale of the Spouses
Floran's land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the
amount from the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely
misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the
remaining portion of the land.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of

respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies be served on
the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance. TSacID

Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses

Floran to deprive them of their valued property. This is an
unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession.
Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his
client's case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and
honest in protecting his client's rights. Once a lawyer fails in
this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. IEHDAT
In Santos v. Lazaro 3 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, 4 we held that
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a
basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a
client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latter's rights. Failure to exercise that degree
of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also
to the legal profession, the courts and society.
The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has
ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right, but a moral and legal
obligation as well. The Court will not tolerate such action from
a member of the legal profession who deliberately and
maliciously did not protect his client's interests.
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the
practice of law for six months is warranted. Atty. Ediza is
directed to return to the Spouses Floran the two (2) sets of
documents that he misled the spouses and Epal to sign. Atty.
Ediza is also directed to return the amount of P125,463.38,
representing the amount he received from the proceeds of the
sale of the land belonging to the Spouses Floran, with legal
interest from the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza
administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,

SO ORDERED.
11. FREEMAN v. REYES
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6246. November 15, 2011.]
[Formerly CBD No. 00-730]
MARITES E. FREEMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. ZENAIDA P.
REYES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by
complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in
obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal
services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance
policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks
recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and
the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with
prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.
In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated April 7, 2000, filed on
May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that her husband Robert
Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October
18, 1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas,
to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa
applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services
of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help
her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other
insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that
she had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing
of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses
for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the
amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of
P47,500.00 for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to
London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check Voucher, 2 issued
by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the
notations in the amount of "P50,000.00" and the date "12-5-98"

were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she

acceded into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for
legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary
Receipt 3 bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office
(respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she went to
see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter
asked for the additional amount of P10,000.00 for travel
expenses, per Temporary Receipt 4 bearing said date, issued
by respondent's law firm. After several phone calls inquiring
about the status of the visa applications, respondent told
her, "Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted
at banned ka sa Embassy." (It is difficult to railroad the process
of securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned by
the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told
her that to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out
P18,000.00 as "panlagay" or "grease money" to bribe some
staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed
her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued on a
later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue
resident visas instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that
to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again
give P20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as
"grease money" to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After
several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa
applications had lapsed, and that another amount of
P18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later,
respondent asked for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per
Temporary Receipt, 5 dated April 19, 1999, to be used for
booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal
costs, per Temporary Receipt 6 dated May 13, 1999, to cover
the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts
were issued by respondent's law firm. IcEaST
Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with
respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she received a picture
of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of
the deceased. She later learned that respondent left for
London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent
explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the
insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with
Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's
insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a
letter 7 dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer
of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the
arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was
covered by three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building
Society (Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln
Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No.
PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No.
2779512). 8 Respondent offered to help and assured her that
representations with the insurance companies had earlier been
made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance
proceeds soon.
According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix
her signature in a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 9 dated
November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the
respondent to follow-up the insurance claims. However, she
found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not
notarized, but another SPA, 10 dated April 6, 1999, was

notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her

signature therein was forged. Later, she came across a similar
copy of the SPA, 11 dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April
30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally bearing the
signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her
knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA,
notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the
insurance companies in London.
Complainant
discovered
that
in
an
undated
letter, 12 addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish
Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made
representations that her husband left no will and that she
had no verified information as to the total value of her
husband's estate and the existence of any property in London
that would be subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter
requested that complainant be advised on the value for
probate in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its
entitlement. Respondent added therein that "As to the matter of
the installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy,
Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to
Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch,
with business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central
District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account name:
Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until
further notice."
Subsequently, in a letter 13 dated July 29, 1999, addressed to
one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group
(PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the
"Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the complainant], per
SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999]," replied
that she had appended the documents required (i.e., marriage
certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter, 14 dated
April 20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that pursuant to
an SPA 15 executed in her favor, all communications
pertaining to complainant should be forwarded to her law firm;
that she sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled
to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount due
and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the
absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having
left no will), she "enclosed an alternative document [referring to
the Extrajudicial Settlement 16 dated June 1, 1999, notarized
by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse
(Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence
Freeman)." In the same letter, respondent reiterated that
complainant "requests that any amount of monies due or
benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account No. 014827377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St.,
Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola, which serves
as her temporary account until further notice."
Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a
demand upon the respondent to return her passport and the
total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing
of the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent
asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the British
Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications,
but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with
the turn of events. On the supposed rescheduled appointment
with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to

Airtech Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny
Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he
would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made
her sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of
P3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the
office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to
ask respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer 17 dated June 20, 2000,
respondent countered that in 1998, complainant, accompanied
by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner
Josefina Bauzon and another woman whose identity was not
ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the inheritance of
her deceased husband, a British national. 18 She told
complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased,
birth certificate of their son, and other documents to support
her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before
she accepted the case, she explained to complainant that she
would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of
P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional
amount of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said
complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid her
the said amounts. With an SPA, 19 dated April 6, 1999 and
notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been
executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications
with the insurance companies in London regarding
complainant's claims. Having received communications from
said insurance companies, she stated that complainant
offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and
the hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to
the matter. She left for London in May 1999 and, upon her
return, she updated the complainant about the status of her
claims. CHEDAc
As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she
met with complainant, she asked her why she had not left for
London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the
embassy had duped her. She explained to complainant that
she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the
visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She
stated that when complainant acceded to such arrangement,
she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a travel
consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that
complainant's previous visa applications had been denied four
times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter,
complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the
travel consultant, who charged her a "professional fee" of
P50,000.00. She added that she had no participation in the
foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the
said travel consultant.
With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent
denied knowledge about the existence of the same, and
declared that the SPA, 20 dated April 6, 1999, which was
notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for
communications with the insurance companies in London. She
stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily
representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah
Buama, her office secretary, and never returned the same,
despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of
the loss of the case folder as she then had no immediate need

of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately

report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of
absence, so as to attend to the financial obligations brought
about by her mother's lingering ailment and consequent
death. 21 Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to
return the case folder and, thus, the law firm was prevented
from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She
maintained that through complainant's own criminal acts and
machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively
pursuing her claims. Between January to February 2000, she
sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the
expenses incurred 22 by the law firm, as of July 1999;
however, instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a
malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations.
On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting
the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments on
Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon
seeing the letter 23 dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's
Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to
arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was
agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier
mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses to be
incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally
agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be
recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a
travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon
return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the
arrangements with the insurance companies in London that
remittances would be made directly to the respondent's
personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason why
respondent went to London was primarily to attend the
International Law Conference, not solely for her insurance
claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00,
which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc.
(in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a
handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount
of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to the
second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged
signature,
the
amount
of
10,546.7
[should
be 10,960.63], 24 or
approximately
equivalent
to
P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of
respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor
was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she
never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to
receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA
[first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing
her in court proceedings.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint 25 for
malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal
Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former
client of respondent), for allegedly barging into the law office of
the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-off the
cords of two office computer keyboards and the line
connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and
electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in an
estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution, 26 dated
July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City
recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency

of evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack

of evidence and for failure of respondent to appear during the
preliminary investigation of the case. 27
Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02108181, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution 28 dated
October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated
February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that the case
be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6,
2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information. 29 Consequently, in the Order 30 dated November
27, 2002, the trial court granted the withdrawal of the
information, and dismissed the case. TSEAaD
In the Report and Recommendation 31 dated August 28, 2003,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust of
complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings
and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended
for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that despite receipt of the approximate amount of P200,000.00,
respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her
son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to
appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of
complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under
the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant
the amounts she received from the London insurance
companies.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in
Resolution No. XVI-2003-166, 32 adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with
modification that respondent be disbarred.
The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating
Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently substantiated
the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having
appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's
deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to
punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their
oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 33
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 34
Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this
Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative
liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs,
such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the
complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate
civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful
acts, to be filed in the regular courts.
In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the
legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa
applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her
deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the
scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant.
A perusal of the [first] SPA, 35 dated November 6, 1998, which
was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized
respondent to represent her and her son, in order to protect
their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial
proceeding and the possibility of any amicable settlement,
relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in the
Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA, 36 dated
April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing
the forged signature of complainant, in addition to the
foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear
and represent the complainant, in connection with her
insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash
treasury warrants, checks arising from said claims, deposit the
same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the
successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA, 37also dated
April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing
the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing
the signatures of two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of
the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three
SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made
integral parts of the records of the case, were not certified true
copies and no proof was adduced to verify their genuineness
and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of
respondent in her behalf with regard to the insurance claims;
however, the admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that
she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. 38
Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the
scope of her authority to represent the complainant in pursuing
the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the
benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall

account for all money or property collected or received for or

from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or
upon demand. cSaATC
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client. 39 In the present case, the cash/check voucher and the
temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of
her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that
she received the total amount of P167,000.00 40 from the
complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's
case. Respondent admitted having received money from the
complainant, but claimed that the total amount of
P120,000.00 41 she received was in accordance with their
agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered
an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the
actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the
discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should
receive, supposedly pursuant to an agreement of engaging
respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a
formal contract of legal services.
Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00
to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her in claiming
the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United
Kingdom Entry Clearance, 42 dated December 8, 1998, it
showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to
London was to attend the International Law Conference in
Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the
gall to take advantage of the benevolence of the complainant,
then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into
believing that she needed to go to London to assist in
recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse,
respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that
she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving "grease
money" or lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00, 43 to the
British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence
in the normal course of conducting official business
transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications.
This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
More
importantly,
apart
from
her
bare
denials
that no remittance was made to her personal bank account, as
shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to
December for the years 2000-2001), 44 respondent never
attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory
explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting, on
the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully
belong to the complainant vis--vis the correspondence by the
insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the
remittance of the following amounts to the respondent's
personal bank account, to wit: Per letter 45 dated November
23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer
Services Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to

complainant, stating, among others, that "An amount of

10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th
September 2000)," and per letter, 46 dated April 28, 2000, from
one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the
Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one
Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays,
stating, among others, that "I can confirm that a death claim
was made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an amount
of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the
client's legal representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon
City, Philippines." Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of
10,489.57 and 471.06 were remitted to respondent
through other means of international transactions, such as the
International Moneymover, which explains why no direct
remittance from the insurance companies in London could be
traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per
monthly transaction report, covering January to December for
the years 2000-2001.
A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and
each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case. 47Section 5, in relation to Sections
1 48 and 2, 49 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal
of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a
separate and independent action for administrative liability, as
the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is
merely substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the
criminal complaint for estafa against her was already
dismissed is of noconsequence. An administrative case can
proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial
wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the
trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the
ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime
was committed. More so, in the present administrative case,
wherein the ground for the dismissal of the criminal case was
because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to
withdraw the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence. CSEHcT
In Velez v. De Vera, 50 the Court ruled that the relation
between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being
such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary
nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of
Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from
any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses
or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should
be reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under
any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by
him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives

rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for

his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in
gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are
guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. 51 Indeed, lawyering is not
a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. 52
In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to
practice their profession for breach of trust and confidence
pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. In Manzano
v. Soriano, 53 therein respondent, found guilty of grave
misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client)
and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a
collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00
as stipulated in their agreement and, to conceal the misdeed,
executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor
and, at the same time, the notary public. InLemoine v. Balon,
Jr., 54 therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit,
and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his
client's insurance claim, falsified the check and made it
payable to himself, encashed the same, and appropriated the
proceeds.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields
profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done
or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with public interest, for
which it is subject to State regulation. 55 Respondent's
repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and
unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of
milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating
upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully
belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate
legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and
integrity required in the practice of law. This being so,
respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising
the noble legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found
guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the practice
of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This
Decision is immediately executory.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded
in the personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites
E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies remitted to
her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57,
and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or
in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately

equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing

exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction. THSaEC
SO ORDERED.
12. IN RE: PACTOLIN
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 7940. April 24, 2012.]
RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455
UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF COURT, vs. ATTY.
RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This case resolves the question of whether or not the
conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral turpitude
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. acSECT
The Facts and the Case
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis
City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of
Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team.
Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas' letter
to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also
designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for
his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental,
got a photocopy of Abastillas' letter and, using it, filed on June
24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal
disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin
attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a
falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren,
not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case 25665 a complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification
of public document. 1 On November 12, 2003 the
Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under
Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory
penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it
affirmed his conviction. 2 Since the Court treated the matter as
an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule

139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good

morals. 9

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted

any pleading during the administrative proceedings before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP
Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632,
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty.
Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty.

Pactolin?

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty.
Pactolin should be disbarred after conviction by final judgment
of the crime of falsification.cTACIa
The Court's Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised before the
Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He
claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision
and referral to the IBP was "factually infirmed" 3 and contained
"factual
exaggerations
and
patently
erroneous
observation," 4 and was "too adventurous." 5
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas' letter which Atty.
Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the
clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his
possession and use of the falsified Abastillas' letter, this Court
held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it
was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on
the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one found in possession of and who used a forged document
is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. 6

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great

caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it
is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar. 10 Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced
that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 11 DAHCaI
Here, Atty. Pactolin's disbarment is warranted. The
Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his culpability for
falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet
served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense
and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. 12
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all
classes and professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold
the law. 13 The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. 14
WHEREFORE,
Atty.
Rodolfo
D.
Pactolin
is
hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from the Rolls
of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his
personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

This Court's decision in said falsification case had long become

final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, 7 the
Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon
to review the judgment of conviction which has become final.
The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer

may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.

[A.C. No. 8391. November 23, 2010.]

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public

document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. 8 Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,

13. YUHICO v. GUTIERREZ

EN BANC

[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L.
GUTIERREZ, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before us is a Complaint 1 dated January 10, 2006 for
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
(Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office

of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico
was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a
Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was
then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they
eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each
other during the hearings of the case.
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him
and asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00. Gutierrez then
claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical
expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico
immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to
pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his
attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan,
this time in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the
medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again,
Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank
check amounting to P60,000.00. 2 Again, Gutierrez promised
to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short
time."
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans.
Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message on July 12, 2005
at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I
may be taking advantage of our friendship. You see i've long
expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from
my client Ogami from Japan. It's more or less more than 5m
and its release is delayed due to tax and the law on money
laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or
b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty
as everyone is.
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow
money from him again. He said Gutierrez claimed that his
daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take
the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez
assured him that he will pay all his debts on or before August
10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m.,
Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really great
trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick and now my bro
in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get
me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now
my immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my
daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt
want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will
pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any
amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the
payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text
message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give
him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make
the payment.

Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from

Gutierrez from August to December 2005. Gutierrez, on the
other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always
failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's
account number and promised to deposit his payment there,
but he never deposited the payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand
letter 3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to
submit his Answer on the complaint against him. 4 aDcETC
In his Answer, 5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one
who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the assistance
he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his
clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to
compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he
has nointention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but
he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his
debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial
condition improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the
mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to
attend on two occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit
their respective position papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD,
only
the
complainant's
counsel
attended.
There
was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme
Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, 6 had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view
of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless
checks.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the,
IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand
Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD
recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the
instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew
effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the
March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD
explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue
of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence,
however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as
the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to
the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report

and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with

modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety
Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to
its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments
for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 7 HTDCAS
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt.
His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay
the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he
justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial
condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which
are beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of
employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of
obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records
show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of
paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of
text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans,
while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making
good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his
acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, 8 the Court had
already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross
misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of
bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the
IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar
Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had
already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed
out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws
or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a
minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the
IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-649
dated
December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, isAFFIRMED.
He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand

Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from

receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory. EcHIDT
SO ORDERED.
14. VENTURA v. SAMSON
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 9608. November 27, 2012.]
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
DANILO S. SAMSON, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to
the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding
the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the
watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to
state, those whose conduct both public and private fail
this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized. 1
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a
Complaint 2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for
"grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The
herein
Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA
B.
VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002
and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating
therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her
person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002
when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein
Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38)
years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident
of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines. . . .
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO
S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed
transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA
B. VENTURA and himself. . . . TDcCIS
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued

a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of

RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the
crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the
corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
on 04 July 2002. . . .
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was denied
in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur. . . .
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was
elevated to [the Department of Justice], by way of a PETITION
FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department of
Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo
S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA
B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute . . .
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines which provides for a
penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney
by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement 3 that sometime
in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the
maid's room at respondent's house when respondent entered
and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her
breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated
that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at
respondent's poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He
brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her.
Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and
warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would
kill her and her mother. CAcEaS
In her Supplemental-Complaint, 4 complainant averred that
respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her mother
agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan
National High School. She further stated that on the night she
was sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent
went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted,
but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as
nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent
forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry
farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack.
She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer 5 that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the
complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a
complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was
dismissed. Respondent, however, has no knowledge or

information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13

years. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in
paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of
respondent in having sex with complainant constitute . . .
grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that [the] act of
respondent in having sex with complainant was done [with]
mutual agreement after respondent gave money to
complainant. Respondent respectfully submit[s] that his act of
having sex with complainant once does not constitute . . .
gross[ly] immoral conduct. There is no human law that
punishes a person who [has] sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant [accepts] compensation therefore.
Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does
not amount to immoral conduct. . . . SEcAIC
xxx xxx xxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an
employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. The said
Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and [had a grudge]
against the herein respondent who terminated her services due
to misunderstanding. . . .
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as
this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and planned act
of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a
result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office
of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of
Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of
respondent. . . .
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back [at]
respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with her
and demanded the payment of the amount [of]
P2,000,000.00[;] otherwise she will file a case against him in
Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not come
across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats
and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case [for]
rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the
Rape Case, Corazon Ventura [sent word] to respondent that
she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In effect,
Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she
[can] get even with him and his wife for separating her from the
employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is
supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is
hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can afford
to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting
down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is
not her biological daughter and she knows before hand that
her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact [that]
Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria
Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No.
5414. . . . SIcEHD
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this

rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having sex with
complainant with just compensation once does not amount to
immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to
temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondent's Answer is his CounterAffidavit 6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He
alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night
with her male friends when her mother was out of the house.
He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had sexual
affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March
19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates
near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted
to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she
asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He
told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go
to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised
when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is a
common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched
complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car
and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging
house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if
he could use the latter's hut. The farm worker agreed and they
went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm worker's hut, complainant did not hesitate in
entering the room. Respondent did not notice any
involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He
asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their
mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up
and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He
told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which
she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, she's not
crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the
money he gave because she needed to buy some things but
her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent
insisted that what happened between them was the first and
the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that
complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found
that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial for
qualified seduction. 7 The charge of rape, however, was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur,
Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the
dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration.
When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the
DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor. DcaECT
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother
appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their
respective Affidavits of Desistance. 8 Complainant stated that
what happened between respondent and her in March 2002
was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before
the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case

against respondent was dismissed. 9
In its Report and Recommendation 10 dated October 10, 2007,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that
respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the
practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of
the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty
of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife
was victim's guardians and for being a married man, Atty.
Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. 11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She
argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She
contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a young and
innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his
moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was
then staying at respondent's residence. Moreover, there was a
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that
respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable
behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the
honor and privilege which his license confers upon him. Thus,
complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed. 12
Meanwhile,
respondent
also
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration 13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that
complainant has not presented any proof of her minority.
Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not
under their custody. He contends that complainant's mother
even testified that her daughter stayed at respondent's house
only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of
his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he
has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a
reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the
practice of law. IScaAE
The pertinent provisions
Responsibility provide:

in

the Code

of

Professional

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. aHIDAE
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 14 the possession of
good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden
duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar. 15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which
tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment. IATHaS
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion
of the upright and respectable members of the
community. 16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. 17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondent's
act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his
former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that
warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had
sexual
intercourse
with
complainant
but
also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did
nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even
gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of
a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of
fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing
a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person
and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on

him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, 19 who for a
time was under respondent's care. Whether the sexual
encounter between the respondent and complainant was or
was not with the latter's consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the
standards of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states
that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others,
any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath
that he is required to take before admission to the practice of
law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's
lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. 20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21 that a lawyer
may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Similarly, inDumadag v. Lumaya, 22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. CcEHaI
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during
the pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the
instant proceedings in view of the public service character of
the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings
as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the
ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is
not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as
a member of the Bar. 23
Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with
disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the
circumstances. 24 In
this
case,
respondent's
gross
misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a
serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice
in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary
action. 25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar

must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should never be decreed. 26 However, in the present case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty. 27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is
hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of
his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be
made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.
RULE 2.01 A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
RULE 2.02 In such a case, even if the lawyer does not accept
a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
RULE 2.03 A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
RULE 2.04 A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statements of facts.
RULE 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
RULE 3.02 In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading
or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the
name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.
RULE 3.03 Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the

firm name unless the law allows him to practice law

concurrently.
RULE 3.04 A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in the
improvement of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration
of justice.
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence.
1. SPS. WILLIAMS v. ENRIQUEZ
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6353. February 27, 2006.]
SPOUSES DAVID
MARISA WILLIAMS, complainants, vs.
T. ENRIQUEZ, respondent.

ATTY.

and
RUDY

RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney." The
charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment1 filed by the spouses David W. Williams and
Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13443 2 pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where
complainants are the defendants. According to the
complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of
the controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then
issued in her favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to
David W. Williams, an American citizen." 3 On January 8,
2004, respondent charged her with falsification of public
documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No.
2004-34. 4
The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the
practice of law, Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated
material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his
comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly
applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa
Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship

when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to

own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of
falsification in the Deed she executed to buy property in
Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2)
Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that she would not lose her citizenship when
she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific
act.
2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated
law, declaring that her "act of marrying" her husband was
equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly
attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his
position, not Marisa's (Annex A-4). 5
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired
judge, who knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is
an American) "will not prevail in the end." 6
In his "Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss," 7 respondent
enumerated matters which to his mind were evidence of the
acts of falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted
that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert
attention from the criminal charges against the complainants,
and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual
basis. IDAESH
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 8 Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline
scheduled
the
case
for
mandatory
conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared.
The parties were then directed to submit their verified position
papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent
had maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against
them and that his acts were forms of attempted extortion. They
also adopted their joint complaint-affidavit by way of
incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant
Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995,
Commissioner
Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala
ruled
that
respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should
be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with
the modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a
warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may
give to his clients."
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for
his actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant
Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino

citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not

show that she has automatically acquired her husband's
citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by
respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that
they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following
objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b)
improve the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re:
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line
with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must
keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the
law and jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least
with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the
Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders,
administrative circulars, regulations and other rules
promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the
administration of justice. The lawyer's life is one of continuous
and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the
law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure
due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility.) 9
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. 10 Indeed,
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 11 As
a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his
duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the
Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a
client. 12 In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is
no less than the Constitution, 13 the most basic law of the
land. 14 Implicit in a lawyer's mandate to protect a client's
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is
the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments,
and
participate
in
continuing
legal
education
programs. 15 Thus, in championing the interest of clients and
defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict
standards imposed by the lawyer's oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter's
cause be dismissed on a technical ground. 16 Ignorance
encompasses both substantive and procedural laws. 17
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the
Investigating Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power
to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution.
Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court
and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be
imposed as a penalty. 18 Pursuant to the IBP Commission on
Bar
Discipline's
Guidelines
for
Imposing
Lawyer
Sanctions, 19 and considering further that this is respondent's
first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as
recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will
suffice. TaSEHC

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties

repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending cases
below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such
arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in
the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy
T. Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully
study the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
2. DULALIA v. CRUZ
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6854. April 27, 2007.]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO C.
CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr.
(complainant) of violation Rules 1.01, 16.02, 2 and 7.03 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint
are as follows:
Complainant's wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application
for building permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite
compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she
failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the
opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004
letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent
Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows,
quoted verbatim:
xxx xxx xxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family,
Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva
Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon
and family, his relatives and neighbors. AEcTaS
It has been more than a month ago already that the
construction of the building of the abovenamed person has
started and that the undersigned and his family, and those
other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under
construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need
to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its
adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to
clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their
properties, health and safety.

It was represented that the intended construction of the

building would only be a regular and with standard height
building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same
would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation
already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the
undersigned's residential house in particular, which readily
poses danger to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to
property, loss of life and for the protection of the safety of all
the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for
your appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest
opportune time. aIcDCA
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of
Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal
Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b),
Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is
inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part
of the owner of the Building under construction with
the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of
the National Building Code and on the part of your good office,
your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of
the same foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal
effect of the non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303
and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties
concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided
in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
. . . 4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly
supplied)
By complainant's claim, respondent opposed the application for
building permit because of a personal grudge against his wife
Susan who objected to respondent's marrying her first cousin
Imelda Soriano, respondent's marriage with Carolina Agaton
being still subsisting. 5 EDACSa
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his
Complaint Affidavit 6 he filed against respondent before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) 7 of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c) 8 of Republic
Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees). 9
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005, 10 the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint in light of the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent
allegedly opposes the application of his wife for a building
permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of
the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was
not in favor of Imelda's relationship with respondent who is a
married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not
authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the
construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to

have satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of
complainant. We find noclear, convincing and strong evidence
to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the
presumption and establish his charges by a clear
preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required
evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the
lawyer continues and the complaint against him should be
dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs.
Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA
283). aCIHAD
xxx xxx xxx 11 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005, 12 the Board of Governors of
the IBP adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review 13 filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01
when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on
September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton,
which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still
subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his
influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to
oppose his wife's application for building permit, in violation of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains
that respondent violated Rule 7.03. EScAHT
To his Comment, 14 respondent attached the July 29,
2005 15 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant's complaint for
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c)
of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution
reads:
. . . A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13,
2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the
Building official appears to be not an opposition for the
issuance of complainant's building permit, but rather to redress
a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the
requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met.
In fact, the Office of the Building Official after conducting an
investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the
Building Code for constructing without a building permit
committed by herein complainant's wife Susan Dulalia. Hence,
a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther
[that] it was only after the said violation had been committed
that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly
pointed out by respondent, the same is being processed
pending approval by the Building Official and not of the
Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant.

Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the

private practice of his law profession despite being employed
in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into consideration the
explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be
justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of
herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to
substantiate
the
complaints
against
the
respondent. 16 (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the
dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in
order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his
position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own
personal interest against complainant and his wife. AEDHST
As for respondent's September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing
to show that he opposed the application for building permit. He
just inquired whether complainant's wife fully complied with the
requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on
top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and
damages to their properties, health and safety" occasioned by
the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit
was filed on September 28, 2004, 17 whereas the questioned
letter of respondent was priorly written and received on
September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building
Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and
issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure
to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate
proper legal action against you." 18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 19 from
the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed, complainant's
wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet
secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator
and from the barangay where the building was to be
constructed.
Respecting complainant's charge that respondent engaged in
an unauthorized private practice of law while he was the
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous
to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state that
respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not
prohibited. 20

It is, however, with respect to respondent's admitted

contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is still
subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation
of
Rule
1.01
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility. aHCSTD
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at
the Clark County, Nevada, USA, 21 when the Family Code of
the Philippines had already taken effect. 22 He invokes good
faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the
applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil

Code. 23 For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides

that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a
qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly
immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community." 24 Gross immoral
conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. 25

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of

contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still
in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. 28
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence. HScaCT

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la

Cruz, 26 this Court declared that the therein respondent's act
of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was
still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was
suspended for two years after the mitigating following
circumstances were considered:

Respondent's claim that he was not aware that the Family

Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the
United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back
to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9,
1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith."

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second

marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not
been romantically involved with any woman; cACHSE

Apropos is this
Rafanan: 29

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and

total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent
person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife
and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry
(sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have
parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 27
In respondent's case, he being out of the country since 1986,
he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that
Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when
he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when
allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was
not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano,
there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any
woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an
absentee even during the pendency of this case. ETIcHa
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted
marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which they
have been living in fact elected him and served as President of
the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been
handling free legal aid cases.
Respondent's misimpression that it was the Civil Code
provisions which applied at the time he contracted his second
marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his
residential community towards his second marriage
notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

Court's

pronouncement

in Santiago

v.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to

obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse,
they
may
become
susceptible
to
committing
mistakes. 30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. aSIATD
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
RULE 6.01 The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts
or
the
concealment of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

RULE 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use

his public position to promote or advance his private interests
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
RULE 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving a government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
1. HUYSSEN v. GUTIERREZ

Thus, a complaint 2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in

the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar
Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6707. March 24, 2006.]
GISELA HUYSSEN, complainant, vs.
GUTIERREZ, respondent.

respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the

deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer
who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand
letters remained unheeded.

ATTY.

FRED

L.

DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This treats of a Complaint 1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela
Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still
connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens,
applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the
Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order
that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the
BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a
period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year.
Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law,
complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs
that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her
demands. After one year, complainant demanded from
respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return
the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which
complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter
dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the
amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his
promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand
letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a
letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for
the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two
blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and
authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due
dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had
stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his
letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the
reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said
checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five
postdated checks on their due dates but they were all
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or
payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001, 4 respondent denied

the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never
physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he
could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the
amount was used as payment for services rendered for
obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent
explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and
likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was introduced
to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big
problem concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and
three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two
others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that
since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten
(10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they
could no longer extend their said status as under the law and
related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders
could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they
could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the
country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised
them that they better secure a permanent visa under Section 3
of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota
Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements
in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant
must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that
her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has
to have the same amount of show money separate of her
money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two
minor children would be included as her dependents in her
said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to
work for their application, which I did and contacted the late
Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the
said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the
complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was
given an independent permanent visa while the other two were
made as dependents of the complainant. In between the
processing of the papers and becoming very close to the
complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant
and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter
would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me

which request were then transmitted to the complainant and

every amount of money given by the complainant to their
counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why
my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the
complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to
be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder
why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts
were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money
from the bank is not really her money but money of World
Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact
was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand
letter to the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the
complaint-affidavit; ECISAD
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was
the very same amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in
obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the
complainant and her son could have been a ground for
deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the
Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could
have been the possible reason why complainant was made to
pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and
her family became very close to undersigned and my family
that I was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return
of their money given and surprisingly they want to recover the
same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer
around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now
being hidden and that the amount of money is now being
sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I
know the consequences of having signed the same and
therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the
fund needed but up to the present my standby loan application
has not been released and was informed that the same would
only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should
have been released last March but was aborted due to
prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the
complainant has now become doubled plus attorney's fees of
P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002
and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25
August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of
respondent's evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings)
were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was
allegedly out of the country to attend to his client's needs.
Reception of respondent's evidence was scheduled for the last

time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to

appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan submitted her report 5 recommending the
disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in
this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that
respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from
complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed
the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his
receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that
he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This
defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the
documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is
the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated
thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of
the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing
would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the
said delay particularly the death of then Commissioner L.
Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed
papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all
on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers
were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started
though some important papers were already finished as early
as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through the
normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since
January that I do not make any follow-ups on the progress of
the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint)

where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of
the amount deposited by your good self in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It
might take some more time before the Bureau could release
the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still
compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner
Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart
attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as
all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the
US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how
come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to
complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also,
why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the
return of the money to complainant if said amount was really
officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these
actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that

respondent received the money from complainant and

appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be
noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty.
Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists.
There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza
regarding the visa application of complainant and his family,
and complainant has also testified that she never met this Atty.
Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud
by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it
more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation
and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has
violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner's report with
modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office
of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
holds a responsible public office. 7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted 8 having received the
US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the
petty cash vouchers 9and receipts 10 he prepared, on the false
representation that that it was needed in complainant's
application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense
that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the
BID. 11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to
submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate
of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in

shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced

by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When
the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 12 He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at
bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that
even though he was given the opportunity to answer the
charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear
several times whenever the case was set for reception of his
evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not
convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely
self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral
obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions
were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to
complainant:
1) Letter 13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which
reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the
said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March
1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to
pay the same to you out of my personal money on said
date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody
here at the office on that day and the amount would be given to
you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal
money. cDECIA
2) Letter 14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of
the amount deposited by your goodself in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release
the refund as some other pertinent papers are still being
compiled and are being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died
of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be
fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This
is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxx xxx xxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you
2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April
20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you
to fill them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to
$10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso
equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have
postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to
cover the whole amount but don't worry as the Lord had
already provided me the means.

3) Letter 15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware
that I have done my very best for the early return of your
money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that
there are still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of
the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is
fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that
I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The
issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face.
It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries
and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to
secure one last Saturday the releases of which are on the
following:
May 4, 1999 200,000
May 11, 1999 200,000
May 20, 1999 200,000

Respondent's act of asking money from complainant in

consideration of the latter's pending application for visas is
violative of Rule 1.01 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02 18 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service
from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private
interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in
any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which
may be affected by the functions of his office. 19 Respondent's
conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character
required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

June 4, 1999 200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my
collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four
checks which I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their
due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with
me for the last time, if any of these checks, is returned, don't
call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I
just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. . . .
4) Letter 16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank
to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments
to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my
creditors to give preference to the check I issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that
instead of returning the other checks I requested
payment instead honored them and mistakenly
your check. This was a very big surprise to
discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

the bank
for stop
returned
me and

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000

in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank.
However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer
nor can I bring the same to your place considering that its quite
a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately
deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be
honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused
of appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed
by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have
issued his personal checks if said amount were officially
deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his

misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several
worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals." 21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing
a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment,
is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the
gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and
issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not
deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a
noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must

faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts

and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions
which
includes
suspension
and
disbarment. 23More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. 24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against
lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons
whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath have proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical
significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was
a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It
bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public
servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As
such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye. 26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for
any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so. 27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 28 we ordered the disbarment of
a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of
Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money
extorted from a certain person.
Respondent's acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent
with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and
thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. 30
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he
received from the complainant with legal interest from his
receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred
to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let

copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be

spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
2. PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division),
LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN
HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG
CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES,
IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND
TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING
CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and
ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on
the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by the
Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling
P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and
P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached
a total of P310 million. 3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK
failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977,
the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its

liquidation. 4A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held

from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. 5 Subsequently,former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of
the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29
of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos
government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with
the Sandiganbayan a
complaint
for
"reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,
Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime
Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto
B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and
Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo
Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein
as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. 6In connection therewith, the PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos. HaIESC
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the
PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In
all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by
their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case Nos. 0005 8 and 0096-0099. 9 The motions alleged
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General 10 and
counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation
of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in

the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when,

in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the
Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service."
On April
22,
1991,
the
Second
Division
of
the Sandiganbayan issued
a
resolution denying PCGG's
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil CaseNo.
0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor
General. 12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond
the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from
his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the
ruling. 14
It
appears
that
Civil
Case Nos.
0096-0099
were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to
the Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the
Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the
resolution of itsSecond Division dated April 22, 1991, and
observed that the arguments were the same in substance as
the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Divisionacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which
he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound;
3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to
respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG;
and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory,
thus res judicata does not apply. 19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of

law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession
and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve
the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service."
I.A.
The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace
the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards
for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of
Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected
in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their
time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed
towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the
central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any
obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties
were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards,
an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other
basic duties competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor originated in the
litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all
aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early postrevolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes,
judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards
set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of
conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties
can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive
law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of
legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American

legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York
"Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory
duties became law in several states in the second half of the
nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in
unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. Anumber of mid-nineteenth
century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed
lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the
"do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions persisted
in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing
law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty
and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core
duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early postrevolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did
not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics. 21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical
standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the
nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar
association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of
duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by
the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar
associations began to form again, picking up where their
colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association
and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their
members. 22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive
bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of
Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics. 23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a
lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public
respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,

the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to

32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the
form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the
"revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service." 25 These concerns were classified as "adverseinterest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverseinterest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current
and former are adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruentinterest representation conflicts" are unique to government
lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To
deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for
"adverse-interest
conflicts"
and
"congruent-interest
representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could
be to the advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any
matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a
judicial capacity. TDcAaH
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many
of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
respectively. 31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its
own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics. 32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing
consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful
revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked
for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and
effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in
part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between
"the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the
United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA

Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary

disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters
during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the
1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 33 The
basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that
defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere. 34In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) 35 became the
applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code. 36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by
DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The
Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct
standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each
rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and
clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable
standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after
the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the
black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts
of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety
on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's
indefinite nature. 38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new
realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he hadintervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained

the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics butreplaced the expansive phrase
"investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It
is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect
of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded,
has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor

General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of

respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case Nos.
0096-0099
before
the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a
"congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B.
The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the
meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the
metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar
Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and
not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the
subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was
the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he
intervened as a Solicitor General, viz: 40
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of
GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed
with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. TaCDAH
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated
March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central
Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas,
then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor
and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Assistant
to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T.
Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they
had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza),
who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum
states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the
Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure
should be taken:
1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary
Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made
since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976
and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or

placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume

business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the
general public.
2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall
order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of
Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken
and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29,
1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating
to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the
petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General
with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and
Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank
and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial
and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as
amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency
of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by
the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent
Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, onhow to proceed with the said
bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve
whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03.The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon

examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that
the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate
an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately
take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers
necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions.
xxx xxx xxx
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the
said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to
adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that
is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the
functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary
Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all
convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the
same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying
the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary
in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and
assets of such institution. ICTDEa
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by

the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its

actions under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the
action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or
judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond
executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed
by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount
of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by
the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of
Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the

inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they
fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided,
however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking
or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this
Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be
vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of
any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding.
(As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16,
1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure
to
liquidate
GENBANK
is not
the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument
that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that
as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the
"matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
differentfrom the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did
not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
"matter" where he got himself involved was in informing

Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate

GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter
in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et
al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten.
The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor
does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether
the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation
of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank
due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its
owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration
cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that
Code
6.03
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because
his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from
the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the
"intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene"
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of
time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of
hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie
between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both
sides of an intervening river . . .) 41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others. 42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word
"intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a
person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. 44 We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history.
The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where
the government lawyer does an act which can be considered
as innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law." HTCAED
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has

investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification

of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only
to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides
that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent
Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed
by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General.
For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of
respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None
of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we
note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The
role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office
of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of
the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government
service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties.
To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine
tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various
policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus,
the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is
already difficult for government to match compensation offered
by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate
that the only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice. 45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned
that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them
from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which
they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which
they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to

make government service more difficult to exit can only make it

less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its
use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the
opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt
frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the
United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court
of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as "a
dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and
only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. 50 At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case
at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not

unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting
a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom
the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work
done by the latter. 52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can
result in denial of due process. SIHCDA
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a
truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan:
"An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can
find private employment upon leaving the government is free to
work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by
superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any
system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability
to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the
position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the
position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great
degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is
this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend

officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue

diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will
have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the
former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to
all members of his law firm. 55 Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be
remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and
loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed,
the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly
speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to untoward
results. 57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will
have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information
between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of
impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9
when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an
evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all
its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch
sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger
that
former
government
employee
may compromise
confidential official information in the process. But this concern
does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed,
the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank
on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is
about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et
al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To
be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about
in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is
indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that
Central Bank offeredno objection to the lawyering of
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for notwo
sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is
intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service. 61 The example given by the proponents
of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the
company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting
might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the
cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in

1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment

conduct may well occur during the period of employment
through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this
concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines ". . . it is hard
to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client
the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm
that law firms want the 'best' government lawyers the ones
who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least
vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular concern is a
non factor in the case at bar. There is nocharge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents
Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both
the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the
above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail
what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout." 66 Prof. Morgan again warns against
extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee's
influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from
government . . ." 67 More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: ". . . The idea that, present officials make significant
decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says
more about the present officials than about their former coworker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it
ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their
friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among
others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously,
and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has
not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2)
the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as
reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period
and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.TaEIAS
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division
of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.

SO ORDERED.
3. SANTIAGO v. SAGUCIO
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6705. March 31, 2006.]
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS B.
SAGUCIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso
Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries,
Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its
operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat
employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda,
Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago,"docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15
July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned
to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to
Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following
violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the

operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have

inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the
case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and
even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to
prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer's fee for
the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the
month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for
defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor. TCacIA
Respondent refutes complainant's allegations and counters
that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed,
respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was
his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed
to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his
duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant's reason in not filing a
motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant's statement during the hearing conducted on 12
February 1999:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn't think he would
do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father's friend and he was
working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by
my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. .
. . . 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist
because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent
argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent's
act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant's allegations that he instigated

the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of
proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment
as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant
but claims that it was only on a case-to-case basis and it
ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as
representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
. . . [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent's asking, intended
as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as
or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or
translate as a specie of 'conflict of interest'. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the abovementioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat
employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant's evidence failed to prove
that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the
retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and
Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January
1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Investigating
Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP
Commissioner Abbas' resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner
Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve
the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004
adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa's Report
and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of
conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client's
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty
of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report
reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will
require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will

conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and

Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code"
(see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B"
of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was
being accused as having the "management and control" of
Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues,
therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the
periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that
case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein
Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to
"maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91
Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he
does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It
should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has
an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters
that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for
"Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps
it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been
labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel
Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No.
97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxx xxx xxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992
and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of
the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management
involved are the very personalities he dealt with as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations
with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation
and part of its management.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy
fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work
while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had
long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited

to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and

Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109;Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The
act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in
the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil.
461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required
the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures
and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v.
Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain
employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of
interest, failure to safeguard a former client's interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court
as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2)
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition
"not
[to]
represent
conflicting
interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations.
The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply
when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not
to engage in "unlawful . . . conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee
to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions." 47
Complainant's evidence failed to substantiate the claim
that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests

to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a
lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The
issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of
wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that
period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation respondent
had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the
one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any
confidential information from his previous employment with
complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests. A lawyer's immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests
only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence
to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private
while working as a government prosecutor

practice

of

law

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services

to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of
Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls
within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal
services to complainant while working as a government
prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer's fee." 53 Thus, as
correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly
violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary
action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless
the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP
has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. DIETcC
Here, respondent's violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent's admission that he received
from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with
unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent
be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from
the practice of the law profession and his name removed from
the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross
violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the
public. 54

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

. . . any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill." 51

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. 55

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of

the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to
the public as a lawyer. 52

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government
employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one
year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent's
violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio

GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
4. LAHM v. MAYOR
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7430. February 15, 2012.]
MARTIN
LAHM
III
and
JAMES
P.
CONCEPCION, complainants, vs.
LABOR
ARBITER
JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J p:
Before us is a verified complaint 1 filed by Martin Lahm III and
James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the
disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
(respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of
lawyer's oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment 2 to the
complaint.
In a Resolution 3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and
Recommendation 4 dated
September
19,
2008
of
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against
the members of the Board of Trustees of the International
School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR
CaseNo. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the
respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are
the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The
said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at
10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the
counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance
and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment

to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents of David Edward Toze. EICDSA
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September
14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain
the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David
Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his
former position as superintendent of the International School
Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal
dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled
hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants
herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an
early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the
respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007
requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27,
2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David
Edward Toze' claim of moral and exemplary damages.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated
September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the]
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment
that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein
complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the
respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable
damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on account
of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the
counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have
asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting,
he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated
September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain
the status quo ante.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be
dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal
dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the
instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent
to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case
because the complainants did not assail the Order dated

September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court. 5 SHECcT
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to
justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual
basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the
authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a
preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against the
September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to
keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward
Toze's employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the
respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will
be dealt with more severe penalty. 6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644 7 which adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The
said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors
had previously recommended the respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case
(A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio
Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing
disposition, 8 but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors
in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the
IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be
sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of
law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the
lawyer's oath. Thus:
Section 27.Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.9 Gross misconduct is any
inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part

of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,

conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is
generally
a
premeditated,
obstinate
or
intentional
purpose. 10 EHaASD
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose
disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of
the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in
support of the administrative charges against the respondent
are intrinsically connected with the discharge of the
respondent's quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a
labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor
controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or
disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the
courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence. 11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were
based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions
as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing
disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon
6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. 12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 13 we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of
the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondent's failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We
find that respondent's misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is
of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was

patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money

as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
xxx xxx xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not
shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations,
as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public. DEcTCa
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice. 14 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 15 we ruled that an administrative
case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as
provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative
cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasijudicial system of our government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v.
Bacatan 16 where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an
accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of
our government, performs official functions that are akin to
those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
approximated to administrative cases of judges whose
decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were
made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him
liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute
misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a
judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof
that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate
intent to cause an injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of
the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently
basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance

of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be

subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to
be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. 18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office
to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 19 SHIcDT
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the
respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the
parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion
had been resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the
time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in
effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue
writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section
1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that:
Section 1.Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by
the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving
or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post
a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order
shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond
which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by
the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is
not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the
Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties
during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor
disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue
writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions,
may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1.Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted

by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the

provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving
or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis
supplied) TaDIHc
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of
writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as
may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the
2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4.Reception of Evidence; Delegation. The
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of
injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of
its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and
their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and
recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days
from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said
rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On
this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained
Edward Toze's Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of
the National Labor Relations Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission, should have been
familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of
procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may
grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the
second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on
the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order
only in a delegated capacity. 20
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the
part of the respondent in resolving the motion for
reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The
unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in
the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would
clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause
prejudice to the complainants. AaCEDS

On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed

that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the
Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case
before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the
Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze
will render work as a superintendent for the school years
August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David
Edward Toze as superintendent of International School of
Manila until the resolution of the former's Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze
and International School Manila is about to expire or end on
August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent
expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Toze's
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
because any delay in the resolution thereof would result to
undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted
prejudice to International School Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the
illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4)
months left with the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September
14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this
Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September
14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David
Edward Toze's Employment Contract with International School
Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal
dismissal case moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in
the resolution of [the] assailed Order . . . should not be
countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is
attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The
respondent's lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending
incident before him for more than five (5) months only to
thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondent's
disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to decide a
case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate . . . . The
respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and

enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter

how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the people's
faith and confidence in the judiciary . . . . 21 TaCDcE
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross
ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case
below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into
prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to
determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 140 22 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge, 23 punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but
not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding
six months, or dismissal from the service. 24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and
provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Additionally, in parallel cases, 25 a judge found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of suspension for
six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the
foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had
previously recommended the respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for three years inA.C. No. 7314, entitled
"Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case,
however, is still pending.

It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust,

the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to
constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability.
They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their
private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official
functions. 26 AHSEaD
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our
exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge
Caguioa, 27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the
palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic
laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where
the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance
with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for
transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge
of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." 28 (citations
omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyer's
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission
of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the
respondent as attorney. TICAcD
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lahm, III v. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, [February 15, 2012],
682 PHIL 1-18)