AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb.

1972]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of
Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without
prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of
the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in
the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity
as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to
the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General.
According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that
the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when
the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation
in favor of the government appears at the back of thecertificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring
an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief
left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Phil. Columbiaan Association Vs. Panis

his is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23338, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner, assailing the orders of (a) respondent Judge Domingo
D. Panis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53531, and (b) respondent Judge
Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution
dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation and is engaged
in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office and facilities are
located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters
owned by petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and
Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila.
In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay
reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals
and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for
execution of judgment, which was granted on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise
issued by the same court on May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, a petition for
injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila and petitioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the demolition of their
houses on the premises in question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53531 against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of
the ejectment proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the City
of Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and
entered an order of condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in accordance
with law. The Court also ordered the parties to submit, within five days, the names of their respective nominees as
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the land in question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss, and later a motion to defer
compliance with the order directing the submission of the names of nominees to be appointed commissioners. The
City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject lot,
mentioning the P2 million deposit with the Philippine National Bank, representing the provisional value of the land.

In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued the writ of possession, and at the same time, denied
petitioner's motion to defer compliance and motion for reconsideration.
On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in
Civil Case No. 90-53346 issued an order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the private
respondents. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition before the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders
dated September 14, 1990, and October 5 and 8, 1990 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court, and the Order dated
September 21, 1990 of Branch 27 of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338). The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution on July 30, 1992, denying consideration
thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early
as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to
expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed the portions to the actual
occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas,
to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City
Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90
square meter lot.
Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because:
(1) the City of Manila has no specific power to expropriate private property under the 1987 Constitution; and (2)
assuming that it has such power, this was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the Public use
requirement and petitioner's right to due process.
Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law expressly authorizing local governments to
undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of
Manila to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same
into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its territorial
jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, thus:
General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may
take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the
general interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract and be contracted
with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all
the powers hereinafter conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied).
Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform, thus:

Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the
same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents, giving first priority to the bona
fidetenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.
For the purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general
funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through
expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the President . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city
and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and lowsalaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987] ).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and
landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970] ). It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to
be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by
changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987];
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.
This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to
such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners (Art. XIII, Sec. 9; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been complied with. Although the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing
Authority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate
courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order,
denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent courts,
passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner
therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.

The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an amount not only fixed by the court, but
accepted by both parties. The fact remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore
estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional. The parties still
have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just
compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v.
Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 [1992] ).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN
V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.

The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.

Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

SYLLABUS

1.
POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; PUBLIC
PURPOSE; CONCEPT. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
"public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept
was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the
new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing
project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461
[1987]).
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEEMED SATISFIED WHEN THE PURPOSE DIRECTLY AND
SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS PUBLIC HEALTH; SAFETY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND IN SUM THE
GENERAL WELFARE. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make
available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DEEMED SUPERIOR TO THE POWER TO DISTRIBUTE LANDS UNDER THE
LAND REFORM PROGRAM. In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised
the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land
Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be
expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform
program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court
said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior

or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the
expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square
meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court
viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform
program.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE THEREOF BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS MUST BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED, EITHER IN THE LAW CONFERRING THE POWER OR IN
OTHER LEGISLATION. It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US
439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature
may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments
(Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTES CONFERRING THE POWER THEREOF TO POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION CANNOT BE BROADENED OR CONSTRICTED BY IMPLICATION. Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they
can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government
units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of
Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters
is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision
sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the
lapse of five (5) years from its award." The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k)
and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to
which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification
submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to
political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d.
249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC USE LODGED WITH THE LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without
first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Ordinarily, it is
the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer
to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546,
90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW
885, 8 ALR 585). There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are,
do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the
Philippine, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be
bound by provisions of law couched in general terms.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION, GOVERNED BY THE RULES OF
COURT. The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in
the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the
Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the

condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528
[1990]7 the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for
their property.

DECISION

QUIASON, J p:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled
"Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the
Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause of the Resolution states:
"WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of
the vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small
scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center, and other progressive feasibility
concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and
fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;
"WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to
implement the above program component;
"WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to
establish the same pilot development center;
"WHEREFORE, . . . ."
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed
two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special
Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon.
Benjamin V. Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San
Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount
of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order
dated January 18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the
order dated February 26, 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the

Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that
an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of
injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9
of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of
the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It
also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for
expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification
of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the
complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification
of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is
valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use"
for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy
the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983];
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot
be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65
thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San
Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort
complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters
or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on
whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public
interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking
of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this
Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the
fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129).
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is
also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain
restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed.
1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the
right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court
of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is
Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
"SECTION 65.
Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases
to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land
will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of
the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid
his obligation."
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129 - A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited
to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted
by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would

naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L.
ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR
585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippine, as sovereign, or its
political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in
general terms.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees
fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the
owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]).
As held in Municipality of Talisay Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990]7 the rules for determining just compensation are
those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they
consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying
the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)

expropriation case amt. for just compensation in dispute judge held in abeyance the write of possession
order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without hearing.
Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in
violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in
the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and
transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with
the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest
for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based
on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited
corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine
National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way
too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day,
respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered
petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ
of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter,
respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner
assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the petitioner was
deprived of due process of law.
Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding
and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon
deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition
of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the
petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent
judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant
petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to
cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.
Read Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court
Republic v PLDT
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e parties)
entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from the US and received by RCA's domestic station
could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines
of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the many rules prohibits the use of the service
for his private use.
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service where the
Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by the RCA's station to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations
were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of
defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court finds it
reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.
Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the
exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the
subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.

The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the
use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this
relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their
interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is
not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F:
Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo,
Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD
1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection
since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of
the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government
on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the
President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the
expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the
decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The
Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the
slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take
effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision
for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to
contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are
expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that
the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof
must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties
does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process
and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. VV.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation
(San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued
an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that
the paymentof the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from
further
hearing
the
case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissibleencroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone [GR 137285, 16 January 2001] Second
Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of
irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
with an approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T-113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the
right of PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by
the Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine
Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court
reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of
Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The
compromise agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable
Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand,
defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income
which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the
parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters
which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the
plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to
the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered
by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the
government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said
defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by
the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise
Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the
approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the
appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the compromise
agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered
owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate filed a
"Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court
annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over
Lot 1406- A to the Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved for its
reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3 November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the
instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot
1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November 1997, PEZA
interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4

August 1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision
dated 25 March 1998, partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court regarding "the
peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed
with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406B." The Estate sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the appellate court in a
Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of public use.
Held: This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an order fixing just
compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its
public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation
order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by
the Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the "swap
arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez
is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July
1991." It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the
matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of
payment such that failure to pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this
effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject
to payment. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not
about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation
that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that
the same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation
1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain
of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was
expropriated "for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto." The authority is broad
enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized.
Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a
transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending PEZA's
original charter. As reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term "public use" has
acquired a more Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) comprehensive coverage. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as
"public welfare."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE
INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the
HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION
SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of
544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for
the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the
Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally

fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the
institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43, MacArthur
Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of title appearing in the Commissioners
Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff,
also marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix A attached to the Commissioners Appraisal Report, for
the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint;
"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value
of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from
September 19, 1969, until fully paid; and
"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of commissioners, Atty. Victorino P.
Evangelista and Mr. Pablo Domingo."[1]
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by
Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to
the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation
with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining
that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with,
respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them
the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted
the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, [2] transferring 20 hectares of
the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to
be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was
taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit
in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing
the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter
previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in
favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be
unenforceable on the ground of prescription "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:

"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution of the same
by either a motion or an independent action having already prescribed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of both
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
"2) denies the plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for Expropriated
Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding paragraph hereof; and
"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, without prejudice to
any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute in relation with the amount already paid to herein
oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said realty to the Bulacan State University pursuant to
Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph Ejercito."[3]
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear
that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing
of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of
the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that if a motion for reconsideration was
denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the remaining period, but which should not be less
than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later
modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now reading thusly:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all cases still pending with the
courts at the time of its effectivity.
In Narzoles vs. NLRC,[4] the Court has said:
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of
numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically,i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration
to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so
dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule
allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition
for certiorari. x x x
The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila Bulletin on August
4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as curative in
nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be
void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 256 SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain
evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has

failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They
make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold
Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are
retroactive. (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)[5]
At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated property. The
petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its
merits.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents
had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary
period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979
judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of
P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped
respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.[6]
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of
Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had
become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May
1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of
Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered
otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the
P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part
of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so
regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of
the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally
settled.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate
any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. [7]Fundamental to the independent existence of a
State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its
presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power
is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every
form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in
property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.[8]
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely
serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[9]
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second,
that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. [10]These twin proscriptions have their
origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. [11] In

determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public,
and the second is public advantage or benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant
growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a
new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.[13]
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion
thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the
Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public
nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the
purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The
property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the
owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being
that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement
in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya [14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the
municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and
of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No.
7160[15] cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of
government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.[16]
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the
termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the
subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned
for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they
were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises'."[18]
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City[19] where the recovery of possession of
property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his
property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the
payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of
petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. [20] Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all
intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights
vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979
judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the

return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory
authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps
apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.[21] After condemnation, the paramount title is in
the public under a new and independent title; [22] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.[23]
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could
likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May
1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to
compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should
take good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the
judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.[24]
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. [25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. [26] In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.[27]
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the
property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in
September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. [29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in
case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application
only to contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary
inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.[31]
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution.
Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid
promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26
February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of
"taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let
the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision
promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY & AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs.

BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., et al. G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
HAD8J5EKCNKC
NACHURA,

J.:

FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by Republic, represented by the then
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the
pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However,
the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. The plaintiffrespondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot. On
the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no
longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881
was
absolute
and
unconditional,
giving
title
in
fee
simple
to
the
Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted in this case, and as such, the respondents herein
are entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property which was not used for a public purpose.
HELD: YES. Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to
secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If
the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of
the
property
to
him.
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as
devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title
and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a
court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity. Accordingly, the court willexercise its
discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such
decree and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiffbeneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may
also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiffbeneficiary
will
secure
a
benefit
from
his
acts.
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and
petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the conditions have for
their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall
return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who
is bound to return x x x.