Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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The AFFs paranoiac fear of surveillance erodes our confidence
in the state in general
Harper 8 (David Reader in Clinical Psychology at UEL, The Politics of Paranoia:
Paranoid Positioning and Conspiratorial Narratives in the Surveillance Society, in
Surveillance & Society, Volume 5, Number 1, p. 1-32, http://www.surveillance-andsociety.org/articles5(1)/paranoia.pdf)
There is no escape since, as Gandy (1993, 2003) has demonstrated, panoptical surveillance is
mediated not only through direct visual and auditory means in physical space, but also
through all manner of electronic data-mining. Smail (1984) has noted how this experience of
continual surveillance leads inevitably to the inscription of anxiety into the lives of
those surveyed. However, since in most paranoid discourse, the Other has malevolent intent, the result is not only anxiety
but self-regulation and suspicion. In Sass's (1987) analysis of Daniel Schreber's paranoia he argued that, because of persecutory
child-rearing by his father, Schreber became a quintessentially panoptical being who experienced an internalized surveillance
thus watching himself watching himself watching himself watch (1987: 144). Such a comment concurs with that of Zizek (1992)
paranoia could be
seen as a system of governance, a psychic panopticon. Although surveillance seems common across
who sees in the concept of paranoia a kind of material superego which sees all and knows all. Thus
Western society, its specific forms may vary from society to society and so we should not be surprised that, for example, those
diagnosed as having paranoid delusions in the US are commonly preoccupied with the CIA whilst in Italy neighbours are a dominant
theme (Gaines, 1995). Moreover, although surveillance is a dominant theme in Western culture, the depiction of paranoia is varied
and contradictory and this offers, as we will see later, some clues to its construction. Recent work in surveillance studies has begun
to critique the view that surveillance is inherently a negative social force or even uniformly experienced as repressive (e.g. Lianos,
2003; Yar, 2003) and that, even in fictional representations, there is a more nuanced view possible (Albrechtslund & Dubbeld, 2005;
events involving large numbers of people with only partial or ambiguous information. In the wake of the September 11 2001 attacks
many conspiracy theories have developed, for example that the Pentagon was hit by a missile, not a plane (Reynolds, 2006); that
the attacks were an inside job (Gillan, 2006) or that the World Trade Centre buildings were brought down by pre-planned controlled
explosions (Pope, 2006). These theories have gained ground - Gillan (2006) reports that a recent poll found that 36% of Americans
believed it very likely or somewhat likely that their government was involved in allowing the attacks or had carried them out
cover-up mode automatically (2005: 33). Bronner (2006), for example, discusses how the chaos in the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) was not adequately conveyed in the 9/11 Commission hearings (National Commission on Terrorist Acts
of claims about the attacks (Popular Mechanics, 2005) and even George Bush felt the need to rebut them only two months after the
attacks: Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that
attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists themselves, away from the guilty. (Bush, 2001)
By affective condition I mean an affective atmosphere that predetermines how something in this case the state is habitually
encountered, disclosed and can be related to. Bearing a family resemblance to concepts such as structure of feeling (Williams
1977) or emotional situation (Virno 2004), an affective condition involves the same doubled and seemingly contradictory sense of
the ephemeral or transitory alongside the structured or durable. As such, it does not slavishly determine action. An affective
condition shapes and influences as atmospheres are taken up and reworked in lived experience, becoming part of the emotions that
will infuse policies or programmes, and may be transmitted through assemblages of people, information and things that attempt to
Berlant (2008) shows how nearly utopian affects of belonging to a world of work are vital to the promise of neoliberal policies in the
and racism, affective-ideational feelings of freedom, and the pervasive economic insecurity that follows from economic crisis.
relieving the suffering of famine victims. My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue
for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of
worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the
issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the informal, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African
regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national
citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor, in a context where many of the
poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income
really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The
record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash
transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared
with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and
intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as
insisting that the answers to the Lefts governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a
process of conceptual and institutional innovation. [I]f
than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may
be nearer to hand than we thought .
impact
turns case
No solvency --- the state is key for civil society to exist in the
first place --- their evidence is theoretical abstraction, and
TURN --- their politics leads to fascism
Negri seek to distinguish the multitude by stressing its capacity to maintain difference, so as not to dissolve it into the mindless
indifference of the mass or the fabricated unity of the people.68 Yet
set of distinctions .
diversity of lifestyles, personal values, community attitudes, ethnicities, etc. that should be respected, left to thrive and release their
innovative potentials. However, differences are not just there to be respected prior to their discursive mobilization; even for
Foucault, they are produced within different strategies and relations of power. This poses a serious problem for non-contextualized
life not only avoids confrontation with the uncivil nature of civil society, but opens the gate to the hunt for the Alien or the Other
deemed responsible for its deformations.108 While neither Rose nor Hard and Negri construct the state as Nietzsche's coldest of
all cold monsters or as Hobbes monstrous Leviathan, the state and the politics around it become a kind of occluded other. In Rose,
the universalizing logics of the social state are displaced by a vital politics that
opens new potentials of somatic individuality and self-creation . In Hardt and Negri, the
nation state could only be viewed as a reactive modern order that is today
irrelevant to the new vital forces of the multitude unleashed by immaterial
production.
women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would
era has given way to a new form of capitalism "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique
of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for
women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender
emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of
liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement.
Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to
two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second,
liberal-individualist scenario but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves
low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women
As women have
poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of
the family wage is being replaced by the newer , more modern norm apparently
sanctioned by feminism of the two-earner family . Never mind that the reality that
underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels , decreased job security ,
declining living standards , a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages
per household, exacerbation of the double shift now often a triple or quadruple
shift and a rise in poverty , increasingly concentrated in female-headed
households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a
narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it
with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities.
harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second
politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing
more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique
of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required
redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third
idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of stateorganised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny
state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs . A telling example is "microcredit", the programme
of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic
red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed,
however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight
poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by
affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary
society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for
our own ends. First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for
a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including but not only carework. Second, we might
disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order
each other, from ourselves and from our true humanity. Trans people are highly motivated to resist that gender straitjacket, which
suggests that, while gender identity may not be fixed and unchanging, it is deeply rooted in us; otherwise trans people could
presumably be socialised out of our gender variant behaviour and identity. Everyone, after all, is showered in cot-loads of gender
later. One of the greatest cruelties of capitalism for all oppressed people is that it possesses the practical and material potential for
our liberation from oppression. Yet by its pursuit of profit maximisation the ruling class is driven to deny the possibility of such
fulfilment to the vast majority of the worlds population. It follows from this approach that
person is as much a social construction as the homosexual, traceable to a particular (but not the same)
historical period, mode of production, and material conditions. One of the problems with
essentialist views is that they ignore such changing material circumstances and tend to regard the ideas of a given period as having
always been just so, ie they are both idealist and ahistorical. On the contrary, Marx argued that ideas in society emerge from the
material circumstances of the production of goods and necessities and from the reproduction of labour power itself. As material
the LGBT
community actually faces higher rates of poverty, homelessness, and economic
insecurity than do heterosexual Americans. A study released last month by UCLA's Williams Institute
apparatus on this issue while economic inequality deepened. [emphasis added] The column failed to mention that
highlighted the difficult economic circumstances confronted by many LGBT couples. Salon summarized some of the study's key
findings:
Contrary to dominant media narratives about gay affluence (the "New Normal," "Modern
the data on wealth, sexuality and gender identity portrays a
vastly different reality shaped by a nexus of gender, sexuality, race and geography. The differences between certain
groups are nuanced, but significant to track, advocates say. For example, the poverty rate for women in samesex couples is 7.6 percent compared to 5.7 percent for women in different-sex
couples. Poverty rates vary considerably between white gay men and gay men of color, with African-American men in same-sex
couples six times more likely to live in poverty than their white counterparts. [emphasis added] The report also found that a
discrimination are especially high among people of color who identify as LGBT. Transgender workers in particular experience high
are especially pronounced among transgender people of color. Additionally, a recent study by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development pointed to widespread housing discrimination against same-sex couples, with heterosexual couples more likely to
receive favorable responses to email inquiries about rental housing. Although some state laws and local ordinances ban housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation, there is no federal law prohibiting the practice. Groups like the National Organization for
data indicate
that issues of poverty and economic inequality are LGBT issues . Ignoring
this plain fact only reinforces crude stereotypes while advancing a divisive and
counterproductive discourse on matters of inequality .
Marriage (NOM) jump at opportunities to depict marriage equality supporters as wealthy, urban elites, but
turns racism
Ascribing identitarian understandings of race ignores how
neoliberalism is responsible for the ascriptive hierarchy of race
Reed 13 (Adolph Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania,
Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism, Published in the New Labor Forum, Volume 22,
Number 1, 2013, http://nlf.sagepub.com/content/22/1/49.full.pdf)
In this way, Changs perspective can be helpful in sorting out several important limitations in
discussions of race and class characteristic of todays left . It can also help to make
sense of the striking convergence between the relative success of identitarian
understandings of social justice and the steady , intensifying advance of
neolib eralism. It suggests a kinship where many on the left assume an enmity . The
rise of neoliberalism in particular suggests a serious problem with arguments that
represent race and class as dichotomous or alternative frameworks of political critique
and action, as well as those arguments that posit the dichotomy while attempting to
reconcile its elements with formalistic gestures , for example, the common race and
class construction. This sort of historical materialist perspective throws into relief a fundamental limitation of the
whiteness notion that has been fashionable within the academic left for roughly two decades: it reifies whiteness as a
transhistorical social category. In effect, it treats whitenessand therefore raceas existing prior to and above social context.10
Both who qualifies as white and the significance of being white have altered over time. Moreover, whiteness discourse functions as a
kind of moralistic expos rather than a basis for strategic politics; this is clear in that the program signally articulated in its name
has been simply to raise a demand to abolish whiteness, that is, to call on whites to renounce their racial privilege. In fact, its
fixation on demonstrating the depth of whites embrace of what was known to an earlier generations version of this argument as
white skin privilege and the inclination to slide into teleological accounts in which groups or individuals approach or pursue
whiteness erases the real historical dynamics and contradictions of American racial history. The whiteness discourse overlaps other
taxonomies could come to displace the familiar ones . For instance, the
underclass could become even more race-like as a distinctive, essentialized
population, by our current folk norms, multiracial in composition, albeit most likely including in perceptibly greater frequencies
people who would be classified as black and Latino racially, though as small enough pluralities to preclude assimilating the group
ideologically as a simple proxy for nonwhite inferiors.13 This possibility looms larger now. Struggles for racial and gender equality
have largely divested race and gender of their common sense verisimilitude as bases for essential difference. Moreover,
versions of racial and gender equality are now also incorporated into the normative
and programmatic structure of left neoliberalism. Rigorous pursuit of equality of
opportunity exclusively within the terms of given patterns of capitalist class
relationswhich is after all the ideal of racial liberalismhas been fully legitimized
within the rubric of diversity. That ideal is realized through gaining rough parity in distribution of social goods and
bads among designated population categories. As Walter Benn Michaels has argued powerfully, according to that ideal, the society
would be just if 1 percent of the population controlled 90 percent of the resources, provided that blacks and other nonwhites,
women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people were represented among the 1 percent in roughly similar
premises of intellectual programs like evolutionary psychology, behavioral economics, genes and politics, and neurocriminology are
strikingly like straight-line extrapolations from Victorian race sciencealthough for the most part, though not entirely, scholars
operating in those areas are scrupulous, or at least fastidious, in not implicating the familiar racial taxonomies in their deterministic
sophistries. Some scholars imagine that epigeneticsa view that focuses on the interplay of genes and environment in producing
Recent
research purporting to find epigenetic explanations for socioeconomic inequality
already foreshadows a possible framework for determinist underclass narratives
that avoid the taints associated with biological justifications of inequality and
references to currently recognized racial categories.15 Ironically, some enthusiasts for this epigenetic
organisms and genotypesavoids determinism by providing causal explanations that are not purely biological.
patter expressly liken it to Lamarckian evolutionary theory, which stressed the heritability of characteristics acquired after birth, as
though this were insulation against determinism. As historian of anthropology George Stocking, Jr., and others have shown,
Lamarckian race theory was no less determinist than its Darwinian alternative, which posited strictly biological determinism. As
one conservatives fought with vigor and one many conservatives are still bitter about to this day. When the Civil Rights Act passed
in 1964, the primary purpose was to root out discrimination in public accommodations (like hotels and movie theaters) and in
employment. The former purposeeliminating public accommodations discriminationhas received renewed attention from
conservatives lately who find it to be an infringement on the rights of racist business owners to be racist. GOP favorite Rand Paul
expressed this view in 2010 and Catos Ilya Shapiro expressed it just a few months ago on MSNBC. These arent new concerns, of
course. One white Nashville resident interviewed at the time of passage said the same thing about the Civil Rights Act: I also think
that it is in violation to my civil rights if someone can say you must serve me. Nonetheless, it is telling that the embarrassment
attached to claiming it is the racists who are the real victims in all of this has sufficiently subsided within the mainstream
conservative movement that even GOP leaders are willing to reinvigorate the claim. I suppose thats par for the course for a
movement thats also pushed the evisceration of the Voting Rights Act and pursued an intentional campaign of voter suppression
that disproportionately targets blacks and other people of color. Despite the fevered conservative protests over the extensive reach
of the the Civil Rights Act, it has not totally succeeded in its aims. Lunch counters and hotels no longer outright ban blacks from
service, a relatively easy thing to root out. But academic studies show that employment decisions continue to be made upon racebased lines. For instance, in one 2003 study, a team of researchers sent nearly 5000 resumes to over 1,300 employment ads posted
in newspapers in Chicago and Boston. The resumes were totally fake and otherwise identical except that some had black-sounding
names on them while others had white-sounding names on them. The researchers found that the applications with white-sounding
names on them received call backs 50 percent more often than the applications with black-sounding names on them. As things
usually go with racist discrimination, it can be hard to pin down a particular given instance as motivated by racism, but the
aggregate numbers do not lie. Clearly, more progress needs to be made on the anti-discrimination front, but anti-discrimination,
even if it were entirely successful, would still never be enough to rectify the economic harms inflicted by centuries of slavery and
racial apartheid. One of the consequences of the racial caste system that characterized American society prior to 1960 is that
black families were prevented from accumulating economic wealth. Because wealth is the
kind of thing that is passed down generations and the kind of thing that grows and grows, this initial racist starting
point has opened up a yawning racial wealth gap that simply cannot be closed
without intentional policy aimed at doing so . In 2010, the median black family held
around $16,000 in wealth, while the median white family held around $130,000. And
this is not just a function of the fact that whites have higher incomes than blacks. Even when you control for
incomecomparing white and black families in the same income rangewhite
families are three times wealthier than black families . The racial wealth disparities hold up and down
the income ladder. As Thomas Pikettys groundbreaking book Capital in the 21st Century has detailed: wealth has a
tendency in a capitalist economy to concentrate into the hands of a few and travel
down generations through gifts and inheritances. Even if racism were wiped out
tomorrow and equal treatment became the norm, it would never cease being the
case that the average white person has more wealth than the average black
person . We could equalize everything else in society, and racial wealth inequality
plus all of the political power disparities that accompany such a thingwould continue into
perpetuity. Thus, those actually serious about righting the wrongs of enslavement and
Jim Crow apartheid must support more drastic leveling efforts . Beefed up antidiscrimination, which is both necessary and good, will not be enough. Ideally, we could
work towards reparations in the form of redistributing wealth along racial lines . With
that an unlikely possibility though, we can at least think about ways to redistribute wealth more generally from those with wealth to
those without it, something that would have a similar, albeit more attenuated, effect as reparations given who the wealthy and nonwealthy happen to be.
2nc neoliberalism
This broader state-phobia sanctions the permeation of
neoliberalism into the social
Noys 10 (Benjamin Professor of Critical Theory at the University of Chichester,
The Grammar of Neoliberalism, at Accelerationism Workshop at Goldsmiths
University, 9-14-10,
https://www.academia.edu/327085/The_Grammar_of_Neoliberalism)
It was the extinction of the Nazi state that made post-war Germany the ideal site to re-found the state in terms of the economic, in
neo-liberalism
solidifies a state-phobia, by arguing that the tendency of any intervention to a
state-controlled economy, planning, and economic interventionism will lead to Nazism or
totalitarianism . In a provocative series of formulations Foucault argues that this state phobia
permeates modern thought, aligning the critique of the spectacle (Debord) and one-dimensionality (Marcuse) with
Werner Sombarts proto-Nazi critiques of capitalism (113-4). Here we might say we can see the emergence of the
grammar argument, in the sense of a common phobia of the state that leaves us
vulnerable to historical re-inscription under the terms of neo-liberalism , or, as Foucault puts
it: All those who share in the great state phobia should know that they are following
the direction of the wind and that in fact , for years and years, an effective reduction of the
state has been on the way, a reduction of both the growth of state control and of a
statifying and statified governmentality. (191-2) What is the precise nature, then, of neo-liberalism? Of
course, the obvious objection to the anti-state vision of neo-liberalism is that neoliberalism itself is a continual form of state intervention , usually summarised in the phrase socialism
for the rich, capitalism for the poor. Foucault notes that neo-liberalism concedes this: neo-liberal government
intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in any other
system. (145) The difference, however, is the point of application . It intervenes on
society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every
moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will
become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market . (145)
Therefore, we miss the point if we simply leave a critique of neo-liberalism at the point
of saying neo-liberalism is as statist as other governmental forms. Instead, the necessity if to
analyse how neo-liberalism creates a new form of governmentality in which the state
performs a different function: permeating society to subject it to the economic. The
state intervention of neo-liberalism is Kantian; it is designed to act on the conditions of
the social to create the possibility of competition and enterprise . Neo-liberalism is opposed to
which legitimation was achieved through economic growth rather than in political terms. At the same time
the spectre of the passive consumer just as much as various forms of leftism and anarchism, instead it what to bring forth the
person of enterprise and production. At the same time, and Foucault traces the roots of German neo-liberalism in the followers of
this competition does not emerge naturally but only as an essence that has
to be constructed and formalised: neo-liberalism is Husserlian. Unlike in classical liberalism, we cannot free
Husserl,
market from the state and expect competition to emerge naturally. Instead, the state constantly intervenes to construct
competition at all levels, so that
action (121).
framework
counter the
affective regulation sustaining neoliberalism, both within and beyond activism. After a brief
2012). This account endeavours to address this deficit in order to suggest strategies that might be harnessed to
introduction to the analytic vocabulary employed in this article the rest of this section presents a brief review of recent work
addressing the intersection of affect and politics. The subsequent section further delineates the specific perspective on affective
bio-politics adopted here. This is followed by a discussion of recent accounts of affective politics and activism that informs an
ensuing discussion of further, more focused, affective contestationary strategies, which prefaces a short concluding section.
Affect, as understood here, is distinguished from the, typically, subjectively conceived notions of
emotion and feeling, with which it is associated, by its dependence on a sense of push in the
world (Thrift 2004, p. 64). This might be the pull and push of place (Duff 2010, p. 893), or of bodies or of other entities in those
places. Affect is, thus, relationally constituted and does not reside in an object or a body,
but surfaces from somewhere in-between (Adey 2008, p. 439), emerging as a relation between bodies,
objects, and technologies (Bissell 2010, p. 272). Affects, however, affect in the sense of pushing such
relationships in some directions rather than others and while they may, as Brennan (2004) argues, have
a biological basis affects are, and have been, widely employed to promote specific outcomes. Architecture provides an exemplary
example (e.g. Allen 2006; Adey 2008; Kraftl & Adey 2008) that Kraftl and Adey argue can both engender.. .new fields of virtual
potential.. .[and].. .simultaneously delimit, design(ate), and demarcate strict performative and often moral possibilities (2008, p.
226). While Thrifts microbiopolitics of the subliminal (2004, p. 68) is suggestive of mechanisms that might help explain how the
kinds of possibilities depicted by Kraftl & Adey (2008) are accomplished, broader ranging discussions of the dynamics of affective
emphasises macro-scale
dimensions to affective bio-politics , notably state-phobia a term that Foucault (2008, p. 76)
bio-politics are hard to come by. Anderson (2012) addresses this lacuna in an analysis that
coins for anti- statism while, echoing Thrift (2004), remaining optimistic regarding the political and ethical promise of work on the
problematized this
promise by arguing that affective life is imbricated in the working out of the
neoliberal problem of how to organise life according to the market (Anderson 2012, p. 40)
more thoroughly and intimately than Andersons emphasis upon macroscale affective phenomena suggests. This more
pervasive and intimate perspective on affective bio-politics is further pursued here
in order to explore and illuminate its contestationary potential . For while a more ubiquitous
perspective on affective bio-politics implies further challenges for contestationary politics, the delineation of these
dimensions to neoliberal government also has the potential to illuminate further
opportunities, and means, to counter neoliberalism. As a first step to identifying these opportunities, the rest of
dynamics of affective life (Anderson 2012, p. 29). The author (Healy 2012) has, however,
this opening section briefly surveys recent work on the intersection of affect and politics.
state cannot be properly understood without understanding their context, and, in order to do that, it is necessary that we
understand to and against whom or what they are addressed. Foucault's own work makes this methodological point in several
different ways. From the analytical perspective of his archaeology,10 statements should be understood not in terms of what they
signify, but in terms of what they do. They hence constitute a form of action that can only be understood within a field of dispersion
of statements, a discursive formation. The term discursive
employs a series of terms that emphasizes the intelligibility of statements and forms of knowledge as actions rather than as mere
semantic de-coding: strategy, programs of conduct, regimes of truth, and so forth.11 In this vein, Foucault speaks of his own work as
necessary to understand the field of utterances of which it is a part, what Skinner regards as its context.14 While there are crucial
differences between Foucault's critical comments on the history of ideas, with its emphasis on authorial intention, and Skinner's
perm
Williams & Srnicek 13 (Alex Ph.D. student at the University of East London, and
Nick Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics,
#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics, 5-14-13,
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-anaccelerationist-politics/)
1. We believe the most important division in todays left is between those that hold to
a folk politics of localism , direct action, and relentless horizontalism, and those that
outline what must become called an accelerationist politics at ease with a
modernity of abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology. The former remains
content with establishing small and temporary spaces of non-capitalist social
relations, eschewing the real problems entailed in facing foes which are
intrinsically non-local, abstract, and rooted deep in our everyday infrastructure. The
failure of such politics has been built-in from the very beginning. By contrast, an
accelerationist politics seeks to preserve the gains of late capitalism while going further than its value system, governance
structures, and mass pathologies will allow.
Perm is ineffective
Williams & Srnicek 13 (Alex Ph.D. student at the University of East London, and
Nick Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics,
#ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics, 5-14-13,
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-anaccelerationist-politics/)
12. We do not believe that direct action is sufficient to achieve any of this . The habitual
tactics of marching, holding signs, and establishing temporary autonomous zones
risk becoming comforting substitutes for effective success. At least we have
done something is the rallying cry of those who privilege self-esteem rather than
effective action. The only criterion of a good tactic is whether it enables significant success or not. We must be
done with fetishising particular modes of action . Politics must be treated as a set of dynamic systems,
riven with conflict, adaptations and counter-adaptations, and strategic arms races. This means that each individual type of political
action becomes blunted and ineffective over time as the other sides adapt. No given mode of political action is historically
all have their place as well in effective political action (though not, of course, an exclusive one).
links
state fear
This state-phobia is transmitted affectively and produces an
atmosphere hostile to the state
Anderson 12 (Ben Reader in the Department of Geography at Durham University,
Affect and biopower: towards a politics of life, Transactions of the Institute of
British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, April 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00441.x/pdf)
Lets backtrack a little so we can open up the third relation between affect and biopower and understand how specific
affective atmospheres become part of neoliberalism understood as a
mobile logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts (Ong
2007, 3). In the 19781979 lectures, Foucault (2008) discusses the differences between European ordoliberalism and the
neoliberalism of Freedman and the Chicago School (albeit while recognising the imbrications of the two through individuals such as
Hayek). Each offers a different solution to the shared problem of how to enable the market. Briefly, ordoliberalism separates the
neoliberalism
enables the market through an absolute generalisa- tion of a specific form
of the market to domains that previously escaped its logic . On this understanding neoliberalism is neither a descriptive term nor an explanatory
concept, but rather the always provisional, always locally contested,
working out of a problem: how the overall exercise of political power can
be modelled on the principles of a mar- ket economy (Foucault 2008, 131). Common to
both types of liberalism is an ethos closely tied to a concern with the
[t]he irrationality peculiar to excessive government (2008, 323). Foucault terms
this collective affect state-phobia and describes it variously in terms of a
fear or anxiety regarding the state (2008, 77). For Foucault, state-phobia is only a secondary
market from society and intervenes on the latter to enable the former through a Vitalpolitik, while
sign or manifestation of a crisis of liberal governmentality (2008, 76). However, I think we can understand it slightly differently: as
die, and the emergence of new object-targets, are bound up with the organisation of affective life.
theorists who speak of a shift from government to governance and of a hollowing out the state; against the backdrop of
conceptions of globalization that claim that global flows of trade, finance, information, and culture have undone the container of
the national state39; and in the presence of political analyses that claim that struggles directed toward the state have been
displaced by grassroots movements conducting sub-, micro-, and transversal politics underneath, across, and above the territorial
state. In short, to reject a theory of the state in favor of an analysis of local struggles in the 1970s marked a break with a prevailing
The binary between civil society and the state fails to account
for contemporary transformations in governance
Villadsen & Dean 12 (Kaspar Associate Professor of Sociology at Copenhagen
Business School, and Mitchell Research Professor of Sociology at Newcastle
University and Professor of Public Governance at Copenhagen Business School,
State-Phobia, Civil Society, and a Certain Vitalism, in Constellations, Volume 19,
Issue 3, p. 401-420, September 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cons.12006/full)
Introduction We begin by making two observations on our present. First, many governments in contemporary
liberal and welfare states have, during the last 30 years, sought to limit the role of the state
in the delivery of what were formerly considered public services . They are concerned to
mobilize agents, movements, energies, and cultures outside of the state, and yet they are afraid that their programmatic attempts
globalization and governance,2 as well as among those who celebrated the bottom up politics of plurality,3 life-politics,4 or the rise
state was losing its internal supremacy and external independence its legal and political sovereignty as well as its capacity for
positions that have sought to call into question and to think beyond the very terrain of state and civil society. In particular, inheritors
of Michel Foucault have claimed to have overcome the analytical dead-end of the traditional state/civil society binary. With reference
to his governmentality lectures,7 certain of his followers famously concluded: The
analytical language
structured by the philosophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to
comprehend contemporary transformations in modes of exercise of political
power.8 This is at the nub of our problem here. What is at stake in seeking to overcome the state/civil society binary, or indeed,
in viewing it as a binary in the first place? Can we escape from the positive valorization of civil society found in more mainstream
that make common reference to the political thought of Michel Foucault: the neo-Marxist writings of Hardt and Negri, and their
associates, on Empire and multitude; and the self-described more modest analytics of Nikolas Rose and his colleagues. Our concern
here is not to show that contemporary versions of the withering away of the state are empirically mistaken, although we do hold
we are
concerned with the ways each of these radical positions proposes to dissolve or
abandon the theoretical framework of the state and to overcome the state/civil
society opposition. In the first section, we refine the problem with reference to Foucault's governmentality lectures and
that theoretical anti-statism is, to say the least, overdone and that it finds little warrant in Foucault. Rather,
the analytical and substantive implications that can be drawn from his approach. We are especially concerned to emphasize what
Quentin Skinner calls the context9 of Foucault's statements and the particular role the notion of state-phobia plays in them. In
the sections that follow, we outline the two approaches mentioned above in order to understand the intellectual and political
consequences of these contemporary attempts to dissolve the state/civil society binary and to stage something of an unexpected
Both approaches
claim to dissolve the traditional state/civil society binary to indicate a new kind of
politics beyond the state. However, they both oddly reinvent the traditional privilege
given to the inventiveness, creativity, and mobility found not in the rigidities of the state and
formal political organizations, but in a domain of energy, expression, and vitality that lies
beyond them, opposes them, or occasionally breaks forth inside them. While we might characterize the multitude as a kind
joins with Hardt and Negri in invoking the Deleuzian creative plenitude of a singular vitality.102
of hyper civil society, Rose's non-conventional communities and moments of minoring103 that can be found even in the
AFF
The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might
recogniz e and name their own desire, and as a result to become a political subject in
the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on
the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. This naming is not
about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of political
subjectivization that is not solely oriented towards or determined by the locus of the
demand, determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject towards others and a political order. As
Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence, or in the register of this essay, a new political
possibility: That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a
question of recognizing something which would be entirely given . In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence
in the world (Lacan 1988, pp. 228229). Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit the
possibility of desire, or as Fink argues: later, however, Lacan comes to see that an analysis that does not go far enough in
constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand unable to truly desire (Fink 1996, p. 90).
the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, for example, Lacan argues that the hysteric's demand that the Other produce an object is the support
of an aversion towards one's desire: the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centred on the
object, in so far as this object, das Ding, is, as Freud wrote somewhere, the support of an aversion (Lacan 1997, p. 53). This
the hysteric
asserts their agency, even authority over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered
agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a
surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the
exclusive capability to satisfy the demand . Thus the logic of as hysterics you demand a new
master: you will get it! At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly
economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand,
powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of
enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address hysterical demand is more
a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim
for change. The limitation of the students call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought, but in the fact that the
hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master . Here the
fundamental problem of democracy is not in articulating resistance over and against
hegemony, but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to
mastery and a deferral of desire . The difficulty in thinking hysteria is that it is both a politically
effective subject position in some ways , but that it is politically constraining from the
perspective of organized political dissent . If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at
least a politics of interruption: imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order,
without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility, with no site
for contest or reappropriation and everything simply the working out of a structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria
represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside