G.R. No.

179010
DEWARA versus LAMELA
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara and Elenita Dewara married before the Family Code took
effect. Consequently, they were separated because Elenita worked in California,
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod
1985 Eduardo, while driving jeep, hit Lamela, who filed and won a case of
serious physical injuries against Eduardo
Court ordered Eduardo to pay 62k as civil indemnity and 10k as moral damages
Eduardo could not pay so the sheriff levied a parcel of land registered under
Elenitas name, which was bought by Lamela at a public auction.
Elenitas attorney-in--fact claimed that land was paraphernal property of Elenita
and could not be used to pay for personal liabilities of her husband.
Respondents claim that property was conjugal as it was bought using Eduardos
money, Elenita being a simple housewife at the time of purchase of the land.
RTC declared property as paraphernal and ruled in favor of the petitioner, tracing
the ownership of the property to Elenitas grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes, and
was sold to her by her father and her aunt for a much lower price, indicating that
it was a donation to Elenita alone. Having declared that the property was the
paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo,
which was personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive property of his
wife.
The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title
during their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil
liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.
ISSUE: whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or
the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
RULING: Conjugal Property
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the
enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to
their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal
property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence
there must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the
burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property
of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically
be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal

partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and
obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be
charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may
be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case
No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil
Code have been covered. This remedy is provided for under Article 163 of the Civil
Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Neither shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property
or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the conjugal partnership
may be held answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a
charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both the husband
and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other
course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal
partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.

GR No. 202932
Ventura vs Abuda
FACTS:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June
1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them
had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U.
Ventura, Jr, the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas
(Crispin) when she married Esteban. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin
was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes
death in 1960.
Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located Delpan
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).
Thereafter, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda
When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided
to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued
paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street.
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31
July 1999.
Edilberto filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila.
Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because
Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void.
Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents
RULING: NO. Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in

bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be
considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of
Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired
through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The
phrase married to Socorro Torres is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not
show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that
Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.
Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was acquired
prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the
purchase price ofthe Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was
made on behalf of her father. Article1238oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor's
consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of
Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any
evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.

GR 177667
FRANCISCO VS GONZALES
FACTS:
Due to a Declaration Nullity of Marriage, Cleodualdo and Michele had agreed to
set forth their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their
childrens support, custody, visitation as well as dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains in a compromise agreement. The ownership of the conjugal
property which consists of house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in the
name of the former spouses shall be transferred by a deed of donation to
children Cleodia and Ceamantha upon reaching 19 and 18.
The respondent ordered Michele and her partner to vacate premises leased to
them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorneys fees. The real
property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal property of the former spouses may held accountable
RULING:
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the present case to those
belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts.
With Cleodualdo and Michele who was married prior to the affectivity of the FC,
property relations are governed by the Civil Code, on Conjugal Partnership of gains. A
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances
means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation. Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this
case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful
detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.
In BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the petitioner
cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties
with respondent Lily Yulo because it was not established that the obligation contracted
by the husband redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of
the Civil Code. The Court stated:
In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce
against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal
home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A &
L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries
liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the
Civil Code.

Similarly in this case, Michele, who was then already living separately from
Cleodualdo, rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrais own benefit. In fact,
when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves
to be husband and wife.
The Compromise Agreement must not be read piece-meal but in its entirety. It is
provided therein, thus:
7. In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their children, Cleodia and
Ceamantha, Cleodualdo and Michelle have voluntarily agreed to herein set forth their
obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support,
custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains as
follows:
(a) Title and ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and
lot located in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be transferred by way
of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co- owners, when they reach
nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old, respectively, subject to the following
conditions:
a.1. Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches
the age of 65 years old, with the following rights and responsibilities:
x x x x[32] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived
their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The
property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.