A.

DISTINCTION

1. Quasi Delict vs Delict

1.

Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607

2.

Padilla vs CA, 129 Scra 558

3.

Cruz vs CA, 282 Scrap

4.

Philippine Rabbit vs People, GR No. 147703 (2004)

5.

People vs Ligon, 152 Scra 419 (1987)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial
court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the
ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO
BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the
Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez,
Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1)
day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher
Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for
their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that
the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the
petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the
removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances
pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court
erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of
the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market
premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and
of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00
each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendantsappellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their
taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful,
and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages,
the imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF
DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE
ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE
COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is
that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97
Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49
O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda,
5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted
not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over
the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the
carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at
bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for
either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses.
The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act
was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused
person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he
can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and
loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3
(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the
demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is
not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect
therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia,
et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds
of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-

delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However,
the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia,
96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised
Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides
that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest
of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action
filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal
action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of
the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the
case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make
a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not
authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and
regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering
that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He
was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called
for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener
awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration
by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money
on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the
prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken
out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made
known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and
some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon
the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the
latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law
and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government
which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall
was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so
the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when
the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and
cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and
following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of
presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in
the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free
services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or
quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of
the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the

civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate
action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action.
To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution
of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on
reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the
two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry
and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same
proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions,
the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects
of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he
was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages
despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly
provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act
or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A
judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the
civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not
exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which
imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet
non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator
that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover
just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or

correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also
be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE
MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME,
ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE, respondents.
Luis S. Topacio for petitioner.
Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
This petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals puts in issue the application of the
common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The essential facts of the case are not disputed.
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the
residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between
the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell
on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop.
Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts
proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were
razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of
Investigation found specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable
substances.
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for
a judgment in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. The Court of First
Instance held for private respondents:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against
the defendant:

1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P80,000.00 for
damages suffered by said plaintiffs for the loss of their house, with interest of 6%
from the date of the filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss
of plaintiffs' furnitures, religious images, silverwares, chinawares, jewelries, books,
kitchen utensils, clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6% from date of the
filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees;
4. With costs against the defendant;
5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit. [CA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo,
pp. 29-30.]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on November 19, 1979, affirmed the
decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages:
WHEREFORE, the decision declaring the defendants liable is affirmed. The
damages to be awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to P70,000.00 for the house
and P50,000.00 for the furniture and other fixtures with legal interest from the date of
the filing of the complaint until full payment thereof. [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 35.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on December 3, 1979 but was denied in a resolution dated
February 18, 1980. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on February 22, 1980. After
the comment and reply were filed, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit on June
11, 1980.
However, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted, and the petition was given
due course on September 12, 1980. After the parties filed their memoranda, the case was submitted
for decision on January 21, 1981.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In not deducting the sum of P35,000.00, which private respondents recovered on the insurance on
their house, from the award of damages.
2. In awarding excessive and/or unproved damages.
3. In applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of the instant case.
The pivotal issue in this case is the applicability of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
issue of damages being merely consequential. In view thereof, the errors assigned by petitioner shall
be discussed in the reverse order.
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner objects to, may
be stated as follows:

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
Thus, in Africa, supra, where fire broke out in a Caltex service station while gasoline from a tank
truck was being unloaded into an underground storage tank through a hose and the fire spread to
and burned neighboring houses, this Court, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, adjudged
Caltex liable for the loss.
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal
course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was
not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall
between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the
fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used
and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA Decision, p. 5;
Rollo, p. 33.]
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it
not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to
provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it
was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it
consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumble and
melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not only
with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the
neighboring houses. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis supplied.]
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had
failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which
sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance
providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find petitioner liable for the loss
sustained by private respondents.
2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents constitutes a finding of fact, such
finding by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no
showing of arbitrariness.
In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in agreement as to the value of
private respondents' furniture and fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With
regard to the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such

cannot be categorized as arbitrary considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in
1951 for P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its reconstruction would cost
P246,000.00. Considering the appreciation in value of real estate and the diminution of the real
value of the peso, the valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed cannot be said
to be excessive.
3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to private respondents as found by the
Court of Appeals, the fact that private respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the
amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its contents has not escaped the
attention of the Court. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code
the amount of P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Said article
provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity
from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach
of contract complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private
respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.
On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek reimbursement of the amount it
indemnified private respondents from petitioner. This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to
the rights of the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by
the insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured
may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss [Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.]
Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the indemnity received by the insured is
the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the
insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within
the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not of record
and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following modifications as to the damages awarded for the loss of private respondents'
house, considering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their insurer: (1) the damages awarded for the
loss of the house is reduced to P35,000.00; and (2) the right of the insurer to subrogation and thus
seek reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it had paid private respondents is
recognized.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted

out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability
of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 2000 and the March 27, 2001 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:

a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity

for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his
unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month,P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum
of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years
at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral
damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses,
doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for
the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to
cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in
the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00
as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical
expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical
expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings
of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital
expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines
and P50,000.00 as moral damages;

i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical

expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital
bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for
loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace
Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the
totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed
the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss. (Citations omitted)
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil

liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accusedemployee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers
subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.

[7]

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In

effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accusedemployee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. On
the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the
judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to
appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
[9]

[10]

[11]

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
[13]

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x
[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they

voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they
cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.
[15]

[16]

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section
7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according
to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
[18]

[19]

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving

independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need
not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than
once for the same act or omission.
[24]

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability

arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
[25]

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,

which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
[26]

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the

criminal
case
and
is
conclusively
bound
by
the
outcome
thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the
case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which
the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is
not possible.
[27]

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly

declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
[28]

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved
of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief filed with the CA and from its
Petition before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is
not supported by competent evidence.
[29]

[30]

[31]

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
[32]

appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to

reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed.
[33]

[34]

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the court below final. Having been a
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his
right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
[35]

[36]

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted
to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from
the judgment rendered against him. x x x.
[37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the

court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped
to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable
and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
[38]

[39]

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who

refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.
[40]

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against
him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA andYusay v. Adil do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in
these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
[41]

[42]

[43]

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary

liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that
an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of
the employer.
[44]

[45]

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the

offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
[46]

[47]

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case

would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a

competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
[48]

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and

conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
[49]

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must

be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been
satisfied due to insolvency.
[50]

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil

action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
[51]

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its

accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature;
its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has
attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be

final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability
is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other
words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction
of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
[52]

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be
strictly complied with.
[53]

[54]

[55]

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal

as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed
by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of
those cases.
[56]

[57]

[58]

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
[59]

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process.It might have lost its right to appeal,
but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to
appeal.
[60]

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that
there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged
in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26
August 1990,while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus
owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x. Neither does
petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
[61]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

the

assailed

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74041

July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on
February 17, 1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a
,Seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was
allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. 1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio
Ligon, was never apprehended and is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused,
Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and
driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going
towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by
the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street
before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic
light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and
immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is
not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to
the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was
rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane
in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell
down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in
chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined the chase
and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi
when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right
behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo

Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person
inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. 4 The three were all
brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan.
The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written statements of Castillo
and Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan. 5 Payuan also
prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983. 6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to
the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated
December 6, 1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. 7 Six months later,
however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio
Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide. 8 He filed the latter information on the basis of
a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo
Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983. 10 These
affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of
Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." 11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio
Castillo, that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand
from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In its
decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far
Eastern University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed
from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was right behind a
Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the
Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette
vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was
handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved
forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran
beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand.
While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to
speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi, then saw
Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down on
Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date
and time in question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen
Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and
Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes,
called a cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of
cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00
big, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front
door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light
changed from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the
transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box
which was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi.
Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat

testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to
veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that
Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle
slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk,
Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat
allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report
the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of the incident.
However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of
Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police
headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that
Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no
reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the
windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able
to balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette
vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he
was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of
common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their
cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given
by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on
appeal, unless it is shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to
consider certain material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at
bar, a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that
they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to
the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias,
is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or
mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in
which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.14 Judicial notice may also be taken of
the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying
approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo
to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These
are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to
what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before
the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about
three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His
testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's
hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering
that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were
moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15 Castillo did not
mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi,
although the police report prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same

date, stated that when the traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the
cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly
the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at the same time the latter
punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that during the
police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did
something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit
prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal
on January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was made the
basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of
the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the
quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with
homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. 17 The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
1avvphi1

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source

of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts
from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof
required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy
street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales.
Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the
purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving
vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the
driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven
facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or
negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of
P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for
funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by
sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.