DATOS SOBRE GASTOS MILITARES EN EL MUNDO

INSTITUTO ESTOCOLMO PARA LA PAZ

SIPRI Definition of military expenditure

Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital
expenditure on:

the armed forces, including peace keeping forces

defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects

paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military
operations

military space activities

Such expenditures should include:

personnel
o all expenditures on current personnel, military and civil
o retirement pensions of military personnel
o social services for personnel and their families

operations and maintenance

procurement

military research and development

military construction

military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country)

Excluded military related expenditures:

civil defence

current expenditure for previous military activities

1. veterans benefits
2. demobilization
3. conversion of arms production facilities
4. destruction of weapons

Sources and methods

The SIPRI database on military expenditure currently covers data for 172 countries.
Consistent data are available from 1988-2012 in the SIPRI military expenditure
database on line. Some of the major recent trends in this data are discussed on this
website. The data for the period 2003-2012 will be republished in the SIPRI Yearbook
2013 in summer 2013. The data series are not always consistent with the data for 195087, as published in previous SIPRI Yearbooks. The data are subject to continuous
revisions and these revisions can be extensive. Significant changes are made to
previously estimated figures. Entire series are revised when new and better sources
come to light. As a result, there is sometimes considerable variation between data sets
for individual countries in different Yearbooks. Conversion to constant US dollars has
been made by the use of market exchange rates (MERs) for all countries (for details,
see section VI and SIPRI Yearbook 2011, appendix 4A).

Learn more about sources and methods

1. Purpose of the data
2. Sources
3. Definition of military expenditure
4. Methods
5. SIPRI estimates for China
6. The SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Expert Network
7. Calculations
1. Purpose of the data

The main purpose of the data on military expenditure is to provide an easily identifiable
measure of the scale of resources absorbed by the military. Military expenditure is an input
measure which is not directly related to the 'output' of military activities, such as military

capability or military security. Long-term trends in military expenditure and sudden

changes in trend may be signs of a change in military output, but such interpretations
should be made with caution.
Military expenditure data measured in constant dollars are a trend indicator of the volume
of resources used for military activities, which allow comparisons to be made over time for
individual countries and between countries. The share of gross domestic product (GDP) is a
rough indicator of the proportion of national resources used for military activities, and
therefore of the economic burden imposed on the national economy.
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2. Sources

The sources for military expenditure data are, in order of priority: (a) primary sources, that
is, official data provided by national governments, either in their official publications or in
response to questionnaires; (b) secondary sources which quote primary data; and (c) other
secondary sources.
The first category consists of national budget documents, defence white papers and public
finance statistics published by ministries of finance and of defence, central banks and
national statistical offices. It also includes government responses to questionnaires about
military expenditure sent out by SIPRI, the United Nations or the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and expert analyses of government budgets by
members of the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Expert Network. (See
below).
The second category includes international statistics, such as those produced by NATO and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data for most NATO countries are taken from
NATO defence expenditure statistics as published in a number of NATO sources. Data for
many developing countries are taken from the IMF's Government Financial Statistics
Yearbook, which provides a defence line for most of its member countries. This category
also includes the publications of other organizations which provide proper references to the
primary sources used. The three main sources in this category are the Europa Yearbook
(Europa Publications Ltd, London), Country Reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit
(London), and Country Reports by IMF staff.
The third category of sources consists of specialist journals and newspapers.
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3. Definition of military expenditure

Although the lack of sufficiently detailed data makes it difficult to apply a common
definition of military expenditure on a worldwide basis, SIPRI has adopted a definition as a
guideline. Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure data include all current and capital
expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries

and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when
judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities.
Such expenditures should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement
pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and
maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid
(in the military expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures
on previous military activities, such as veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and
weapon destruction are excluded.
In practice it is not possible to apply this definition for all countries, since this would
require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military
budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. In many cases SIPRI cannot make
independent estimates but is confined to using the national data provided. Priority is then
given to the choice of a uniform definition over time for each country in order to achieve
consistency over time, rather than to adjusting the figures for single years according to a
common definition. In cases where it is impossible to use the same source and definition for
all years, the percentage change between years in the deviant source is applied to the
existing series in order to make the trend as accurate as possible. In the light of these
difficulties, military expenditure data are not suitable for close comparison between
individual countries and are more appropriately used for comparisons over time. To see a
structured breakdown of the SIPRI military expenditure definition please go here
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4. Methods

SIPRI data reflects the official data reported by governments. As a general rule, SIPRI takes
national data to be accurate until there is convincing information to the contrary. Estimates
are made primarily when the coverage of official data does not correspond to the SIPRI
definition or when there are no consistent time series available. In the first case, estimates
are made on the basis of an analysis of official government budget and expenditure
accounts. The most comprehensive estimates, for China and Russia, have been presented in
detail in previous Yearbooks. Other countries where the entire series is estimated are Israel
and the United Arab Emirates. In the second case, differing time series are linked together.
In order not to introduce assumptions into the military expenditure statistics, estimates are
always based on empirical evidence and never based on assumptions nor extrapolations.
Thus, no estimates are made for countries which do not release any official data. These
countries are displayed without figures.
SIPRI estimates are presented in square brackets in the tables. Round brackets are used
when data are uncertain for other reasons, such as the reliability of the source or because of
the economic context. Figures are more unreliable when inflation is rapid and
unpredictable. Supplementary allocations made during the course of the year to cover
losses in purchasing power often go unreported and recent military expenditure can appear
to be falling in real terms when it is in fact increasing.

Data for the most recent years include two types of estimate which apply to all countries:
(a) figures for the most recent years are for adopted budgets, budget estimates or revised
estimates, and are revised, more often than not, in subsequent years; and (b) the deflator
used for the latest year in the series is an estimate. Unless exceptional uncertainty is
involved with these estimates, they are not bracketed.
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5. SIPRI estimates for China

In its estimates of Chinese military expenditure, SIPRI seeks to take into account a number
of sources of military expenditure outside the official defence budget. Such sources of
military expenditure include funding from other central government ministries (some of
which is publicly available, some of which is not), funding from local government and
funding from internal People's Liberation Army (PLA) sources-the latter probably
represents a much smaller share of the total than in the past. SIPRI's estimate of China's
military spending is based on a methodology used in a study published in SIPRI Yearbook
1999, which provides estimates of Chinese military spending from 1989 to 1998, based on
both the official defence budget and data and estimates for a number of items outside the
budget (see below). [1]
SIPRI's estimates for China continue to use Professor Wang's methodology. The figures are
based on the official defense budget, and estimates for the additional items identified by
Professor Wang. These are based on additional data from various editions of the China
Public Finance Yearbook, the China Statistical Yearbook, and other official publications,
but also in some cases require additional estimation for more recent years, as some of the
data series used by Professor Wang are no longer available.
The items outside the official defence budget that are included in the estimates are: (a)
spending on the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP); (b) soldiers' demobilization and
retirement payments from the Ministry of Civil Affairs; (c) subsidies to the arms industry;
(d) additional military research and development (R&D) funding by civilian government
ministries; (e) additional military construction expenses; (f) Chinese arms imports; and (g)
residual military-owned enterprises. Professor Wang included one additional item, namely
an estimate for PLA revenues from arms exports. However, to avoid the risk of doublecounting, this item (which was a very small part of the total) has been removed.
The figures for items a and b come from published expenditure figures up to 2011, while
the figures for 2012 are estimates based on the rate of change of the official budget);
estimates for item c-subsidies to the arms industry-are based on a share of the total budget
for industrial subsidies (with further estimates for 2010-2012 based on the average rate of
decline of this figure in previous years); estimates for item d) - the largest additional item are based on the rate of growth in overall Chinese Research & Development and Science &
Technology expenditure; estimates for item e-additional military construction-are based on
a share of the government's capital infrastructure budget. As these figures are not published
beyond 2006, further estimates are made for 2007-2011 based on the rate of change of the
official defence budget; estimates for item f) are based on the rate of change of China's

arms imports as measured by the SIPRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV). The figure for item g)
is assumed to have declined steadily since 1999, as a policy of divestment from such
activities has been followed. The figures for 1989-98 were based on a share of the official
defence budget.
The resulting SIPRI estimates for Chinese military spending for recent years come to a little
over 1.5 times the official defence budget for most years. SIPRI's current estimate for R&D
spending is quite high, suggesting a share of R&D in overall military spending close to that
of the USA, and considerably higher than for major European arms producers.
A 2006 report by the US-China Policy Foundation, based on a analysis of available
Chinese-language sources, broadly concurs with the list of items included by SIPRI, but
also adds various additional forms of funding to the PLA from local government, as well as
some higher education expenses for PLA officers and compensation for disaster relief
activities. The report concludes, however, that there is not at present enough information to
make a reasonable estimate of total Chinese defence-related spending.
While details of some elements of Chinese military spending outside the official defence
budget are publicly available (such as the PAP budget) others-most importantly R&D
spending-are not, and can at present only be the subject of educated guesswork. Further
research based on publicly available Chinese-language sources could provide improved
estimates, but without greater transparency on the part of the Chinese Government, a
completely accurate figure is not currently possible.
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6. The Military Expenditure and Arms Production Expert Network

SIPRI's efforts to gather reliable military expenditure data (as well as on the arms industry)
are assisted by the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Expert Network, an
international network of experts associated with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms
Production Programme
Network Members provide SIPRI with regular data on the military expenditure and/or arms
industry of specific countries on which they have a particular expertise (most often, though
not always, their own). In addition, SIPRI will from time to time consult with members of
the network on specific issues relating to their areas of expertise. Network members receive
a small annual honorarium in return for the provision of data. This is typically $150-500,
depending on the volume of data supplied. In addition, they receive a copy of each edition
of the SIPRI Yearbook to which they have contributed data. They are also credited for their
contribution in the relevant section of the Yearbook.
The SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme periodically seeks new
members of the Network for countries where new or improved sources of data are
considered necessary, or where we become aware of relevant potential Network members
who could provide such improved data. Potential network members must fulfil the
following requirements:

Education to Masters Degree level or equivalent

Evidence (through relevant publications or otherwise)of a detailed understanding of

the military budget and/or arms industry of the country for which they are to
provide data.

Relevant publications in relevant fields, including international security, military

affairs, peace and conflict studies, defence and peace economics, etc.

If you are interested in becoming part of the Network or want more information, please
contact Dr. Elisabeth Skns, Director of the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms
Production Programme.
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7. Calculations

The SIPRI military expenditure figures are presented on a calendar-year basis. The only
exception is the USA, for which statistics report data on a fiscal-year basis. Calendar-year
data are calculated on the assumption of an even rate of expenditure throughout the fiscal
year.
The deflator used for conversion from current to constant prices is the consumer price index
(CPI) of the country concerned. This choice of deflator is linked to the purpose of the
SIPRI data - that they should be an indicator of resource use on an opportunity cost basis.
Average market exchange rates (MER) for the relevant year are used to convert local
currency figures into US dollars. For the constant dollar figures, this means the MER for
the base year (currently 2011), while for the current dollar figures given for the most recent
year's data, this means the MER for that year (currently 2012). Market exchange rates are
determined by the supply and demand of currencies used in international transactions, and
as such do not always accurately reflect differences in price levels between countries.
An alternative is to use GDP-based purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors (or
PPP exchange rates). The PPP dollar rate of a country's currency is defined by the World
Bank as 'the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same amount of
goods and services in the domestic market as a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States'
[2]. Such GDP-based PPP rates are designed to control for differences in price levels and
thus to provide a measure of the real purchasing power of the GDP of each country.
Using GDP-based PPP rates instead of MERs for currency conversion results in much
higher output and expenditure figures for many developing countries. For example, while
the ratio of US to Chinese military expenditure in 2012 was just over 4:1 based on MER,
using PPP rates the ratio was only around 2.75:1. However, the reliability of such PPP rates
is lower than for MERs, since PPP rates are statistical estimates, calculated on the basis of

collected price data for a basket of goods and services for benchmark years. Like all
statistical estimates they are subject to a margin of error.
Furthermore, GDP-based PPP rates are of limited relevance for the conversion of military
expenditure data into US dollars. Such PPP rates are designed to reflect the purchasing
power for goods and services that are representative of spending patterns in each country,
that is, primarily for civilian goods and services. Military expenditure is used to purchase a
number of goods and services which are not typical of national spending patterns. For
example, the price of conscripts can be assumed to be lower than the price of a typical
basket of goods and services, while the prices of advanced weapon systems and of their
maintenance and repair services can be assumed to be much higher. Due to these
uncertainties, SIPRI uses market exchange rates to convert military expenditure data into
US dollars, despite their limitations.
The choice of base year (the year in whose prices the data are expressed) also has a
significant impact on cross-country comparisons of expenditure data because different
national currencies vary against the dollar in different ways. For the current edition of the
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, the base year has been changed to 2011, having
previously been 2010. As the dollar fell against most major currencies in 2011, and as a
result of inflation between 2010 and 2011, this has made the world and most regional totals
in most years higher when expressed in constant (2011) US$ than it was when expressed in
constant (2010) US$. The dollar's performance against other currencies in 2012 was mixed,
so the relationship between other countries' military expenditure expressed in constant
(2011) US$ and expressed in current (2012) US$ is varied. Given also the effects of
inflation inflation, the world total when expressed in current dollars ($1753 billion) is a
little higher than when expressed in constant (2011) US$ ($1739 billion)..
The ratio of military expenditure to GDP is calculated in domestic currency at current
prices and for calendar years.
Economic groupings used are based on figures for 2011 Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita as shown in the World Bank's World Development Indicators for 2012. For the
purpose of calculating aggregate totals, estimates have been made for countries for which
data are lacking in some years. These estimates are made on the assumption that the trend
for these countries is the same as for the geographical region in which they are located.
For information on countries included in the geographical regions see Regional coverage.
[1]Wang, S., 'The military expenditure of China, 1989-98', SIPRI Yearbook 1999.
[2] World Bank, World Development Report 2010: development and climate change (World
Bank: Washington, DC, 2009), p377.

Summary

World military expenditure in 2012 is estimated to have been $1756 billion, representing
2.5 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $249 for each person in the world.
The total is about 0.4 per cent lower in real terms than in 2011, the first fall since 1998.
Nonetheless, the total is higher than in any year between the end of World War II and 2010.
The distribution of global spending in 2012 shows what may be the beginnings of a shift
from the West to other parts of the world, in particular Eastern Europe and the developing
world.
In Western and Central Europe, austerity measures continued to reduce military spending.
In Asia and Oceania, while military spending still increased in 2012, it did so at a slower
pace, partly as a result of weaker economic growth in the wake of the 2008 global financial
crisis.
In Central and South Asia, North America, Oceania, and Western and Central Europe,
increases in the period 20032009 were followed by decreases in 200912; in sub-Saharan
Africa, East Asia, and Latin America, there was a major slowdown in the growth rate, with
smaller slowdowns in Eastern Europe and South East Asia. In contrast, the rate of growth
accelerated in the Middle East and North Africa. The overall effect on the world total was a
lowering in growth in 201011, now followed by the fall in 2012.

World military spending, 2012

Region
Africa
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Americas
Central America and the Caribbean
North America
South America
Asia and Oceania
Central and South Asia
East Asia
Oceania
South East Asia
Europe
Eastern Europe
Western and Central
Middle East
World total
The spending figures are in current (2012) US dollars.

Spending
($ b.)

Change
(%)
39.2
16.4
22.7
782
8.6
708
65.9
390
59.8
268
28.2
33.7
407
100
307
138
1756

1.2
7.8
-3.2
-4.7
8.1
-5.5
3.8
3.3
-1.6
5.0
-3.7
6.0
2.0
15
-1.6
8.3
-0.4

World military expenditure, 20032012

Spending figures are in constant (2012) US dollars.

Armed conflict
Contents

Overview
NEIL MELVIN

I. Armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring

MARIE ALLANSSON, MARGARETA SOLLENBERG AND LOTTA THEMNR

II. The fragile peace in East and South East Asia (sample PDF)
STEIN TNNESSON, ERIK MELANDER, ELIN BJARNEGRD, ISAK SVENSSON AND
SUSANNE SCHAFTENAAR

III. Patterns of organized violence, 200211

LOTTA THEMNR AND PETER WALLENSTEEN

Summary
In 201112 conflict continued to be a major concern for the international community, most
notably in the Middle East, western Asia and Africa, but also with increased levels of
interstate tension in East Asia. Nevertheless, deaths resulting from major organized
violence worldwide remained at historically low levels.
Perhaps the biggest single factor that has shaped the significant global decline in the
number of armed conflicts and casualty rates since the end of the superpower confrontation
of the cold war has been the dramatic reduction in major powers engaging in proxy
conflicts.
However, the relationship between states and conflict may be changing once again. In
recent years there has been an increase in the number of intrastate conflicts that are
internationalizedthat is, that have another state supporting one side or another. Such
involvement often has the effect of increasing casualty rates and prolonging conflicts.
Shifting interests and changing capabilities as a result of a weakening of the unipolar postcold war security balance and the emergence of elements of multipolarity are clearly
affecting the overall international order, even while levels of conflict remain relatively low.
Nevertheless, some developments in 201112 could be seen as warning signs that if the
positive trends in conflict that emerged in recent decades are to be sustained, new ways
need to be found to build cooperative international relations to manage the changing global
security order.

Numbers of armed conflicts, 200211

Armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring

Mali, Syria and Yemen were ravaged in 2012 by armed conflicts related in one way or
another to the Arab Spring. All three cases point to the importance of understanding the
Arab Spring and its repercussions in order to fully grasp regional conflict developments.

They are all to some extent defined and influenced by the major political upheavals in
2011.
While the chain of events set in motion by the Arab Spring was different in each country,
depending on the domestic contexts, Mali, Syria and Yemen illustrate general phenomena
central to peace and conflict research: conflict diffusion and conflict escalation. There is a
clear risk that conflict may spread and escalate further in this region. However, just as the
present conflicts were difficult to foresee at the outset of the Arab Spring, the future paths
of conflict are equally difficult to predict.

The fragile peace in East and South East Asia

More than 30 years of relative peace have contributed to making East and South East Asia
the worlds main economic growth region. Yet the peace seems by no means secure. While
states have avoided direct conflict with each other and have stopped supporting insurgent
movements on each others territory, decades-old suspicions linger and economic
integration has not been followed up with political integration.
Increasing tensions since 2008 have been underpinned by rapid military build-ups in
several countries, notably in East Asia. Meanwhile a number of intrastate armed conflicts
in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailandremain active in South East Asia, and some of
these have escalated in recent years.
A deepening of peace in the region will require improvements in several bilateral and
multilateral relationships, notably between North and South Korea; China and Japan; China
and ASEAN; and China and the United States.

Battle-related deaths in armed conflicts in East and South East Asia, 1946
2008

Patterns of organized violence, 200211

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) maps organized violence around the world
according to three categories of violent action: state-based conflict, non-state conflict and
one-sided violence.
The overall number of incidents of organized violence resulting in the deaths of at least 25
people in a particular year (the threshold for counting by UCDP) was slightly lower in
2011, at 98, than in 2002, when it stood at 114. This was solely due to a decrease in
incidences of one-sided violence; both state-based and non-state conflicts were more
prevalent in 2011 than in 2002.
In the 10-year period 200211 there were 73 active state-based conflicts, including 37 that
were active in 2011; 223 non-state conflicts, including 38 that were active in 2011; and 130
actors recorded as carrying out one-sided violence, including 23 in 2011.
The three categories show markedly different patterns over time. The annual number of
non-state conflicts can rise and fall sharply, displaying no obvious trends. In contrast, major
changes in the number of state-based conflicts tend to happen slowly.
Developments in the incidence of one-sided violence fall somewhere between these two
extremes. The data for 200211 illustrate the difficulty of drawing direct links between
patterns in the three categories of organized violence. The different categories can certainly

influence each other (as shown by the examples of the Arab Spring and East and South East
Asia). However, the mechanisms are complex, and understanding themlet alone how to
manage themrequires in-depth, case-based study

US Military expenditure
Military spending by the United States declined by 5.6 per cent in real terms in 2012.
Together with the 1 per cent fall in 2011, this is the first clear manifestation of an
adjustment of US military spending to a post-war situation. However, spending in 2012
$685.3 billionwas still 69 per cent higher in real terms than in 2001, which marked the
beginning of the wars on terrorism, in Afghanistan and, from 2003, in Iraq.
The future level and trend in US military expenditure was a prominent topic in the political
debate in the USA during 2012. However, much of the decision-making process on future
military spending was linked and subordinated to the political process of addressing high
and rising government debt.

US military spending, 19502017

Spending figures are in constant (2012) US dollars.

Russian military expenditure

The rising trend in Russias military expenditure, which started in 1999, accelerated sharply
in 2012, with a real-terms increase of 16 per cent. The draft budget for 201315 contains
plans for a further rise in nominal terms of just over 40 per cent by 2015. The increases
come as Russia implements the ambitious 201120 State Armaments Programme and

undertakes a wide-ranging reform of its armed forces, which many doubt can be
implemented fully.

Security spending and violent organized crime in Central America

Central America has had some of the lowest levels of military expenditure as a share of
GDP in the world. Following the end of the regions civil wars in the 1990s and in the
absence of any external military threats, defence spending in most Central American
countries was constant or falling until at least the mid-2000s. However, in more recent
years this trend has reversed, as some of the regions militaries have become involved in the
fight against drug cartels and organized crime groups, alongside internal security forces.

The reporting of military expenditure data to the UN

The number of states reporting to the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military
Expenditures has dropped from a high of 81 in 2002 to 49 in 2012.
European states had the highest reporting rate in 2012 (27 of 48 states). The worst rates
were in Africa (2 of 54 states) and the Middle East (0 of 14 states).

The governance of military budgeting and expenditure in Colombia and

Indonesia
Colombias five-decade war against guerrilla and drug trafficking groups has been the
primary determinant of the countrys level of military expenditure. Despite the longrunning civil war and severe problems of human rights abuses by the security forces,
Colombia has no recent history of military rule. Transparency in military spending is also
fairly good, and has been improving in recent years.
The extensive security sector reform that accompanied Indonesias transition to democracy
since 1998 has largely ended the militarys dominant role in politics. However, while the
Indonesian armed forces no longer seeks to interfere in politics, democratic civilian control
of the military remains weak, and serious gaps in transparency and accountability in
relation to military finance, budgeting and procurement remain, although some progress has
been made in these areas.
PRODUCCION

Summary

The economic downturn following the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent
austerity measures imposed in North America and Western Europe began to have an impact
on sales in the worlds arms industry in 201112. However, the impact on the industry was
not uniform, with varied results for individual
company.

Ongoing spending discussions have generateduncertainty in the largest arms and military
services marketthe United Statesand are a key reason companies based there and in
Western Europe are seeking increased market shares in other regions, including Asia, Latin
America and the Middle East. Individual companies are taking steps to insulate themselves
against austerity measures through military specialization, downsizing, diversification, and
exports and other forms of internationalization. In some cases company subsidiaries have
maintained or increased arms and military services sales outside of the countries in which
the parent companies are headquartered.
Companies also use acquisitions to improve the products and services they already deliver.
While much attention is paid to acquisitions, a number of divestitures also indicate the
ways in which the industry is restructuring to accommodate the austerity environment and
changing customer requirements.
Governments use a number of strategies to assist their arms industries outside of their home
markets. These include direct government arms export promotion; support for cost
reductions; and the use of rhetoric about arms industry employment. In contrast, countries
that have not cut military expenditure see this dilemma as an opportunity to either obtain
more favourable terms on arms imports or to develop their own industries.

Companies in the SIPRI Top 100 for 2011, by country

Cybersecurity and the arms industry

The growing importance of cybersecurity in the military and civil realms has led to
noteworthy diversification by arms-production and military services companies into the
cybersecurity
market.
In 2012 cybersecurity continued to rise on the agendas of the international political and
security communities. Revelations about Flames and Stuxnet made headlines and inspired

fresh discussions about the growing use of cyberweapons and cyberwarfare. While there is
no reliable evidence, a growing number of countriesincluding China, Iran, Israel, Russia
and the USAwere suspected of using cyberweapons and making offensive interventions
across cyberspace.
The rise of cybersecurity on the political and military agenda has evident economic
implications. According to one estimate, global public and private cybersecurity spending
was approximately $60 billion in 2011 (equal to 3.5 per cent of world military expenditure).
The USA was the biggest spender on cybersecurity, accounting for half of the total, and was
the only country where the levels of public and private spending on cybersecurity were
almost equal. In the rest of the world, the private sector accounted for the majority of
national spending on cybersecurity.
States reliance on private cybersecurity providers could become a matter of political
concern, particularly with regard to democratic transparency, oversight, accountability and
cost. The provision of services by arms-producing companiesas well as traditional
cybersecurity providersmay change the way in which states define and manage their
cybersecurity and cyberdefence policies.

The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies

The SIPRI Top 100 lists the worlds 100 largest arms-producing and military services
companies (excluding Chinese companies), ranked by their arms sales in 2011. Sales of
arms and services by companies in the SIPRI Top 100 totalled $410 billion in 2011. In
comparison with the Top 100 companies in 2010 (which is a slightly different set of
companies), the 2011 arms sales represent a 5 per cent decrease in real terms.
The decrease in arms sales by the SIPRI Top 100 companies in 2011 is due to several
factors, including the withdrawal from Iraq and the United Nations embargo on arms
transfers to Libya; programme delays due to austerity-related military spending cuts and
related postponements in weapon programme commitments; and the weak US dollar in
many countries in 2011.

The 10 largest arms-producing companies, 2011

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Company
(country)
Lockheed Martin
Boeing
BAE Systems (UK)
General Dynamics
Raytheon
Northrop Grumman
EADS (trans-Europe)
Finmeccanica (Italy)

Arms sales
($ m.)

Profit
($ m.)
36 270
31 830
29 150
23 760
22 470
21 390
16 390
14 560

2 655
4 018
2 349
2 526
1 896
2 118
1 422
3 206

9
10

Company
(country)
L-3 Communications
United Technologies

Arms sales
($ m.)

Profit
($ m.)
12 520
11 640

956
5 347

Companies are US-based, unless indicated otherwise. The profit figures are from all
company activities, including non-military sales.

Summary
The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 17 per cent
between 20032007 and 200812. The five largest suppliers in 200812the United
States, Russia, Germany, France and Chinaaccounted for 75 per cent of the volume of
exports. This is the first time since the end of the cold war that China has ranked among the
five largest arms exporters, which had consisted solely of the USA and European states.
China may represent the vanguard of an increase in the significance of Asian suppliers in
the international arms trade, as South Korea is an emerging arms supplier and Japan and
Singapore have potential to become major suppliers.
Other significant changes in 200812 include the absence from the top five suppliers of the
United Kingdom for the first five-year period since 1950; the departure of the Netherlands
from the 10 largest suppliers; and the ranking of Ukraine as the ninth largest supplier.
One of the consequences of the impact of the financial crisis in the USA and Europe has
been the additional pressure to seek new export markets. This has led the USA and
European states to streamline bureaucratic procedures and to be more willing to engage in
licensed production, technology transfer and cooperative production arrangements.
While SIPRI data on international arms transfers does not represent their financial value, a
number of states also publish figures on the financial value of their arms exports. Based on
national data, SIPRI estimates that the total value of the global arms trade in 2011 was at
least $43 billion.

The trend in transfers of major arms, 20032012

The main importers and exporters of major arms, 20082012

Exporter
1. USA
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. France
5. China
6. UK
7. Spain
8. Italy
9. Ukraine
10. Israel

Global
share (%)
30
26
7
6
5
4
3
2
2
2

Importer
1. India
2. China
3. Pakistan
4. South Korea
5. Singapore
6. Algeria
7. Australia
8. USA
9. UAE
10. Saudi Arabia

Global
share (%)
12
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3

Recipient regions of major arms imports, 20032007 and 200812

Arms transfers to Western and Central Europe

The trend in the volume of major conventional weapons imported by states in Western and
Central Europe broadly matches recent trends in military spending in the region. Between
20032007 and 200812, imports in Western Europe fell by 16 per cent and in Central
Europe by 49 per cent. In Western Europe the overall fall in imports was largely driven by
declines in imports by Greece and Italy, which fell by 61 per cent and 55 per cent,
respectively.
Decisions to delay and cancel import contracts appear to be affecting European states
efforts to boost their own arms exports, which have been stepped up in recent years in order
to help offset losses in revenues caused by reduced domestic procurement. The budget cuts
of European states may also affect efforts to promote the consolidation of arms production
in Europe and the joint development and acquisition of weapon systems.

Transparency in arms transfers

The number of states reporting their arms imports and exports to the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) decreased from 86 states in 2011 to an all-time
low of 52 states in 2012. Africa was the only region that did not record a significant decline
in reporting.
An increasing number of governments have published national reports on arms exports. As
of January 2013, 35 states had published at least one national report on arms exports since
1990.

Arms transfers to Syria

As the conflict in Syria intensified in 2012, the international community remained at an
impasse on how to respond. It could not agree on how to deal with the conflict in general or
with supplying arms to the parties in the conflict in particular. Whereas the European
Union, the League of Arab States, Turkey and the United States maintained arms
embargoes against the Syrian Government, Iran and Russia continued to supply it with
arms. Rebel forces called for foreign military aid and neighbouring countries appeared to
supply them with arms or provide funds for arms acquisitions.
Since the start of the conflict in 2011 there has been a sharp division between states that
oppose the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Syria and that continue to supply
arms to the Syrian Government, and states that have imposed arms embargoes on Syria and
called for a UN embargo. Russian officials have been most vocal with regard to the former
position and made clear statements that arms supplies were continuing in 201112.
The main source of weapons for Syrian rebel groups appears to have been the capture of
arms from government troops and arsenals. Small arms and light weapons were also
obtained on the black market in Iraq and Lebanon. Nevertheless, rebel forces repeatedly
called in 2012 for governments supporting their cause to supply them with weapons and
other military equipment

Summary
At the start of 2013 eight states possessed approximately 4400 operational nuclear
weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert. If all nuclear
warheads are countedoperational warheads, spares, those in both active and inactive
storage, and intact warheads scheduled for dismantlementthe United States, Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel possess a total of approximately
17 270 nuclear weapons.
The availability of reliable information about the nuclear weapon states arsenals varies
considerably. France, the UK and the USA have recently disclosed important information
about their nuclear capabilities. In contrast, transparency in Russia has decreased as a result
of its decision not to publicly release detailed data about its strategic nuclear forces under
the 2010 RussianUS New START treaty, even though it shares the information with the
USA. China remains highly non-transparent as part of its long-standing deterrence strategy.
Reliable information on the operational status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the
three states that have never been party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)India,
Israel and Pakistanis especially difficult to find. In the absence of official declarations,
the available information is often contradictory, incorrect or exaggerated.

World nuclear forces, 2013

Country
USA

Deployed
warheads

Other
warheads

Total
Inventory

2 150

5 550

~7 700

6 700
65
~10
~250
90110
100120
~80
..
~12 865

8 500
225
~300
~250
90110
100120
~80
68?
~17 270

Russia
1 800
UK
160
France
~290
China
..
India
..
Pakistan
..
Israel
..
North Korea
..
Total
~4 400
All estimates are approximate and are as of January 2013.

The legally recognized nuclear weapon states

All five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPTChina, France,
Russia, the UK and the USAappear determined to remain nuclear powers for the
indefinite future. Russia and the USA have major modernization programmes under way
for nuclear delivery systems, warheads and production facilities. At the same time, they
continue to reduce their nuclear forces through the implementation of New START and
through unilateral force reductions.
Since the nuclear weapon arsenals of Russia and the USA are by far the largest, one result
has been that the total number of nuclear weapons in the world has been declining. The
nuclear arsenals of the other three legally recognized nuclear weapon states are
considerably smaller, but all three states are either deploying new weapon systems or have
announced their intention to do so. Of the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states,
only China appears to be expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal. In 2012, China
conducted a comprehensive series of missile trials consolidating its road-mobile, landbased and submarine-based nuclear deterrent.

Stocks of fissile materials

Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential for all types of
nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear
weapons. The most common of these fissile materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA have produced both
HEU and plutonium; India, Israel and North Korea have produced mainly plutonium; and
Pakistan mainly HEU. All states with a civilian nuclear industry have some capability to
produce fissile materials.

Highly enriched uranium

Separated plutonium
Military stocks
Civilian stocks

Global stocks, 2012

~1285 tonnes*
~224 tonnes
~264 tonnes

* Not including 92 tonnes to be blended down.

Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces

India and Pakistan are increasing the size and sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Both
countries are developing and deploying new types of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise
missile and both are increasing their military fissile material production capabilities.
Indias nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of a minimum credible deterrent and nofirst-use of nuclear weapons. In June 2012 the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh,
convened a meeting of Indias Nuclear Command Authority, which reportedly stressed the
need for thefaster consolidation of Indias nuclear deterrence posture based on an
operational triad of nuclear forces.
In 2012 Pakistan conducted a series of missile trials testing most of its nuclear-capable
missile types that are currently in operational service or still under development. Pakistan is
also expanding its main plutonium-production complex at Khushab, Punjab.

Israeli nuclear forces

Israel continues to maintain its long-standing policy of nuclear opacity. It neither officially
confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons. It is estimated that Israel has
approximately 80 intact nuclear weapons, of which 50 are for delivery by Jericho II
medium-range ballistic missiles and 30 are gravity bombs for delivery by aircraft. The
operational status of the longer-range Jericho III ballistic missile is unknown. There was
renewed speculation in 2012 that Israel may also have developed nuclear-capable
submarine-launched cruise missiles.

North Koreas military nuclear capabilities

North Korea maintains a secretive and highly opaque military nuclear programme. There is
no public information to verify that it possesses operational nuclear weapons. However, in
January 2012 the US Director of National Intelligence assessed that North Korea had
produced nuclear weapons, although he gave no estimate of the size of the countrys
weapon inventory.
During 2012 several non-governmental reports concluded, based on the analysis of satellite
imagery and other evidence, that North Korea was making technical preparations for
carrying out a third underground nuclear test in tunnels at its nuclear test site, Punggye-ri,
in the north-east of the country.

Global stocks of fissile materials, 2012

Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential for all types of
nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear
weapons. The most common of these fissile materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA have produced both
HEU and plutonium; India, Israel and North Korea have produced mainly plutonium; and
Pakistan mainly HEU. All states with a civilian nuclear industry have some capability to
produce fissile materials.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials compiles information on global stocks of fissile
materials.