Outline.....................................................................................................................................................................

2
CMR Generic 1NC................................................................................................................................................. 3
***CMR Links***................................................................................................................................................. 8
CMR Militarization Links..................................................................................................................................... 9
CMR SBSP Links................................................................................................................................................ 10
CMR Human Mission Links................................................................................................................................ 11
***CMR Impacts*** CMR Smart Power Module............................................................................................12
CMR Terrorism Module...................................................................................................................................... 15
CMR Warfare Module......................................................................................................................................... 17
***CMR Aff Answers***..................................................................................................................................... 18
Uniqueness............................................................................................................................................................. 19
Link Turn............................................................................................................................................................... 20
No Impact............................................................................................................................................................... 21
No Spillover........................................................................................................................................................... 23

Outline

This is a generic DA if NASA runs the plan. You must ask in cross-x who does the plan, if they say NASA, then
run it. Also, the link cards are pretty bad, you must either win that the plan leads to militarization or it may
link to SPS affs. The link card there also is crap. However, there are a wealth of impacts that can be gleaned
from backfiles, so if you think you can win the link debate, I would suggest running it. So, heres the outline.
CMR is going down now, & the plan kills it. And, no CMR leads to countless wars worldwide, & you could spin
it to kill hegemony. Oh, and ASPEC might work well if you want to read this, just say they dont clarify in crossx & so we lose ground to our favorite DA.

CMR Generic 1NC

1. CMR is on the brink at its lowest point since Vietnam
Desch 10 (Michael Desch, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, 10/18/10
Why have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan been so corrosive of civil-military relations?
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/17/why_have_the_wars_in_iraq_and_afghanistan_b
een_so_corrosive_of-civil_military_relations)
If civil-military relations aren't that bad, then why even mention them? The answer is clear:
The Iraq and Afghan wars have seriously frayed the fabric civil-military in the United States ,
perhaps not yet at the level of the Vietnam War, but certainly heading in that direction.
Beginning with the pre-Iraq war debate between Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz over the appropriate force levels for the
Phase IV operation in Iraq, continuing through the so-called "revolt of the generals" over Iraq
strategy as the situation there deteriorated, and culminating in the contentious fall 2009
Afghan strategy review, these wars have divided civilian leaders and important segments of
the military in a way not seen since the rancorous civil-military debates about the conduct of
the Vietnam War of the late 1960s.
2. The DOD/Air Force want militarization control civil programs doing it angers them
Launius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2,
2010,
Astronaut
Envy?
http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vo
l_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)
Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed to this mission to the present. Throughout the
1990s, a succession of studies argued for the potential of military personnel in space. One
1992 study affirmed: It is absolutely essential for the well being of todays space forces as well
as the future space forces of 2025, that DOD develop manned advanced technology space
systems in lieu of or in addition to unmanned systems to effectively utilize military mans
compelling and aggressive warfighting abilities to accomplish the critical wartime mission
elements of space control and force application. National space policy, military space doctrine
and common sense all dictate they should do so if space superiority during future, inevitable
conflict with enemy space forces is the paramount objective. Deploying military man in space
will provide that space superiority and he will finally become the center of gravity of the
U.S. space program.43 Another analysis found 37 reasons why military personnel in space
would be required in the future, ranging from problem-solving and decision-making, to
manipulation of sensors and other systems. It concluded that A military space plane could
play a key role in helping the United States Air Force transform itself from an air force into an
aerospace force.44 Yet another study found: Our National Security Strategy must take full
advantage of the full political, economic, and military power of this nation to be successful.
That means soldiers, sailors, and airmen able to operate in every region of the world critical to
national security, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. A strategy built on
anything less is incomplete and shortsighted.45 The rationale for a military astronaut rests
largely on the human flexibility of offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking
capabilities not present with machines. There is no way that a price tag can be placed on
such characteristics as flexibility or serendipity because the essence of these attributes is the
ability to capitalize on the unanticipated or unknown, concluded one study.46 According to
some reports, DOD 44Maj. David M. Tobin, Mans Place in Space-Plane Flight

CMR Generic 1NC

Operations: Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room? Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65,
quote from p. 62. 45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., Military Man in Space: Essential to
National Strategy, Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
National Defense University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 46Air Force Space
Command study, The Utility of Military Crews in Space, 1985, quoted in Theodore
Wierzbanowski, Manned vs. Unmanned: The Implications to NASP, AIAA- 90-5265 paper,
presented at AIAA Second International Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p.
10. developed a space plane named Blackstar and began flying missions as early as 1990.47
Notwithstanding these speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by
Eisenhower to split the civil and military space programs and to assign the
human mission to the civil side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept.
It represents one instance, among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and
competition has taken place in the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national
reconnaissance space programs.
3. That kills CMR we completely lose control of the military
Foster 97 (Gregory D. Foster, George C. Marshall Professor and former J. Carlton Ward
Distinguished Professor and director of research at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Confronting the crisis in civilmilitary relations
Published
in
the
Washington
Quarterly,
1997,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01636609709550275)
Our response to the Bosnia situation, then, like Somalia and Haiti before it, says much about
the distorted relationship that now exists between civilian authorities and the military. But
unless something truly catastrophic involving U.S. troops yet occurs in Bosnia, any claim to
the effect that there is a crisis in civil-military relations will likely fall on deaf ears. That will
certainly be so if, in the end, we incur negligible casualtiesin which case, another political
bullet having been dodged, we will be sustained in the complacent belief that all is well. The
extent of civilian subjugation to the military is further exem- plified by the 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and its accompanying recommendations on armaments and forces.
The QDR was charged with "a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan and other elements of the
defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense
strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year
2005."10 What a mouthfuland what a sweeping mandate! But like the other exercises in
bureaucratic and political legerdemain that preceded it (the Roles and Missions Commission
and the so-called Bottom-Up Review) the QDR produced only superficial and modestly
incremental recommendations for change. By no stretch of the imagination were there calls
for the sort of fundamental transformation that would give substance to the military's claims
that it is in the midst of a "revolution in military affairs." On the contrary, the QDR
recommendations call only for maintaining the existing combat force of 10 activeduty Army
divisions, 20 Air Force fighter wings, 12 aircraft carrier battle groups, and 3 Marine
expeditionary forces, with a few minor emendations at the margins, all for the continuing
purpose of ostensibly being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts (or "major
theater wars") nearly simultaneously.11 Once again, the military worldview has
prevailed unblemished. As the QDR report is the product of the secretary of defense
himself, and as the president reportedly has called it "brilliant," it is only logical to conclude
that our civilian national command authorities have essentially bought into the conception of
war and military affairs embedded in the review lock, stock, and barrel. Similarly, the
independent National Defense Panel established by

CMR Generic 1NC

Congress to evaluate the QDR proposals and to propose alternatives has thus far given little
sign that it will offer anything that strays too far from established orthodoxy. Even if the
National Defense Panel were to propose something truly heterodox that strikes at the core of
established military thinking, its purely advisory status robs it of authoritative voice and
leverage. It thus will fall to Congress to make final judgments about future military direction,
and Congress has repeatedly shown how totally it is immersed in the minutiae of budgetary
bean-counting and captive of prevailing military thought. Although both Democrats and
Republicans on Capitol Hill have criticized the QDR report as "largely a status quo product"
and a "cautious document" that "makes only minor changes to the current force," the views
repeatedly expressed by Rep. Floyd Spence (R-S.C), chairman of the House National Security
Committee, are more representative than not: Budget considerations are driving the
decisionmaking on issues of both strategy and force structure, instead of strategy driving
decisions on forces and budgets. . . . The preparedness of U.S. armed forces to fight highintensity major conflicts in defense of vital national interests is eroding inexorably. . . . The
diminished readiness of our military forces is most directly influenced today by two
competing pressures: the post-Gold War cutbacks in defense budgets and downsizing of
military forces and the expanding demands of manpower-intensive peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations. . . . The cumulative effects of readiness, quality-of-life and
modernization problems are putting at risk the nation's ability to rapidly employ and sustain
substantial forces in combatcapabilities that lie at the very heart of our national military
strategy and that are essential for a superpower with global interests.12 These are words
with which the military is perfectly happyecstatic evenand they demonstrate
how wedded members of Congress are to traditional conceptions of war and
military purpose that, in a largely subliminal and unrecognized way, undermine their
ability to exercise truly discerning control over the military. Such skepticism as these
individuals bring to the table, in other words, is skepticism of change rather than of stasis.
4. Effective CMR is key to Pakistan stability
Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, 9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior
Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform
project at Brookings. 2009 civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,
http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the
understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the
short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with
far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states
with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent
potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing
states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug
production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has
frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can
destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and
Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near
future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are
that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development
capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic
importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely
limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and
civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States ability to respond to
such crises in the future.

CMR Generic 1NC

5. Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict draws in China, India and Russia
Pitt 9 (William Pitt, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on
Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence, 5/8/09,
Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World, http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?
mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)
But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with
troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were
waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in
terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the
violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the
killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take
place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new
ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in
Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us
all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear
weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in
the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a
shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal
security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties
to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring
India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century.
The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and
share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real
potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.
Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the
Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in
Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But
insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a
negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds
including soldiers, militants and civilians died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of
terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female
education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late
2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered
on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to
take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after
the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a
regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their
guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their
rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan,
must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of
Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how
best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant
gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White
House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one
of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported
The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border
that harbor al-Qaeda and the

CMR Generic 1NC

Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working
with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani
government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary
India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency
fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for
dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is
prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an
army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little
confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear
weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that
shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of
Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani
government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in
Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly
concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for
militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuelproduction facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns,
repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani
Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution
because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad,
has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani
nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of
those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time
Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 the U.S. isn't sure of the
total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is
primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S.
officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell
could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for
everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the
worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several
very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into
military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the
Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted
for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist
organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster.
We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The
developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front
burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the
situation. So should we all.

***CMR Links***

CMR Militarization Links

The DOD/Air Force want militarization control civil programs doing it angers them
Launius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2,
2010,
Astronaut
Envy?
http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vo
l_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)
Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed to this mission to the present. Throughout the
1990s, a succession of studies argued for the potential of military personnel in space. One
1992 study affirmed: It is absolutely essential for the well being of todays space forces as well
as the future space forces of 2025, that DOD develop manned advanced technology space
systems in lieu of or in addition to unmanned systems to effectively utilize military mans
compelling and aggressive warfighting abilities to accomplish the critical wartime mission
elements of space control and force application. National space policy, military space doctrine
and common sense all dictate they should do so if space superiority during future, inevitable
conflict with enemy space forces is the paramount objective. Deploying military man in space
will provide that space superiority and he will finally become the center of gravity of the
U.S. space program.43 Another analysis found 37 reasons why military personnel in space
would be required in the future, ranging from problem-solving and decision-making, to
manipulation of sensors and other systems. It concluded that A military space plane could
play a key role in helping the United States Air Force transform itself from an air force into an
aerospace force.44 Yet another study found: Our National Security Strategy must take full
advantage of the full political, economic, and military power of this nation to be successful.
That means soldiers, sailors, and airmen able to operate in every region of the world critical to
national security, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. A strategy built on
anything less is incomplete and shortsighted.45 The rationale for a military astronaut rests
largely on the human flexibility of offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking
capabilities not present with machines. There is no way that a price tag can be placed on
such characteristics as flexibility or serendipity because the essence of these attributes is the
ability to capitalize on the unanticipated or unknown, concluded one study.46 According to
some reports, DOD 44Maj. David M. Tobin, Mans Place in Space-Plane Flight Operations:
Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room? Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65, quote from p.
62. 45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., Military Man in Space: Essential to National Strategy,
Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense
University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 46Air Force Space Command study, The
Utility of Military Crews in Space, 1985, quoted in Theodore Wierzbanowski, Manned vs.
Unmanned: The Implications to NASP, AIAA- 90-5265 paper, presented at AIAA Second
International Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p. 10. developed a space plane
named Blackstar and began flying missions as early as 1990.47 Notwithstanding these
speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by Eisenhower to split the
civil and military space programs and to assign the human mission to the civil
side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept. It represents one instance,
among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and competition has taken place in
the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national reconnaissance space
programs.

CMR SBSP Links

DOD wants to buy SBSP from utilities government ownership angers them
NSSO 7 (National Security Space Office, 2007 Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for
Strategic Security http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htm)
Several major challenges will need to be overcome to make SBSP a reality, including the
creation of low-cost space access and a supporting infrastructure system on Earth and in
space. Solving these space access and operations challenges for SBSP will in turn also open
space for a host of other activities that include space tourism, manufacturing, lunar or
asteroid resource utilization, and eventually settlement to extend the human race. Because
DoD would not want to own SBSP satellites, but rather just purchase the
delivered energy as it currently does via traditional terrestrial utilities, a
repeated review finding is that the commercial sector will need Government to
accomplish three major tasks to catalyze SBSP development. The first is to retire a major
portion of the early technical risks. This can be accomplished via an incremental research and
development program that culminates with a space-borne proof-of-concept demonstration in
the next decade. A spiral development proposal to field a 10 MW continuous pilot plant en
route to gigawatts-class systems is included in Appendix B. The second challenge is to
facilitate the policy, regulatory, legal, and organizational instruments that will be necessary to
create the partnerships and relationships (commercial-commercial, government-commercial,
and government-government) needed for this concept to succeed. The final Government
contribution is to become a direct early adopter and to incentivize other early adopters much
as is accomplished on a regular basis with other renewable energy systems coming on-line
today.

CMR Human Mission Links

The Air Force and DOD want independent manned flight ability plan angers them
Launius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2,
2010,
Astronaut
Envy?
http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vo
l_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf pg 66-67)
The DOD, while certainly an important supporting organization in Mercury, remained
committed to achieving an independent human spaceflight capability. If we concede that
man can go into space for peaceful missions, stated a USAF white paper in 1961, we
must admit that man can go into this same environment for military purposes . It
is the Air Force view that many will be required to go into space to perform tasks that will be
important to our national security.20 From this position flowed a series of decisions aimed
at creating what the DOD called the Manned Military Space Program (MMSP). Several
immediate programs resulted and the Air Force noted: Fully coordinated, cooperative and
where appropriate, joint effort between the Air Force and the NASA is required in order that
the content and objectives of the MMSP are properly defined within the framework of the
total national space program.21

Competition Yes
NASA and DOD compete over rocket development
GAO, 3/98, Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation Remains Largely Unfulfilled, U.S. General
Accounting
Office,
http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=BRANAAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Nasa+DOD+competition&ots=tn62K8SyMn&sig=
DXDIMSkhnVF9KkYQHxUOei9Usnk#v=onepage&q=Nasa%20DOD%20competition&f=false
Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA's and DOD's relationship over this type
of testing has been recently marked by competition. Partly to improve its competitive position, NASA
has consolidated rocket propulsion test management in one center, but is struggling to define the
center's authority for this role. Testing engines in the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of
Nasa and Air Force competition. In July 1997, an EELV engine contractor provisionally selected
NASAs Stennis Space Center to test engines in the next phase of the program. Consequently, the
future role of the Air Force's tat center for this program is uncertain.
History of DOD-NASA relations is riddled with rivalry and resentment
Fred Boone, Admiral, USN, 12/70, NASA OFFICE OF DEFENSE AFFAIRS THE FIRST FIVE YEARS,
NASA, http://history.nasa.gov/HHR-32/HHR-32.htm
During the final years of the NACA, the Military Services had initiated R&D programs in the new
field of space. When NASA was created, the Services had been required to transfer some of this
activity to the new Agency, including certain supporting facilities and teams of R&D personnel. Quite
naturally, this had left some feeling within DOD that the Services had been deprived of something
which was theirs by right of initiation and, in some cases, ultimate user status. This, in turn, had caused
some reluctance to enter into a fully cooperative partnership of mutual support in aerospace activities,
as obviously intended by the Space Act.

***CMR IMPACTS***

CMR Smart Power Module

Balanced CMR is key to Smart Power

Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, 9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project
and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of
the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. 2009 civil-military relations, fostering
development, and expanding civilian capacity , http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relationsfostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity
Most current proponents of a NSGD seek a strategy that employs a broad definition of
development as it applies to foreign assistance -- inclusive of humanitarian aid, post-conflict
reconstruction and good governance as well as poverty alleviation and economic growth.
Within this vision, an NSGD would also address other relevant development policy areas such
as trade and migration. The underlying understanding is that efforts in all of these areas
shape the longterm progress of developing countries, including the prevention of conflict. The
workshop discussions also reminded participants that development assistance can be
interpreted more narrowly as long term aid programs to various less-developed countries.
This definitional problem continues to be important as the government explores the scope of
potential new strategies, but the feeling of the organizers is that the complementarities of
crisis response and longer term development should be emphasized. There is a general
consensus on the need to strengthen the capacity of the United States
governments civilian international affairs agencies as part of a smart power
approach to global engagement. Clearly, it is a national security imperative to ensure
that the United States government can effectively harmonize stabilization efforts with broader
development approaches and institutions. At a strategic level, policymakers must identify
steps that can set the nation on a course of greater reliance on, and sufficient investment in,
civilian development expertise.
The smart power doctrine is key to stop global economic collapse, disease, terror, and
climate change
Nye 9 (Joseph S. Nye, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, professor of International Relations
at Harvard University, 9/10/9, American Power in the Twenty-First Century, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/nye74/English)
CAMBRIDGE The United States governments National Intelligence Council projects that
American dominance will be much diminished by 2025, and that the one key area of
continued American superiority military power will be less significant in the increasingly
competitive world of the future. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called the 2008
financial crisis a sign that Americas global leadership is coming to an end. The leader of
Canadas opposition Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, suggests that US power has passed its
mid-day. How can we know if these predictions are correct? One should beware of misleading
metaphors of organic decline. Countries are not like humans with predictable life spans. For
example, after Britain lost its American colonies at the end of the eighteenth century, Horace
Walpole lamented Britains reduction to as insignificant a country as Denmark or Sardinia.
He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even
greater ascendency. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee
of Roman power. Even then, Rome did not succumb to another state, but suffered a death of a
thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes. Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions
of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the US in the coming decades, the classical transition
of power among great states may be less of a problem than the rise of modern
barbarians non-state actors. In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power
diffusion may be a greater threat

CMR Smart Power Module

than power transition. So, what will it mean to wield power in the global information age
of the twenty-first century? What resources will produce power? In the sixteenth century,
control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland
profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population
and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on its industrial primacy and its
navy. Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails,
but in an information age it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins.
Today, it is far from clear how the balance of power is measured, much less how to develop
successful survival strategies. In his inaugural address in 2009, President Barack Obama
stated that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the
justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and
restraint. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, America cannot solve
the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America.
We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal.
Smart power means the combination of the hard power of command and the soft power of
attraction. Power always depends on context. The child who dominates on the
playground may become a laggard when the context changes to a disciplined classroom. In
the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the
Pope had, but four decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalins empire had
collapsed. In todays world, the distribution of power varies with the context. It is
distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game . On the
top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the US is likely to remain the
only superpower for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has already
been multi-polar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major
players, and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of crossborder transactions that occur outside of government control. It includes diverse non-state
actors, such as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets,
and, at the other extreme, terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cybersecurity. It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change. On this bottom
board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity,
multipolarity, hegemony, or any other clich. Even in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalization and
transnational challenges. The problem for American power in the twenty-first
century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the
most powerful state. Although the US does well on military measures, there is
much going on that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the
information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that
prevents America from achieving all its international goals acting alone. For
example, international financial stability is vital to Americans prosperity, but the US
needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change, too, will affect
Americans quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone. In a world where
borders are more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to
terrorism, America must help build international coalitions and institutions to address
shared threats and challenges. In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game. It is
not enough to think in terms of power over others. One must also think in terms of power to
accomplish goals. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help to accomplish
ones own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of
relevant power. The problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not
one of decline, but of recognizing that even the most powerful country cannot
achieve its aims without the help of others.

CMR Terrorism Module

CMR key to homeland security and fighting the War on Terrorism
Guttieri 3- Member of the Global Public Policy Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School
and faculty share with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the US Army War
College (August 2003, Karen,Homeland security and U.S civil-Military Relations,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2003/aug03/homeland.ht
ml
The American strategic policy communityfor example, the US Commission on National
Security in the 21st Centurywas concerned with homeland defense prior to 9/11. After that
fateful day, the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term:
homeland security. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for,
but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a
great deal about US civil-military relations. America's post-9/11 obsession with securing the
"homeland" shifted the domestic political landscape, including American civil-military
relations. The American model of civil-military relations has been characterized by a contract
according to which the military defends the nation's borders while domestic police keep order
at home. "On September 11," in the words of DoD Transformation "czar" Arthur K.
Cebrowski, "America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new
contract is being written."[1] This Strategic Insight describes some of the forces compelling
military changes in the historical context of US civil-military relations. Although the military
itself may resist change, institution-building (outside and within that organization) and
attitudinal changes in response to massive terrorist attacks at home cannot but alter
American civil-military relations. Much of the shift in American politics since 9/11 has to do
with the nature and requirements of homeland security: it is both public and private,
interagency (involving a number of government elements) and civil-military. Implementing
the new national security strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and
jurisdictions of authority.[2] Government-private sector coordination is vital to critical
infrastructure protection. Agency-to-agency coordination is the foundation of any national
response to security threats involving multiple levels of government in a nation consisting of
more than 87,000 government jurisdictions.[3] Civil-military coordination is indispensable
for ensuring adequate military support to civilian agencies responsible for homeland security.
The quality of America's civil-military relations will be a factor in the effectiveness of
America's "war on terror," while by the same token, the conduct of the war will irrevocably
shape those relations. Given the US military's lead in homeland defense, civilian control of
the military should be a topic of particular interest to anyone concerned with the function of
democracy in wartime.

CMR Terrorism Module

Terrorism risks extinction
Alexander 03. (Yonah, Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington
Times, August 28, lexis)
contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and
brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super
Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious
implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must
Unlike their historical counterparts,

be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international
cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to
achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death,"
should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist
groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of
societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa
Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to
destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the
Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs."
The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons,
operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation
inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies,
there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful
lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term
deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a
"ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several
suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation
in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus,

it behooves those countries victimized

by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on
May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For
without victory, there is no survival."

CMR Warfare Module

CMR now has global consequences any divide leads to war

Cohen 97 (Elliot, Spring, professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Civil-military relations - Are U.S. Forces
Overstretched?,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v41/ai_19416332/pg_9/?
tag=content;col1)
Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain
pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a
crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open
division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa
in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course,
favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it
was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media,
where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time
individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in
these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. In the
modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to
shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely in the annals of
statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices.
Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the
Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral
Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had
Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be
remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there
might have been a third world war. Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was
remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield
Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have
made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception
of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and
America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near
halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the
federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important,
civil-military relations in the United States now no longer affect merely the closet-room
politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices
about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American
tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been
petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and
conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of
the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a
world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

***CMR Aff Answers***

Uniqueness

Inevitably expanding non-combat missions collapses CMR

Yoo 9 John Yoo, Fletcher Jones Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Chapman University
School of Law; Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute, May 2009, THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ISSUE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNDER THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: LOOKING
BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD: ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATION OF WAR, Duke Law Journal, 58
Duke L.J. 2277, p. lexis
This appears to explain developments in civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War.
It does not appear that civilian monitoring or sanctions have fallen; in fact, they may
well have risen. The tension in civilian-military relations nevertheless has sharpened
because the difference between civilian and military policy preferences has grown at an
even faster rate. This should come as no surprise. The disappearance of the Soviet threat,
which had been the overwhelming focus of American military planning for a half-century, left
both sets of leaders searching for a redefinition of national security means and ends.
Increasing reliance on the military for operations that do not involve combat, such as
drug interdiction, nation building, and disaster relief, may draw the military more
deeply into civilian debates, increase the scope for disagreements over the role of
the military, and place strains on the military's resources and warfighting abilities.
An all-volunteer force may have exacerbated tensions as the military becomes more separate
and distinct from civilian society.

Link Turn
Space policy keeps NASA and DOD operations separated to civil and military
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, NASADEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM
Current U.S. National Space Transportation policy establishes NASA as ''lead agency for
technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable space
transportation systems.'' DOD's role in the current Policy is focused on expendable launch
systems. The practical effect of this language has been to limit unnecessarily DOD's
involvement in decisions pertaining to next generation reusable systems. To meet emerging
national security requirements for space control and force projection, DOD should be able to
fully explore next generation reusable system solutions. Conversely, this delineation has
precluded NASA innovation in exploiting the DOD investment in expendable launch vehicles.
As mentioned earlier, the current and foreseeable launch rates do not support the
development of fully reusable launch systems.

No Impact
No impact to CMR there is already too much civilian control in the military
Feaver and Kohn 5 [Peter Feaver, professor of Political Science and Public Policy and the director
of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies at Duke University, and Richard H. Kohn, Professor of
History at the University of North Carolina, 2005, The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and Their Mutual
Misunderstanding, in American Defense Policy, 2005 edition, ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta,
Collins G. Shackelford, p. 339]
CONCERNS about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve
are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic. Writing in the 1950s,
Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating,
if not embracing, the conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also
suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a substantial degree of cultural autonomy
Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy
military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and
dictates of its civilian masters.z The end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in
American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate. The contemporary
heirs of Janowitz see the all-volunteer military as drifting too far away from the norms of
American society, thereby posing problems for civilian control. They make four principal
assertions. First, the military has grown out of step ideologically with the public, showing
itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious (and fundamentalist)
than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the
Republican Party. Second, the military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted
with and sometimes even explicitly hostile to civilian culture. Third, the armed forces have
resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and
have generally proved reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control
and military effectiveness will both suffer as the military-seeking ways to operate without
effective civilian oversight and alienated from the society around it-loses the respect and
support of that society. By contrast, the heirs of Huntington argue that a degenerate civilian
culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it intends to eradicate healthy and
functional civil-military differences, particularly in the areas of gender, sexual orientation and
discipline. This camp, too, makes four key claims. First, its members assert that the military is
divorced in values from a political and cultural elite that is itself alienated from the general
public. Second, it believes this civilian elite to be ignorant of, and even hostile to, the armed
forces-eager to employ the military as a laboratory for social change, even at the cost of
crippling its warfighting capacity. Third, it discounts the specter of eroding civilian control
because it sees a military so thoroughly inculcated with an ethos of subordination that there is
now too much civilian control, the effect of which has been to stifle the military's ability to
function effectively. Fourth, because support for the military among the general public
remains sturdy, any gap in values is inconsequential. The problem, if anything, is with the
civilian elite. The debate has been lively (and inside the Beltway sometimes quite vicious), but
it has rested on very thin evidence-competing anecdotes, claims and counterclaims about the
nature of civilian and military attitudes. Absent has been a body of systematic data exploring
opinions, values, perspectives and attitudes inside the military compared with those held by
civilian elites and the general public. Our project provides some answers.

No Impact
CMR doesnt make sense as a policy any more irregular warfare has blended the lines
of civil and military
Cronin 8 (Patrick Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University, 10/1/08 Irregular warfare: new challenges for civil-military relations
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_234/ai_n31461852/pg_12/?
tag=mantle_skin;content)
Persistent irregular conflict poses difficult new challenges for command and leadership and
civil-military relations in general. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate these
challenges. The Iraq engagement began with a short, conventional war that aimed massive
military power to defeat a hostile state and depose its leader. The Commander in Chief, with
the approval of civilian leaders in Congress, authorized the action, and military commanders
carried it out successfully. But after the initial goals were achieved, the engagement in Iraq
rapidly devolved into a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict in Afghanistan shows, in an
irregular war against an asymmetric, nonstate threat, the traditional lanes of authority no
longer clearly separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the
engagement, the military commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials
responsible for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction.

No Spillover
Policy disagreements dont undermine overall CMR and dont spill over
Hansen 9 Victor Hansen, Associate Professor of Law, New England Law School, Summer 2009,
SYMPOSIUM: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR: ARTICLE: UNDERSTANDING THE
ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED
CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, South Texas Law Review, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 617, p. lexis
According to Sulmasy and Yoo, these conflicts between the military and the Bush Administration are the latest
examples of a [*624] crisis in civilian-military relations. n32 The authors suggest the principle of civilian control of
the military must be measured and is potentially violated whenever the military is able to impose its preferred policy
outcomes against the wishes of the civilian leaders. n33 They further assert that it is the attitude of at least some
members of the military that civilian leaders are temporary office holders to be outlasted and outmaneuvered. n34
If the examples cited by the authors do in fact suggest efforts by members of the military to undermine civilian control
over the military, then civilian-military relations may have indeed reached a crisis. Before such a conclusion can
be reached, however, a more careful analysis is warranted. We cannot accept at face value the authors' broad
assertions that any time a member of the military, whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the
views of a civilian member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch, including the
President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates to either a tension or a crisis in civilmilitary relations. Sulmasy and Yoo claim there is heightened tension or perhaps even a crisis in civil-military
relations, yet they fail to define what is meant by the principle of civilian control over the military. Instead, the authors
make general and rather vague statements suggesting any policy disagreements between members of the military and
officials in the executive branch must equate to a challenge by the military against civilian control. n35 However, until
we have a clear understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, we cannot accurately determine
whether a crisis in civil-military relations exists. It is to this question that we now turn.

No risk of a spillover---many checks exist even after explicitly overruling the military
Hooker 4 - Colonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in international
relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served in the Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, Winter 2004, Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military
Relations, Parameters, p. 4-18
Clearly there have been individual instances where military leaders crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally
and illegitimately with respect to proper subordination to civilian authority; the Revolt of the Admirals and the
MacArthur-Truman controversy already have been cited. The increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior
military officials criticize their civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged and even
classified information, cannot be justified.
Yet civilian control remains very much alive and well. The many direct and indirect instruments of objective
and subjective civilian control of the military suggest that the true issue is not controldefined as the governments
ability to enforce its authority over the militarybut rather political freedom of action. In virtually every sphere,
civilian control over the military apparatus is decisive. All senior military officers serve at the pleasure of the President
and can be removed, and indeed retired, without cause. Congress must approve all officer promotions and guards this
prerogative jealously; even lateral appointments at the three- and four-star levels must be approved by the President
and confirmed by Congress, and no officer at that level may retire in grade without separate approval by both branches
of government. Operating budgets, the structure of military organizations, benefits, pay and allowances, and even the
minutia of official travel and office furniture are determined by civilians. The reality of civilian control is confirmed not
only by the many instances cited earlier where military recommendations were over-ruled. Not infrequently, military
chiefs have been removed or replaced by the direct and indirect exercise of civilian authority.37