Asian Surety vs.

Herrera
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of
Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records
alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led
by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with
an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian
Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio
of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of
directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of
documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3,
Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified
and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and
other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN
FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed
against Aminnudin.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received
the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, another two weeks and a third "weeks before June
25."
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.

RULING:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt
its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

SAMMY MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Police
officer Yu and company were on foot patrol (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo,
Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon
Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving
very fast."
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As
the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line. Yu's companion, police officer
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner
and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest,
and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of

bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.
RULING:
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner
were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers
to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the
seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a
brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to
be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted
to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's
credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to
arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim
that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest
(Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his
companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.

Q You are sure of that?

A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create
any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" " inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as
noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware
that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in
[sic] his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Stonehill vs. Diokno

[GR L-19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and
Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila),
Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different
dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl
Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said
persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.

Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of
documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that,
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized.
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly
described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However,
the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and (b)
those found seized in the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) residences of
Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et.
al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962 Resolution of the Supreme
Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on the
documents, papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using
them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences is made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the 29 places, offices and other premises.

Papa vs. Mago

[GR L-27360, 28 February 1968] En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a
duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two
trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police.
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the

name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496),
praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or
their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief
of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However,
when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an
assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed
an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower
court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of
court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the
Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte
motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article
of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting
of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967,
Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods
under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without
waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or
other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 79 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully
open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable
cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question.
The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said
search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief
of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority
to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code
does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen
did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a
search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared

that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

[GR 45358, 29 January 1937] First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to
the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition,
ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With
said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of
4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the
years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2
memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles
of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2 packages of
correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers,
many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and
stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).
The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest
below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the
articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through
his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent,
be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court
issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of
notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court.
On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the
order of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 8th of said month be set aside
and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file the
search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present
an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a
petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date
together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled,
that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized
them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority.
On September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled,
and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of
2 days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should
not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a
motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose
of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On October 10,

said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the documents and
papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 ,
34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the
court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the
search warrant as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which
were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere
information secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant
must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.
The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted
that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by
agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if
the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary.
Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had
no personal knowledge of the facts.

People vs. Molina

[GR 133917, 19 February 2001] En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person
was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle
passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the
pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior
to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the

alleged pusher Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) will be passing at NHA, Maa,
Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP,
Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team
leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the
house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30
a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and
Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his
house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered the
"trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused
Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial
court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused
waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court
rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section
10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the
seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article
III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula
and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, they could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to
open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula
and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon,
Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would
appear that the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only
after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace
officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.

Valmonte vs. de Villa

[GR 83988, 24 May 1990] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant
to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an

effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 85 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers
and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the
alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people. They aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a
court order or search warrant. They further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court's decision
dated 29 September 1989, Valmontes and ULAPs petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP
filed the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search
and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution.
Held: Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e.
at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per
se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and
installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave
perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events
have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police
forces. Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or
performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power,
to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the
government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for
best achieving them.
The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop
does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be
denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants
are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally
allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped
and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have
been instruments of some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing
passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally
objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity. Lastly, the Court's decision on
checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 86 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned
with power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints.
Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is

supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope
of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.

People vs. Salanguit

[GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon
City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able
to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw
that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a
group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve
the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately
1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search,
the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other
hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for
possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed
on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the
admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground
that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force
by the police in the execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of drug
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana
may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being
founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to,
and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found,
i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case
Q-95-64357 only.

PP vs. Syjuco
Facts:
The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search warrant issued, the
officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among
others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and contained some letters, documents
and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the provisions of the law and of
the Constitution relative thereto?
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue belong to
Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents or records
referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the
Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that they are actually
being used for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only ground upon which
such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant)
and when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that the things belonging to
Atty. Remo and to others also be searched and seized.
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very well founded,
the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key
thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby
declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this
decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful
investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and executed the
warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

The People of the Philippines vs Mikael Malmstedt

Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCOM inspection at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish, a derivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him
guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the
reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there was no
search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused
argues that the search and arrest was made without a warrant
Held: The RTC decision is affirmed.
Ratio: The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a
warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present
his passport.

People vs. Bagista

The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City,
received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with
naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5'2" or 5'3", would be transporting marijuana from up north.[1]

Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a
civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at
around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles,
both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana
leaves on board.[2] After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate
No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded
the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that
they were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt.
Fider began inspecting the bags in the front.[3] While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly
hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag
with black and orange stripes[4] on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3)
bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she
was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified as accusedappellant.[5] The confiscated
bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana.[6] Accusedappellant's defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and selling of
vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan,
Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria Opino
in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her
sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and
began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the
marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning
the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with
them for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the
NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on the bus. To corroborate
her story, accused-appellant presented the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He
testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from
the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the passengers who
among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time
looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated at
the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus.[7] During Yangkin's crossexamination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by a
man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City
but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not seek out the alleged
owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered to
pay for the fare of the sacks,[8] contrary to accused-appellant's testimony. In convicting accusedappellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible.
The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of
the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a coordinating individual.
His testimony reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the accused.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the
carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was
not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People vs. Francia, L-69253,
September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 495)."[9]
Accused-appellant is in error. The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.[14] The basis for the
rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a

lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,[15] and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.[16] With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.[17] This in no way, however, gives the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[18]
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from
the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings
since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search
by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against
accused-appellant. At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the
inadmissibility of the evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless
search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained therefrom.[19] Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence.[20]
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant's possession. She denies this fact
and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger
seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually happened at the
checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellant's apprehension, that of the
prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the testimony
of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such
testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.[21] The
exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result,[22] which We do not find in the instant case. Moreover, accused-appellant's
defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the
10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant
claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its fare, but that conductor
Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who told him
that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the bus offered to
pay for the same. In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be
given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials of the accused appellant.
[23]
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of
Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant's
reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not
hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the
marijuana found in her possession. As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution's case, such as the
color of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from
accusedappellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not
detract from the prosecution's case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized,[24] which was
signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.

Prudente vs. Dayrit

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila,
Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of result of
our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions arent licensed to possess said

firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions
which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of
the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts. The examination of the said witness was not in
form of searching questions and answers. Search warrant was a general warrant and, Violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD: Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the
Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The
probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search
Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath,
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and witnesses
he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes several
offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc.
Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific
offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and
COMPANY,
CPAs

Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs, is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of
accounting.
In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through
its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks)
deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money
with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller
acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit
slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6
SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for
L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When
Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the
passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya and
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the
words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook
but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre
got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was
then standing beside Macaraya.
The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August 1991) of
P300,000
from
its
savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of
L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip.
A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint
for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed
to the CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank.
But it modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.
RULING:
Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple
loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that x x x savings x x x deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. There is a debtorcreditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The
savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights
and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and
performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The
fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good
father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is
that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a
family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks must
observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their depositors.

However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract between the
bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the
bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply imposes
on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the
contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because banks do
not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves.
Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation: Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility
arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For breach of the
savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to Allied
Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the
processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. When the passbook is in the possession of
Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree
of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only
to the depositor or his authorized representative. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to
receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the
defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was
negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation
to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden
was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. But Solidbank failed
to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom
Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. Solidbank also failed to
adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if
there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or
command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must not
only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also insure that its employees do
likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in
possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction,
Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized

representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the
passbook to another person.
Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have
happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not
returning the passbook to Calapre.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance:
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual,
where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would
exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant
from his breach of contract
Mitigated Damages: Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. This means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, then the
courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in
allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus,
the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
In PBC v. CA where the Court held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the
damages between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we
hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank
must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
UCPB vs Spouses Beluso
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari declaring void the interest rate provided in the promissory notes executed
by the respondents Spouses Samuel and Odette Beluso (spouses Beluso) in favor of petitioner United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter
could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending
on 30 April 1997. The spouses Beluso constituted, other than their promissory notes, a real estate
mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-31539 and T27828, as additional security for the obligation. The Credit Agreement was subsequently amended to
increase the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of P2.35 Million pesos and to extend the
term thereof to 28 February 1998.
On 30 April 1997, the payment of the principal and interest of the latter two promissory notes were debited
from the spouses Belusos account with UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for P1.3 Million was again released
to the spouses Beluso under one promissory note with a due date of 28 February 1998. To completely avail
themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the spouses Beluso executed two

more promissory notes for a total of P350,000.00. However, the spouses Beluso alleged that the amounts
covered by these last two promissory notes were never released or credited to their account and, thus,
claimed that the principal indebtedness was only P2 Million.
The spouses Beluso, however, failed to make any payment of the foregoing amounts.
On 2 September 1998, UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total obligation
of P2,932,543.00 plus 25% attorneys fees, but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. On 28
December 1998, UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Beluso to secure their credit
line, which, by that time, already ballooned to P3,784,603.00.
On 9 February 1999, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against
UCPB with the RTC of Makati City.
Trial court declared in its judgment that:
the interest rate used by [UCPB] void
the foreclosure and Sheriffs Certificate of Sale void
UCPB is ordered to return to [the spouses Beluso] the properties subject of the foreclosure
UCPB to pay [the spouses Beluso] the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees
UCPB to pay the costs of suit.
Spouses Beluso] are hereby ordered to pay [UCPB] the sum of P1,560,308.00.
Court of Appeals affirmed Trial court's decision subject to the modification that defendant-appellant UCPB
is not liable for attorneys fees or the costs of suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not interest rate stipulated was void
Yes, stipulated interest rate is void because it contravenes on the principle of mutuality of contracts and
it violates the Truth in lending Act.
The provision stating that the interest shall be at the rate indicative of DBD retail rate or as
determined by the Branch Head is indeed dependent solely on the will of petitioner UCPB. Under such
provision, petitioner UCPB has two choices on what the interest rate shall be: (1) a rate indicative of the
DBD retail rate; or (2) a rate as determined by the Branch Head. As UCPB is given this choice, the rate
should be categorically determinable in both choices. If either of these two choices presents an
opportunity for UCPB to fix the rate at will, the bank can easily choose such an option, thus making the
entire interest rate provision violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
In addition, the promissory notes, the copies of which were presented to the spouses Beluso after
execution, are not sufficient notification from UCPB. As earlier discussed, the interest rate provision
therein does not sufficiently indicate with particularity the interest rate to be applied to the loan
covered by said promissory notes which is required in TRuth in Lending Act
2. Whether or not Spouses Beluso are subject to 12% interest and compounding interest
stipulations even if declared amount by UCPB was excessive.
Yes. Default commences upon judicial or extrajudicial demand. [26] The excess amount in such a
demand does not nullify the demand itself, which is valid with respect to the proper amount. There
being a valid demand on the part of UCPB, albeit excessive, the spouses Beluso are considered in
default with respect to the proper amount and, therefore, the interests and the penalties began to run
at that point. As regards the award of 12% legal interest in favor of petitioner, the RTC actually
recognized that said legal interest should be imposed, thus: There being no valid stipulation as to
interest, the legal rate of interest shall be charged. [27] It seems that the RTC inadvertently overlooked
its non-inclusion in its computation. It must likewise uphold the contract stipulation providing the
compounding of interest. The provisions in the Credit Agreement and in the promissory notes providing
for the compounding of interest were neither nullified by the RTC or the Court of Appeals, nor assailed
by the spouses Beluso in their petition with the RTC. The compounding of interests has furthermore
been declared by this Court to be legal.
3. Whether or not foreclosure was void
No. The foreclosure proceedings are valid since there was a valid demand made by UCPB upon the
spouses Beluso. Despite being excessive, the spouses Beluso are considered in default with respect to
the proper amount of their obligation to UCPB and, thus, the property they mortgaged to secure such

amounts may be foreclosed. Consequently, proceeds of the foreclosure sale should be applied to the
extent of the amounts to which UCPB is rightfully entitled.

PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES

1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision
The cause > Different categories > Proximate
Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui (11k~) as
payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of the checks, Reyes
requested PCIB Money Shops manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his savings account and have
it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make the
deposit.
In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes current account number
to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was 815 so that was the
number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren
Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was for FlorencioAmador, so he posted the
deposit in the account of Amador.
The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes ledger indicated that his
account only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later but it
was dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tuis favor. Tui returned the check to
Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.
Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of
his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in Amadors account was
transferred to Reyes account upon being cleared by the former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k. The
bank then honored the check.
RTC ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay damages to Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASIS NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES CASH

DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME
For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred
and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that
the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence.
Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties
He posted the cash deposit in Amadors account from the assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit
slip
He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty,
considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by Reyes were
dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance