ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES:

(1) ANGEL ABAD VS. HERMINIO DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015
FACTS:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Angel Abad assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission
Resolution. This Resolution affirmed the permanent appointment of Herminio Dela
Cruz as City Government Department Head III. Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed
(Dela Cruz) as City Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent
capacity on December 28, 2006.The City Assessor is given the item of City
Government Department Head III. In Resolution No. 06-361, majority of the members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa concurred in
the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government Department Head III.
Pursuant to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1235 granting the City
Government of Muntinlupa the power to take final action on its appointments, the
appointment of Dela Cruz was considered attested to by the Civil Service Commission.
(Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, wrote
the Civil Service Commission and expressed the disapproval of Dela Cruz's
appointmen alleging that the position of City Government Department Head III
corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela Cruz's
former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18.
According to Abad, Dela Cruz's appointment violated Item 15 of Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the
promotion of an employee to a position more than three (3) salary grades above his
or her former position.
Abad added that being a qualified next-in-rank, he applied for the position of City
Government Department Head III. However, he and three (3) other qualified
applicants were allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of Item 10
of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, series of 2001. According to
Abad, the appointment of Dela Cruz caused "demoralization within [their] ranks." Due
to a fire, the City Government of Muntinlupa, therefore, failed to act on Abad's Letter.
Abad filed with the Mayor's Office the lettercomplaint reiterating his request for
disapproval of Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department
Head III. Mayor San Pedro referred Abad's letter-complaint to the City Government of
Muntinlupa's Personnel Department The Grievance Committee recommended the
invalidation of Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department
HeadIII. Mayor San Pedro's approval to this recommendation was then referred to the
CSC-NCR. CSC-NCR invalidated DelaCruz's permanent appointment as City
Government Department HeadIII. CSC reversed this decision on dela Cruzs
appeal.CSC ruledthat Dela Cruz's appointment was an exception to the three-salarygraderule. Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection process rendering his appointment
"very meritorious[.]" CA dismissed petition for review and affirmed the appointment.
CA held that the three-salary-grade rule "only gives preference to the person
occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy,but does not by any means give [the
employee next in rank][the]exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy." As
long as the employee appointed to the position possesses the minimum qualifications
for the position,the appointment is valid.
SC found that the present petition must be denied.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Dela Cruz's promotion to the position of City
Government Department Head III is void because it violated the next-in-rank rule.
HELD: Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis
of merit. Both the Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the
position. While those who are next in rank to a vacant position may be given some
preference, no one has a vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary
grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest. The
Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region and the Civil Service Commission
agree that respondent possesses the minimum qualifications under the law for the
position of City Government Department Head III. Moreover, the appointment of Dela
Cruz was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa in Resolution No.
06-361. The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for
promotion.
The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the
position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant.
Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the
appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid.
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-inrank. Re 3-salarygrade rule, case falls under one of the exceptions(deep selection
process).
(2) ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR.v. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO
G.R. NO. 181760, 14 October 2014, EN BANC, (LEONEN, J.)
The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
has the power to appoint officers in the region's civil service. However, if there is no
regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of
appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required for the
position in the national government to be appointed in a permanent capacity.
FACTS:
Regional Governor Dr. Parouk S. Hussin of the ARMM appointed Dr.
Sangcad D. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the Department
of Education (DepEd) Division on Lanao del Sur in a temporary capacity. In 2005,
Hussin reappointed Dr. Benito in the same position but in a permanent capacity.
Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office of the ARMM to
attest to Dr. Benitos appointment. However, Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena
(Buena) declined on the ground that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive
service eligibility required for the said position. The latter filed a petition for
Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional Office to attest
to his permanent appointment arguing that the position does not belong to the
Career Executive Service under the Administrative Code of 1987, thus, the position
does not require Career Executive Service eligibility. He further claimed that under
RA 9054, Regional Governor of the ARMM is the appointing authority for
positions in the civil service in the region. Since Hussin already exercised his
discretion, the Regional Office had no choice but to attest to his appointment.
Buena claimed that the permanent appointee must have career executive
service eligibility. According to Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy
of the ARMM. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law,
the Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service Commissions mandate
under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.

ISSUE:
Is Dr. Benito validly appointed as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent in a permanent capacity by the Regional Governor of ARMM?
RULING:
No. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to
the Career Executive Service. Appointment to the position is based on merit and
fitness and gives the appointee an opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions, such as Schools Division Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the
appointee is guaranteed security of tenure. The position is above Division Chief.
An Assistant Schools Division Superintendent has a salary grade of 25. As to
functions and responsibilities, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent assists
the Schools Division Superintendent in performing executive and managerial
functions under Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001. In fact, the law
recognizes that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs
to the Career Executive Service. Section 7 of the said law explicitly provides that an
appointee to the position must be a career executive service officer. In this case, Dr.
Benito does not possess the required career executive service eligibility. He,
therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot be
compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of Dr. Benito.
The Regional Governor has the power to appoint civil servants in the
ARMM under Republic Act No. 9054. In Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
279 or the ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010, the Regional Assembly set the
qualification standards of Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of Divisions
of the Department of Education in the Autonomous Region. Nevertheless, when
Dr. Benito was appointed Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in 2005, there
was yet no regional law providing for the qualifications for the Assistant Schools
Division Superintendents of Divisions of the Department of Education in the
Autonomous Region.
(3) DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al.
G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although their respective functions are
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion.
FACTS:
In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T.
Duque III (Duque) as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was
thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently,
President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque
was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio
capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled

corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine

Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen
and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as
well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO
292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC
and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity,
impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition
against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
RULING:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but
declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio
capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although their respective functions
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IXA
of the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the
1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the
Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and
members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in
any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with,
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which
is the disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duques
tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this
disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the

Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive

Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position
(i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7,
paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the
central personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish
a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the
merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources development programs
for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC
Chairmans membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must
affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the
primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairmans membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be
derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective
charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they
were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and
functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when
the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions,
which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as
imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the
accreditation of health care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the

payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that
is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position,
and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices,
Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the
control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the
status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of
Health and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS
and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing
Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of
their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such,
the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by
the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of
CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he
served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who
is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office
has not expired.That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure
as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are
just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of
Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF,
were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed
and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the
sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible
authority emanates from the State. Duques official actions covered by this
clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and
memoranda approving appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs,
promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and employee benefits,

and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
(4) RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 199032
November 19, 2014
FACTS:
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged
remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad"
may be found.5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was
presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six
(6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the
victims.6
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 7 which was later enforced by the elements ofthe
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination withthe members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains. 8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence 9 premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position asVice
Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by
the Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 0914407 which was to be enforced in Davao City; 11 (c) the human remains sought to be
seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant; 12 (d) the police officers are
mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; 13 (e)
the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause; 14 (f) the rule against
forum shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one
specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched and the
articles to be seized.16
ISSUE: Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated
Search Warrant No. 09-14407
RULING: Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that
"[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest
him of his position as such,"Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as
Vice-Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of
the Courts Resolution in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta 34 wherein he was
administratively penalized with fines of P15,000.00 and P5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peraltas authority to act as ViceExecutive Judge, it must be
qualified thatthe abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the

invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de factoofficer is and explains that his acts are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jureofficer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de factoofficer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.37
The treatment of a de factoofficers acts is premised on the reality that third persons
cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and,
as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are
legally such.38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of
title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the
public as distinguished from the officer in question is concerned. 39 Indeed, it is far
more cogently acknowledged that the de factodoctrine has been formulated, not for
the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the
public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the
duties of an office without being lawful officers. 40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur:
(a) there must be a de jureoffice; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the
office in good faith.41
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly,
there is a de jureoffice of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a
colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was
only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality that is, the
operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also,
it may be said that there was general acquiescence by the public since the search
warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice
Executive Judge.42 Finally, Judge Peraltas actual physical possession of the said office
is presumed to bein good faith, as the contrary was not established. 43 Accordingly,
Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de factoofficer when he issued
Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de
jureofficer suffering no administrative impediment.

(5) EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND

LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA and DIGNA MATALANG COCHING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194061

April 20, 2015

FACTS:
The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San
Vicente, Palawan, which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.
On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use
Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing establishment.
According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the
name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly occupied the land during
his lifetime.
On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses)
also applied for SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.
According to the respondent spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through
a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maraon, a
registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights,
executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,10 and Digna Matalang Coching (another respondent in
this case), also registered survey claimants.
On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioners SLUP application
before the DENR. On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order giving due course
to the petitioners SLUP application and rejecting the respondents SLUP application.
The RED later denied the respondents motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2004.
The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They
filed on August 25,2004, through registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to the
Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioners lawyer and the Office of
the RED. The appeal fee was paid on September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna
Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed her
appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16,
2004.
While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a
Certificate of Finality11declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final
and executory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.
On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514.
On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the
December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the coverage of
the SLUP ofthe petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the
SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary
reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held that the
December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality
because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum, instead of a Notice
of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR Secretary and
not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal
fees within the reglementary period.
The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR
Secretary. The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision
of the Office of the President.
The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CAs ruling.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS
CORRECTLYFILED TO THE DENR SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990.
RULING:
It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege,
should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. This has been consistently held
in relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to
offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-compliance.
Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule
has always been liberality.
Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by
law.28 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to
promote their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.29
In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing
Corp.,30 we held:
It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the
attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the
rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the
rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.x x x This is especially true with quasijudicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical
rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]
The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations
imposed by the requirements of due process.31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo

v. Pagcor,32
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to
administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained. 33
Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure
to enhance fair trial and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction
has no application when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases
involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation
disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the
violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure
should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.
Liberal Construction as Applied in the Present Case
It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to
the RED, filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary within the fifteen (15)day reglementary period. They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen(15)day period. These violate Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87 which requires the filing of a
Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the reglementary period.