Philippine Bar Association vs.

COMELEC
FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and
Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create
the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of
the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections
for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacating the
position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed
and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional
provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have
not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and
honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are
less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining
order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents
office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the
way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a
new mandate or to elect a new president.

Araullo v Aquino
Facts: 1. On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate to reveal that some Senators, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
2. Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public
statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a
program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
3. The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to
the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable.
4. Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP
were filed.
5. Respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
Issue: WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Held: The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.

Lansang v Garcia
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party assembly in 1971 causing the
death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang were invited by the police headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang
questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet
the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this
case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to
annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to
receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of
the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and
systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by
Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

Aytona v Castillo
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the
same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute
appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal
appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case
(quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent
appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President
Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to
prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts
which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for
him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to
avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps

taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
Note: Rule 66 Quo Warranto .
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

Facts:In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the
provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: The six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992, refers to the thenincumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previouslyelected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners,
Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous
People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-President was held
last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or the
previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court
states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his
allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge, and the people have made judgment.

De leon vs Esguerra
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,

Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years
must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

CIR v Campos Rueda

In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign country]
in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier.
She however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the
Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that
the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code
which provides:

That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death
tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines
not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of
which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar
exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is
not a state as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not
recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its
being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De
Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax
Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such
exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.

US v DORR
Facts: 1. A complaint was filed in the CFI of Manila against Fred L. Dorr (editor) and Edward F.
OBrien, charging them with the publication of a false and malicious libel against Seor Benito
Legarda, one of the United States Philippine Commissioners.
2. Defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint. From this
judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.
3. During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking that they
be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United
States, which motion was denied by the court.
Issue: WON the provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to jury trials are in
force in the Philippine Islands?
Held: No. 1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by and
belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the territories
which are a part of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris, under which
the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory
was to be determined by Congress.

3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the
Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental
limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and
which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those
express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their
contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution relating
to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right to trial by
jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the Constitution relating to
jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession,
for trials by jury, and consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the
defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in
overruling their application for a trial by jury.
We conclude that the publication of the caption and headlines in the "Manila Freedom," upon
which the information is based, constituted the offense of libel; that the judgment is sustained by
the evidence; that the defendants, Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. OBrien, are guilty of the offense
charged in the information; that no error was committed in the trial of the case prejudicial to the
rights of the defendants, and that the judgment of the Court of First Instance should be affirmed