Relative Necessity

Author(s): Timothy Smiley

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1963), pp. 113-134
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
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OF SYMBOLIC
JOURNAL
LOGiC
Volume 28, Number 2, June 1963

THE

RELATIVE NECESSITY
TIMOTHY SMILEY

1. This paper was suggested by some work of Alan Ross Anderson on

deontic logic. Anderson proposed in [1] that the various deontic modalities
('it is obligatory that', 'it is forbidden that', 'it is permitted that', etc.)
should be defined in terms of the ordinary alethic modalities ('it is necessary
that', 'it is possible that', etc.). The definition I shall consider is not in fact
Anderson's own, though it is closely related to it. His definition, as set out
in [1], involves the idea of an (unspecified) penalty or sanction. A forbidden
action is defined as one whose commission entails the application of the
sanction; an obligatory action is one whose omission entails the application
of the sanction. If we write 0 for 'it is obligatory that', L for 'it is necessary
that', and if S is a propositional constant to be interpreted as expressing
that the sanction is applied, we can put the definition in the schematic
form OA dfL(d A
S). What I propose instead is to choose a different
constant, T say, and put the definition in the form OA =df L(T v A).
From the formal point of view there is no difference between the two
definitions: to pass from one to the other is merely a matter of contraposition, by taking T to be the negation of S or vice-versa. The reason for
choosing the alternative definition is that it suggests a new way of regarding
the derived systems. If we define OA as L(T v A) then to assert OA is to
assert that T strictly implies A or that A is necessary relative to T. Since
the pattern of the definition is independent of the particular interpretation
that may be put on T we can say that to the extent that the standard
alethic modal systems embody the idea of absolute or logical necessity,
the corresponding O-systems embody the idea of relative necessity - necessity
relative to an arbitrary proposition or body of propositions. They should
therefore be appropriate for the formalisation of any modal notion that
can be analysed in terms of relative necessity. Thus by applying the definition in the case where T expresses the postulates of a mathematical
theory, 0 can be read 'it is provable that'. Where T expresses the content
of a legal code, O will be read 'it is the law that'; where T is interpreted
in terms of an individual's corpus of beliefs, 0 will be read 'so-and-so
believes that'. For the deontic case itself the obvious way to interpret T
would be as expressing the content of an (unspecified) moral code. Our
definition then amounts to saying that A is obligatory if it is implied by
the code, permitted if it is consistent with it, and forbidden if it conflicts
with it.
In ? 6 I shall consider the interpretation of 0 as 'X believes that' in
Received

April

17th, 1962.

113

114

TIMOTHY SMILEY

connexion with the so-called 'pragmatic paradoxes', but apart from this I
shall confine myself to the purely mathematical problem of demonstrating
what the various O-systems are. In ?? 2-4 I shall solve this problem for the
systems derived from S2, M, S4 and S5. A rough description is that they
differ from the originals in not having the theorem LA v A - none of
them, that is, have OA D A as a theorem, only O(OA D A) instead. In ? 5
I shall examine the O-system derived from the classical propositional
calculus, which turns out to be equivalent to Lukasiewicz's 'L-modal'
logic. In ? 6 I shall show that the additional assumption that T is selfconsistent is to be matched by adding the axiom scheme OA M
A
2. The system OS2. OS2 is a system whose formulae are built up
from propositional variables by means of the singulary connective 0
together with any truth-functionally complete set of connectives. It is
characterized by the following axioms and rules:
Al .
A2.

All tautologies.
OA, if A is a tautology.

A3. O(ADB)D.OADOB.
A4. O(O(A D B) a OA D OB).
A5. O(OADA).
RI. From A and A D B infer B.
R2.

From O(A

B) infer O(OA D OB).

The system S2 can be got from OS2 by writing L for 0 throughout and
adding the axiom scheme LA D A.1
In formulating OS2 and S2 in this way it is intended that the rule R2
is not to be used unrestrictedly, but only for the generation of further
theorems from theorems. In this it resembles the rule of substitution for
propositional variables, the rule 'from A infer LA' in S4, or indeed the rule
of generalization in the predicate calculus. These might all be called 'rules
of proof' as opposed to proper 'rules of inference' like R1. The distinction
is brought out in the following definitions of theoremhood and deducibility:
A is a theorem if there is a sequence of formulae ending in A, of which
every member either is an axiom or else follows from preceding formulae
by RI or R2. If A is a theorem we write F-A.
B is deducible from A,, ..., An if there is a sequence of formulae ending
in B, of which every member either is one of A,, . . ., An or else is a theorem2
1 For the equivalence of this version of S2 to the original one (ignoring Lewis's
existential
postulate B9), see [3]. The equivalence
properly only covers theoremhood, since Lewis did not introduce the idea of deducibility into his system.
2 If one's concern were with proofs rather than provability,
one might add the
requirement that a theorem used in a deduction should be accompanied by a proof
of itself; cf. [5] Definition III. This would not affect deducibility,
but would make
possible a mechanical test for putative deductions.

RELATIVE NECESSITY

115

or else follows from preceding formulae by R 1. If B is deducible from

Al, ..., A,, we write Al, ..., An F B.
An almost immediate consequence of these definitions is that the deduction
theorem for material implication holds in both systems. There are assertions
in the literature that the deduction theorem fails for S2, but they are the
result either of treating R2 as a straightforward rule of inference (as in [6]
p. 61) or else of a mistake3.
Let us now suppose that to the vocabulary of S2 there is added a propositional constant T. If A is a formula of OS2 let AT be the formula of S2
which comes from A by replacing 0 by L(T D ...) throughout. In other
words:
A if A is a propositional variable;
(,-A)T =dr -AT, (A D B)T =d AT D BT, etc.;
(OA)T df L(T D AT).

AT

=df

We want to show that A1, ..., A n I B in OS2 if and only if (A1)T,

I BT in S2. Since the deduction theorem holds for both systems,
(An)T
and since in addition (A D B)T = AT D BT, it will be enough if we can
prove merely that I A in OS2 if and only if I AT in S2. The proof that if
F A in OS2 then F AT in S2 is a comparatively simple matter of an induction
on the length of the supposed proof of A. In order to prove the converse
I shall first adapt a method of McKinsey's to show that if A is not a theorem
of OS2 then it takes an undesignated value in some finite OS2-matrix,
and I shall use the fact that the matrix is finite to construct from it an
S2-matrix in which AT takes an undesignated value (and hence cannot be a
theorem of S2).
By an S-matrix, where S is any propositional calculus, I mean a set K
and a subset D (of 'designated' elements) such that (1) functions are defined
over K corresponding to the connectives of S, so that each assignment of
members of K as values of the propositional variables determines values in
K of compound formulae as well; (2) the theorems of S receive designated
values in every assignment.
The converse of (2) cannot be expected to be true in general, but for
3 See [7] p. 117, where A -3B F A -3<>B is asserted on the ground that if F A -3B
then I OA -3OB. The present rule R2 contains the gist of the rule of substitution
of strict equivalents which figured in Lewis's original formulation of S2 in [8] p. 125.
Lewis's writing there of a strict equivalence being "assumed or subsequently
established" might suggest that he intended the rule to be a rule of inference proper,
were it not that he uses an almost identical phrase in connexion with the rule of
substitution for propositional variables. In [9] the whole matter is left obscure by a
confusion of use and mention in the statement of the rule, but in [7] itself the treatment is tantamount to taking it as a rule of proof (see p. 116; in following back the
reference given there to [9] p. 7, note the erratum listed on p. iv).

116

TIMOTHY SMILEY

every S there is one S-matrix for which it is true. The proof of this is a
generalization of McKinsey's proof of Theorem 4 in [10].
Let us say that a pair of formulae A and B are synonymous, if for every
formula C and every formula C* got from C by replacing one or more
occurrences of A by B, C F C* and vice-versa. Defined in this way synonymity is an equivalence relation, and we may therefore introduce the
idea of a proposition as an equivalence-class of synonymous formulae.
We can moreover associate with each connective of S a function taking
propositions as arguments and values. Let E(Aj) be the proposition corresponding to the formula Ai. Then corresponding to each connective Q we
define a function Q( , ...,
) by setting Q(E(Ai), ..., E(An)) =df
E(f2Aj... An). If now we choose K to be the set of all propositions of S
and D to be the set of such propositions as correspond to theorems of S,
we obtain an S-matrix (which we may call the propositional matrix of S)
for which the converse of (2) is true. For if A is not a theorem of S then
the assignment in which each propositional variable p is given the corresponding proposition E(p) as its value will give A the undesignated value
E(A).
Interdeducibility is obviously a necessary condition for synonymity,
and in a great many systems it is a sufficient condition as well, but OS2
(like S2) is an exception to this, and it will help us in investigating its
propositional matrix if we can establish some simple alternative criterion
for synonymity.
LEMMA 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for A and B to be
synonymous in OS2 is that I A = B and I O(A
B).
Proof. If A and B are synonymous then A = A I A = B and
O(A = A) I O(A = B). But A = A and O(A = A) are axioms of OS2
under the schemes Al and A2 respectively. Hence I A = B and I-O(A = B),
so that the condition is a necessary one. To show that the condition is
sufficient we shall show first that if A and B satisfy it then so do C and C*,
where C is any formula and C* is got from it by making one or more replacements of A by B. It will then follow (using I C = C*) that every such
pair are interdeducible, and hence (from the definition of synonymity)
that A and B are synonymous. The proof is by induction on the complexity
of C. If C is a propositional variable the only possibility that can arise is
C = A, C* = B, when the result is trivially true. If C is of the form
QD1 ... Dn, where f2 is a truth-functional connective, then (except in the trivial
case mentioned) C* is QDj* ... Dn*, where each Di* is either identical with Di
or is got from it by making one or more replacements of A by B. Either way
(in the first case because Di = Di* is a tautology and in the second case in
virtue of the induction hypothesis) we have I Di = Di* and I O(Di
Di*).
Since Q is truth-functional the implication (D1 = D1*)
. .. . . (Dn Dn*)
v (C = C*) is a tautology and hence an axiom of OS2. Hence, by repeated

117

RELATIVE NECESSITY

detachment,

F C = C*. Similarly

O((D

=D1*)

D ...

. (Dn

Dr*) D

(C =- C*)) is an axiom under the scheme A2, so that by repeated use of

A3 and RI we get F O(C C*). Finally, if C is of the form OD, and C*
is OD* we argue as follows:
1. F O(D

D*)

2.

F O((D

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

FO(D DD*)
FODDOD*
F OD* D OD
FOD _ OD*
F O(OD)D OD*)
F O(OD*vOD)
F O(OD OD*)

D*) D (D D D*))

Induction hypothesis.
A2.

From 1, 2byA3, Rl.

From3byA3, RI.
Proof as for 4.
RI.
From4,5byAl,
From 3 by R2.
Proof as for 7.
From 7, 8 by A2, A3, R1.

From 6 and 9 respectively we see that F C = C* and F O(C _ C*), as was

to be shown.
Let x, +, -, 0 be the matrix functions which are to answer to the
connectives &, V, , 0, and let x>y =dr xXY = y.
LEMMA 2. The propositional matrix of OS2 satisfies the following
conditions :4
Cl.

K is a Boolean algebra with respect to -,

X, +.

C2. If x > 01 then x e D (1 being the unit element of the algebra).

C3. O(xxy) = OxxOy.
C4. O(-Ox+x)=O1.
To verify Cl, observe that (by lemma 1 and axioms Al and A2) tautologically equivalent formulae are synonymous, and that to synonymity
between formulae there corresponds identity between propositions. For
example, AvA is synonymous with A, and consequently E(A) + E(A)
E(A). Since every element of the propositional matrix is of the form E(A)
for some A, it follows that the Boolean postulate x + x = x is satisfied,
and the remaining postulates similarly.
4 This lemma was suggested by Theorems 3 and 4 of [10], the treatment
being
dualised to suit a different choice of connectives. The conditions stated here are rather
weaker than those in McKinsey's theorems, partly because I have been able to dispense
with his notion of a "normal" S2-matrix. This notion certainly has a place in a general
theory of matrices for modal logics, but when one considers (as McKinsey does not)
deducibility as well as theoremhood, one sees that a general theory is going to raise
complications that would be out of place here. E.g., for a proper treatment of systems
with rules of proof that are not full rules of inference we should have to consider
matrices with at least two kinds of designated elements (corresponding to the theorems
on the lines of [11].
and the true propositions respectively),

118

TIMOTHY SMILEY

To verify C2, let A be any formula such that E(A) = x, and let B be
any tautology (so that E(OB) = 01). If x > 01 then x x 01 = 01, which
means that A & OB must be synonymous with OB. Since OB is an axiom
under the axiom scheme A2, we therefore have FA & OB. From this
it follows by Al and RI that F A, and consequently that x e D.
To verify C3, let A and B be formulae such that E(A) = x and E(B) y.
We argue as follows:
1. FO(A v.B :A&B)
2.

F OA

A2.
From 1 by A3, RI.

OB v O(A&B)

3. FIO(A&B
RA)
4. FIO(A&B):OA
5. F O(A&B) o OB
6. FO(A&B) = (OA & OB)
7. FO(OA ,O(B d A&B))
8. F0(O(B A&B) .OBO0(A&B))
9. F O(OA .OBOR O(A&B))
10. FO(O(A&B) OA)
11.

F O(O(A&B)

A2.
From3byA3, R1.
Proof as for 4.
From 2, 4, 5 by Al, RI
From 1 by R2.
A4.
From 7, 8 by A2, A3, RI.

From 3 by R2.

OB)

Proof as for 10.

(OA & OB))

From 9, 10, 11 by A2, A3, RI.

12. FO(O(A&B)

By lemma 1 it follows from 6 and 12 that O(A&B) is synonymous with

OA & OB, whence O(xx y) = Oxx Oy.
To verify C4, let A be any formula such that E(A) = x and let B be
any tautology. We argue as follows:
1. FO(OA DA)
2. FOB
3. FO(OA :A)

OB

4.

FO(B

5.
6..
7.
8.

FO(OBRO(OA :A))
FO((OA DA)RB)
F O(O(OA A) OB)
FO(O(OAvA)=
OB)

OA vA)

A5.
A2.
From 1, 2 by Al, R1.
From 1 by A2, A3, RI.
From 4 by R2.
A2.
From 6 by R2.
From 5, 7 byA2, A3, RI.

By lemma 1 it follows from 3 and 8 that O(OA v A) is synonymous with

OB. Since OA v A is tautologically equivalent to OA v A it also is
synonymous with OB, whence O(- Ox + x) = 01.
The same argument as was used above to verify CI shows that the various
functions in the propositional matrix which correspond to the truthfunctional connectives are not independent of each other but can all be
defined, e.g., in terms of x and -. The use below of the notation (K, D,

119

RELATIVE NECESSITY

x, 0) will imply that we are dealing with a matrix for which the same
thing is true.
LEMMA
3. If a,, ..., ar are elements of a matrix M = (K, D, -, x, 0)
which satisfies the conditions C1-4 of lemma 2, then there is a finite matrix
M= = (K1, D1, -1, x 1, 1) satisfying the same conditions and such that
(i) aj eD1 if and only if aj ED; (ii) -lai = aj if and only if -aj = aj;
(iii) a x 1 aj = ak if and only if aj x aj = ak; (iv) Ojai = aj if and only
if Oai = aj.
Proof.5 Let K1 be the Boolean subalgebra of K generated by al, . ..,
01, and 00 (Obeing the zero element of K). Let -1 and x 1 be the same
as - and x except for being defined only over K1, and let D1 be the
common part of D and K1. To define O1 let us say that x coversy if x and y
both belong to K1, Ox > Oy, and Oy e K1. We note that the number of
elements covered by any x e K1 is finite (since K1 is finite) and non-zero
(since 00 e K1 and by C3 Ox > 00, so that x covers 0). We therefore set
OX =df OX1 + * * + Oxn, where xl, . . ., xn are the elements covered by x.
We remark first that if Ox as well as x belongs to K1 then O0x = Ox.
For in this case x covers itself. Suppose it also covers x2, ..., x". By hypothesis Ox > Ox2, ..., Ox > Oxn, so by Boolean algebra
.

Ox

=Ox

OX2

...

+ OXn

=Ox.

It is evident from the definitions of K1, -1, x 1, that if M satisfies the

condition Cl so does M1.
To verify C2, observe that since 01 as well as 1 belongs to K1 then,
by the remark above, 01I = 01. Hence if x e K1 and x > 01I then (since
M satisfies C2 and since in M1 it is indifferent whether > is defined in
terms of x 1 or x) x e D, whence x e D1 by the definition of D1.
To verify C3 we observe that the elements covered by x x y consist
of all products of pairs of elements of which the first is covered by x and
the second by y. For on the one hand if x covers xi and y covers yj then
Ox > Ox, and Oy > Oyj, so that O(x x y) Ox x Oy > Oxi x Oyj=
O(xi x yj), and also Oxl e K1, Oyj E K1, so that O(xi x yj) = Ox, x Oyj e K1;
thus x x y covers xi x yJ. Conversely, if x x y covers z then Ox > Ox x Oy
= O(x x y) > Oz, so that x covers z, and y likewise. Suppose then that
x covers xi, . . ., xm, that y covers Y1, . . *, yn, and that x x y covers
Z1, ...,
Z8. Then O1x xi Oly = Olx x OiY = (Ox, + . . . + Oxm) X (Oyl
+ ?

+Oyn) =(Ox
X
O(xm
Yn) = Ozi +

X Oy)

+Ozs

**+

(Oxm X Oyn)

Oi(x

x y) =1(x

=O(xl

X yi) +

* *+

X1 y), as was to be

shown.
To verify C4 we observe first that Ojx < Ox, for if x covers xi, .*

.,

xn

5 Cf. [10] Theorem 5. The definition of "covers" is different from McKinsey's:

this is in order to be able to apply the method to OS4, below, by analogy with
McKinsey's Theorem 12.

120

TIMOTHYSMILEY

+
It
follows
Boolean
x
that
by
-Ox
algebra
+
>
+ x,
Oix.
-Ojx
and hence, by C3 and the definition of >, that O(-Ojx + x) > O(-Ox + x).
Since M satisfies C4 this means that O(-Oix + x) > 01. But -Oix +
x < 1, so by C3 O(-Ojx + x) < 01. Thus O(-Ojx + x) = 01. Hence
O(-Olx + x) belongs to K1 as well as -Ojx + x, and so, by the remark
above, 01(-0jx + x) = 0(-0jx + x). But we have just shown that

then by hypothesis Ox > Oxi, . . ., Ox > Ox., whence Ox > Oxj + ...

Oxn =

0(-Oix

+ x) = 01 = 011. Hence 0j(-i0ix

+1 x)

01(-Oix

+ x) = O1l,

as was to be shown.
To verify (i), (ii) and (iii) we need only refer to the definitions of -1
and x 1. To verify (iv) we observe that if Oal = aj then Oa, as well as as
belongs to K1, so that Ojai = Oa, = aj, as was to be shown.
LEMMA
4. If (K, D, -, x, 0) is a finite matrix satisfying the conditions C 1-4 then there is a function L defined over K such that:
D1. K is a Boolean algebra with respect to-,

x, +.

D2. If x > LI then xeD;

D3.

L(x x y)=Lx

D4.

Lx < x;

x Ly;

and there is an element t of K such that Ox = L(-t + x).

Proof.

Let Lx

=df

Ox, and let t be the product of all those elements

x for which Ox = 01. The number of such elements is finite (because K

is finite) and non-zero (because 01 = 01), so we know that this product
exists and belongs to K.
The condition DI simply repeats C1.
To verify D2, observe that LI = 1 x 01 = 01, so that if x > LI then
xeD by C2.
To verify D3 we observe that L(x x y) = (x x y) x O(x x y)
(x x y) x (Ox X Oy) = (x X Ox) x (y x Oy) = Lx x Ly.
To verify D4 we observe that x X Lx = x x (x x Ox) = x x Ox = Lx.
To show that Ox = L(-t + x) we need to prove first that if y > -t

then Oy = Ly, while if y > t then Oy = L1. If y > -t then-Oy + y > -t.
But by C4 O(-Oy + y) = 01, so by the definition of t Oy + y > t.
Hence -Oy + y= 1, i.e. y > Oy. Hence Oy=y x Oy =Ly, as was
to be shown. If on the other hand y > t then Oy > Ot and consequently
Oy > 01, since Ot = 01 by C3 and the definition of t. But in any case
Oy < 01, since y < 1. Hence Oy = 01 = 1 x 01 = L1, as was to be
shown. Now, for any x, t + x > t and -t + x > -t. Therefore, using
what has just been proved, we have that Ox = O((t + x) x (-t + x))
O(t+x) x O(-t+x) =L1 x L(-t+x) =L(1 x (-t+x)) =L(-t+x)
LEMMA
5. If a finite matrix (K, D, -, x, L) satisfies the conditions
D1-4 of lemma 4 it is an S2-matrix.

121

RELATIVE NECESSITY

Proof. We first show that in every assignment of values in a matrix

satisfying D1-4 the axioms of S2 all receive a value greater than LI. We
then show that if in addition the matrix is finite this property is preserved
under the application of the rules of the system. It will follow that every
theorem of S2 always takes a value greater than LI, and the condition
D2 ensures that all such values are designated.
By D 1 each axiom Al, being a tautology, always takes value 1 and
consequently each axiom A2 always takes value LI. Again by Dl
y > x x (-x + y), and so by D3 Ly > Lx X L(-x + y). Hence
-L(-x + y) + -Lx + Ly = 1, so that each axiom A3 always takes
value 1 and consequently each axiom A4 takes value L1. By DI and D4
-Lx + x = 1, so that each axiom of the form LA : A always takes
value I and each axiom A5 takes value L1. To see that the rules preserve
the property, let the values assigned to formulae A and B be x and y
respectively, so that the value of A v B is -x + y. For R1 the hypothesis
is that x > LI and -x + y > LI. By Boolean algebra it follows that
x X (-x + y) > LI and hence that y > LI. For R2 the hypothesis is
that L(-x + y) > LI. Since the Boolean algebra K is finite it is atomic,
so that -y is 'the sum of a number of atoms, zi, . . *, zn, say. Then
x ... x -zn) =-Lx
-Lx + Ly =-Lx
+ L(-z
+ (L-zl X ... X
x
Thus
=
in order to
...
X
(-Lx + L-zn).
(-Lx + L-zl)
L-zu)
show that L(-Lx + Ly) > LI it will be sufficient to show that for every i,
L(-Lx + L-Zi) > LI. Since each zi is an atom, either Zj < x or Zj < -x.
If Zi < -x then x < -zi, whence Lx < L-zi by D3, or -Lx + L-Zj
-x + -Zi, whence L-Zi=
1. If on the other hand Zi < x then -Zj
L(-x + -Zj). Since Zi < -y, -x + y < -x + -Zi, and hence by D3
L(- x + y) < L(- x + -zi). Thus on the hypothesis that L(- x + y) > LI
we have that L-zi = L(-x + -zi) > L(-x + y) > LI. But since

x < 1, -Lx > -LI

by D3. Therefore -Lx + L- zi>

LI + Li

1.

Thus in either case -Lx + L-zi - 1, whence L(-Lx + L-zi) = LI.

THEOREM. F A in OS2 if and only if F AT in S2.
Proof. The proof that if F A in OS2 then F AT in S2 is by induction on
the length of the supposed proof of A. If A is an axiom under Al then AT
is also a tautology and hence an axiom of S2. If A is an axiom under A2
then A is OB, where B is a tautology. In this case AT = L(T D BT) and
is likewise an axiom under A2. If A is an axiom under A3 then AT is of
the form L(T a. BT D CT) a L(T D BT) D L(T D CT) and is provable
from A2 by A3 and RI. If A is an axiom under A4 then it is of the form
O(O(B D C) a. OB D OC). In this case we show that AT is a theorem of
S2 as follows:
1.

FL(L(T

DX

BT D CT) D L((T :) BT)F

RCT)) A2 b
FrOm A2 bY R2.

TIMOTHY SMILEY

122

F L(L((T D BT) D (T D CT)) D. L(T D BT) D L(T D CT))

2.

Axiom A4.
3.

F L(L(T Do.BT D CT) Do.L(T D BT)FDL(T

4.

F L(T D (L(T D. BT D CT) D. L(T D BT) D L(T D CT)))

A
CT))
From 1, 2by A2, A3, RI.
From 3 by A2, A3, R I.

If A is an axiom under A5 then AT is of the form L(T D. L(T D BT) D BT)

and thus is provable from A5 by A2, A3, and RI. If A is got by applying
RI to theorems C and C D A, say, then by the induction hypothesis CT
and (C D A)T are both theorems of S2. But (C D A)T = CT D AT, so that
AT follows by RI. If A is got by applying R2 to a theorem O(B D C) then
A = O(OB D OC) and we show that AT is a theorem of S2 as follows:
1.
2.
3.

F L(T D. BT D CT)

4.

FL(TDo.L(T

FIL((TDBT)

D (TDCCT))

FIL(L(TOBT)DL(TOCT))
DBT)

DL(T

DCT))

Induction hypothesis
From 1 by A2, A3, RI.
From2byR2.
From 3 by A2, A3, R1.

To prove the converse result, suppose that A is not a theorem of OS2.

If in the propositional matrix we assign the value E(p1) to each variable pi
that occurs in A, A itself will take the (undesignated) value E(A). By
lemmas 2 and 3, taking a,, . . ., a, to be the values E(Pi), . . ., E(A) of the

various well-formed parts of A, we see that there is a finite OS2-matrix

(K1, D1, -1, X 1, O1) for which the same is true. Let L and t be defined
for this matrix in the way described in the proof of lemma 4. Then by
lemmas 4 and 5, (Kj, D1, -1, x 1, L) is an S2-matrix. Let us assign to T
value t in this matrix. Then the identity O0x = L(-it +1 x) means that
for any assignment of elements of K1 as values for the propositional
variables, A and AT will receive the same element of K1 as their value
in their respective matrices. We have therefore found an S2-matrix and
an assignment of values in it under which AT receives an undesignated
value; and we conclude that it is not a theorem of S2.
3. The systems

OM and OS4.

OM is got from OS2 by adding the

following rule of proof:

R3.

From A infer OA.

With the help of R3 we can pass from O(A

B) to OO(A D B) and from

this by A2, A3, RI to O(OAD OB). Thus the addition of R3 makes R2

redundant. Also, each axiom under A2 can be derived by R3 from the
corresponding axiom under Al, and A4 similarly from A3. Thus OM can
equally well be formulated as follows:
Al.

All tautologies.

RELATIVE NECESSITY

123

A3. O(ADB)D.OADOB.
A5.
RI.
R3.

O(OA =)A).
From A and A v B infer B.
From A infer OA.

OS4 is got by adding to either version of OM the axiom scheme

A6.

OA:vOOA.

M and S4 are got from OM and OS4 by writing L for 0 throughout and
adding the axiom scheme LA v A. (See [3] for the equivalence of these
versions to the originals.)
Given that R3 is intended to be, like R2, restricted to the derivation of
theorems from theorems, the definitions of theoremhood and deducibility
for the new systems parallel those given in ? 2 for OS2 and S2. Since
the deduction theorem for material implication holds in all four systems
it will be sufficient for the equivalence result if we can prove that F A in
OM (or OS4) if and only if I AT in M (or S4). The proof follows ? 2 closely.
LEMMA 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for A and B to be
synonymous in OM or OS4 is that F A =- B.
Proof. The necessity of the condition is evident. To prove that it is
sufficient we observe that if F A =- B then by R3 I O(A = B), upon which
we can repeat the argument of lemma 1 of ? 2 (though some simplifications
are now possible).
LEMMA 2. The propositional matrix of OM satisfies the conditions
C1-4 together with
C5.

01=1.

The propositional matrix of OS4 satisfies Cl-5 and

C6.

OOx = Ox.

Proof. To verify C1-4 we simply repeat the arguments of lemma 2 of ? 2.

To verify C5 we observe that if B is a tautology then both B and OB are
theorems of OM and OS4 and therefore so is B = OB. Hence by lemma 1
B and OB are synonymous, whence the result. To verify C6 we observe that
by A5, A3, RI, F OOA v OA. Therefore by A6 OOA
OA is a theorem
of OS4, whence the result follows by lemma 1.
LEMMA 3. If a,, . . ., ar are elements of a matrix M = (K, D, -,
x, 0)
which satisfies Cl-5 or C1-6, then there is a finite matrix M1 = (Kj, D1,
-1, X 1, O1) satisfying the same conditions and such that (i) aj e D1 if
and only if ai E D; (ii) -ai = aj if and only if -ai = aj; (iii) ai x 1 aj = ak
if and only if a, X aj = ak; (ib) Ojai = aj if and only if Oaj = aj.
Proof. The construction of M1 is exactly as in the proof of lemma 3
of ? 2 (except that in virtue of C5 it is no longer necessary to include 01
explicitly in Kj), and so is the proof that (i)-(iv) and Cl-4 hold. To verify

124

TIMOTHY SMILEY

C5 for M1 we observe that since 01 as well as 1 belongs to K1, Oil = 01.

Since M itself satisfies C5 we conclude that Oil = 1. To verify C6 we
observe that since Ox > Ox, QOx > OOix by C3. Since M itself satisfies
C6 it follows that Ox > OOlx. Hence every element covered by Olx is
covered by x. Conversely, if x covers y then from the definition of 01,
Olx > Oy, whence by C3 OOx > QOy. Since M satisfies C6 it follows that
OO1x> Oy, so that every element covered by x is covered by Olx. But from
the definition of O1, if x and Ojx cover the same elements then Olx=
0101x, as was to be shown.
Let D5 be the condition Li = 1, and let D6 be the condition LLx = Lx.
LEMMA4. If (K, D, -, x, 0) is a finite matrix satisfying Cl-5 or Cl-6
then there is a function L defined over K such that the matrix (K, D,
-, X, L) satisfies Dl-5 or Dl-6 respectively; and there is an element
t E K such that Ox = L(-t + x).
Proof. The constructions of L and t and the subsequent arguments repeat
those of lemma 4 of ? 2. To verify D5, we observe that by C5 01 = 1, so
that LI = 1 X 01 = 1. To verify D6 we observe that by C6 OOx = Ox,

(x X Ox) X O(X X Ox) = X X OX X OxX OOX=

so that LLx
x X Ox x Ox x Ox = x X Ox Lx.
LEMMA5. If a matrix (K, D, -, x, L) satisfies D1-5 it is an M-matrix;
if it satisfies D1-6 it is an S4-matrix.
Proof. We have already shown, in the proof of lemma 5 of ? 2, that the
axioms of M always take values > LI in a matrix satisfying D1-4, and also
that this property is preserved under the application of R1. To see that
it is also preserved under the application of R3 we observe that if x > LI
then by D3 Lx > LL1, while by D5 LLl = LI. It is evident that if in
addition D6 is satisfied then each axiom of S4 under the scheme A6 always
takes the value 1.
THEOREM. F A in OM or OS4 if and only if F AT in M or S4 respectively.
Proof. In proving that if F A in OM then F AT in M the only case not
already dealt with in the corresponding proof in ? 2 is that where A is
of the form OB and follows from a theorem B by R3. By the induction
hypothesis BT is a theorem of M, whence by R3 F L(BT), and hence by
A2, A3, RI F L(T D BT). Where OS4 is concerned the only further case is
that where A is an axiom under A6, in which event AT is of the form
L(T D BT) D L(T D L(T D BT)), which comes from A6 in S4 by A2, A3,
Al, RI. The converse implication, that if F AT in M or S4 then F A in
OM or OS4, follows from lemmas 2-5 exactly as in ? 2.
4. The system
A7.

eOA

OS5.

OS5 is got by adding to OS4 the axiom scheme

OOA.

S5 comes from OS5 by writing L for 0 throughout and adding the axiom

125

RELATIVE NECESSITY

scheme LA D A. Since once again the deduction theorem holds in both

systems it will be enough if we can prove that F A in OS5 if and only if
F AT in S5. It does not seem as if the method of the previous sections
is of any use here; instead I shall show how the general problem can be
reduced to the case in which A contains no iterated modalities, and then
establish the result for this special case by an argument based on Wajsberg's
decision procedure for S5.
LEMMA 1. The following pairs of formulae are synonymous in OS5:
(i) A and A v (p& p); (ii) A and A v O(p v U.p); (iii) BOA v NOB
and r-O(A&B); (iv) O(A v OB) and OA v OB; (v) O(A v NOB) and
OA v NOB.
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition for A and B to be synonymous
in OS5 is that F A - B; the argument of lemma 1 of the preceding section
shows this. Part (i) of the present lemma therefore follows from axiom Al;
part (ii) follows from A2, Al, RI; and part (iii) follows from A2, A3, Al, R1.
To prove (iv) we argue as follows:

1. F 0 ((A V OB) D3(NOB vDA))

2. F O(A v OB) :. OOB DOA
3.
4.

F NOB : OOB
F O(A v OB) v (OA v OB)
FO(OBD(A v OB))

A2.
From 1 by A3, Al, RI.
A7.
From 2, 3 by Al, RI.
A2.
From 5 by A3, RI.
A6.

5.
6.
7.

F OB

8.

FIO(AD(AvOB))

A2.

9.

FIOA O(AvOB)

From8byA3,RI.

F OOB v O(A

v OB)

OOB

10.

F (OA v OB) DO(A

11.

F O(A v OB)

v OB)

(OA v OB)

From6,7,

9byAl,

RI.

From 4, 10 by Al, R1.

The proof of (v) is exactly the same as the proof of (iv) except that OB and
NOB are interchanged throughout, with a consequent interchange of the
references to A6 and A7.
Let us say that a formula of OS5 is in normal form if it is of the form
r-.sOB0v B1 v OB2 v ... v OBn (n > 1), where none of the Bi contain any
occurrence of 0.
LEMMA2. Every formula of OS5 is synonymous with a conjunction
of formulae in normal form.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formula
in question, A say. If A is a propositional variable then by part (ii) of lemma
1 it is synonymous with rsO(p v up) v A, which is itself in normal form.
If the main connective of A is truth-functional then (by the induction
hypothesis and the definition of normal form) A is synonymous with a

126

TIMOTHYSMILEY

truth-functional compound of formulae in each of which 0 occurs at most

once. By the process of reduction to 'conjunctive normal form' familiar
from the propositional calculus, it follows that A is synonymous with a
conjunction of disjunctions of such formulae. The disjunctions themselves are not yet necessarily in normal form, however, for they may
perhaps have (i) no component B1, (ii) no component HOBO, or (iii)
two or more components HOBO. But by lemma 1, parts (i), (ii) and
(iii) respectively, each such disjunction is synonymous with a formula
in normal form, whence the result. Finally, if the main connective of A
is 0, then by the induction hypothesis A is synonymous with a formula
O(Ai & ... & Am), and hence with OA1 & ... &OAm, where each Ai is
in normal form. OAi is therefore of the form O(~OB' v B1 v 0B2 v ... v
OBn). By lemma 1, part (v), and by part (iv) applied n - 2 times, this
is synonymous with ~OBo v OB1 v OB2 v ... v OBn, and by part (i) of
the lemma this in turn is synonymous with -OBo v (p & Up) v OB1 v OB2
v ... v OBn, which is in normal form.
LEMMA3. If A is in normal form and I AT in S5 then F A in OS5.
Proof. In this case AT is of the form -.-,L(T D Bo) v B1 v L(T D B2)
v ... v L(T D Bn1).We now show that if AT is a theorem of S5 then either
(T D Bo) D B1 is a tautology or else (T D Bo) D (T D Bi) is a tautology
for some i > 1. Consider the matrix got by forming the cross-product of
the ordinary two-valued matrix n times with itself, the element 1 = <t,t,..., t>
being the only designated element. Let the function L be defined as follows:
LI = 1; Lx = </, I, . . ., /> if x = 1. It is readily verified that the result
is an S5-matrix (Cf. [12]). Suppose now that none of the indicated formulae
are tautologies, so that each of them can be falsified by some assignment of
truth-values in the two-valued matrix. If in the present matrix we assign
to each propositional variable the value <xi, . . ., xn> where xi is the value
it takes in the two-valued assignment which falsifies the i th of the indicated
formulae, then AT receives in consequence an undesignated value, which is
impossible if it is a theorem.
Suppose it is (T D BO) D B1 that is a tautology. Since T cannot occur in
Bo or B1 we see (giving T the truth-value I) that B1 must be itself a
tautology. Similarly, giving T the value t, if (T D Bo) D (T D Bi) is a tautology then so is Bo D Bj. Thus we have shown that either B1 is a tautology
or, for some i > 1, Bo D Bi is a tautology. But if B1 is a tautology it is an
axiom of OS5, whence F A by Al and R 1. And if Bo D Bi is a tautology
then it too is an axiom and hence by R3, A3, RI, F OBO D OB1, whence
F A by Al, RI. Thus in either case F A, as was to be shown.
THEOREM. F A in OS5 if and only if F AT in S5.
Proof. The proof that if F A in OS5 then F AT in S5 is just like the
corresponding proof for OS4. The only additional case to be considered
is that where A is an axiom under A7, in which case AT follows from A7

RELATIVE NECESSITY

127

in S5 by A2, A3, Al, R 1. To prove the converse half of the theorem we

observe that by lemma 2 A is synonymous with a conjunction Al & ... & Am
where each Ai is in normal form. A - Al & ... & Am is thus a theorem
of OS5 and therefore, by what has just been shown, its translation is a
theorem of S5. But if both AT and AT = (A1)T & ... & (Am)T are theorems
of S5 then so is (Ai)T, for each i. It follows by lemma 3 that each Ai is a
theorem of OS5; and hence A too, as was to be shown.
5. The system
A8.

OPC. OPC is got by adding to OS5 the axiom scheme

A:) OA.

Since we can now deduce OA from A, by A8 and R 1, the rule R3 becomes

redundant; also the axioms A6 and A7 are now redundant, being special
cases of A8. Thus OPC can equally well be formulated as follows:
Al .
A3.

All tautologies.
O(A D B) D. OA D OB.

A5.

O(OA D A).

A8.
RI.

A D OA.
From A and A

B infer B.

If as before we write L for 0 throughout and add the axiom scheme

the added axioms together with A8 make each formula LA
synonymous with A. Thus the resulting system is nothing but the classical
propositional calculus, PC, formulated so as to give prominence to a connective which - because of the triviality of its truth-table - is not normally
taken as a primitive. We can in fact simply ignore L throughout, and in the
definition of the translation ( )T we can simply take (OA)T to be T D AT.
Since the deduction theorem once again holds in both systems it will be
enough to establish that F A in OPC if and only if F AT in PC (i.e. if and
only if AT is a tautology). It easy to verify that all the axioms of OPC
translate into tautologies, and that this property is preserved under the
application of R 1. To prove the converse we need the following lemma:
LEMMA. If B is a theorem of OPC then every formula OA is synonymous
with
OMB D A..
Proof. Using the argument of lemma 1 of ? 3, it will be enough if we
can prove the equivalence OA = (T-...O-.-Bn A), and this we do as
follows:
LA D A,

1.
2.
3.
4.

F-AD(A:B)
FA
0(A
-.B)
F -.A . OA O0 RB
I-B

5.

F -.B D A

Al.
FromlbyA8,Al,Rl.
From 2 by A3, Al, RI.
Hypothesis.
From 4 by Al, RI.

128
6.
7.
8.

TIMOTHY SMILEY

F ORB D OA
FA DOA
F-OA =(LOABVA)

From 5 by A8, A3, R.

A8.
From3, 6, 7byAl,

RI.

Suppose now that AT is a tautology. Let A OB be the formula of OPC

which is got by substituting TOM-B for T throughout AT. Just as AT was
derived from A by systematically replacing each well-formed part of the
form OC by T D C, so A-O-B must come from A by systematically replacing
each part OC by SORB D C. Hence, by the lemma, A-O-B is synonymous
with A. But A-O-B,
being a substitution instance of the tautology AT,
is itself a tautology and hence an axiom of OPC. Therefore F A in OPC,
as was to be shown.
Equivalence of OPC and the i-modal logic.6 An idiosyncrasy of Lukasiewicz's L-modal system, [13], is that as well as using particular connectives
or "functors" it allows for functorial variables. These variables are governed
by a rule of substitution enabling one to pass from a theorem containing a
variable to any one of the formulae falling under the corresponding theorem
scheme; e.g. from CbpCbNpbq to any instance of the scheme C#(p)C#(NP)
+(q). I shall therefore ignore these variables and replace the axiom in which
they occur by a corresponding axiom scheme, and will thus treat the Lmodal system as though it were given by the following axioms
1.

CO(P)CO(N.p)O(q)

2.

CpAP

together with rules of detachment and substitution. The translation I have

in mind is that in which 0 corresponds to Lukasiewicz's A and vice-versa,
the truth-functional connectives being matched in the obvious way. I
shall show that the two systems are equivalent inasmuch as if A1 and A2
are translations of each other, F A 1 in OPC if and only if F A2 in the L-modal
logic.7 The proof of this is by induction on the length of the proofs of Al
and A2 respectively. If A1 is an axiom under the scheme Al then A2,
being a tautology, is provable from Lukasiewicz's theorems 10, 20, 22.
If A1 is an axiom under A3 or A5 or A8, then A2 is got by substitution
6 "D. P. Henry of Manchester ... told me ... that he had defined a modal logic
within the propositional calculus by defining Mp as Czp, where z is a variable not
put to any other purpose (As the answer to "p ?", "Possibly" means "Yes, if -".)
From this information alone it would seem that the system would boil down to
Lukasiewicz's
(Prior, [14] p. 189).
..."
7 Lukasiewicz
did not define the idea of deducibility for his system. What he did
define was the axiomatic 'rejection' of formulae, but this need not be treated separately
from theoremhood, since it can be shown that the rejected formulae are exactly those
that are not theorems: [15].

129

RELATIVE NECESSITY

or 98 (ACAfP) or axiom 2
in Lukasiewicz's theorem 77 (CAlCpqCApAq)
(CpAp), respectively. If A1 comes from earlier theorems by detachment
then A2 comes by a parallel detachment. Conversely, if A2 is an instance
then we are to prove Al in OPC
of the axiom scheme CO(p)CO(Np)O(q)
as follows:
1. F (A

B)

O(A dB)

2.

FI(A

B)

3.
4.

F (B A) .OBnOA
F (A-B) a. OA OB

5.

F (p -q)

OA

A8.
From 1 by A3, Al, RI.

OB

Proof as for 2.
From 2, 3 by Al, RI.

a. 0(p) = +(q)

on the complexity

By induction

of

+(p), the case where the main connective is 0 being given by 4, and the
case where the main connective is truth-functional by Al.
= q) a.

6.

F (up

7.
8.

p q)
F(p =q)vq v
Fip)a.
p) D(q)

Q'p)=

(q)

Proof as for 5.

Ai.
From 5, 6, 7 by Al, RI.

If A2 is the axiom CpAp, A1 is an instance of A8. If A2 follows from earlier

theorems by detachment, Al comes by a parallel detachment. Finally, if
A2 comes by substitution in an earlier theorem, A1 is to be proved by
making the same substitution at every step in the corresponding proof
in OPC.
6. Addition

of a consistency

condition.

Suppose we add to the

various alethic systems not only the constant T but also a condition expressing that T is self-consistent, viz. GLUT. I shall first show that the
equivalences already established continue to hold provided we add to the
corresponding O-systems the scheme
A9. OA AO

Let us call the strengthened systems S2+, OS2+, etc. There is an alternative
axiomatisation of OS2+, OM+,OS4+, OS5+, in which A9 is replaced by the
single formula SORB where B is any tautology.8 To see this we argue
as follows:
1.

F O(A :.-.,A

2.
3.
4.

FOAD.OeA

F OB.

:B)

OeB
OA D YOGA

FOB

A2.

Froml byA3,AI,RI.
From 2 by Al, RI.
A2.

From 4 by Al, RI.

SORB) D SORB
From 3 we see that every instance of A9 is deducible from SORB in

5.

F (OB

8 Cf. Prior,

[16] p. 141.

130

TIMOTHYSMILEY

all the systems concerned, and conversely from 5 that LOMB is deducible
from a particular instance of A9.
In talking of "adding" a formula A to a system S we may have in mind
either of two different things: (1) a weak sense of addition, producing a
system in which a formula B is a theorem if and only if A F B in S, and
in which B is deducible from A1, . . ., An if and only if A, A1, . . ., A n F B
in S; or (2) a strong sense, producing a system in which theoremhood and
deducibility aredefined as for S but with A now counted as an axiom. When
S contains what I have called rules of proof which are not full rules of
inference the two senses will diverge, for in the strong sense (but not in
the weak) the theorems are closed under the rules of proof as well as the
rules of inference. For example, adding A to S4 in the strong sense will
yield as theorems all the formulae, LA, LLA, etc., that can be got from A
by applying R3; whereas none of these formulae will normally become
provable if A is added in the weak sense, for of course in S4 we do not have
A F LA, etc.9 Having drawn this distinction, I shall show that it need not
affect our present results. Provided we add A9 (or its equivalent) to the
to the corresponding alethic
0-systems in the same sense as we add LT
systems then it is immaterial which sense this is as far as the equivalence
under translation is concerned.
THEOREM. F A in OS2+ (OM+, OS4+, OS5+) if and only if F AT in
S2+ (M+, S4+, S5+), the systems being taken in the weak sense.
Proof. Let B be any tautology. We have shown above that A is a theorem
of OS2+ (taken in the weak sense) if and only if COMB
F A in OS2. By
the equivalence established in ? 2, C
-A in OS2 if and only if
L(T D DEBT)F AT in S2. Since BT, like B, is a tautology, T D DEBT
is tautologically equivalent to AT, and hence e..sL(TD D-EBT)is interdeducible with PLOT in S2. We have thus shown that F A in OS2+ if and
F AT in S2, i.e. if and only if F AT in S2+ taken in the
only if LT

weak sense. Similarly for the other systems, using the equivalences established in ? 3 and ? 4.
To prove the correspondingtheorem when the systems are taken in the
strong sense we need the following lemma:
LEMMA. If B is any tautology then B and SORB are synonymous
in OS2+, OM+, and OS4+, the systems being taken in the strong sense.
Proof. We argue as follows:
Al.
1. FB
A2.
2. FOB
9 Essentially the same
of there being two kinds
system M by adding the
to add a further axiom,
it or only to the original

distinction may crop up even when there is no question

of rules. For example, we can avoid the need for R3 in the
stipulation that if A is an axiom so is LA. If we now wish
the question arises whether this stipulation is to apply to
ones.

RELATIVE NECESSITY

3.

F OMB

From 2 by A9, R1.

4.
5.
6.

FB

O B
F O(OB :DB)
F O(B D eO?-B)

7.

F OB D O eCOMB
FOOB
F O(B =_
OMB)

Froml,3byAl,RI.
A5.
From 5 by A2, A3, RI.
From 6 by A3, R1.

8.
9.

131

From2,7byRl.
From 2, 8 by A2, A3, RI.

By lemma 1 of ? 2, steps 4 and 9 above are a sufficient condition for B and

COMB to be synonymous in OS2. But this lemma can be applied equally
well to OS2+, provided that the system is taken in the strong sense, for in
this case its theorems are closed under the application of R2, which enables
us to repeat for OS2+ the last of the induction steps in the proof of the
lemma. Similarly, but more simply, for the other two systems, using lemma
I of ?3.
F A in OS2+ (OM+, OS4+, OS5+) if and only if F AT in
THEOREM.
S2+ (M+, S4+, S5+), the systems being taken in the strong sense.10
Proof. For OS2+ we simply repeat the whole argument of ? 2, except
that for Cl1-4 and Dl1-4 we substitute throughout CO-4 and DO-4, where
CO is the condition 00 = 0 and DO is the condition L-t = 0. The only
new steps are the proof that the propositional matrix satisfies CO (which
is a corollary of the lemma proved above) and the proof that the matrix
constructed in lemma 4 of ? 2 satisfies DO, which runs as follows: by C3
Ot x O t = 0(t x t) = 00; but Ot = 01 and, by CO, 00 = 0, whence
O-t
Ot x O-t= 0. Hence L-t=
0(1 x -t)
01 x 0-t
-t x
O-t = 0. For OM+ and OS4+ the proof is a similar repetition of the argument of ? 3. For OS5+ no separate proof is necessary, for it will be shown
that for this system and for S5+ the stronger and weaker versions in fact
coincide with each other. To verify this we observe that if in OS5 C
F A then by the deduction theorem F COMB D A. From this by R3, A3,
RI it follows that F 0,.O B D OA, and hence by RI that 0 NO
P0.B F OA.
But by A7 and RI, COMB F 00B.
Hence if
P0MB FA then
COMB F OA. Thus even if we take the weaker sense of addition, the set
of theorems of OS5+ is closed under R3 and so coincides with the set of
theorems in the stronger sense, and similarly for S5+.
10 The condition -L-T
corresponds to Axiom 15 of [1], by which Anderson postulated the non-necessity
of the sanction S. In adding this axiom to M, S4 and S5
Anderson took the resulting systems in the strong sense (cf. note 9 above and [1]
p. 55). It follows that it is OM+, OS4+, and OS5+, taken in the strong sense, which
correspond strictly to Anderson's intentions, i.e. which reproduce the purely deontic
part of the mixed alethic-deontic
systems which Anderson called OM, OM', OM".
There still remains the problem of axiomatising these mixed systems in full, which
will involve the addition of 'mixed' axioms such as LA O OA.

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TIMOTHY SMILEY

For OPC+ the theorem is true but not worth stating, for the addition
of A9 makes OA synonymous with A, so that OPC+ is simply another
version of PC. Moreover, the addition of -L -T to PC makes T n A
synonymous with A, so that the translation ( )T is also more or less trivialised.
It has often been remarked that there is an air of paradox about certain
statements of belief or disbelief, for example about "A is true but X believes
it is false". For a suitable choice of X and A this may well be true and,
true or false, there is nothing in the least remarkable about its being asserted
by anyone other than X, but for X to assert it himself - for him to say
"A is true but I believe it is false" - would be self-stultifying. If we render
"X believes that" by 0, the statement in question becomes A & OVA,
and we see from (2) below that O(A & 0VA) is a theorem in all the
systems developed so far. Thus if we accept any one of these systems as
correct under the present interpretation we shall be able to offer the following
explanation of the paradox: it is absurd for X to assert "A is true but X
believes it to be false" because this is something which, as a matter of logic,
X must believe to be false, and it is absurd to assert something which one
not only does but logically must believe to be false. A very similar question
arises if we consider "A is true but X does not believe it" instead of "A is
true but X believes it is false", A & ,-.,AO instead of A & Orwe11 In this
case however, unless we make some additional assumption about the
internal consistency of X's beliefs we have to adopt a rather different
explanation of the paradox. The absurdity of asserting "A is true but I
don't believe it" is not the absurdity of asserting something which one must
believe to be false, nor is it the absurdity of asserting something which one
cannot believe to be true (cf. (7) below); rather it is the absurdity of asserting
something which one must believe that one does not believe: cf. (5) below.
The relevant formal results are:
is independent in all the systems considered so far (always
(1) .1 & O0-V.-A
ignoring the trivial OPC+).
is provable in all the systems.
(2) 0O(A & 0.A)
is provable in all the systems that have A9, but not
(3) #.O(A & OV-..dA)
otherwise.
(4) A &,,OA is independent in all the systems except OPC.
11 The same pattern
A & -OA recurs in the "pragmatic
paradoxes"
of [17],
in which a man is told that a certain thing will happen without his having any
advance knowledge of it. He deduces a contradiction from this and is all the more
surprised at the outcome. The paradox can be resolved, following Quine [18], by
observing that it is not what the man is told that is contradictory but only his treating
it as a piece of advance knowledge; A & -OA is not contradictory but O(A & -OA)
is. This simple line of solution is made possible by the fact that under the interpretation
of 0 as 'X knows that', OA v A is a logical truth.

RELATIVE NECESSITY

133

(5) 0

.O (A & -.OA) is provable in all the systems.

(6)
-'OO(A& -OA) is provable in all the systems that have A9, but not
otherwise.
(7) -O(A &,-OA) is provable in OS4+ and OS5+, but not otherwise.
Proofs. (1) It will be sufficient to show that neither A & O,-...iAnor its
negation is in general provable in either of the two strongest systems,
OPC and OS5+. For OPC it is enough, by the result of ? 5, to show that
neither formula generally translates into a tautology. For OS5+ we first
form the cross-product of the ordinary two-valued matrix with itself,
obtaining a four-valued matrix whose elements are the ordered pairs
<1,I>, <t, />, </, t>, <f, />, the only designated element being <t, t>. If we now
set O<x, y> =df <X, X>, it is easy to verify that the result is an OS5+-matrix.
But when A is given the value <K,t> A & 0 -,..,Atakes the same (undesignated) value, while -.(A & 0 --,A) takes the value <t, f>.
(2) O(A & O'A) is an immediate consequence of A5.
(3) If A9 is present -O(A & OVA) follows from O(A & OVA
A). To
show that it is not provable otherwise it is enough to show that it is not
provable in the strongest system without A9, viz. OPC, and for this it is
enough in turn to observe that -O(A & OV...iA) never translates into a
tautology.
(4) Use the same matrix and the same assignment of values as in the
proof of (1).
(5) In all the systems O(A & B) is synonymous with OA & OB, so
OrO(A & BOA) is interdeducible with 0 (OA & 0 B..'OA), which is an
immediate consequence of A5.
(6) If A9 is present rOO(A & O..'OA)follows from OO(A &
BOA).
Otherwise we argue as in the proof of (3).
(7) The proof of r.-,O(A & r.-,OA) in OS4+ and OS5+ is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

OOA COCOA

A9.

OA OOA
OA v.-OrOA
O(A & -OA) = (OA & O-OA)
rO(A & BOA)

A6.
From 1, 2 by Al, R1.
Cf. ? 2, lemma 2.
From 3, 4 by Al, R1.

To show that rO(A & BOA) is not in general provable in the remaining
systems we need only consider the two strongest, OPC and OM+. For OPC
it is enough to observe that the formula does not translate into a tautology.
For OM+ we must first form the cross-product of the two-valued matrix
with itself four times over, obtaining a 16-element matrix whose elements
are the various quadruples <t, I, t, I> etc., <t, t, t, t> being the only designated
element. If we now set O<w, x, y, z> =df <X X y, X X Z, Y X Z Z> it is easy to
verify that the result is an OM+-matrix. But when A is given the value

134

TIMOTHY SMILEY

<t, t, t, /> OA takes the value <t, I, I, I>, whence A & B.-,OAtakes the value
<I,t, t, /> and consequently r.-,O(A & B.-,OA) takes the (undesignated)
value <K,t, t, t>.

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[1] ALAN Ross ANDERSON, The formal analysis of normative systems. Technical
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[3] E. J. LEMMON, New foundations for Lewis modal systems. This JOURNAL,
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[4] Ivo THOMAS, Logic and theology. Dominican
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[5] RICHARD MONTAGUE and LEON HENKIN, On the definition of formal deduction'.
This JOURNAL, vol. 21 (1956), pp. 129-136.
[6] MOH SHAW-KWEI, The deduction theorems and two new logical systems. Methodos, vol. 2 (1950), pp. 56-75.
[7] RUTH C. BARCAN, The deduction theorem in a functional calculus based on
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[8] C. I. LEWIS and C. H. LANGFORD, Symbolic logic. (New York, 1932.)
[9] RUTH C. BARCAN, A functional calculus of first order based on strict implication.
This JOURNAL, vol. 11 (1946), pp. 1-16.
[10] J. C. C. MCKINSEY, A solution of the decision problem for the Lewis systems
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[11] E. V. HUNTINGTON,
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[13]

JAN LUKASIEWICz,

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Pragmatic paradoxes. Mind, vol. 57 (1948), pp. 358-9.
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[18] W. V. QUINE, On a so-called paradox. Mind, vol. 62 (1953), pp. 65-67.
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