Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. 1 Respondent, who
was already married with three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while
he was reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant
and respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the
child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent
started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and
forgiveness from this Court. He submitted certificates from government and civic organizations
appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious groups, and
certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro. 2
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon. 3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003)
recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the
suspension of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has shown
integrity and moral uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to
him may be attributed to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways
after taking his oath as member of the bar.4
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August 15,
2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits the
paternity of the child and agrees to support her.5
On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondents motion for
reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not
supporting his child.6
On August 25, 2003, respondents wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that
respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with
complainant, such was only

because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case after
respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel respondent to sign the
affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers that respondent is the sole
breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely affected by his suspension. 7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts
acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then
he shall comply unconditionally.8
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyns letter.9
On January 13, 2004, complainants counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her
children, respondent has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair the
damage done to them.10
On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainants Comment, reiterated his willingness to
support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for the months of
March to December 2005 in the amount of P2,000.00 each.11
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her
and her three children that respondent had to support complainants daughter when it is not clear
who the childs father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where
the paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present administrative case to get
support from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with said office despite
having been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still
connected with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary and benefits; and that this
was the first time that they received communication concerning respondents administrative case. 13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties
and received salary and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for
reconsideration thus the case has not yet attained finality.14
In view of respondents show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it
just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years
suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension
imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO
YEARS suspension effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainants further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a
proper case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillos record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of
Justice including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.

SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

The fallo reads as follows:

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
2

Rollo, pp. 154-175.

Id., p. 145.

Id., p. 192.

Id., pp. 184-185.

Id., p. 179.

Rollo, pp. 147-150.

Id., pp. 183-183a.

Id., p. 177.

10

Id., p. 218.

11

Id., p. 231.

12

Id., pp. 237-239.

13

Id., p. 242.

14

Id., p. 244.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4921 --- Carmelita I. Zaguirre, Complainant, versus Atty. Alfredo Castillo, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For resolution is the Plea for Reconsideration1 filed by Atty. Alfredo A. Castillo of the March 6, 2003
Decision2finding him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and suspending him indefinitely from the
practice of law.
Atty. Castillo claimed that for the past years, he received commendations for exemplary performance
and contributions to public service and that he and his wife have been active in church. His
employment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro is their only source of income
and suspending him from the practice of law would affect his children. He insisted that the Court
consider the sanctity of the family in imposing the penalty.
The IBP however prayed that the plea for reconsideration be denied because he had not really
mended his ways since he continues and still fails to recognize and support his child. 3
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro informed this Court that Atty. Castillo
continued to discharge his functions and had been regularly receiving his salary and other benefits
despite being indefinitely suspended. According to Atty. Castillo, his indefinite suspension is not yet
final in view of the pending motion for reconsideration.
The majority would grant Atty. Castillos plea for reconsideration and reduce his penalty to two (2)
years suspension in view of respondents "show of repentance and active service to the community."
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
In the March 6, 2003 Decision, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Castillo based on its finding
that he was grossly immoral. He was also found to be unscrupulous because, after executing a
notarized affidavit wherein he recognized and undertook to give support to his child with Zaguirre,
and his incriminating handwritten letter where he bargained with Zaguirre concerning the monthly
support of the child,4 he subsequently denied his paternity and reneged on his promise to give
support. The Court was appalled at the reprehensible and amoral attitude of Atty. Castillo when he
justified his liaison with Zaguirre as merely the product of mans polygamous nature.
The Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full satisfaction
of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity
and uprightness required of every member of the profession.
I agree with the IBPs finding that Atty. Castillo has not mended his ways because he continues and
still fails to recognize and support his child with complainant. He has not shown remorse for having
maintained an affair with Zaguirre and fathering her child.
Admittedly, he received commendations for his exemplary performance and contributions to public
service. Unlike the majority though, I hesitate to conclude that these commendations adequately
proved respondents repentance. Aside from the self-serving statement that "he has mended his
ways and suffered so much because of the embarrassment, ridicules and dislikes brought about by
this event, especially to his family",5 there is absolutely no proof of respondents remorse. Besides, a
lawyer must not only be exemplary in his public life, but equally important, he must also be morally
upright in his personal life.
I am distressed to note that in the pleadings submitted by respondent and his wife, they make it
appear that they are the aggrieved party. Thus, they claimed that if we "prolong these agonies, it will
not only add anguish and anxiety but also physical economic hardship upon the respondent and
indirectly to his family which they already suffered and still suffering".6

It must be emphasized that to this date, respondent has not yet served his penalty. Aside from a
short leave of absence, he continued to practice his profession and regularly received his salary and
other benefits. So what economic hardship is he talking about?
As early as August 28, 2003, respondent admitted that acknowledging complainants daughter and
giving support remain his undertakings. He even volunteered to comply unconditionally if they are
the required proofs of his remorse.7 He professed that he did not disown his responsibility to give
support.
If, indeed, respondent was so remorseful and willing to comply unconditionally with
his own undertaking, why then did he wait until after the lapse of one (1) year and seven (7) months
before attempting to give support to complainants daughter. It was only on March 31, 2005, that
respondent furnished us with photocopies of ten (10) postdated checks payable to Zaguirre
at P2,000.00 each.8 He failed to mention or offer a concrete or permanent settlement.
In his Plea for Reconsideration, Atty. Castillo also claims that:
The respondent is now living in peace and happiness with his family. The darkness of the past has
been buried beneath the earth a long time ago.9
I am perplexed how Atty. Castillo can claim that he is now "living in peace and happiness with his
family" while complainant Zaguirre and her daughter are encountering hardships brought about by
his non-support.
It is also revolting and ridiculous for respondent to remind this Court in his Plea for
Reconsideration, that suspending him from the practice of law would affect his children and that we
should consider the sanctity of the family in imposing the penalty. It must be mentioned, lest
respondent has forgotten, that he was the one who undermined the sanctity of marriage and family
when he maintained an illicit affair with another woman during the subsistence of his marriage.
Respondent invokes the sanctity of marriage, yet his acts prove otherwise. 10 The moral delinquency
that affect the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.11
Initially, the Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral
integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession. To date, I find no evidence of
remorse or sincere repentance of respondent. There is a dearth of evidence that he has instilled in
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of
the legal profession.
As held in Delos Reyes v. Aznar:12
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is
a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA
439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,

which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand
and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him" (Quingwa v.
Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny Atty. Alfredo A. Castillos Plea for Reconsideration. His INDEFINITE
SUSPENSIONmust now immediately take effect.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 154-159.

Id. at 135-144.

Id. at 184-185.

The letter dated March 12, 1998 reads in part:

"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy
and others (say) that I am the look alike (sic) of your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix
amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not
more than P1,000.00."
5

Rollo p. 158.

Id.

Id. at 183.

Id. at 231.

Id. at 158.

10

Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 663 [1998].

11

Id.

12

Adm. Case No. 1334, 28 November 1989, 179 SCRA 653, 658-659.

EN BANC
QUIRINO TOMLIN II,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6971

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II,

Respondent.

Panganiban, C.J.,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
Promulgated:

February 23, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint [1] before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary
obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility[2] and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.[3]
Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00
partially covered by seven postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to
encash them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the
drawee bank, to wit:
Check No.
MOB 1011326
MOB 1011311
MOB 1011328
MOB 1011313
MOB 1011329
MOB 1011314
MOB 1011330

Due Date
May 16, 2001
June 11, 2001
June 17, 2001
August 12, 2001
August 16, 2001
August 19, 2001
September 18, 2001

Amount
P13,500.00
P30,000.00
P5,000.00
P50,000.00
P5,000.00
P50,000.00
P5,000.00

Reason for Dishonor

RTCOCI
RTCOCI
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter[4] sent on
September 25, 2002;[5] however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt
without justifiable reason. Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[6] In addition, he filed the instant case for
respondents disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead
he filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading [7] and a
motion to dismiss complaint.[8]
Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation
of the rule on non-forum shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the
IBP about the cases he filed for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent
pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[9] Respondent
argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the
criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.
On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied [10] the motion
to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of
Procedure. Respondents motion for reconsideration[11] was likewise denied on
June 16, 2004.[12]
Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an
answer.[13] His last motion for extension was however denied for lack of merit.
Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline declared him in default.[14]
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate
proceedings on the ground of prescription [15] and omnibus motion to recall the
default order.[16]
On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties
to submit their respective verified position papers after which the case shall be
considered submitted for resolution.[17]
Only the complainant submitted his position paper.[18]

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper
despite several requests for extension, in disregard of the orders of the
IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against respondent
does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law from one year to two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of
our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. [19] Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[20] Any
gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character
is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege.[21]
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the
complainant but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to
pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent
just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any
wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting
gross misconduct.[22] Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer
to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.[23]
The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping
with the filing of this administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-

shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a

favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another[24] or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
[25]
Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
disbarment proceedings.[26] Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondents act of making or drawing and
issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to
discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a
criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case,
only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings.[27]
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise,
this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to and
continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate.[28]
Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified
position paper despite several opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the
time he received on December 20, 2003[29] the Order[30] of the IBP requiring him to
file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating Commissioner
submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration,
manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall
the default order. Until the end, respondent offered no plausible explanation for his
failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on insisting, on plainly unmeritorious

grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondents failure to comply

with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of
judicial authorities.[31] Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has
disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[32]
In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two years as recommended by the IBP commensurate under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective
immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with
most severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1]

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Rollo, pp. 12-17.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1: A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes; and
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
[3]
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (1979), Sec. 1.
[4]
Rollo, p. 8.
[5]
Id. at 9.
[6]
Id. at 61-67.
[7]
Id. at 26-29, 30-33, 34-38.
[8]
Id. at 45-58.
[9]
Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03.
[10]
Rollo, p. 110.
[11]
Id. at 113-120.
[12]
Id. at 123-124.
[13]
Id. at 125-130, 135-137.
[14]
Id. at 140-141.
[15]
Id. at 142-146.
[16]
Id. at 147-150.
[17]
Id. at 152-153.
[18]
Id. at 157-165.
[19]
Lao v. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, 120 (2003).
[2]

[20]

Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005.

People v. Tuanda, A.C. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692, 697.
[22]
Lao v. Medel, supra at 121.
[23]
Id. at 120.
[24]
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 305 (1996).
[25]
Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 619, 655-656 (1995).
[26]
Lucente v. Evangelista, Jr., 444 Phil. 721, 727 (2003).
[27]
Po Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005.
[28]
In re Brillantes, Adm. Case No. 1245, March 2, 1977, 76 SCRA 1, 15.
[29]
Rollo, p. 26.
[30]
Id. at 25.
[31]
Garcia v. Bala, supra note 20.
[32]
Lao v. Medel, supra note 19 at 123.
[21]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law

bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid

distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I
am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,

then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or

commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which
are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law

firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role
as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to

appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does

not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business

terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified

who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming

with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176
N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice
on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in factfinding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations,
Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who
has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation
but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts
and conditions involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the
giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it
as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d
773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if
he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor
in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't

believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8

Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)."
(Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176
N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the

insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice
on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the

result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in factfinding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations,

Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who
has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation
but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts
and conditions involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the
giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it
as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d
773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if
he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor
in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8
Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)."
(Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT
CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
JOHN SIY LIM,

A.C. No. 5653

Complainant,
Present:

- versus-

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. CARMELITO A.
Promulgated:
MONTANO,
Respondent.
February 27, 2006
x----------------------------------- ---------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative
to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas
See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan City.[1]
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case
No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.
[2]
The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A.
del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant
herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15,

1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the

plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the
trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable
mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the
reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court
reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court, dated
December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiffappellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of
Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been
vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorneys fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED.
There is no clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in
bad faith. There should be no penalty on the right to litigate.[3]

The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling
of the CA and denied the petition.[4] Entry of judgment was made of record on
October 3, 2000.[5]
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance [6] as counsel of
Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in
Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a
Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,[7] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on the
present case had already become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant,
plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in the decision
sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
(P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision and the

same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company

to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the
court the amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[8]

On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas
See Tuazon) filed the Complaint[9] for nullity of TCT and other
documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession before the RTC
of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch
126 issued an Order[11] in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for
Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant
herein), and denying for lack of merit, the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision
without Writ filed by respondent counsel.
[10]

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment
against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit[12] dated March 20, 2002,
complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928
out of malice, pointing out that it involves the same parties, the same causes of
action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542. Thus, the
complainant prayed that the respondent be disbarred and/or suspended from the
practice of law for his gross misconduct, on the following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the
respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928
on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his
clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyers oath not to promote or
sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his
clients to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of
all controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory
decision of our court.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied the allegations against him. While he

admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein,
he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new

case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and,
as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the
complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of
instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the
case based on his professional appreciation that his client had a good case.
In his Reply,[15] the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of
forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old
complaint; and the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an
action in remwhile the other case is an action in personam did not merit
consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[16]
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the
case to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea. Only the counsel for the respondent
appeared at the mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that
there were no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the
mandatory conference and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified
Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who
submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the
respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a
two months suspension from the practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res
judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since
(a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute
deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had the
required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the
merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on

Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and
Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his
own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and
executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation
that he was not the original counsel of his clients and that when he filed the
subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his
clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title, deserves scant consideration. As a responsible
member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory
decision on his clients rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case
involving the same property and asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the partieslitigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
[17]
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[18] Thus,
the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x x[19]

The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will
not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial
identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first case and
a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case,
is sufficient.[20] Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between
the same parties or their privies.[21] This was what respondent resorted to in order
to give some semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should
have
realized
that

the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[22] effectively determined with
finality the rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice.[23] The filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or
repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act
with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to
him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. [24]
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation
of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule
12.04[26] of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or
malice.[27]
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in
the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct
the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has
time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the
court dockets.[28]
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we
also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish
the end desired.[29]
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that
any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This
Decision is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the
Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO
MARTINEZ

YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA.

ALICIA AUSTRIAAssociate Justice

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

On leave.
Rollo, pp. 17-24.
[2]
The judge who originally heard the case was Judge Antonio J. Fineza, who was found guilty of gross misconduct
in this Courts Decision of May 5, 2003 in A.M. No. RTJ-02-1705 [450 Phil. 642 (2003)], for his refusal to issue a
writ of execution in said case. It appears that the case was later transferred to Branch 126 (id. at 7-17).
[3]
Id. at 40.
[4]
Id. at 31-46.
[1]

[5]

Id. at 47.
Id. at 4.
[7]
Id. at 5-6.
[8]
Id. (Emphasis supplied)
[9]
Id. at 17-24.
[10]
As earlier noted, the case was transferred to this sala.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 48-54.
[12]
Id. at 1-2.
[13]
Id. at 2.
[14]
Id. at 58-62.
[15]
Id. at 63-67.
[16]
Id. at 68.
[17]
Foronda v. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 9, 23.
[18]
TBoli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 508 (2002).
[19]
Id.
[20]
Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 199, citing Rovels Enterprises, Inc.
v. Ocampo, 439 Phil. 777, 790-791 (2002).
[21]
J. FERIA AND M.C. NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, VOLUME 2, (2001 ed.) 131,
citing Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303 (1912) and Paz v. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608 (1945).
[22]
396 Phil. 32 (2000).
[23]
Garcia v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 512, 515.
[24]
Foronda v. Guerrero, supra note 15, at 23.
[25]
Rule 12.02 A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
[26]
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.
[27]
See Foronda v. Guerrero, supra note 15, at 24.
[28]
Sanchez v. Brion, 319 Phil. 67, 70 (1995).
[29]
Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 426 (2003).
[6]

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005]

NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY,
NICOLAS, complainants,
vs.
ARQUILLO, respondent.

INC.,
Atty.

and
BEN
MACARIO

A.
D.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients written consent is given after a full
disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests shall
as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint [1] filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Ben A.
Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that LetterComplaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:

Herein [c]omplainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas,

accuses (sic) herein [r]espondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging
in conflicting interest in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union.
Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein [r]espondent appeared and
acted as counsels for both complainants (eight out of the eighteen complainants
therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).
In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-108897, 1-05-1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-05-1096-97
(consolidated cases), herein [r]espondent appeared as counsel for complainants
therein, Teresita A. Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando, Virginio C.
Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli
Quimoyog. In the very same consolidated case, [r]espondent was also the counsel
of one of the respondents therein, Jose G. Castro.

Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12,
1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein [r]espondent filed
before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28,
1997, [r]espondent filed aComplainants Consolidated Position Paper, this time
representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated
case.[2] (Citations omitted)
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998
Order[3] of the IBP-CBD directing him to do so. Even after receiving five notices, he
failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to
have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the complainants
were ordered to submit their verified position paper with supporting documents, after
which the case was to be deemed submitted for decision. [4] In their
Manifestation[5] dated August 30, 2004, they said that they would no longer file a
position paper. They agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their LetterAffidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying documents.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his Report,[6] Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating
the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the
former recommended the latters suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of
the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the
modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years.
On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were
transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP denied the Motion.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the
recommended period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. [7] Corollary to

this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned
clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. [8]
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of
interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in
representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also
duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer
will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or,
when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.[9]
In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C.
Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss
those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel
for several complainants in consolidated NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97,
I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the
cases in the second set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the subject
Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo
protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:

3.
More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants,
respondents, except Atty. Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should be
made accountable for not according complainants their right to due process. [10]
In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no
conflict of interest in his representation of both the respondent and the complainants in
the same consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on the same side.
Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario on the
consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of
personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this fact allegedly showed
that there was no conflict in the interests of all the parties concerned.
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in
the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the dismissed
employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer
should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his
alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the
dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was
one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:

As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be impossible
since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was
[r]espondent who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s

counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong.
But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the complainants. Here
lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
Thus it has been noted
The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the
clients claim against the other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated
action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of
disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client. The foregoing considerations
will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special
elements which make it one of trust and confidence[.] (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230,
4th ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)[11]
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded
on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is highly
improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the
attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. [12]
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two years. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases also involving
attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year.[13]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon
his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

[1]

Dated March 16, 1998; rollo, pp. 2-3.

[2]

Report of the IBP-CBD, pp. 1-2.

[3]

IBP-CBD Order, per Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas; rollo, p. 17.

[4]

IBP-CBD Order, August 18, 2004; rollo, p. 36.

[5]

Rollo, pp. 38-39.

[6]

Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, August 27, 2004.

[7]

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

[8]
[9]

Rule 15.03, id.

Santos v. Beltran, 418 SCRA 17, December 11, 2003; Hornilla v. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220, 223, July 1,
2003. See Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, p. 166.

[10]

Complainants Position Paper signed by Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, p. 8, August 28, 1997; rollo, p. 14.
Emphasis ours.

[11]

Report of IBP Investigating Commissioner, p. 4.

[12]

Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412, March 4, 1998.

[13]

See Santos v. Beltran, supra; Nakpil v. Valdes, supra; Tiania v. Ocampo, 200 SCRA 472, August 12,
1991.

SECOND DIVISION
EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO,
Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 6589

Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) dated 02 October 1997, [1] Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty.
Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section
20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or
willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed
the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and
employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly
showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its
lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to
attain his ends.

According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of

the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama,
Antique.[2] The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her
co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by
virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property.
However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered
the disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein. [3]
Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in
contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted
by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.
[4]
On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and
his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the
penalty of one month imprisonment and fine. [5] Subsequently, on
26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment,
defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each. [6]
In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent
denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint
was a form of harassment.[7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but
were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the
complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the
reception of complainants evidence was conducted. [8] While notices
were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception
of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to
respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address.
Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence.[9]
In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March
2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M.
Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents
actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were

not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost
his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of
willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit
or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus,
according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is
respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11]
Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as
final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an
act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the
instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the
Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings
relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when
in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much
emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to
file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the
Commission of his change of address.[12]
Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be
reasonable
under
the
circumstances,
the
Commission
recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month. [13]
As explained in the Report:
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the
basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a
claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from
an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed
prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in
Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however,
including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as
his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for

which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)

month.[14]

On 30 July 2004, the IBP

passed a resolution adopting
the Report and Recommendation, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376
CBD Case No. 510
Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.
Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has
been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and
for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the
contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial
court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio
B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) month.

The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.

Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. [15] Such is the
situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt
case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers

commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven,

and eventually punished by the lower courts.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus,
while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his
client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and
common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and
justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its
indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts [16] and to show respect to its
processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to
obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise
of disciplinary action against him.[17]
Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen
display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to
support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues
inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily
caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation
being conducted by the IBP.
Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not
proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the
Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it
will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the
Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will
provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct

and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this
decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE
TINGA

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

O.
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp.1-2.

[2]

Gertrudes Bantolo, et al. v. Coleta Castillon, et al., Civil Case No. 1345, RTC Antique,
Branch 10.
[3]

Rollo, p. 1.

[4]

Rollo, p. 2.

[5]

Rollo, pp. 7-13.

[6]

Rollo, pp. 62-75.

[7]

Rollo, pp. 17-19.

[8]

Rollo, pp. 111-155.

[9]

Rollo, p. 168.

[10]

Rollo, pp. 168-169.

[11]

Rollo, p. 170.

[12]

Rollo, pp. 173-175.

[13]

Rollo, p. 175.

[14]

Rollo, p. 176.

Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility (First Edition), p. 116, citing In re

Macdougall, 3 Phil. 70 (1903).
[15]

[16]

Choa v. Judge Chiongson, 329 Phil. 270, 276 (1996).

[17]

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-79690-707 7 October 1988, 166 SCRA 316, 332.

[18]

Garcia v. Manuel, Adm. Case No. 5811, 20 January 2003, 395 SCRA 386, 392,
citations omitted.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158130. July 29, 2005]

ATTY. MARTIN T. SUELTO, petitioner, vs. NELSON A. SISON, EMIL A.

SISON, FRANKLIN A. SISON and SANTOS LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City which adjudged herein respondents brothers Nelson, Emil and
Franklin, all surnamed Sison, to pay herein petitioner Atty. Martin T. Suelto the sum
ofP100,000.00 for and as notarial fees for services the latter has rendered, as well as
actual litigation costs in the form of filing and docket fees, petitioner lodged the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
[1]

[2]

[3]

Before January 15, 1994, respondents Sison brothers started negotiating for the
sale of their three (3) parcels of land to their herein co-respondent Santos Land
Development Corporation (the corporation).
In the series of negotiations, Atty. Danilo A. Basa, one of two retained counsel of
the corporation, was present in order to incorporate whatever the parties agreed upon
in the draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and the Deed of Absolute Sale
they were going to forge.
[4]

[5]

[6]

A Road Right-of-Way Agreement between the Heirs of Bernardo D. Carpio and the
Sisons reading:
[7]

xxx
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the persons composing the FIRST PARTY are the surviving heirs and
successors-in-interest of the late BERNARDO D. CARPIO, the late husband of SOL
T. CARPIO, one of the signatories herein, and the father of the rest of the signatories
to this agreement;
WHEREAS, the late BERNARDO D. CARPIO, on the one hand, and C. A. SISON
ENTERPRISES, INC. & CONCORDIA A. SISON, on the other hand, executed a
document called Road Right-of-Way Agreement dated May 29, 1984, consisting
of three (3) pages and entered in the Notarial Registry of Notary Public Renato B.
Pagatpatan of Davao City as Doc. No. 78; Page No. 16; Book No. 21; Series of 1984;
WHEREAS, the parties composing the SECOND PARTY are the successors-ininterests of C.A. SISON ENTERPRISES, INC. and Concordia A. Sison;
WHEREAS, the parties herein have agreed to go on with and fulfill the aforesaid
Road Right-of-Way Agreement;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the parties herein have
agreed, as follows:
1.
That by this agreement, the rights and obligation of the late Bernardo D. Carpio
under the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way Agreement are deemed to have been
transmitted to the FIRST PARTY [while] those rights and obligations under the same
Road Right-of-Way Agreement pertaining to C. A. SISON ENTERPRISES, INC.
and Concordia A. Sison are deemed to have been transmitted to the SECOND
PARTY. A copy of the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way Agreement is attached to
this agreement as Annex A to form an integral part thereof; shall (sic)

2.
That the parties have the right to assign, transfer, or in any other way, transmit
their rights and obligations under this agreement and the aforesaid Road Right-ofWay Agreement Annex A hereof, to any party or parties provided that the party
making such assignment, or transfer shall give notice to the other;
3.
That the two (2) year period mentioned in paragraph 1 found on page 1 of the
Road Right-of-Way Agreement Annex A hereof shall be reckoned from
___________ (sic), 1994.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
[8]

was in the meantime prepared and signed by the parties. It was notarized by the
Sisons counsel Atty. Arturo V. Agudo on January 10, 1994.
On January 15, 1994, the parties agreed to conclude and sign the MOA prepared by
Atty. Basa whereon the Sisons had in fact affixed their signatures. The parties met at
the office of the corporation.
[9]

Since Atty. Basa was at the time out of the country, the corporation asked its other
retained counsel, herein petitioner, to give the MOA a final look.
On perusing the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa, petitioner inputed therein the names
of the respective spouses of the Sisons. And to paragraph 5(h) of the MOA which
reads:

(h) That the FIRST PARTY shall within thirty (30) days from date of execution of
this document undertake the delineation of the Road Right of Way Agreement as
stipulated in the Road Right of Way Agreement dated May 29, 1984 between
Bernardo Carpio and C.A. Sison Enterprises, Inc. and Concordia A. Sison.
(Underscoring supplied),
[10]

petitioner added a second sentence reading:

The delineation shall include the technical description of the exact location of the
Road Right of Way which should be incorporated in an affidavit of
confirmation thereof to be executed by the parties therein and/or their duly authorized
representatives and which should be accordingly registered in the involved certificates
o[f] title in the office of the Register of Deeds by and at the expense of the FIRST
PARTY.
x x x (Underscoring supplied).
[11]

Aside from incorporating to the MOA the above-stated amendments, petitioner

prepared a Joint Affidavit of Clarification and Confirmation (Joint Affidavit), in
conformity with the immediately-quoted second sentence he introduced to paragraph
[12]

5(h) of the MOA, executed by Sol T. Carpio as representative of Bernardo D. Carpio,

and Nelson A. Sison as representative of the Sisons, reading:

WE, SOL T. CARPIO, of legal age, widow, Filipino and a resident of Davao City,
Philippines, and NELSON A. SISON, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of
Davao City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law
hereby depose and say that:
That we are both representatives of the parties to that ROAD RIGHT OF WAY
AGREEMENT dated May 29, 1984 by and between Bernardo Carpio and C.A. Sison
Enterprises, Inc., and Concordia A. Sison; Sol T. Carpio being the widow of Bernardo
Carpio and the attorney-in-fact of her children who are her co-heirs of said decedent
(Bernardo Carpio) while Nelson A. Sison is duly authorized representative of C.A.
Sison Enterprises, Inc., and Concordia A. Sison, as well as the registered owner
himself of one of the parcels of land involved in the aforementioned Road Right of
Way Agreement;
That while the specific location and technical description of the area agreed by
the parties have already been determined and in fact actually established on the
ground, the same was not properly indicated or annotated in the Certificates of Title
thereof, hence, the need of this affidavit for that purpose, and thus be duly annotated.
That the aforementioned area subject-matter of the aforementioned Road Right of
Way Agreement, as now established, has the following Technical Description, to wit:
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
A pertinent provision in the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa, which was retained in the
final MOA, called for the retention by the corporation of 10% of the total purchase price
for the following purpose:
[13]

(3) x x x
(b) . . . Provided, further, that the [CORPORATION] shall withhold an amount
equivalent to TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total purchase price to defray expenses for
taxes, notarial and attorneys fees and other fees and charges and incidental
expenses relative to the sale of the parcels of land and the improvements thereof and
to carry out the transfer thereof to the [CORPORATION]. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
There was, however, no agreement on the amount of notarial fees to be paid or taken
from the 10% retained amount.
[14]

On January 15, 1994, the Sisons and the corporation affixed their signatures on the
MOA, as finalized by petitioner who notarized it on even date.
The Sisons and the corporation subsequently executed three Deeds of Absolute
Sale dated February 11, 1994 covering the 3 Sison properties in favor of the
corporation. The deeds of sale were notarized by the Sisons counsel Atty. Agudo.
[15]

On February 3, 1994, the corporation received from petitioner a Statement of

Account dated January 15, 1994 addressed to it, for the account of Nelson A. Sison,
Emil A. Sison and Franklin A. Sison, wherein petitioner made the following billing:
[16]

Legal fees for preparation and notarization of Memorandum of Agreement dated

January 15, 1994 between Santos Land Development Corporation and Nelson A.
Sison, Emil A. Sison and Franklin A. Sison recorded as Doc. No. 06; Page No. 03,
Book No. XVI, Series of 1994 at the minimum rate of one and one-half per cent (1)
of the consideration of P40,274,870.00; for final preparation of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale per stipulations therein but was notarized by another lawyer after
signing thereof . . .
P604,123.05
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
On February 7, 1994, Mrs. Sol T. Carpio and Nelson Sison signed the Joint
Affidavit prepared and notarized on even date by petitioner.
[17]

It appears that petitioner sent a letter dated February 18, 1994 to the Sisons stating
his fees and charges in connection with the preparation of documents on the sale. For
by letter of February 21, 1994, the Sisons wrote petitioner the following:
[18]

We received your letter dated February 18, 1994, stating your fees and charges
regarding the preparation of documents of the Deed of Sale of our land to Santos
Land. The families of Franklin, Emil and Nelson would like to make it clear to you
that it is our understanding with the Santos Land particularly with Mrs. Nelia Partoza
(President of Santos Land) that all documents regarding the sale of the lands to be
sold will be prepared by the Sison family with their chosen lawyer/adviser which
is not you.
We made this clear to them because our family is also in the subdivision business and
the preparation of the Deed of Sale and other pertinent papers regarding its transfer to
the buyers is just an ordinary thing to us and to our lawyer.
You have never been hired by us or asked your help in any matter dealing with the
sale of our land to Santos Land in all our talk to Santos Land you are always the
adviser of Santos Land and not on our side. We have our own legal adviser so you
have no right to charge us with any legal fees whatsoever.

In the making of the memorandum agreement between Santos Land and Sison
family, it has been our understanding with Mrs. Nelia Partoza that they will shoulder
all expenses regarding its being finalized.
We hope that this letter will clarify everything regarding the matter of fees.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
A copy of the Sisons February 21, 1994 letter was received on February 26,
1994 by the corporation.
[19]

In the meantime, the Sisons requested from the corporation through its President,
Nelia D. Partoza, the remittance to them of the balance of the 10% of the purchase
price retained pursuant to the earlier-quoted paragraph 3(b) of the MOA. Partoza
complied with the request, drawing the Sisons to send her a letter of April 28,
1994 reading:
[20]

We thank you very much for releasing the checks covering the balance of the 10
percent retention.
We have transferred and given to you the title of the lands which you bought from us
and all legal fees, taxes and incidental expenses have already been covered by us.
As to the case of your legal adviser and retainer Atty. Martin Suelto, please refer to the
letter which we wrote to him and of which you have been copy furnished.
Enclosed herewith is the copy of the letter which we sent to him for your perusal.
(Underscoring supplied).
The April 28, 1994 letter of the Sisons was received by the corporation on April 29,
1994. The records do not show that this letter drew any comment or response from the
corporation.
[21]

As petitioner failed to collect his fees in connection with his finalization and
notarization of the MOA and preparation and notarization of the Joint Affidavit of
Clarification and Confirmation, he filed on August 24, 1994 a complaint before the RTC
of Davao City for Collection of Sum of Money and Attorneys Fees against the Sisons
alleging, inter alia, that:
[22]

xxx
4.
Plaintiff prepared and notarized a MEMORAN-DUM OF AGREEMENT dated
January 15, 1994 between Santos Land Development Corporation and defendants
Emil A. Sison, Franklin A. Sison, and Nelson A. Sison, the latter in his personal
capacity and as the attorney-in-fact for Franklin A. Sison, concerning the sale of
certain parcels of land, recorded in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 06; Page No. 03;

Book No. XVI, Series of 1994, copy hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex A.
5.

Paragraph 3 (b) of the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement, provides:

xxxx

3.
That the total price of FORTY MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY
FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY (P40,274,870.00) PESOS shall
be payable in accordance with the following manner:
(a) x x x x
(b) That the balance of THIRTY FOUR MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY NINE PESOS & 50/100
(P34,233,639.50) shall be payable in three (3) years
computed five months after the date of execution of this
Memorandum of Agreement. Provided, that payments
herein shall be payable in equal quarterly installments
covered by postdated checks of the SECOND PARTY.
Provided, further, that the SECOND PARTY shall
withhold an amount equivalent to TEN PERCENT (10%)
of the total purchase price to defray expenses for
taxes, notarial and attorneys fees and other fees and
charges and incidental expenses relative to the sale of the
parcels of land and the improvements thereof and to
carry out the transfer thereof to the SECOND PARTY.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
6.
Furthermore, he gave extensive legal advises (sic )and services to the
defendants concerning the implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement.
Plaintiff likewise prepared and notarized a JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF CLARIFICATION
AND CONFIRMATION between Sol T. Carpio and Nelson A. Sison concerning a
ROAD RIGHT OF WAY AGREEMENT affecting the parcels of land subject of the
Memorandum of Agreement and the deeds of Absolute Sale, to facilitate and expedite
the implementation of the said Memorandum of Agreement.
xxxx

11. For failure and refusal of the defendants to pay the just claim of plaintiff,
plaintiff was constrained to engage the services of counsel on a contingent basis equal
to 25% of whatever plaintiff may recover from defendants for which defendants
should be held liable.
12. Plaintiff will spend about TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) to file and
prosecute this case but the exact amount shall be proved during the trial of this case.
(Underscoring supplied).
[23]

The Sisons, in their Answer with Counterclaim, denied having any obligation to
petitioner, they alleging that they never engaged his legal services nor received any
legal advice from him as it was the corporation, petitioners client, which retained his
services and requested him to finalize and notarize the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa;
and that they had no obligation in his preparation and notarization of the Joint Affidavit.
[24]

As special defense, the Sisons alleged that when petitioner finalized and notarized
the MOA and prepared the Joint Affidavit, the corporation assured them that it would
take care of his legal fees.
By way of compulsory counterclaim, the Sisons alleged that the filing of the
baseless complaint against them was malicious, as a result of which they were
compelled to engage the services of counsel to protect them and would likely incur
incidental expenses of at least P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 each, and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each.
[25]

The Sisons later filed a Third Party Complaint against the corporation,
alleging, inter alia, as follows:
[26]

xxx
4.
Inasmuch as it was third-party defendant which retained the services of
[petitioner] in connection with the notarization of the said memorandum of agreement
including the other related documents and committed to pay all the legal fees therefor,
then the fees being collected by plaintiff should be borne solely by the third-party
defendant;
5.
However, third-party defendant failed to make the necessary arrangement for
the payment of Atty. Sueltos attorneys fees as a consequence of which third-party
plaintiffs were unnecessarily haled to court by Atty. Suelto and was thereafter
compelled to file this third-party complaint for which they incurred expenses
of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. (Underscoring supplied).
[27]

The Third Party Complaint thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the third
party defendant-corporation to indemnify third party plaintiffs, the Sisons, for whatever
they may be required to pay petitioner and to pay them P50,000.000 for attorneys fees.
[28]

To the Third Party Complaint the corporation filed their Answer, alleging, inter alia,
that the Sisons had no cause of action against it, it being their agreement that the
Sisons would pay the services of petitioner.
[29]

Upon the following issues, to wit:

1.
Whether or not plaintiff has been retained by, and/or rendered legal services to,
either of the other parties (defendants/third-party plaintiffs and third-party defendant)
in connection with the preparation and notarization of the Memorandum of Agreement
and other documents and legal advices as to justify him to claim for such fees, and
whether the fees had been agreed upon beforehand?
2.
Assuming the plaintiff is entitled to claim notarial and attorneys fees, who is
liable to pay the same, and whether the amount being claimed is fair and reasonable?
3.
On the part of the plaintiff, whether he is entitled to damages and attorneys fees
from the defendant/third-party plaintiffs; on the part of the defendants/third-party
plaintiffs, whether [they are] entitled to damages and attorneys fees from the plaintiff
on [their] counterclaim and for reimbursement from the third-party defendant; and on
the part of the third-party defendant, whether it is entitled to its claim for damages and
attorneys fees from defendants/third-party plaintiffs. (Underscoring supplied),
the trial court, Branch 33 of the RTC of Davao, by decision of July 28, 1997, held that
the participation of petitioner in the final negotiation of the sale was not as lawyer of the
Sisons but of the corporation, and if petitioner rendered some advice in connection
therewith, it should be for the account of the corporation in accordance with their
Retainership Agreement.
[30]

Respecting notarial fees, the trial court found no evidence to show that the parties
had any agreement beforehand on the amount thereof.
On the 10% retention provision in the MOA, the trial court held that the same was
not for attorneys and notarial fees alone, it having stated that it was to defray expenses
for taxes, notarial and attorneys fees, and other fees and charges and incidental
expenses relative to the sale . . . and to carry out the transfer [of the properties] to [the
corporation].
Passing on the services of petitioner, the trial court held that with respect to the
MOA, as finalized, he did some revisions thereon, albeit the revision . . . to include the
names of the wives of the Sisons is not material to the effectivity of the MOA . . . As for
the addition by petitioner of a sentence to paragraph 5(h) bearing on the Road Right-ofWay provision, the trial court held:

The clause x x x exact location of the Road Right of Way which should be
incorporated in an affidavit of confirmation thereof to be executed by the parties
therein and/or their duly authorized representatives and which should be accordingly

registered in the involved certificates of title in the office of the Register of Deeds by
and at the expense of the FIRST PARTY, which was added on by the plaintiff to the
MOA is but an amplification of the first clause in the paragraph, and may even be
dispensed with. As a matter of fact, the Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. 6) which
was already signed by the SISONS when presented to SUELTO had this last sentence
in its paragraph 5(h): The delineation shall include the Technical Description of the
road register (sic) with the Register of Deeds which practically encompasses the idea
suggested in the revision made by the plaintiff. If the delineation shall include the
technical description then the exact location of the road will definitely be identified.
This delineation will definitely be in a public instrument in order that it will be
registered with the Register of Deeds. There is no need for the confirmationof Sol
T. Carpio because the original Road Right of Way Agreement was already embodied
in a public instrument, and binding on the successors-in-interest of the contracting
parties, and there is no indication that the heirs of Bernardo Carpio are reneging on
that agreement. At most, plaintiff could have refined the last sentence in paragraph
5(h) of Exh. 6 by adding a word or words between road and register and it would
have served the import of paragraph 5(h). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
[31]

In other words, the trial court found that petitioners addition of the second sentence
to paragraph 5(h) of the MOA was a mere amplification of the first sentence thereof, and
the execution of the Joint Affidavit was not necessary as the Road Right-of-Way
Agreement dated May 29, 1984 was embodied in a public instrument which is binding
on the successors-in-interest of the parties absent any indication that the heirs of
Bernardo D. Carpio are reneging on that agreement.
In any event, the trial court held that petitioners preparation and notarization of the
Joint Affidavit was done not for the benefit of the Sisons but for the benefit of his client,
the corporation, and that the argument of petitioner that the January 10, 1994 Road
Right-of-Way Agreement earlier prepared, signed by the parties, and notarized by the
Sisons counsel Atty. Agudo could not be registered in the absence of technical
description of the properties covered is untenable, for the Registry of Deeds has the
ministerial duty to register deeds, conveyances, and the like, whether effecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public
instruments.
The trial court added that the technical description of the Road Right-of-Way is
needed only for purposes of issuing a separate title and that even without the technical
description, the agreement may still be annotated on the grantors certificate of title.
Be that as it may, the trial court held that since the Sisons were likewise benefited
by petitioners notarization of the MOA and of the Joint Affidavit, it is only proper that
they should recompense him, pursuant to the earlier-quoted provision of the MOA on
the retention of 10% of the purchase price, citing Article 2142 of the Civil Code which
provides:

ART. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical
relation of quasi contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited
at the expense of another.
Holding that the notarial services done by petitioner must be based on quantum
meruit, there being no prior agreement thereon, the trial court found petitioners bill
for P604,123.05 unreasonable, unconscionable and grossly inflated, citing Section 24,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 24. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied).
The trial court, noting that petitioners services were limited to perusing the
MOA (Exhibit. 6), going over what [had] already been agreed upon and therefore, in
[petitioners] own word, he could not change what [the parties thereto] had agreed upon,
and making two (2) additions in the MOA, one of which, as stated earlier, is a mere
amplification of what had already been agreed upon, [the other being the furnishing of
the names of the respective spouses of the Sisons], and . . . preparing the Joint
Affidavit of Clarification and Confirmation , which to the mind of the Court benefited
most his client, and which could have been prepared by [the] SISONS lawyer just as
well, and taking into account the value of the properties sold P40 million plus ,
held that the amount ofP100,000.00 as notarial fees is reasonable and conscionable.
[32]

Accordingly, the trial court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered adjudging the

defendants SISON liable to pay SUELTO the sum of P100,000.00 for and as notarial
fees for services the latter has rendered, as well as actual litigation costs in the form of
filing and docket fees.
The counterclaim of the SISONS and the counterclaim of SANTOS LAND are
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[33]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendants-third party- plaintiffs Sisons

assigned to the trial court the following errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANTS-THIRD

PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPEL-LANTS LIABLE TO PAY THE NOTARIAL
FEES OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AS IT DOES NOT CONFORM WITH
ITS FINDING THAT IT WAS THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
WHICH ENGAGED THE SERVICES OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE THIRDPARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
PAYING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES NOTARIAL FEES WHICH FACT IS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE NOTARIAL FEES OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AT P100,000.00, THE SAME
BEING UNCONSCIONABLE CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT HIS
SERVICES CONSISTED IN MAKING MINOR AND
INCONSEQUENTIAL REVISIONS IN AN ALREADY PREPARED
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AND NOTARIZING THE SAME,
AND PREPARING AND NOTARIZING A JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
CLARIFICATION AND CONFIRMATION WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE
IMMATERIAL AND BENEFICIAL TO HIS CLIENT. (Underscoring
supplied).
[34]

By the assailed decision of October 30, 2002, the appellate court reversed that of
the trial court.
[35]

The appellate court agreed with the Sisons contention that the trial courts judgment
is inconsistent with its factual findings that it was the corporation which engaged
petitioners services in connection with the finalization and notarization of the MOA and
preparation and notarization of the Joint Affidavit. It too agreed with the Sisons claim
that the corporation, being in the real estate business, agreed to assume petitioners
notarial fees.
In another vein, the appellate court, noting the provision in the MOA regarding the
retention of the 10% selling price by the buyer corporation to be applied to expenses
including notarial and attorneys fees and the corporations returning of the balance
thereof to the seller-Sisons in the amount of more than P600,000.00 despite the
corporations previous receipt of petitioners Statement of Account and copy of
petitioners demand letter to the Sisons, held that the return of the said balance elicited
the clear and unrebuttedpresumption . . . that all expenses pertinent to the sale have
been discharged.
Accordingly, the appellate court set aside the trial courts decision.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of April 11,
2003 by the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes before this Court raising the following
issues:
[36]

[37]

[38]

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE.
III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN MARGINAL[I]ZING THE SERVICES OF THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT. (Underscoring supplied).
[39]

Why the Sisons are not amenable to settle petitioners billing for notarial fees is
reflected in the following transcript of Nelson Sisons testimony:
Q

Of course, when that Memorandum of Agreement was being finalized, you were
very much aware of the fact that there is that provision about the payment of the
notarial fees and the attorneys fees as provided in the Memorandum of
Agreement, is it not?

Yes, sir.

And you are aware of the fact that you are the one, under the agreement, who
will be paying for the notarial fees and other fees of the lawyer?

Yes.

And of course, that provision was eventually included in the final draft that you
signed the Memorandum of Agreement, is it not?

Yes, sir.

x x x You are willing to pay for the notarial fees after it is finished to be taken
out of the ten percent retention?

Yes.

But of course, your only objection is that, it should be a lawyer of your own
choice?

Yes, sir.

xxx
Q

You said that when you objected to Attorney Sueltos notarizing the Memorandum
of Agreement, Mrs. Partoza, as President of Santos Land assured you and I quote:
Amin na lang yan. When she told you: AMIN NA LANG YAN, what was your
understanding when she said AMIN NA LANG YAN?

Our understanding when she said Amin na lang yan, on our objection why the
name of our lawyer was changed to Atty. Suelto is that, inasmuch as Atty.
Suelto, we believe is their retainer, and there are lots of lawyers retaining them, so,
they will absorb the expenses, if there is any, on signing of the Memorandum of

Agreement, for convenience of both. x x x[40] (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied).

As gathered from the above-quoted transcript of Nelson Sisons testimony, the

Sisons were willing to pay for the notarial fees to be charged to the 10% retained
amount of the purchase price, if the lawyer notarizing it is one of their choice.
That the Sisons wanted to have a lawyer of their choice to notarize the MOA could be
on account of their desire to be able to save some expenses, as gleaned from
petitioners testimony regarding Nelson Sisons alleged reason why it should be the
Sisons own lawyer who should notarize the Deed of Sale:
[ATTY. LOREJO]:
Q

You notarized [the Deed of Absolute Sale]?

Well, it was supposed to be finalized after I made the corrections but then, the
Sisons, more specially Nelson Sison, made a request that the document, the deed
of sale should be notarized by their lawyer so that they will be able to save
some expenses. . .[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Why the corporation returned to the Sisons the balance of the 10% retained
purchase price, despite its awareness that petitioner, its own retained counsel, had a
pending request to it to settle his notarial fees from said 10% retained purchase price
spawns conflicting versions. The corporation claims that the Sisons had told it that they
would settle petitioners notarial fees. The Sisons claim, on the other hand, that the
corporation through Nelia Partoza undertook to settle the same.
What is clear, however, both in the pleadings and in the evidence of both parties, is
that the notarial fees for the MOA, not to mention the Joint Affidavit, had not been paid.
The appellate courts presumption that the notarial fees had been paid with the return by
the corporation to the Sisons of the balance of the 10% retained purchase is thus
incongruous with the clearly established fact that petitioners notarial fees had not been
paid.
As priorly stated, by Nelson Sisons admission, he and his siblings were willing to
charge the payment of notarial fees to the 10% retained purchase price provided the
lawyernotary public was one of their choice. The MOA provision that notarial fees
relative to the sale, among other expenses, would be charged to the 10% retained
purchase price bears no qualification whatsoever, however, on which lawyer whether
of the Sisons or of the corporation would perform notarial services for the provision to
apply.
The Sisons, having agreed in the MOA, which is the law between them and the
corporation, to charge notarial fees from the retained 10% of the purchase price, but
the balance thereof having been returned to them without petitioners notarial fees being
settled, they are under obligation to settle the same, at a reasonable amount of course.
The trial courts determination of the amount of P100,000.00 as fair and reasonable
notarial fees, inclusive of actual litigation cost, under the circumstances reflected above,
merits this Courts approval. It levels the unreasonable, unconscionable billing of
petitioner-retained counsel of the corporation and the desire of the Sisons made known

to the corporation and petitioner to save on expenses by wanting a lawyer of their own
choice to notarize the MOA and other documents.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is, in light of the foregoing discussions, REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

[1]

CA Rollo at 120-130.

[2]

Records at 244-269; CA Rollo at 48-73.

[3]

P3,861.75, dorsal side of page 1 of the Complaint, Records at 1.

[4]

TSN, October 11, 1996 at 9, Folder of TSN at 531.

[5]

TSN, July 15, 1996 at 11-12, Folder of TSN at 445-446.

[6]

Exhs. 6 6-e, Folder of Exhibits at 42-47.

[7]

Exh. 9, Folder of Exhibits at 61-63.

[8]

Ibid.

[9]

Supra, note 6.

[10]

Exh. A and A-6, Folder of Exhibits at 1-7.

[11]

Ibid.

[12]

Exh. B, Folder of Exhibits at 8-9.

[13]

Exh. A-3, Folder of Exhibits at 4.

[14]

TSN, October 11, 1996 at 16, Folder of Exhibits at 538.

[15]

Exhs. 10, 11, and 12, Folder of Exhibits at 64-69.

[16]

Exh. C, Folder of Exhibits at 10.

[17]

Supra, note 12.

[18]

Exh. 4, Folder of Exhibits at 40.

[19]

Ibid.

[20]

Exh. 5, Folder of Exhibits at 41.

[21]

Ibid.

[22]

Records at 1-5.

[23]

Id. at 2-4.

[24]

Id. at 19-22.

[25]

Id. at 21.

[26]

Id. at 59-62.

[27]

Id. at 60.

[28]

Ibid.

[29]

Id. at 85-89.

[30]

Id. at 244-269.

[31]

Id. at 264-265.

[32]

Id. at 71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied).

[33]

Page 25 of decision, Records at 268.

[34]

CA Rollo at 41.

[35]

Id. at 120-130.

[36]

Id. at 195-202.

[37]

Id. at 204-216.

[38]

Rollo at 5-24.

[39]

Id. at 6.

[40]

TSN, March 26, 1996 at 348-349, 351.

[41]

TSN, September 27, 1995 at 61-62.

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131966. August 31, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A.

DESIERTO, as Ombudsman, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,
MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT, ROLANDO DELA CUESTA, JOSE
M. CONCEPCION, JOSE R. MENDOZA, HERMENEGILDO C.
ZAYCO, EMMANUEL M. ALAMEDA, AMADO C. MAMURIC,
DOUGLAS LU YM, JAIME GANDIAGA, NARCISO M. PINEDA,
DANILO S. URSUA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and the Second Motion for
Reconsideration filed by private respondent Cojuangco, Jr. as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
On September 23, 2002, the Court, in the above-entitled case, granted the petition
for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines. The resolution of the Ombudsman
in OMB-0-90-2811 dismissing the Republics complaint was set aside, and the
Ombudsman was ordered to proceed with the preliminary investigation in said case and
to exclude respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as defendants.

Respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and petitioner Republic of the Philippines then
filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. Both were
denied by the Court in its Resolution dated August 16, 2004.
Respondent Cojuangco, Jr. filed a second motion for reconsideration on the ground,
among others, that the Resolution dated August 16, 2004, was promulgated without the
requisite division of five as required by A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC. The Court in its
Resolution dated April 25, 2005 recalled the Resolution dated August 16, 2004 and the
(first) Motion for Reconsideration together with the Second Motion for Reconsideration
is deemed submitted for resolution.
In his first Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Cojuangco argues that:

a.
It was because of lack of evidence or probable cause that the Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-90-2811, not because the offense has prescribed or
that LOI 926 and PD Nos. 961 and 1468 precluded prosecution under RA No. 3019
and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Court in its decision of
September 23, 2002 did not overturn the Ombudsmans finding of lack of probable
cause, the Ombudsmans Resolution of June 2, 1997 may not be nullified.
b.
No evidentiary basis exists for the Courts finding that the offense had not
prescribed; it was, consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense
charged had not prescribed.
c.
It was also error for the Court to have found that PD Nos. 961 and 1468, LOI
No. 926 may not be taken into account in determining whether the respondent violated
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.
d.
The Court, apparently, overlooked respondents contention that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case has been violated warranting
dismissal of OMB-0-90-2811.[1]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, for its part, questions the Courts ruling
ordering the exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as
defendants in OMB-0-90-2811.[2]
The Court will first resolve respondent Cojuangcos motions for reconsideration.
In his second Motion for Reconsideration, respondent raises the same issues which
were earlier submitted in his first Motion for Reconsideration, i.e., as to the existence of
probable cause and the matter of prescription. [3]
The Court denies both motions of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.
Graft Investigation Officer II Aleu A. Amante, in his Resolution dated June 2, 1997,
recommended the dismissal of the case on the finding that there is no sufficient
evidence to engender a well-founded belief that violation of the Anti-Graft Law was

committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. [4] Contrary to respondents
argument, such conclusion is basically premised on the finding that the acquisition by
UNICOM of the sixteen oil mills was done in accordance with P.D. No. 961, [5] and not
because there was no sufficient evidence that private respondents are probably guilty of
the charges against them. Amantes recommendation specifically stated that
respondents cannot be made criminally liable for implementing a government policy
because there is no element of evident bad faith or malice. [6] And, as is stated in the
assailed Decision, the validity of LOI No. 926, and P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 will not
protect respondents from criminal prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Moreover, we categorically held in the Orosa case that the fact the transactions were
done pursuant to P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 will not shield the respondents from being
charged considering that prosecution for violations of R.A. 3019 involves questions
as to whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto by the
private respondents were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government; whether they caused undue injury to the government; and whether
the private respondents were interested for personal gain or had material
interests in the transactions.
Similarly in the present case, contrary to the Ombudsmans belief, LOI No. 926 and
P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 cannot protect private respondents from criminal prosecution
as they are being charged with commission of acts tantamount to violations of R.A.
3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. [7] (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, while P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 may have sanctioned UNICOMs
acquisition of the sixteen oil mills, it should not deter the Ombudsman from determining
in the preliminary investigation whether such acquisition caused undue prejudice,
disadvantage and injury to the government, or that private respondents had a material
and personal interest in the acquisition thereof, acts which are defined as corrupt
practices and declared unlawful under R.A. No. 3019. These questions have not been
taken into consideration by the Ombudsman when he concluded that there is no
sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief that violation of the Anti-Graft Law
was committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof.
If the Court were to adhere to private respondents argument that valid laws shall be
taken into account in determining whether there was a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, then the validity of laws would create a blanket
shield and there would be no prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186
of the Revised Penal Code, as all acts committed by public officers will be beyond
reach, despite the undue damage, injury and prejudice to the government, and the
personal gain and material interest of the public officers involved.
Moreover, it is not true that the Court has no evidentiary basis for its finding that the
offense had not prescribed. As stated in the assailed Decision, since the ten-year
prescriptive period in violation of R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Section 2 of Act No.

3326, and applying further the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan,[8] the complaint in
this case, which was filed on March 2, 1990, was well within the prescriptive period.
The counting of the applicable ten-year prescriptive period in this case commenced
from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February
1986 after the EDSA Revolution, and the filing of the complaint with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on March 2, 1990. Between these dates, at
the most, only four (4) years had lapsed. Hence, the complaint was timely filed.
The Court likewise finds respondents contention in his motions that the seven-year
delay in the disposition of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman warrants the
dismissal of the case against him, without merit.
In the case of Dela Pea vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Court had the occasion to restate the doctrine that:

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical

reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Despite the finding that there was a considerable delay by the Sandiganbayan in
the disposition of the petitioners case, the Court did not dismiss their case for the
reason that the failure of the petitioners therein to assert their right to a speedy
disposition of their case amounts to a waiver of such right. Thus, the Court held:

Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case
was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing. Also, in their petition, they
averred: Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits,
petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary
investigation. They slept on their right a situation amounting to laches. The matter
could have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed
signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made
some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not
waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such
right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was insensitive to the
implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against
him by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter,
which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have

been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his

acquiescence.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
In respondent Cojuangcos case, records shows that the last pleading filed prior to
the Ombudsmans Resolution dated June 2, 1997 was respondents Motion to Suspend
Filing of Counter-Affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991. [11] Between 1991 and 1997,
respondent did nothing to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly,
his silence during such period amounts to a waiver of such right.
Moreover, respondents right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work
against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice [12] considering
that the funds used to acquire the 16 moth-balled oil mills came from the coconut levy
funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public
funds.[13]
It is noted that the Courts decision in the Orosa case,[14] which is cited in the
decision of the present case, was set aside per Resolution dated July 7, 2004, on the
ground that two of the respondents therein, Ma. Clara Lobregat and Jose C.
Concepcion, were deprived of their right to file their comments on the petition, and as
such, the case was not yet ripe for resolution when the Court rendered its decision. Be
that as it may, said resolution does not bear any consequence on the present case as
the jurisprudence relied upon in the Orosa case are still valid and binding precedents.
As regards petitioner Republics motion that the assailed Decision be reconsidered
insofar as the exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as
defendants in OMB-0-90-2811 is concerned, the Court finds the same bereft of merit.
According to petitioner, respondents Regala and Concepcion should not be
excluded as respondents because they are being charged for illegal acts committed in
their official capacity as members of the Board of Directors of UNICOM and UCPB, in
conspiracy with the other private respondents. [15] Such argument, however, has already
been overruled by the Court in both the Regala[16] and Castillo[17] cases, wherein the
Court ordered the exclusion of petitioners therein from the acts complained of in
connection with the legal services they rendered to the other respondents. Thus, the
Court held in the Castillo case that:

It is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in the present case is not being required to
name his clients. However, the case of Regala is still applicable to the present case
because the two cases are the same in more important aspects.
The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants
Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his
affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regala the professional relationship was
raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proved during the
trial. This notwithstanding, this Court struck out the complaint against the lawyers.
The respondent Republic argued in its Comment that:

Moreover, the rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a

valid ground to dismiss a complaint against a party. It is merely a ground for
disqualification of a witness (Section 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be
invoked at the appropriate time, such as, when a lawyer is under compulsion to
answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned on such
confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to
produce, through subpoena duces tecum to otherwise, letters or other documents
containing the same privileged matter. But defendant is not being required to testify
about or otherwise reveal any confidential communication made by the client to him
or his advice given thereon. What is clear from the complaint is that defendant is
being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with the other defendants in
the commission of the acts complained of.
Besides, the attorney-client privileged communication does not apply if the
confidence received by an attorney is for the purpose of advancing a criminal or
fraudulent purpose.
This was the same argument raised by the Republic in the case of Regala. In
overruling the Republics position, this Court ruled:
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that
they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain
inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. [18]
In this case, respondents Regala and Concepcion were constituted as Members of
the Board Directors of UNICOM and UCPB in the course of their duties as counsel, and
following the ruling in the Regala and Castillo cases, they should be excluded as
defendants to the case.
Finally, during the pendency of this petition, respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat
died on January 2, 2004.[19] The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. [20] Consequently, the
case against respondent Lobregat should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the first and second Motions for Reconsideration filed by private
respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., and the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

The Decision dated September 23, 2002 is MODIFIED to the effect that the charges
against deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in OMB-0-90-2811, pending
preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, is ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 637-638.

[2]

Id., p. 693.

[3]

Id., pp. 1170-1180.

[4]

Original Record, Folder 1, p.783.

[5]

Rollo, p. 81.

[6]

Id., pp. 81-82.

[7]

Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 131966, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 452, 459.

[8]

G.R. No. 109376, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 655 [2000], cited in Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No.
136506, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 585.

[9]

G. R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485, 487-488.

[10]

Id., pp. 487-488.

[11]

Records, Vol. 1, p. 672.

[12]

Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107211, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 703, 716.

[13]

Republic vs. COCOFED, G.R. Nos. 147062-64, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 462, 481.

[14]

Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 585.

[15]

Rollo, p. 695.

[16]

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 122.

[17]

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138231, February 21, 2002, 377 SCRA 509.

[18]

Id., pp. 513-515.

[19]

Rollo, Annex 1, p. 1137.

[20]

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code; Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4,
2001, 364 SCRA 334, 362.