1) Natalia Realty vs.

DAR
Facts: NATALIA is the owner of a 125 hectare land in Antipolo, Rizal. On April 18,
1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20, 312 hectares of land located
in Antipolo, San mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis. The NATALIA properties were situated within the areas
proclaimed as townsite reservation.
HLRB granted NATALIA the permit to develop the land into a subdivision. When
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the subdivision.
NATALIA sought cancellation of the Notice on the ground that the land in question
ceased to be agricultural ands when PP No. 1637 transformed it into a townsite
reservation.
Issue: WON the undeveloped portions of NATALIA properties are covered by
CARL
Ruling: No. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands, which
are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands." Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation.
2) Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of
CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made
to apply to it:
>Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition
of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
>Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
>Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

>Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
>Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in >Section 13
(W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands
are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they
currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13
and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988),
insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage
HELD: Unconsitutional! The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section
II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is
invalid. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
3) De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and
brings those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the
return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which
various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with
respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970,
respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because
the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an
action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent,
being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed
to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not
be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but
such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as

an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and
one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for
other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on
a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though
private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling
their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant
here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for
the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5)
categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on
the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the
goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force." we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be
regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as
a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held
liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that
they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
4) Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary
of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain
5) Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at
redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who

are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish
owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the
Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can
be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The
CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall
obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two
alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock
distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off
corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition
by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago,
approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21,
1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the
farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the
interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of
terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually
received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives
havent really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms
of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the
recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1)
the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP
of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated
land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed
by HLI via Rule 65.
Issues and rulings:
Does the PARC have jurisdiction, power, and authority to nullify or revoke the
SDOA (Stock Development Operation Agreement) ?

*The PARC has jurisdiction, power, and authority to nullify and revoke the SDOA.
Although RA 6657 do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke or
nullify the SDOA, such power and authority is deemed possessed under the doctrine
of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much
a part of it as that which is expressed. It may be stated that the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of agricultural land of corporate
owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
Was the PARC correct in nullifying or revoking the SDOA?
*The PARC was correct in nullifying or revoking the SDOA because:
>HLI has not fully accomplished with its undertaking to distribute
homelots to the beneficiaries under SDOA despite the lapse of 16 years. However,
since the SDOA was already revoked w/ finality, the DAR must pay HLI the just
compensation for the homelots pursuant to Sec. 4 Art. 13 of the Constitution.
>the mechanics and timelines of stock distribution violate the provisions of
DAO 10.
Was the PARC correct in including the lands that RCBC and LIPCO had acquired
from HLI in coverage of agrarian and reform program?
*PARC was not correct in including the lands that RCBC and LIPCO had acquired
from HLI in the coverage of the agrarian reform program. RCBC and LIPCO are
considered bona fide purchasers for value and have acquired rights, which cannot be
disregarded and must be protected.
Should the 80.51 hectare land transferred to the government for use as part of the
SCTEX be excluded from the compulsory agrarian reform coverage?
*yes, it should be excluded from the compulsory agrarian reform coverage
considering that the transfer was consistent with the governments exercise of the
power of eminent domain. But considering that the sale and transfer of the 80.51
hectare SCTEX lot came after compulsory coverage has taken place, the
beneficiaries should have their corresponding share of the lands value, for which
HLI should be held responsible.
6) Republic vs. DAR and Salvador
FACTS: Two properties of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC) were
placed under the coverage of CARL. SNLABC sought exemption of their properties,
arguing that due to the ruling in the Luz Farms case, land devoted to livestock is
outside the coverage of the CARL. Upon ocular inspection, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) found that one of the parcels of land, the Lopez land, were
exempt from CARL coverage. The other parcel, the Limot land, was not exempt.
SNLABC appealed the finding with the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture.

The DAR, however, ruled that both Lopez and Limot lands were subject to the
CARL. SNLABC appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which rendered the
assailed decision. The CA affirmed the findings of the MARO, that the Lopez land
was exclusively used for livestock. The presence of coconut trees in the Lopez lands,
it is still used primarily for raising livestock. There are also structures meant for such
a purpose. The Limot lands, on the other hand, were used both for coconut and
rubber plantations. The MARO found that it was only used as an extension of
grazing land, inconsistently at best. Both the DAR and SNLABC appealed the
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Lopez and Limot Lands are under the coverage of CARL
HELD: Both petitions are denied. The DAR argues that the tax declaration of the
Lopez lands classify it as agricultural land. Also, that the SNLABC was incorporated
after the implementation of the CARL shows that there is an attempt to evade CARL
coverage. It is, however, doctrine that tax declarations themselves are not conclusive
evidence as to the classification of land. Also, it is the actual usage of the land, not
its classification, which determines its eligibility for CARL. As for the Lopez lands,
it as inherited by the owner of SNLABC as livestock land. Its use has been for
raising livestock even before the incorporation of SNLABC. Hence, the time of
incorporation, and the tax declaration are irrelevant.
As for the Limot lands, it is not enough that such are used as seasonal extensions of
grazing land. The livestock are not regularly situated in the land in question, but are
only brought there at times for grazing. It is land actually devoted to coconut and
rubber. Hence, it cannot be exempted.
7) DAR vs Delia Sutton
FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by
respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On
October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, CARL
took effect. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively
to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. MARO
inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the
coverage of the CARL. DAR ignored their request DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of
1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O.
fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio. DAR Secretary
Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for

exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration.

They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. Office of the President
affirmed the order of DAR On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the
intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the
land reform program of the government.
ISSUE: WON DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.
HELD: Assailed AO is unconstitutional. In the case at bar, we find that the impugned
A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing
a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.
8) Daez v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which
was being cultivated by the respondent farmers Soriente et al. The problem arose
when the land was subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474.
Thus, the land was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9,
1980. On May 31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under duress stating
they are not tenants but hired workers. Hence, Daez apllied for exemption of OLT
claiming her land is untenanted and the cancellation of the CLTs. (not majorly
related to the topic) In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her
husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands
located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16)
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of
residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina: Denying Eudosia Daezs application for
exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474,
petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7)
hectares. DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong Leong affirmed the assailed order upon
finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Disregarded
the affidavit of the farmers under duress. Court of Appeals Sustained the decision of
both DAR secretaries Supreme Court Denied their prayers and sustained the
decisions Main Issue Related to our topic Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from
coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an
application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. DAR
Regional Director March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B.
Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the
application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure
to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law.

They appealed to DAR Secretary. DAR Secretary Affirmed the decision of the
regional director. Appealed to the Office of the President (OP). Office of the
President Ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the
retention of the 4.1685 hectare of land. Still denied the application of the children.
Hence the appeal in CA. Court of Appeals Reversed and set aside the decision of the
Office of the President.
Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land
Held: Petitioner Daez has the right to retain the 4.1685 hectare land pursuant to her
right of retention under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657 Paez was denied the right to choose
what she wants to retain.
9) The Tenants Of The Estate Of Dr. Jose Sison vs CA
Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court
of Appeals upholding an order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella
Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had issued
certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr.
Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of
their shares if they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.
Certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the
petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of
cultivation. the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform,
Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked,
"UNDER PROTEST."
Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case which revealed that the
landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sisonat Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided
among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2,
1966. Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had been issued
to the petitioners-tenants. However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981
recommended that the landholdings be included in the Operation Land Transfer.
Petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for
exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer was
denied. Motion for reconsideration was denied as well.
After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order
was issued on September 7, 1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his
predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison
are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison,
Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than
seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven
(7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sisonare not entitled

to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer

because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has the authority to cancel
certificates issues?
RULING:
Petitioners contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority
or jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued
to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretarys administrative jurisdiction as
implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to
retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been
illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the
Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.
10) Rodriguez v Salvador
Facts: On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and
daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu.
Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 7 issued by virtue of Free Patent
No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by
Teresita Salvador; that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere
tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest and that despite several verbal and written
demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.
The petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she
and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and
permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana
Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to
agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there
is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.
Issues: WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners-defendants are not tenants of the
subject land
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. Agricultural tenancy relationship does
not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following
requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee;
2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the
parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their
neighbors.
11) Alita vs. CA
FACTS:This case is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the
respondent Court of Appeals rendering/declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is
inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law; declaring that the four
registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as
owners thereof; and ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, one of them is
Gabino Alita since the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.
The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of
land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead
patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated
in Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally
cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of
P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR for
short).
ISSUE: WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian
Reform under P.D. 27.
HELD: NO, we agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However,
such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the
Public Land Actor Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, "The Homestead Act has
been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy
citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family
and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain
degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this
vital right."

12) Replublic vs. CA

Synopsis
The five parcels of land in issue have a combined area of approximately 112.0577
hectares situated in Bgy. Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal. The Tax
declaration classified the properties as agricultural. When petitioner DAR subjected
the lands to compulsory acquisition pursuant to the CARL, private respondent
applied for exemption therein. The same was denied, and on appeal, the Court of
Appeals created a commission to conduct ocular inspection and survey the land.
Later, based on the report submitted by the commission, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Order of the DAR and exempted the lands from CARL.
The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. The commission was created
without objection from the parties and based on their report, it was found that the
land use map submitted by private respondent was an appropriate document
consistent with the existing land use. It was confirmed that the lands are not wholly
agricultural as they consist of mountainous area with an average of 28 degree slope
containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6
hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. The CARL has
further provided that all lands with 18% slope and over except those already
developed shall be exempt from the coverage of CARL.
13) Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos v. EM Ramos and sons
Facts: Several parcels of land which form part of a larger expense originally owned
by the Manila Golf & Country Club was acquired by EMRASON for the purpose of
developing the same into a residential subdivision. EMRASON applied for an
authority to convert and develop its property into a residential subdivision, which
was then approved by the Municipal Council of Dasmarias, Cavite. The actual
implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay because the property was
mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of the Overseas Bank of
Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. On June 15, 1988,
RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, took effect,
ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. Then
came the Aquino governments plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of
the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate. Part of the
overall conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain
at the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands of the
proposed industrial project as well as the governments commitment to the tenant
farmers. To address this commitment, DAR was tasked with acquiring additional
from the nearby, which included the subject property of EMRASON. DAR Sec.
Benjamin Leong then sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each
of which drew protest from EMRASON.
Issue: Whether the subject property could be placed under the CARP.

Held: No. Lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law are not subject to agrarian reform.
14) Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
Facts: Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria were the owners of a parcel of agricultural
land. They were childless. However, Gregorian had a son named Virgilio and two
daughters named Esperanza and Caridad, both to different woman. When Gregoria
dies, Hilaria and Gregorio sold the subject property to Dr. Deleste. When Hilaria
died, Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of
the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was
appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel then filed an action
against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. It was held that the
subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria
and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to
Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio
were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2)
interest in it. While the case was still pending, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was
issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus,
the subject property was placed under the said program. However, only the heirs of
Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners.
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property as
commercial/residential.
In 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private
respondents. Subsequently, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of
Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in
favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407.
Petitioner now seek the nullification of such order alleging that the subject land (lot
1407) was outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the
enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 reclasifying the land into a
residential/commercial land.
Issue: WON Land No. 1407 is covered by the agrarian reform program.
Held. No. The Court agree with petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot
No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the
enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No.
1313. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA)
2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are
empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in

consultation with the National Planning Commission. It was also emphasized therein
that [t]he power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from
agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject
to the approval of the [DAR]. City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of
Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time.
It was the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB,
which was already in existence at that time.
Therefore, since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial
land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be
considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657.
15) Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB
Facts: On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to
be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and
employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and
employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other
kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The
agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between the
lessees and the CMU. When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the
participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants
under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation
of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to
coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the
condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for
educational purposes.
Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved
for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and
exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?
Held: The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and
answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The
Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of
"CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for
the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student
population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of
the university in the years to come.

16) DAR v DECS

FACTS: Lots No. 2509 and 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462
hectares located at Negros Occidental were donated by the late Jalandoni to
respondent DECS. DECS leased the lands to Anglo Corporation for 10 agricultural
crop years, and was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years,
commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005. Eugenio Alpar and
several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject
lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. Respondent
DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and
renovations of schools in the nearby locality. DAR, on the other hand, argued that
the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same
are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they
are in fact leased to Anglo Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is
the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes
ISSUE: 1. WON the subject land is exempted from the coverage of CARP.
2. WON the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP
HELD: No. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption. In
order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary; and 2) the purpose is for school sites
and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.
Thus, the plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in
this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.The
Court also differentiated their ruling in the case of CMU v. DARB, wherein it
declared the land subject thereof exempt from CARP coverage. Firstly, in the CMU
case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain
because it was reserved by the late President Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 for
the use of CMU. Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although
a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del
Monte Phils., Inc.) under a Management and Development Agreement, the
undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as
part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students.
Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future
educational needs of the CMU.

(2nd issue)At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual and
potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. .
The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and
farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. In the case at bar,
the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the
subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP.
17) Milestone Farms Inc. v Office of the President
Facts: The petitioner applied for exclusion of his 316 hectares property. The DARs
Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) recommended the
exemption. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible entry against
Balajadia before the MCTC which ruled in favor of petitioner but was reversed by
RTC and reinstated by MCTC.
While case was pending, the law was amended providing that private agricultural
lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine were EXLUDED from coverage of
CARL. Due this, DAR secretary (Secretary Villa) issued an order exempting only
the 240 hectares of the 316 hectartes of property.
Six months later, without knowledge of CA (as parties did not inform the appellate
court) the DAR secretary granted petitioners application to convert portions of the
whole 316 hectares of property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use and disposition of that land is already beyond DARs
jurisdiction.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is declared exempt from the
CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect,
the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs
jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR
Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or
exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each
case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit
parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential
and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as
exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock
production.
Petition is DENIED.