J.K.

Asiema
GPR 302 Equity
2012/2013

MAXIMS OF EQUITY
There are certain general principles upon which the court of equity exercises its
jurisdiction. Many of these principles have been embodied in the so-called maxims of
equity. The maxims are, however, only guidelines and are not applied strictly in all
cases. They are to be seen as trends which can be detected in many of the detailed rules
which equity has established.
The maxims have no logical division and many of them overlap. A particular maxim may
contain by implication what another maxim contains. These maxims do not cover all the
situations in equity.
The most notable maxims are as follows:
1. He who seeks equity must do equity.
2. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands.
3. Equality is equity/Equity is equality.
4. Equity looks to the intent/substance rather than the form.
5. Equity regards as done that which ought to be done.
6. Equity imputes an intent to fulfil an obligation.
7. Equity acts in personam.
8. Equity will not assist a volunteer.
9. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy; where there is a wrong there is
a remedy (Ibi jus ibi remedium).
10. Equity does not act in vain.
11. Delay defeats equity; equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent (Vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt).
12. Equity follows the law (Acquitus sequitur legem).
13. Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail.
14. Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail.

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1. He who seeks equity must do equity

This maxim means that a person who comes to seek the aid of a court of equity to enforce
a claim must be prepared to submit in such proceedings to any directions which the court
may deem fit to give. He must do justice as to the matters in respect of which the
assistance of equity is sought. The plaintiff must be prepared to do equity in its popular
sense of what is right and fair to the defendant. For instance, a person seeking an
injunction will not succeed if he is unable or unwilling to carry out his own future
obligations. This maxim is the foundation of the equitable doctrine of election.
Illustrations of this maxim are as follows:
(i) Contracts of employment and strikes
Chappell v. The Times Newspapers Limited [1975] 2 All E.R. 233
The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain their employer from
terminating their contracts of employment after a strike. The court refused to grant the
injunction because the plaintiffs refused to give an undertaking not to engage in activities
that were disruptive to their employers business. The Court of Appeal stated that in
seeking an equitable remedy, the plaintiffs had to be prepared to do equity. By refusing to
give an undertaking not to disrupt newspaper production, they were in effect telling the
employers that they must keep to their part of the contract even though the plaintiffs were
not themselves ready or willing to keep to theirs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were not
entitled to the relief claimed.
(ii) Illegal Loans
Lodge v. National Union Investment Company Limited (1907) 1 Ch. 300
B borrowed money from M and mortgaged certain securities to M. M was not a
registered moneylender as required by law. The transaction was therefore illegal and
void. B sued M for delivery up of his securities on this basis. The court refused to make
the order unless B repaid the loan. Since B was seeking equitable relief, he had to do
what was right and fair, that is, first repay the money owed by him to M.
Contrast: Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe [1956] A.C. 539 at 549.
The Privy Council in this case stated that the case of Lodge cannot be treated as having
established any wide general principal that governs the action of courts in granting relief
in moneylending cases. See also Barclay v. Prospect Mortgages Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 672

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Although courts do not enforce illegal contracts today, the case of Lodge v. National
Union Investment Company Limited is still important as an illustration of the early
application of the above maxim.
(iii)

Consolidation:

This applies where a person has lent money and is entitled to two mortgages made by the
same mortgagor. The lender may consolidate the mortgages and refuse to permit the
mortgagor to exercise the equitable right to redeem one mortgage unless the other
mortgage is redeemed as well. See: Pledge v. White [1896] A.C. 187
For a detailed discussion on consolidation, particularly as to the conditions to be satisfied
before a mortgagee can consolidate, see: SNELL, Chapter on Securities (26th Edition, pp.
425-426).
(iv) Notice to redeem mortgage:
A mortgagor who wishes to exercise his right to redeem his mortgage before the due date
of redemption must give his mortgagee reasonable notice of his intention. Reason: This
gives the mortgagee reasonable time to find some other investment before payment is
made by the mortgagor. The mortgagor would otherwise be required to pay interest in
lieu of notice.
(v)

Election:

Where a donor gives his own property to E and in the same instrument purports to give
Es property to X, E will be unable to claim the whole of the gift to him unless he allows
the gift to X to take effect. This is referred to as the doctrine of election. ( SNELL 26th
Ed. P. 532 et seq)
(vi)

Equitable estoppel:

There are two types of estoppel, namely, promissory and proprietary estoppel.
Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel arises where by his words or conduct, one person, A, makes some
representation or promise to another person, B, and B relies on that representation or
promise and acts to his (Bs) detriment. Here, equity will preclude A from resiling from
his representation or promise.
Example 1: If a landlord tells his tenant towards the end of the term that he intends to
demolish the leased premises after the term expires, the landlord cannot subsequently
claim damages from the tenant for leaving the premises unrepaired or failing to

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re-decorate the premises at the expiry of the term. See: Marquess of Salisbury v. Gilmore
(1942) 2 KB 38.
Example 2: If a landlord agrees to accept a reduced rent and the tenant acts on this
agreement to his detriment (eg he spends the extra money), the landlord cannot thereafter
demand the full rent. See: Central London Property Trust Limited v. High Trees House
Ltd (1947) KB 130. See also: Combe v. Combe (1951) 2 KB 215
Notice to resile from the promise
The promisor can resile from his promise by giving the promise notice so that the
promisee has a reasonable opportunity to resume his former position. It is only if
resumption of the former position is impossible that the promise becomes final and
irrevocable. See: Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd (1964) 1 WLR 1326 at 1330.
In the case of Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd (1955)
WLR 761, it was Held: That where a patentee grants a licence to a manufacturer in return
for certain periodic payments and later agrees not to enforce the payments, he may
nevertheless again enforce the payments when a reasonable time has elapsed, after giving
notice of his intention to do so.
To the extent that the promisor can resile from his promise on giving notice, promissory
estoppel at equity is temporary. In contrast, promissory estoppel at common law is
permanent.
Proprietary Estoppel
Proprietary estoppel arises where one person, A, knowing that another person, B, is
acting under some mistaken belief that he (B) has some right to As property, actively or
passively encourages Bs acts. Here, equity will restrain A from acting contrary to the
belief on which B has acted. A will thus be precluded from denying Bs supposed rights
in As property.
While promissory estoppel at equity may be temporary and merely provides a defence
(shield), in contrast, proprietary estoppel is permanent in its effect and can confer a
substantive right of action (sword).
Four conditions must, however, be satisfied for proprietary estoppel to apply:
(a) Expenditure
B must have incurred expenditure or otherwise prejudiced himself. Eg. B may have spent
money on improving property which in fact belongs to A, for instance, by building a
house on As land. See: Inwards v. Baker (1965) 2 QB 29.

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(b) Mistaken Belief

B must have acted in the belief, and A must have actively or passively encouraged B to
believe either that he (B0 owns a sufficient interest in the property to justify the
expenditure, or that B will obtain such an interest. See: Michaud v. City of Montreal
(1923) 129 LT 417; Inwards v. Baker
Thus if B improves As land believing that A will grant B a sufficient interest in it, A
cannot then evict B on the ground that no rent or price has been agreed upon and
therefore that there cannot be a contract between them. See: Duke of Devonshire v. Eglin
(1851) 14 Beaver 530.
(c) Conscious Silence
A must have known that B was incurring expenditure in the mistaken belief, and that A
was entitled to object but nevertheless stood by or participated in the expenditure without
enlightening B. See: Hopgood v. Brown (1955) 1 WLR 213.
(d) No bar to Equity
No proprietary estoppel will arise in equity if enforcing the right claimed would
contravene a statute. See: Chalmers v. Pardoe (1963) 1 WLR 677.
Contrast: Ward v. Kirkland (1966) 1 WLR 601 at 631.
2. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands
The distinction between the first maxim, He who seeks equity must do equity and the
second maxim, He who comes to equity must come with clean hands is that the first
maxim applies to a future obligation while the second maxim refers to the past conduct of
the plaintiff.
E.g. A tenant whose lease has been forfeited by the landlord for non-payment of rent
cannot expect relief against forfeiture if he has committed a breach of covenant such as
using the leased premises for a purpose other than that allowed under the lease. See:
Gill v. Lewis [1956] 2 Q.B. 1 at 13, 14 & 17
Mountford v. Scott [1975] Ch. 258
Litvinoff v. Kent (1918) TLR 298
Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84
The plaintiff must not only be prepared to do what is right and fair (as in the previous
maxim), but he must also show that his past record in the transaction is clean, for "He
who has committed Iniquityshall not have Equity. See: Jones v. Lenthal (1669) 1 Ch.
Ca. 154 (SNELL p. 35)

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Limit to this rule:

Where the plaintiffs breach was only trifling or where he has broken a much less
important covenant than the one he seeks to enforce, the maxim will not apply. See:
Besant v. Wood (1789) 12 Ch.D 605
Chitty v. Bray (1883) 48 LT 860
Meredith v. Wilson (1893) 69 LT 336
Hooper v. Bromet (19030 89 LT 37; affirmed: (1904) 90 LT 234, CA
The unclean conduct of the plaintiff should be closely connected with the relief being
sought . See:
Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch. 302 at 332; [1965]1 All ER 611 at 626;
[1965] 2 WLR 790
The Duchess and Duke of Argyll had been married and were divorced. During their
marriage, they had exchanged certain confidential information. After the divorce, the
Duke sought to publish the information. The Duchess applied for an injunction to restrain
the Duke from publishing the information, i.e. to restrain a breach of confidence by her
husband. The Duke argued that his wife had committed adultery and was the cause of the
divorce and in view of this the court should not grant her the relief she sought. The court
Held: That the wifes alleged conduct had no connection with her application for an
injunction and allowed her application. The court remarked that her conduct did not
license the husband to broadcast unchecked the most intimate confidences of earlier and
happier days.
NOTE: What bars the success of the plaintiffs claim by using the maxim is not a general
depravity but rather, a depravity which has an immediate and necessary relation to the
equity sued for. The depravity must be a depravity in a legal as well as moral sense. The
maxim must therefore not be interpreted too widely as allowing any unclean conduct to
defeat a plaintiffs claim. Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
blameless lives. Per Brandeis J. in Loughran v. Loughran (1934) 292 US 216 at 229.

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3. Equality is Equity/Equity is Equality

This maxim applies to a situation where two or more persons are entitled to the same
property. An important principle of equity which is illustrated by this maxim is that in the
absence of sufficient reasons for any other basis for division, those who are entitled to
property should have the certainty and fairness of equal division.
Equality in this sense does not mean literal equality but proportionate equality. Equity
therefore seeks to effect a distribution of property and losses proportionately to the
several claims or liabilities of the persons concerned. This maxim has been applied in
relation to property in a variety of ways:
A. Presumption of a tenancy in common
Equity leans in favour of a tenancy in common as opposed to a joint tenancy. In a joint
tenancy, when one joint tenant dies, the whole estate belongs to the surviving joint tenant.
The estate of the deceased inherits nothing. There is no equality here.
Equity will, therefore, in a number of instances, treat persons who are joint tenants at law
as tenants in common. Although at law the survivor is entitled to the whole estate, he will
hold in part as trustee for the estate of the deceased.
Three of these instances are as follows:
A (i) Purchase in unequal shares
If A and B purchase property with purchase money provided by both of them in unequal
shares, and they hold the property as joint tenants, on As death, B becomes entitled to the
whole of the property at law. In equity, however, B is treated as a trustee for As estate
proportionately to the share of the purchase money contributed by A. Had the purchase
money been contributed in equal shares, B would have been entitled to the whole
property in equity and at law. This is because where two purchasers contribute the money
in equal shares, they may be presumed to have purchased with a view to the benefit of
survivorship.
A (ii) Purchase in equal shares: Severance of joint tenancy
Even where the property is vested in the parties as joint tenants in equity as well as at
law, e.g. where they contribute money in equal shares, equity will treat the joint tenancy
as severed so as to exclude the incidence of survivorship.
A (iii) Partnership property
Where partners acquire property, they are presumed to hold it as beneficial tenants in
common.

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B. Equal division
As stated above, the maxim will be applied whenever property is to be distributed
between rival claimants and there is no other basis for division. Illustrations:
B (i) Husband and Wife
The court will, after a divorce, refuse to dissect meticulously the joint bank account
which both the husband and wife drew upon and paid their income into. Meticulous
dissection here refers to division of funds in the account proportionately to the amount
drawn or deposited by each spouse. The court will therefore divide the balance equally
between the spouses. Note: This principle does not apply where the husband and wife are
still living together. Reason: Their rights in a joint bank account are not meant to be
affected or interfered with by the court.
B. (ii) Trusts
Where property has been settled in unequal shares with a provision that any share which
fails to vest shall accrue to the other shares by way of addition, the accrual takes place in
equal shares and not in the proportions laid down by the settlor for the original shares.
See: Re Bowers S.T. [1942] Ch. 97
This is the case notwithstanding that equality is attained at the price of altering the
proportions prescribed by the settlor. See: A Critque in (1942) 58 L.Q.R. 311.
B. (iii) Copyright
Where an author bequeaths the manuscript of a work to A and the copyright to B, and
publication of the work is made possible only by using the manuscript, the proceeds of
sale of the copyright will be divided equally between A and B. See: Re Dickens [1935]
Ch. 267.
For another example of the operation of the maxim, see: Re Kavanagh (1949) 66 T.L.R.
65.
4. Equity looks to the intent/substance rather than the form
The court makes a distinction between matters of substance and form. Whenever there is
a contradiction between the two, equity presumes that matters of substance prevail over
matters of form.
This maxim can be applied to trusts. For a person to create a trust, it is not necessary to
use technical words. The intention to create a trust can be inferred from conduct. A court
of equity will hold the existence of a trust even if the word trust is not mentioned. E.g.

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I hope he will hold the property safely for my sons benefit. The court looks at the
substance rather than the form.
Another illustration is the equitable remedy of rectification where the court, in ordering
rectification of an instrument, looks at the intention of the parties as per their agreement
so that the instrument correctly reflects and records their intention or agreement. See:
Webster v. Cecil (1861)30 Beav. 62
5. Equity looks upon as done that which ought to be done
This maxim is applied mostly to contracts, particularly agreements for lease. Equity treats
a contract to do a thing as if the thing were already done. It does so only in favour of
persons entitled to enforce the contract specifically and not in favour of volunteers.
E.g. if there is an agreement for a lease of property and the lease requires to be registered,
equity will presume that the agreement is valid, notwithstanding the absence of
registration. See:
Walsh v. Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch.D 9
FACTS: The defendant, a landlord, entered into a written agreement to grant the plaintiff
(tenant) a lease of a mill for 7 years. The agreement provided that rent was payable in
advance if the tenant so wished. The law provided that if a grant for a lease exceeded 3
years, in order for it to be enforceable, a deed must be prepared ( i.e. a lease as
distinguished from an agreement). In this case, there was no deed. The tenant also paid
rent in arrears, not in advance. The landlord demanded the years rent in advance. It was
not paid and the landlord sought to obtain possession of the premises. The tenant argued
that the landlords suit to recover possession of the premises was illegal as no 7-year
lease had been granted and therefore the agreement was not in accordance with the law.
As such, he was not bound to pay the rent demanded by the landlord.
HELD: The agreement for the lease was as good as the lease itself. The court would treat
as done that which ought to be done.
Distinction between English law and Kenyan law regarding the application of Walsh
v. Lonsdale
Souza Figuerido v. Moorings Hotel (1960) EA 926
FACTS: By a lease, the respondent landlord let certain premises to the appellant tenant.
The applicable law required such a lease, being for a period of more than 3 years, to be
registered. A lease was drawn but was not registered. The tenant defaulted in payment of
rent and the landlord sued for recovery thereof. The tenant argued that he should not pay
the money as the lease was unenforceable since the provision requiring registration had
not been complied with.

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HELD: An unregistered lease cannot create any interest, right or confer any estate which
is valid against third parties. HOWEVER, the unregistered lease operates as a contract
inter partes, is valid as between the parties and can therefore be specifically enforced.
The tenant was therefore liable to pay the arrears of rent.
The Kenyan position modifies or limits the application of the maxim. The agreement for
lease or unregistered lease, as the case may be, is not equated with the registered lease,
but is regarded as a contract between the parties which gives a right to either party to sue
for specific performance of the contract.
Other English Cases
Zimbler v. Abrahams [1903] 1 KB 577
Gray v. Spyer [1922] 2 Ch. 22 (CA)
Manchester Brewery Company v. Coombs [1901] 2 Ch. 608
6. Equity imputes an intent to fulfil an obligation
If a person is under an obligation to perform a particular act and he does some other act
which is capable of being regarded as a fulfilment of his obligation, that other act will
prima facie be regarded as a fulfilment of the obligation. See:
Lord Lechmere v. Lady Lechmere (1875) Cas. T. Talb 80
Lord Lechmere undertook that within the first year of marriage, he was going to set aside
money to purchase land for his benefit and that of his wife. He died intestate (without
making a will). He had never set that money aside, but he owned a lot of land before and
after marriage. HELD: The land bought during the marriage was to be treated as a
fulfilment of the obligation.
The doctrines of performance and satisfaction are founded on this maxim.
7. Equity acts in personam
A court of equity operates primarily in personam and not in rem. A right in rem is a
right in a specific piece of property. A right in personam is a right that can be enforced
only against a specific person rather than a thing.
Originally, the court of Chancery did not itself interfere with the defendants property.
Instead, it made an order against the defendant personally. If the defendant failed to
comply with the order, the court punished him for his disobedience by committal for
contempt. In this way, equity acted in personam. The same case applies today both in
England and Kenya.

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However, in some cases, imprisonment was ineffectual to compel a defendant to comply

with an order of the court of equity. Accordingly, the court of Chancery got the power to
issue a writ of sequestration, under which sequestrators were appointed to take possession
of the property in dispute, and eventually of all the defendants property, until he did the
act which he had been ordered to do.
This power of enforcing orders by committal of the defendant or sequestration of
property has been supplemented by statute. See: The Civil Procedure Rules, Order XXI
on Execution of Decrees and Orders. (The rules refer to attachment rather that
sequestration.)
Although at present equity is not confined to acting in personam, its jurisdiction is still
primarily over the defendant personally. It is therefore immaterial that the property in
question is not within the reach of the court, provided that that the defendant himself is
within the courts jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the leading case of Penn v. Lord
Baltimore, specific performance was ordered in respect of an agreement relating to
boundaries of land in America, with the defendant being in England.
Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 444
FACTS: The plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement as to how the
boundaries of certain lands were to be drawn. The land was in the USA (Baltimore,
Maryland), while both the plaintiff and defendant resided in England. The suit was filed
in England. The defendant argued that the court in England had no jurisdiction since the
subject matter of the dispute was in the USA.
HELD: That the defendant was nevertheless liable to perform his part of the agreement.
The court reasoned that the person on whom the order was made, the defendant, was in
England. In this way, the court acted in personam.
8. Equity will not assist a volunteer/Equity favours a purchaser for
value without notice
A volunteer in this sense is a person who has not paid consideration for a gift or property.
As a general rule, a court of equity will not give any assistance to a person who has not
paid valuable consideration. It will only grant an equitable remedy to a purchaser for
value without notice.
The remedy of specific performance, for instance, can only be granted to a person who
has paid valuable consideration.
Exceptions to the application of this maxim
Trusts

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Claimants of rights under a trust constitute an exception to the application of this maxim.
Trusts are a creation of equity. In a trust, property is conveyed by the donor to the trustee
to hold on trust for the beneficiary even though the beneficiary has not paid any
consideration. A beneficiary can seek the assistance of the court of equity to order a
trustee to convey property to that beneficiary.
9. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy
Ibi jus, ibi remedium. (If there is a wrong, there is a remedy for it.)
The meaning extracted from this maxim is that no wrong should be allowed to go
unredressed if it is capable of being remedied by courts of justice.
It must not, however, be assumed that every moral wrong should be redressed by equity.
The maxim refers only to rights which are suitable for judicial enforcement, but were not
enforced at common law owing to some technical defect.
E.g. Enforcement of a trust: Where A ( a donor) conveyed land to B (a trustee) to hold on
trust for C (a beneficiary), and B kept the benefit of the land for himself, C had no
remedy at law. Yet such an abuse of confidence was clearly a wrong capable of redress in
a court of justice. The court of Chancery therefore applied this maxim to enforce the trust
in favour of the beneficiary.
10. Equity does not act in vain
The court of equity will not grant a remedy which cannot be enforced. This also applies
where there has been a change of circumstances such that the remedy is rendered
nurgatory or is overtaken by events e.g. force majeure.
11. Delay defeats equity; Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent
Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt
A court of equity has always refused its aid to stale demands where a party has slept
upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court
into activity, but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are
wanting, the court is passive and does nothing.:
Per Lord Camden in Smith v. Clay (1767) 3 Bro. C. 639n at 640n
Delay which is sufficient to prevent a party from obtaining an equitable remedy is called
laches.

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This maxim does not apply to equitable claims to which the Limitation of Actions Act
(Cap 22) applies, either expressly or by analogy.
Express Limitation: The act itself contains provisions on equitable claims which are
subject to limitation.
Implied Limitation/Limitation by Analogy
Where a claim is not expressly covered by any statutory period but is closely analogous
to a claim which is expressly covered, equity will act by analogy and apply the same
period. The class of cases to which the Act will be applied by analogy is, however,
extremely small.
In all cases where the Act applies expressly or by analogy, delay which is within the
statutory limitation period will not be a bar to a claim whether legal or equitable.
The doctrine of Laches
Laches essentially consists of the lapse of time coupled with the existence of
circumstances which make it inequitable to enforce the claim. For instance, delay will be
fatal to a claim for equitable relief if the plaintiff has so acted as to induce the defendant
to alter his position on the reasonable faith that the claim has been released or abandoned.
See: Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch.D 145
Ignorance, disability (lack of legal capacity), undue influence will be a satisfactory
explanation of delay and will not bar a plaintiff from obtaining equitable relief. In
addition, laches, unlike estoppel, is a personal disqualification and will not bind
successors in title. See: Nwakobi v. Nzekwu [1964] 1 WLR 1019
Delay may also bar claims for equitable remedies such as specific performance,
rescission, rectification and injunctions other than final injunctions to which a party is
entitled as of right.
Delay-Action not barred:
Williams v. Greatrex [1957] 1 WLR 31; [1956] 3 All ER 705
The plaintiff (purchaser) brought an action for specific performance of a contract made
10 years previously. HELD: The purchaser was entitled to specific performance of the
contract notwithstanding the 10-year delay for other reasons specified by the court (not
our concern here). But the case discusses laches.
Delay-Action barred:
Lolkilite ole Ndinoni v. Netwala ole Nebele (1952) 19 EACA 1

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The appellant was the son of a deceased who was alleged to have committed homicidehe had killed another person. Some 35 years later, a claim was made in the Native
Tribunal for compensation for the killing. The Native Tribunal rejected the claim but the
Supreme Court supported it. The Court of Appeal, however, HELD, inter alia: That it is
repugnant to natural justice to entertain a claim of this nature after so long.
See the judgments of:
Edwards C.J. and Sir Barclay Nihill.
Note: This maxim does not apply to cases to which the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap
22) applies, either expressly or by analogy.
12. Equity follows the law (Acquitus sequitur legem)
This maxim means that equity treats the common law as laying the foundation of all
jurisprudence and it does not necessarily depart from legal principles.
Where a statutory or common law rule is direct and governs the case, equity applies the
rule of law as the appropriate system. In such cases, the rules of law are in fact binding in
equity as they are in common law.
Where equity has to regulate the equitable interests which it has created, it acts, so far as
possible, on the analogy of the legal rules applicable to the corresponding legal interests.
It is only when there is some important circumstance disregarded by the common law that
equity interferes.
Equity follows the common law as regards limitation of action. It applies the Limitation
of Actions Act as a bar to equitable claims either by way of analogy or because the Act is
binding on a court of equity.
13. Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail
14. Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail
These two maxims govern questions of the priority of rival claimants to the same
property in equity. See: SNELL (26th Ed.) Chapter 4 pp. 46-71

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15