G.R. No.

L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and,
if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of
the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section
15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in
this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session
or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either

as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members
of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to
address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the
present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.
1wph1.t

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.
The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have
adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines."
Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of
National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to
adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP,
(4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control,
the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col.
Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and
while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted
to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is
considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices
mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk
on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as
the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack
key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that
they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further
than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and
the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech
challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the
AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the
Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a
civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that
Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence
agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies
mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by
Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur,
Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions
throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding
or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded
to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added
that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that
they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory
to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of
our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group
therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not
prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were
aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners".

Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not
among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less,
unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-17144

October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA,
LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T.
LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA,
ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition
that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as
follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., Member of
the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor
of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of
Cebu stated the following:.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as

long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be
appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in
his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or
the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., fails to do
so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special
committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that
if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall
not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the
Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to
defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same daybefore
closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda,
San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose members are the sole respondents
had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered before the House,
made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59
and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and

for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended
from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be,
as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes
the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any
other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the

floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case,
a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked
his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House,
that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may
not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holtvs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411;
City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23
Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124
Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145

Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted
the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the
resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
(2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.
We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the
power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene
in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the
power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In
1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no
hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court
of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state
has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no
provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house

of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department
and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the
courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in
the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent.
In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months
because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered
in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate
had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and
the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each
house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an electivemember (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent
of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best
represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then
the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the GovernorGeneral, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not

impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail. 12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction
had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as
such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all
members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable
cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court
thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered
G.R. No. 175352
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate.
The Facts
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this
Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.

Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, 1 he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant
to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their
appointment to another government office.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which
appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an
act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by
another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto,
it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of
office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years.
Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator
in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers suit, petitioners
cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they suffered
some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent.
Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds.
Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court would
have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and
that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case
since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an action
for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the

unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and
other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out
that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which
is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled
corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section
13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent. 4
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:

4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the
First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February
23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex
"A."
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his
incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having
been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he duly
accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and
duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his
seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON,
G.R. No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such and
still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law
and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himself
as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and
other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only to the legitimate
senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino
people.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed
an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed
an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for
quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However,
under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the
action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must
claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate
office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the
petition would still fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, 7 otherwise known as the
PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,
whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most
vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety
Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. 9
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a
voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July
1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by
which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their
power, the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision
of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the
Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a
voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and
proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that
action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering
caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as
contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red
Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or
adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their
people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and
through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the
peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation),
and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is
united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles:

1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire
to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its
international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may
be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.
It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all
peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class
or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely
by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or
ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their
respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all
times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by
desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one
country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all
Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each
other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the
Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the
Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.11
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral
workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as
belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency
and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled,
and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of
government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies
when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and
independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The
PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy;
otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National

Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent
in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or
controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The
PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private
entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided
under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be
financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year
which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their
respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the
thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed
by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed
of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall
be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by
the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter
delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen a select
group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming
majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the
PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the
PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent
Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled
PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees
in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by
law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16
in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and

other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the
commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations,
the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically
in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the
chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman
is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control
over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of
the President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the
Court explained the Presidents power of control over all government offices as follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial
branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial
body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not
one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local
government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."

Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In
mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions
outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no
dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive
branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or
reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution
where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive
branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control
over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of
the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.
(Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the
PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate
powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of
the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions
or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman
is a private office, not a government office.
1avvphi1

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be
justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government
representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freelyelected representatives of a National Societys active members must remain in a large majority in a
National Societys governing bodies.19
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of
PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or
not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1264,21 reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in
the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross
Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution
shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, 22 which ruled that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by
its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general
corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is
a government corporation. However, the Camporedondoruling failed to consider the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent
of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on
Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case
of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In
the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be
government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government.
Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on
22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended,
creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic
to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as
are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall
be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)

In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the constitutional provision prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution
recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a
general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law
applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such
legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only
corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws,
the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations
through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are governmentowned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or controlled
corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special
charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage
facilities, were public property which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city,
municipality or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local
Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act, 25 the LWUA has a budget amounting
to P400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local
Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from
the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such assets
or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the
provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the
board directors and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject
to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered
government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter
but also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts.

Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike
the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in
the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a
government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact
creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants
it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections
1,28 2,29 3,304(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are
void.
The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition
by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set
forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine
Governments treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society
must be "duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public
authorities in the humanitarian field."
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 175352

January 18, 2011

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,

vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration1 filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15,
2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movantintervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Attached Position Paper3 filed on December 23, 2009.
In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman
is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes
of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." 5 The Decision, however, further
declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and
consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation." 6 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.7
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent raises the following grounds:
(1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the
Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did
not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A.
No. 95 should be considered obiter.8
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was unnecessary
for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia, 9 wherein the Court said
that it "will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the
Decision, disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there
was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be
deemed obiter.
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the constitutionality of its
Charter on the following grounds:
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS
AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR PNRC OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95, AS AMENDED WAS NEVER AN
ISSUE IN THIS CASE.

B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 AND NOT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF
CONGRESS.
C. PNRCS STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN. WHILE IT IS
PERFORMING HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS AS AN AUXILIARY TO GOVERNMENT, IT IS A
NEUTRAL ENTITY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL, YET IT
DOES NOT QUALIFY AS STRICTLY PRIVATE IN CHARACTER.
In his Comment and Manifestation10 filed on November 9, 2009, respondent manifests: (1) that he
agrees with the position taken by the PNRC in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated August
27, 2009; and (2) as of the writing of said Comment and Manifestation, there was pending before the
Congress of the Philippines a proposed bill entitled "An Act Recognizing the PNRC as an
Independent, Autonomous, Non-Governmental Organization Auxiliary to the Authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be Known as The Philippine Red Cross." 11
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as well as those of
movant-intervenor in their respective motions, we have reconsidered our pronouncements in our
Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some
provisions of the PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not
raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was
not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the
issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 12 thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a wellestablished rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.13
Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void certain sections of
R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was
some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC,
the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of unconstitutionality
notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22, 1947 during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, which provided for a proscription against the creation of private corporations by special
law, to wit:

SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)
Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and Article XII, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter reads:
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No.
6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in existence in the
Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress after the Republic of the Philippines
became an independent nation on July 6, 1946 and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence
to the Convention of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick of Armies in the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the Philippines
indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by
war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose and like other
volunteer organizations established in other countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions,
to promote the health and welfare of the people in peace and in war.14
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and further amended by
P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background and legal basis of the creation of the
PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A.
No. 95, as amended by P.D. 1264, provides:
WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August 1894, the nations of the world
unanimously agreed to diminish within their power the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armed Forces in the Field and at Sea, The Prisoners of War, and The Civilian Population in
Time of War referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946, and
proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and by the
action, indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering

caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as
contemplated by the Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter of the American National Red
Cross which was terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other countries which have ratified or
adhered to the Geneva Conventions assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in
peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their
international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the people of the
world;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order
No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby decree and order that Republic Act No. 95, Charter of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) as amended by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be
further amended as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to
be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as
are inherent upon a national Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall
be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)
The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from Section 3 of its Charter,
which provides:
Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:
(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces in time of war, in
accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva
Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to perform all duties devolving
upon the Corporation as a result of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the
said Convention;
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities of the armed
forces as a medium of communication between people of the Republic of the Philippines and
their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time of war, and to act in such matters between
similar national societies of other governments and the Governments and people and the
Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines;
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in time of peace
and in time of war and apply the same in meeting and emergency needs caused by
typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to devise and carry on
measures for minimizing the suffering caused by such disasters;

(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of war as may be
found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the Philippines a
member of the Red Cross.
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which, together with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the IFRC and RCS, make up the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian
movement, whose mission is:
[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and
ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies,
to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to
encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the
Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and
assistance.15
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in humanitarian activities in the
Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in the country include:
1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise affected by armed
clashes between the government and armed opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence on the population;
3. Visiting detainees; and
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the public and private sectors. 16
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries
in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and
social programmes.
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS) Position
Paper,17 submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to the elements of the specific nature of
the National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the
Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They are also
guided by the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement:
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red Cross
movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed
conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected and
protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to

ordinary private entities or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui generis character
is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot
require any change in the personnel or structure of a National Society.National societies are
therefore organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in
contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs.
xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public authorities as
voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit
from recognition at the International level. This is considered to be an element distinguishing
National Societies from other organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian
response.
x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide Movement in which all Societies have equal
status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the
essence of the Fundamental Principle of Universality.
Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the public authorities in the
humanitarian field. x x x.
The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private
institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies
cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red
Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general having larger resources
than the Societies, working towards comparable ends in a given sector.
x x x No other organization has a duty to be its governments humanitarian partner while remaining
independent.18 (Emphases ours.)
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and
effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,19 explained that the purpose of
the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent
the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to
other groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come
within the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular
individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution
will hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve the public good or national interest. It
should be noted that a special law, R.A. No. 9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not
the general corporation code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives which are
private corporations, in order to implement the States avowed policy.

In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service rendered by the PNRC as
the governments partner in the observance of its international commitments, to wit:
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to
bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC
provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community
Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a
voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929. x x
x.20 (Citations omitted.)
So must this Court recognize too the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law.21 Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. 22 This constitutional
provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead
of using the latter to negate the former.
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its
Fundamental Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the
governments humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC
must have an autonomous status, and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial
manner.
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of National Societies of
the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private and profit-making entities. It is the
main characteristic of National Societies that they "are not inspired by the desire for financial gain
but by individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as
part of the service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to the
Community."23
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither "be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality"
as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. 24
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although it
is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or
-controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15,
2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto
imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice
1wphi1

Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving
the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all
of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded
to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake
its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or
for Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No.
95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as
an issue and should not have been passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui
generis being neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and
constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by
deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,
JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G.
ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are being
given and made:

a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as
Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly
counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat
Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in
force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body",
and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April
7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought
to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as
the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of
the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent
Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant

Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without
appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter
in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the
Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder
of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may
be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of
the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez
in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out
of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May
25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May
31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear
as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him
to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is,
to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intracorporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she sovereign acts, of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original
petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor
general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice."
On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective
Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed
their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course
to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on
September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and
decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference
to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has
allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President 4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on
July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party
affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)

1 member Aksyon Demokrasya

1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners
as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate
met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the
Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of
and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is
the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members."

Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the
issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the
domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental
law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the
full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its
occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an
interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are
there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The
solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory
that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority
leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution
or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of
the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature,
whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies." 12

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the
domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed
jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of
a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a
veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any
quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an
effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this
Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.

17

In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to
'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]
legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's
"full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court
held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings,
but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court
"had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the
previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 andMontenegro v. Castaeda 23 that "the authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege . . .) belongs to the
President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the
Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character
are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the nonjusticiability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers
characteristic of the presidential system of government the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1)
those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial
decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive
department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and
enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the
others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field
of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass
upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions
are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met,
or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed by the
Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under
the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the
system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we
have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but
are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and
defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky.
589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional
limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial
power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative
in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved
issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties

the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that
the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it involved "the legality, not
the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article
VI of] the Constitution."

The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to
nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The
Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." The
Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning, an act of the
political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and
will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to
reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such
jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals
only if such "decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to
look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later
enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further
that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the
internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
discretion were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due
the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16
(1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
respondents.

Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear
that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly
Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries with
it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a
minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that
group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As
a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCDUMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted
for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half
of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that
the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal
does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of
these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect
the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was
seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular session,

when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to
assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39This practice
continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee. 40History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the
political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to
a party with a lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number
of votes or adherents than the majority." 42Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to
select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political
parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority
groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." 43 To our mind, themethod of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of
its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its
internal affairs. 45Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal
vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them,
before the courts may intervene.47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers
as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate
was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the
duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is
unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she
has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be
said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of the
powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the
term "grave abuse of discretion."

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by
the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2821

March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to
deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to
explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada
and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating
charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed
his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he
did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read
slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with,
but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner
and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his
privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator
Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement.
At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was
recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore,
urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not
allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his
place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a
majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the

senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here aboutquorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without
costs.

Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J., concurring:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate
because the legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by
petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726;
23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then
its proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its
proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a
political question the determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue
involves a constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by
the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly
less. And for obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the
Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent
believing as they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group
believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of
admission to the contrary, does not find it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the
Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups? This
anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain
unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws,
resolutions and other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt
because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may extend, in
diverse forms, to the House of Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as
the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is
developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a large
extent, be stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as
the guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the final word on the constitutional mandate
governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion, under the present
circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the situation which
demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.
As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate, 2I firmly believe that
although petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be

countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting President of
the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll
was called, only twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and
therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter are clear.
The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum.
the house of representative consist of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a
majority or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority of which quorum must, of
course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute aquorum to do business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than
the majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed. Vacancies from
death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion
of Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S.
E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot
transact business, this view being in keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting
a smaller number than a quorumto adjourn from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL.,
340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is then established, created by the mere presence
of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or
faction of the majority present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a majority,
and when that majority are present, the power of the House arises. (U. S. vs.Ballin, Joseph &
Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)
If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all
have been duly notified, and the minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority
of those present may act,provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number.
In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum,
and a majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum,
the power of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th
ed., sec. 283.)3
Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is
true that respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he represent the
majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the
present senatorial alignment, he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of
the situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is absolutely essential in
the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic
principles consecrated in our Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our
political life as a republican form of government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a
mockery.

The situation now in this Court is this there are four members who believe that there was
no quorum in respondent's election as against four other member who believe that there was
such quorum. Two members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal
to assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of
whether or not respondent has been legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under
the present conditions. This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other
measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by
them by convening a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by reiterating therein all that
has been previously done by them. This is a suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is
watching with a happy heart the movement of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning
for a clean and honest government in this dear country of ours.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the
position of President of the Senate is in issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents
took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen
because of the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as
acting President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of
the Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been properly adjourned,
and the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump
session, and said rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which
was opened by petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators who remained in the
session hall had only continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the
President of the Senate was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President
of Senate, to fill the vacate position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February
21, 1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two
Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano
TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan,
Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente
Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili,
Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session was
being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness the session,
became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and other peace
officers to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued and several
shots were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard because the
spectators would either shout to drown their voices or would demeans that some other Senator
should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible
for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure and without grave danger
to its integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles
David moved for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no objection, petitioner
adjourned the session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine other Senator namely,

Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Sulipada
Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left the session hall.
Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum and, assuming the
presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into a rump session, in which a
resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and electing
respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent pretended to assume the office of
president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of
the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full
power to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the
Rules of the Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be
called in the Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the
presidency except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none
of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that
convened in the rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and
the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Taada announced and reserved in
open session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour
privilege, it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President,
petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February
21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M. Taada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the
secretary of the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were preferred against the herein
petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an
integral part hereof:
(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session
hall until about 11:35 A.M.;
(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Taada and
Sanidad and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution,
after which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that
the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order;
(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges
their functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make
use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech on
the charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following 22
Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz,
M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,

Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose
Avelino;
(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute,
but this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy;
(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the
charges against petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and when after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics
of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad
"Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to
recognized the right of Senator Taada to speak.
(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by
prearrangement, but the police officers present were able to maintain order. No shots were fired
among the audience, as alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo
Angeles David, one of petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of the session, evidently again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to
prevent Senator Taada from speaking;
(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote;
(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote;
(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.
(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and
Clarin followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in
sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner, whereupon
Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record
as it was in so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;

(p) Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges against the petitioner contained in the
Resolution, attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval
ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete
text of said Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously approved;
(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral
part hereof as Exhibit "2". Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent
having abstained from voting;
(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his
oath of Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since
then, has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said
office;
(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in
his favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there
was no opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;
(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was
evidently and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive Senator Taada of his right to take
the floor and to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all
means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68,
Exhibit "1", and that when the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in
the said session was ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;
(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked
and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the
Chair while the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate
President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had
the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by
petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by
anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at
4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the
Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of
Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill
and confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum;
that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he
did not count with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the
specialinvestigation committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner
deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(b) No cause of action as there are only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against
twelve Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his out

ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group
of ten Senators to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the
Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.
In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political question, the determination of which by the Senate
is binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of
the Philippines and said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5
Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the Senate is the only body that can
determine from time to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said
body; and this Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an
encroachment upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to
Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.
Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events,
it is only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the
present controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it does, a purely political question, the
determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and conclusive on
the courts.
The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the
question has been determined by the Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of
them represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled,
it would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the
Senate.
The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve
the enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the
Senate. Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not
only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the
Constitution, it cannot be divested.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various court, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error,
as the law or the rules of the court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts
in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or
regulations is in question.
(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.
Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the
truth on the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reached the settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.
Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting
President of the Senate and that executive recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The
contention is erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which
the Legislature power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide
questions of law, much less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive
power, which in the philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the
Legislative power, do so. The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.
The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from
time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a litigation likein the
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them.
To shirk that responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the
powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of
which the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to thelegality of the
adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring
vacant the position of President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could
continue holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of
justice have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the
resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to
vote, Senator Taada voted,Senator Taada voted in the negative, alleging as ground damaging
facts, supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of
petitioner. At the same time, Senator Taada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to
be held on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of delivering during
the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said charges.
On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Taada
and Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a
Committee of three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructed to
proceed immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.
Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE
SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE AVELINO.

WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the
Philippines Government and leaders of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacaang palace on
January 15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least,
tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government, and placed the interest of grafters and
corrupt officials as supreme and above the welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is
impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the
press, especially the Chronicle Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as
follows:
The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the
investigations of the surplus property commission irregularities and the immigration quota
scadal as acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed the
National Bureau of Investigation agents for persecuting Liberal party leaders.
"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because
in that place are no investigations, no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after
us."
Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his
actuations which, he claimed, were mainly responsible for the division of the party into two
hostile camps.
Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in
power, because why should we be saints when in reality we are not?
He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the
surplus property scandal and the immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the
Liberal Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the late
President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against the Liberal Party", Avelino said.
Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the
government, Avelino maintained that the Liberal Party men are entitled to more
considerations and should be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain measure of tolerance,
Avelino said, adding, "What are we in power for?"
Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of
Presidential Roxas. As a result of these investigations, the members of Congress are
subjected to unjust and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is worse is
the fact that these senators and representatives are being pilloried in public without formal
charges filed against them. (Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).
At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to
President Quirino on Liberal Party discipline. At the same time he demanded
"tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by the party in power.
The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing
specific has teen filed against atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of

Investigation agents have persecuted top leader of the LiberalParty. That is not
justice. That is injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.
Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot
permit abuses, you must at leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in realitywe are not? We are
not angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go
to hell wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of
Interior to go after us.
When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the
bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.
Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St.
Francis' convent. When thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to
produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers that thehunted man had gone
the other way.
Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of

the memory of the late President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of
enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader in the eyes of the public.
If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it,
because Quirino's administration is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.
Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members
are stockholders. Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit.
The Liberal Party, he said, has practically no dividends at all. It has lost even its
original capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments to the government of
Nacionalistas like: Lino Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General
Manager of the National Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January
18, 1949.).
WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of
January 16, 1949, the Senate President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and
threatened that "unless the proper redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to
take the necessary steps to protect my reputation and good name";
WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification
demanded by the Senate President, but on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949,
challenged him to take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished the truth,
we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further
repeated the publication of their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;

WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate
President has not carried out his threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication,
thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and corruption;
WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were
exhibited photostatic copies of four checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have
come into the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had assumed his
office;
WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the
National City Bank of the National City Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in
favor of the Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife,
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippine
National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the
Nederlands Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino,
Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;
WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a
Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the
Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving
Account No. 63436 with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the
Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn by the aforementioned Chinese concern,
Chiung Liu Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate
President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her
current account with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the
Senate President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other
checks totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank
on October 26, 1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;
WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the
Senate on February 18, 1946, in an attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to
be interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details and definiteness that it
left many doubts unsettled;
WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that
the same represented proceeds from the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is
directly contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath
before the Horilleno Investigating Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been
loaned byhim to the Senate President, who repaid the same within ten days;
WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948,
deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made in the current account of the Senate President's
wife Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86

were deposited before his election to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after
his election;
WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his
speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect that he and his wife had made substantial amounts
in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;
WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en
politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it
was right for the Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds committed
by the opposition;
WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President
justified the commission of electoral frauds, which justification is a direct attack on the
sovereignty of the people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;
WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments which passes upon all Presidential appointment, including thoseto the
judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to
interfere with and influence some judge in decidingcase pending before, thereby imperilling
the independence of the judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;
WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate
demand a through, impartial and immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,
1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed
2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning
at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not
then opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time petitioner
ascended the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the
resolution introduced by the Senators Taada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to
his side Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.
Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that
petitioner called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.
Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and
the roll call showed the presence of the following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco,
Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,

Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia,
Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was
again opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the
reading of the minutes proceeded.
Senator Taada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the
session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes.
he wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator
who speak without having been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair
to recognized the right of Senator Taada to speak, and every time he would make the request,
Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from
individuals of the audience, where two fist fight took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard
from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of
the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe
motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged
the gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and,
thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique
Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him. Twelve SEnator, respondent and his
eleven supporters, remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the
SEnate, ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag raised
the question of quorum and the question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll
call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to
continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of record that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore
and those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to
preside over the session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the
Chair.
Senator Taada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against
petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration
and approval of said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by
Senator Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to
the President Pro-tempore and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which
read as follows:
RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND
DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT OFTHE
SENATE.
Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable
Jose Avelino, President of the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby

declared vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated Acting
President of the SEnate, until further orders from this Body.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz
and has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting President of
theSenate.
The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we
believe the following conclusions are unavoidable.
1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the
Senate could not continue holding session and transact business for lack of quorum.
In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.
ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT
A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain
restriction, it has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even
questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made
after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the
journal. The motion is not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an
appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too
tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a
democratic social order. Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything
other than placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.
There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to
decree motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in
thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to
said effect was properly made and met with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it
was right for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection, provided
the motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the
motion, did not object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence,
however, fails to support petitioner's claim.

We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of
opinion that the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator Taada was bent on delivering a
speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by Senator
Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation
of said charges had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949,
when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In
said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of
confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of Senators,
believing themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to waste any time to give a showing of
said majority and must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to wrestfrom him the
Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the
Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and
had been requesting that Senator Taada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Taada himself
made attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process
that would give due course to the investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68,
Exhibit 1, and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.
This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session
hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the
Taada and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's
Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the session beopened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session
under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving
petitioner such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to
take measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the
petitioner and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying,
action on the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his impedingouster, by
the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.
The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
QUORUM
There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only
twelve Senators, those composing respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll
call ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had raised the question
of quorum.
The Constitution provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such

manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article
VI.)
The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual
members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership
of each chamber of Congress.
The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less
than thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the
majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact
that the above constitutional provision does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of
the amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments
that can validly change the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution.
"Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of
said members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context
of the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their
political nature and implications, are justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the
Supreme Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should
there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the
Philippines, according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional
question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent
was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application
and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the Constitution. Should the two absent
Senators comeand attend the session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the
Senate will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each
group supporting petitioner's and respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the
Senate. Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested
from respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and revolution, there is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance
with the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong committed
within the framework of democracy it established in this country. Should this Supreme Court refuse
to exercise jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such
shirking of official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the
issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of Congress, but also the
presidential succession as provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty
which we should not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the
Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner
and his nine supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to
transact business.

4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing
respondent as acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution
for lack of quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the
Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential
succession, so much so that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not
entitle respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes the
invalidity of respondent's election.
Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would
not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a
mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point of view of
laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great
importance, such as who will wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the questions that this Court
must answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective
supporters in the Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive
business and should not be minded for the purposes of our decision.
The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of
their own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the
polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the
Senate and the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the
Constitution and by the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step
beyond said legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of
justice, the latter cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of
jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of
the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the
President of the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and
above objections voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the
majority, we cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion:
Otherwise, we would be disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would
be printing the stamp of our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny
imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the
functioning and actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving
the country of the benefits of legislation.
When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and
prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him
and to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous
importance which we should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us.
Such complaint constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve
Senators, in utter violation of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother
agency of government can offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint
has been filed.
The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective
action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent individual
units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can onlyact in

organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the
organizing element without which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The
importance of such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional
Convention, and that is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the
existence of quorum for the former National Assembly to transact official business and that
requirement was also imposed by the National Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted
itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original
text of the Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty
reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less
than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution
provides for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact
official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into
a quorum to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend
the session, even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with
petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the
Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to
displease the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to
continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the
orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago,
he impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground the injustice
then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero now being more
generally recognized petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this
sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people,
the final arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That
conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively
nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of
humanity springing fromthe golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold
onslaughts from many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing
their will through fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently
demand a more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of administration of
justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a
philosophy and social order based on constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all
conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this Court
to refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail
and by experience we know that it had suffered many failures than revolution. This immeasurable
responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the performance of its plain duty and should
dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of
wind.

The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility,
should not be understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as
enunciated by Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in practice
the system of check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make
absolute that principle is to open the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate
governments within a government and three independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid
such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles
embodied in the fundamental law.
Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts.
The Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power
of courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the silence, when
the proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall, had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional
provisions. The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and
outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.
To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been advanced
that, the President of the Philippines having recognized respondent as a duly elected acting
President of the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory sprouts from
the same ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how the latter
should dispose of a pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge by
saying that nothing should guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our official
functions, disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may
split into two groups after a presidential election and each group may proclaim a different candidate
as the duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the
principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious
Pilate, wash our hands and let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77
Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The
more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the
escutcheon of the post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.
We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments
or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed
to continue transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free
expressionof the will of the majority.

BRIONES, M., dissente:

Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito
adelantar las siguientes observaciones:

(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en
los asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La
cuestion constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido de
que esta Corte deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la
cuestion de si el grupo de senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado
tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha facultad, puesto que cuando
dicho grupo se reunio no habia un quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la
Constitucion y de los reglamentos del Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser
enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros
en demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las manos en un ademan de inhibicion
pilatista; no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-del-desierto estilo
aveztruz. El issue constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy importante. Tiene
repercusiones directas y vitalisimas en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio
supremo de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica
el tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional
es lo esencial e importante.
Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto
surgido en el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una
tremenda crisis nacional, preada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras instituciones
politicas, para el orden publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la nacion.
Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de
America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del ao 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La
analogia es completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos Senadores, cada cual
pretendiendo ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la
genuina representacion popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers
Senate", por los nombres de los presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte
Suprema de New Jersey no podia asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion
eminentemente politica, por tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso y, por boca
de su Presidente el eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo el siguiente categorico
pronunciamiento:
. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by this
record, we have no doubt; and we are further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to
conceive of any crisis in public affairs that would more imperatively than the present one call
for the intervention of such judicial authority. (supra, p. 758.)
Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas
por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema
necesidad de resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la
estabilidad del gobierno y ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto: no existe la
misma razon de extrema necesidad en el presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre
las dos facciones en nuestro Senado esta afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda
cabe de que la normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave preocupacion de todo el mundo y con
grave dao de la tranquilidad publica?
(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. Estimo
que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion
frente a la oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el. En vista de esta
oposicion, el deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de levantamiento de la sesion
presentada por el Senador Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar

levantada la sesion. Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando rutinariamente el

presiding officer puede dar por aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad
de levantar la sesion no estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma
sumamente peligrosa en manos de un presidente despotico y arbitrario.
La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus
facultades inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y
tumulto en la sala de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no
justifican semejante pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos. Lo que debia haber
hecho el Senador Avelino era tratar de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden.
Tenia medios para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los
senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion y los senadores del otro grupo tenian
perfecto derecho a proceder como procedieron, quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la
sesion. Esta sesion venia a ser una tacita reconduccion una simple prolongacion de la sesion
que habia sido declarada abierta por el presidente Avelino con un quorum presente de 22
miembros.
(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de quorum. Es cosa
establecida y admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12
miembros del grupo llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado "Senado
de Avelino". En esta coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion
del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la
lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes que al
comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y
solamente respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores del grupo de Cuenco.
Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el Senado
de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe
ser de 13 miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la Union americana
esta repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado firmemente la doctrina de que la base para
determinar el quorum legislativo es el numero totalde miembros elegidos y debidamente cualificados
de cada camara.1 En el presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por tanto, el
grupo Cuenco no podia seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta de quorum. De
acuerdo con la Constitucion y los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos caminos para
actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o compeler la
asistencia de suficientes senadores del otro grupo para constituir dicho quorum, pudiendo a dicho
efecto ordenar inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas. (Constitucion de Filipinas, art. VI, sec. 10, ap.
2;2 Reglamento del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.3) Asi que todos los procedimientos efectuados
por el grupo Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.
Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto constitucional sobre quorum es
significativo. Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute aquorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en el texto enmendado de
1940 se dice: "A majority of each House shall constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se
quiere deducir la consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso sea la
posibilidad de una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la existencia de
un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la
enmienda no han hecho mas que copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion federal
americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el sentido de que seala, como base
para determinar el quorum, la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por
tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido
tradicional de que la base para la determinacion del quorum la totalidad de los miembros electos y

cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es elemental en hermeneutica legal que una misma
cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas racional
para elquorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero incluyendo al
Senador Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar gravemente
enfermo, hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento de ser llamado por el
Senado. El fundamento de esta opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no debe ser
contado un miembro que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es
igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es
convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas
eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el precepto constitucional y la regla
pertinente no establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir.
(4) Cual es el remedio. No cabe duda de que una mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a
reorganizar el Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas
prescritas por la Constitucion, las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo Cuenco que
al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo menos hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos
constitucionales y legales para efectuar una reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler
la asistencia de un numero suficiente de Senadores para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si
fuese necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo
sigan boicoteando las sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el
grupo Avelino acude voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos grupos pueden buenamente
restaurar la normalidad constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la reorganizacion que desee y dicte la
mayoria.
Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y
facultad para ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de
sus adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos
concierne son sus repercusiones juridicas.
Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la republica, el que
mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de un
clima politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de mano y
de estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) eso que caracteriza la historia azarosa de las llamadas
"banana republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo rigor, sin
blandas transigencias, la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que la
implementan.
Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his
election was illegal.
It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a
member of the Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or
permanently. There is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session be the
criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of
communication should operate to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the
purpose of determining the presence of a majority.
The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the
theoretical and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to fulfill their
missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become
more apparent. The interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to
transact business so long as it is a majority of the legislators present in the country. Nothing in my
opinion could have been farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit,
under circumstances, less than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people
to approve measures that might vitally affect their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The
necessity of arresting absent members to complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the
necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for
ruling out absentees who are beyond the legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a lawmaking body and is little concerned with jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is
an emergency measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to
arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who were inside the
Philippines territory. This is especially true in the United States of America, after whose form of
government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to the other side of the globe.
This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1).
In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising
authority within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a
senate that, it is alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other reasons
alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate
branch of the government so much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.
Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:
An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by authority of law;
xxx

xxx

xxx

This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by
the legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can
only be raised by the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures.
(Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the
Senate appointed by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would
not be the Senate by the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more
reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The
interest of the public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy
determination of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and public
order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers'
Reports, annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent
on the question of this Court's jurisdiction.
March 14, 1949
RESOLUTION
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose
Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has
resolved, by a majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this
Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice
Briones in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground
that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the latter's
persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is
in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction
but concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the
question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.

FERIA, J., concurring:

In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether
this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners
Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and compel
the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of
Sec. 11, Article VI, of the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating
to the election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et al., who
were represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the jurisdiction
of this Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case on the ground that the question
therein involved was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented by
Attorney Jose W. Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends that
this Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court had
jurisdiction.
And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was
whether it was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the
respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment
to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the
United states of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was
not passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives,
voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents
maintained the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the
exclusive province of the Legislature.
The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State
Constitution of the United States of American, after which our owns is patterned, has given rise to
the distinction between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and
politicalquestions which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under
the Constitution, by the People in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government, except to the
extent that the power to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or
statutory provision. Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a
justiceable one, it has been generally held that the first involves political rights which consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the government of
the government, while justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights
accorded to every member of the community or nation.
Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate case and controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the
jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which
comeswithin the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to
decide, the judicial department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act
of the Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of
thecourts is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied.

Divorced from the remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of alegislative or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a
coercive force.
Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood,
45 Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of
said respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and therefore this
Court had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and
dissented from the decision of the majority.
When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling of
the Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the
present case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim of stare decisis,
and in order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said
that "The Supreme Court has changed its colori.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally
from the habits of though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the
sympathy they could not but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The
ANNALS of the American Academyof Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino
case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide
whether or not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing to
abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of
the Justices, who have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the
jurisdiction of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases,
so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well.
But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was
a quorum in the session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority,
not on the number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and
this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason
of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house
is empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for
considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that
Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of
the Senate, the actual members of the SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twentythree (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the
Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the case
of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not
disqualified. And in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2,
of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in imposing death excepted
from the court those members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this Court
held that the absence of the Chief Justice Avancea, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a
legal disqualification, and his vote was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the
decision imposing death penalty.

PABLO, J., concurrente:

Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia
jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin
embargo, nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar
resoluciones. Desde luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La huelga en el Senado continua.
Los recientes acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones
dentro y fuera del pais. Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia pueden
desbordase y causar fatales consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es
necesario, impedirlo.
El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles
en varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la
solitud original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto
a mi voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una
parte, ni por la anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.
La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben importante las consecuencias; pero como
ciudadano, me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico. Al
pueblo interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza es transigir, pues,
para que haya seis votos que sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion
anterior, fracasara todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la crisis en el
Senado.
El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que
hubo quorum en la continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del Senador Avelino y
compaeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce
senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que
el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion. Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un
conflicto que esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para
dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce senadores formaban quorum.
De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or
hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit which
seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide
in judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for
the study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the
teaching may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual wellbeing and collective happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from
many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We
intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left hanging in
the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment
and reasonable and just in a quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half
of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like
mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent
persons with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news
reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and
movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of
political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been
shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the
upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives.
It has already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of
the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous
in belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one
way or another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe
it to be right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several
Senators who in not remote past (see Vera vs.Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to the present the Supreme Court has
and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at present
abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous
controversies as the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in
democracy, the role of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of
the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the
merits.
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in
the Alejandrinovs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a
colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring
inconsistencies.
Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role
as spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution.
Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case
raises vital constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our
Constitutional Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the
organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to
decide such constitutional questions.
Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike
to attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the
legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful
than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers
temporarily stop to work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But
society is menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy
and chaos are its alternatives.
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor
officials and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of quorum should not be
leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the constitutional
amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The
words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of thequorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because
they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the
majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (). It can neverbe identified with one-half () or
less than one-half (). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less
is etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all
opposites, and in the same way that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the
creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less
than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24)
units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid,
Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two
equal number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one
hand cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning
great. Majority means the greater of two numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number
greater than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It presupposes the
existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators
composing the Senate.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum
created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the session of
February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)
The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by
one among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take
measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such
House may provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for
the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.
As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the
picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings
us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator
Mariano J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel
for petitioner, manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting
President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions.
He would only make of record his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner
from presiding over said sessions.

The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent
under oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so
that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure, is
inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about
respondent's testimony, because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's
counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.
Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to
refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from
the historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.
If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he
has sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment
made under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been not only
failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his
group of Senators have given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue
warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions of the
Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping
him, have to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical
endeavor to compel them to attend the sessions?
The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in
all newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered,
weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday sessions, February
18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command
the position of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the
sessions of the Senate, the most characteristic and important function of President of the Senate.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of
office. (Santiago vs.Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p. 980981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's
reason? They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the
motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to
exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of
the majority has only increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to
sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt
that the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it, the present national
crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest
are highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that
they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers entrusted with the
execution. Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that
demand remedial legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife
would have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court
would have ordered petitioner's reposition.

Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would
certainly have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the sessions with senators
of the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The twelve
senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all
the disputed actuations of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they
would have succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of President of
the Senate.
Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionablequorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy,
by quorumthe rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken
the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's action in
adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of
the Cuenco group would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for
immediate execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing the session hall.
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious
charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot
demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result
will not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position by attending the
sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA,
AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin
taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners

claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which
approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call,
the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed
the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following
transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by
Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as
having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session
hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in
the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other
versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line
17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published
version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the
question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss
this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they
admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents.
Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the
transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the
rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call
for the years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored
Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to
approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and
instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the

session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996
and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the
law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of
grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De
Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of
separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum
for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the
enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each
House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except
insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the
bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for
approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is
false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the
petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions
of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the
Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment
of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was
no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by
parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power
to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and
when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the
propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in
the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision
for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter
of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United
States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all
powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings
are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the
House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may
think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage.
The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the
legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we
decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma
provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds
vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any
particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is
shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50
N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He
wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere
comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion
[by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond
judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment
that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence
of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion
approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being
none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the
individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case
is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some
legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such
as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out,
the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no
means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee
report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr.
Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects,
then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his
attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the
Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we
assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair
can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do
not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this
Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and
esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the
institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own
affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon
the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the
original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nayshad already been taken, it would have been sheer
tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that
the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40
p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader
moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned
until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except
Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of
Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not,
in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if
Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have
put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to
the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established
the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep.
Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep.
Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry
Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and
Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting
had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing
this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has
refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to
the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the
following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost
the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that
they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the
work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall
be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases
and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say
that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to
have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership
of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of
the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No.
7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is
required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of
the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent
character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals."
As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment
has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC
ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the
near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci"
tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of
both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel
Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the

supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in
the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson
promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and
whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment
and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci"
tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service
of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal
wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the
Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main
that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the
"Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino,

Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F.
Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties
standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases,
has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations
to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings." 24 The
fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary
of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed
the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact
on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether

or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that
he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously,
therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and
charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing
the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient
petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by
the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the
vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class
suit, and members of the bar and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor
Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed
in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes
moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a
case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance
of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings
and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that
the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an
act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after
15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the
following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body.
The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years,
leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a
quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault v. Nazareno, the Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Proceduremust be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve
Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the
Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the
acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of
the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of
the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at
the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be
valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries
which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is

incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress
or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on
notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective
even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. 49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The
organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules
of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases.
The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought

to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in
the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275
is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on
the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184849

February 13, 2009

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA
PAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE
BALAJADIA, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on October
28, 2008 by petitioners-spouses General (Ret.) Eliseo D. dela Paz (Gen. Dela Paz) and Mrs. Maria
Fe C. dela Paz (Mrs. Dela Paz) assailing, allegedly for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the orders of respondent Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (respondent Committee), through its Chairperson, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago (Senator Santiago), (1) denying petitioners Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash
Subpoenae and (2) commanding respondent Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Jose Balajadia, Jr.
(Balajadia) to immediately arrest petitioners during the Senate committee hearing last October 23,
2008. The petition thus prays that respondent Committee be enjoined from conducting its hearings
involving petitioners, and to enjoin Balajadia from implementing the verbal arrest order against them.
The antecedents are as follow
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International
Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the
delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela
Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow
airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros

[approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his
possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the
euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting
them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct
on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing,
petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with
Motion to Quash Subpoena.2 Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committees
jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section
13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent
Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required
signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very
same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus,
cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
Respondent Committee filed its Comment3 on January 22, 2009.
The petition must inevitably fail.
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses
of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of
this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. 4
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in
the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of
the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Taada v. Cuenco, 5 was
characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of
virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify
these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication.

Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senates action.
Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction over the
petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we are convinced that respondent
Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its authority.
lawphil.net

Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:

12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the relations of
the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral
organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident
involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction.
The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen.
Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the
INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of "public" money ostensibly to
cover the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with immigration and
currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained him
and other members of the delegation in Moscow.
Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain
provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign
currency across borders.6 The Moscow incident would reflect on our countrys compliance with the
obligations required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the respondent Committee can
properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds discovered in
Moscow as this would involve the Philippines commitments under these conventions.
Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the
respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee
may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in
office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention
by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen.
Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds.
Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the
Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order7 of arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the
Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.

Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation. 8
Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual. In the legislative
inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent Committee and the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by
the Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees,
there was no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same
hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of
Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian considerations.9 Consequently, the order for her arrest was
effectively withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 22041

September 11, 1924

JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator
appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District. The respondents are
Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier,
Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan
B. Alegre, Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmea,
Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion Guanco,
Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all members of
the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante,
Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine
Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent
Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution
reads as follows:
Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is
hereby declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the
Sixth District on the occasion of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;

Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of
his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year from the first
of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed
by the Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said
Governor-General for his information.
The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and
entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against
the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution
of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ
of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his
office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the AttorneyGeneral, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later,
by demurrer, has pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we desire first of all
to say that looking through the form of the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted
by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official
employees. May the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul
the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his
official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the other interesting questions
which have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, which are familiar to students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our
system of government, each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the
control of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to
decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts
must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule
of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against
the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the
courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate
to compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69
Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De

Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt
[1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel.
Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex
rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and instructive. They
are found among the decisions of our own court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other
jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is
only necessary to explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief
executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original application made
in this court praying for a writ ofmandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to call a special
election as provided by law. The Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no
jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive
department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained
and the complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of
Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29
Mich., 320), which we will now proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra, concerned a bill
praying the United States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas
from executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court
said the single point which required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained by
injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the
Executive Department.Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department;
though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible
consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse
obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If,
on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute
the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the Executive and
Legislative Departments of the Government? May not the House of Representatives
impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere in behalf
of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction
the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange
spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in
that court?
These questions answer themselves.

xxx

xxx

xxx

We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had
against Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson, as a
citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an Act of Congress
by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execution by the President. . . .
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on account of being
written by Judge Cooley, related to an application for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to
perform a duty imposed upon him by statute. Judge Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three
distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited
and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of
action equally independent.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the
others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a
restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the department which
controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own
sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The
Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in making
laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner
acting within their proper province, because they are only applying that which is law to the
controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of these
checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the
remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to
correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its
equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what
their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered.
If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature could in like
manner override executive action also, the government would become only a despotism
under popular forms. On the other hand it would be readily cancelled that no court can
compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its
command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear
by the constitution or the laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the
control of the other is not only implied in the framework of government, but is indispensably
necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course than that
which leaves the head of the executive department to act independently in the discharge of
his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to something worse, should the
courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And while
we should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our
judgment would be no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an
officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render obedience to the
law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of
the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor with that of
the executive to place him in position where, in a matter within his own province, he must act
contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of the judiciary to
control bymandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of California, supra,
was an original proceeding in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected senators
of the state to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that
the petitioners had been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied,
Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader, they do not
make a case justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form of government the
judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra,
Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the
Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion by the United States Supreme
Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of the late Chief Justice that the court should
not assume jurisdiction of the proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the principles laid down in
some of the preceding authorities have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the
fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the three departments of the government are
independent of each other. "They are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate
province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive
was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be
exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the
executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is
not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to
be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey
on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been presented years
ago in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in
the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court. It
is now too late to go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not
only impracticable but impossible since at least two decision of the United States Supreme Court
seem to us to be controlling.

No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to
direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a
court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it
will be the end of popular government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme
Court to issuemandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our
mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and
his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the
Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have
no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate.
The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate
who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might
have the spectable presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them
to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the
person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95
Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood,supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no
consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that does not
belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to
surrender a power which it is its duty to exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from
this court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will
create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely
to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or
which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any
possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a
branch of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief
Executive and the Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the
non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office
until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by
the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an
appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any
reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power
granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a
power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the
correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature
and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history suspended a
member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when
permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an

opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed
but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its
functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to
the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs.
Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to
deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was there announced
is equally applicable to the instant proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is inserted so that the
vital question argued with so much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there may be
at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and
balances of government. The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate
branch of the government, takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system
suggests the thought that no action should be taken elsewhere which would constitute, or even
seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior
does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this
and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court
does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it
be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is
not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to
assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes
down the halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against
the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be
amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the
court. So ordered.
G.R. No. 128055

April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering
the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with

pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April
1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On
13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved,
forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise
of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan,
Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @
Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao
Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu
Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin
Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits
the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 9194555 and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating
from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty
until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court.
Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his
office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.

On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a
fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from
the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November
1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed
G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.
The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and
directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed
against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to
cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with
her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by
the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman
to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31
July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
(Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995
motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its
03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by
the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled
"Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.
On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration
and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding
at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take
effect immediately upon notice.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President,
Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of
the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the
Senate shall inform this Court of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the
suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be
lifted at that time." 2
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits

under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the
service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the suspension pendente
lite of an accused public officer may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly
upheld by this Court.
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear
and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of
the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to
the conduct thereof. It has been said that
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been

afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged
do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions
of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or
of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to
quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts
for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act
3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the
same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to
the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the
grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called
upon to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner
sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12petitioner sought the nullification of the hold
departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which
deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for

reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these
cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she
failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the
splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in
the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,

upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
Congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals
with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject
to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as
a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any
possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been
couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the
question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view 19that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription
thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the
Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the
Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS,
IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel
M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member
of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"1

Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES." 2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate 3 and sixteen (16)
members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, 5 signed by its
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment
thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action. 6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees 7 to
the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep.
Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees 9 to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been
recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral
Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other
members were given a copy thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House
approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining
their negative votes, Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a
rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality

of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by
the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill
No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of
the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
"Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as
ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss
the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the
present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as
taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted
into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all
the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective
official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006,
has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned

from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal
of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their
respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other
elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of
the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its
title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67,
leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the
appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as
the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that
the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would
be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the
issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents
merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised
by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the
petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of
standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then
Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos. 19 Similarly, the
Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other
petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the
validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee
on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional
provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months
away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The
following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that
the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our
stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul
of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same. 31

Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as
well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an
act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media

time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title
be a complete index of its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions
of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this
provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? Thats
all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election
practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier
seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very comfortable with the title
"Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again
until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very touchy
issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the
Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam
just for the title Is that what youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that there is
already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it
would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly
adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is
a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field,
we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is
covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the
House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair
election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is
more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the theory.
So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special
provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...

REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus
Election Code?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why dont we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election
practices?

REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:

Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Youre back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." Thats the House version, eh, dahil
pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act." 38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it
would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. 39 It is
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed
limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in
Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same
case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal
the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators
were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply
and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.44 The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. 46 On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners
insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of
the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it
was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report
was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched
in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the
provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now
appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for
which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a
detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise
bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed
amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The
said provision states, thusly:

Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president and vicepresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Courts consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where
the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure."
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is

challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has
been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of
their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their
contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the

Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the

Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC
or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures
for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus,
the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be

easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or
controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will
necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents
acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward
system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to
invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335,
the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will
guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation
of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy
and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related
requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication.
And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental
act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a
judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further
overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim
or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are
unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to
themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the
constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their
allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his
own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.
By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have
the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to
serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials
and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue
targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it.
It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as
petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only
without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality.
To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based
on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives
for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not
exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws
against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate
and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to
evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled
to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax
and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will
be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of
the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary
measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and
the BOC. The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the
[BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or
acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any
loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a

result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance

or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
law differently. InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,20 this Court
declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on

a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably

arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized
as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in
their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty
does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and
control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary
[of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for
all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of
its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic
activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate
units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall
be headed and subject to the management and control of the
Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees,
charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs
laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic
frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the
clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all
ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such

substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the

law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the
provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing
for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the
delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives
Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be
sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the
Excess the Revenue Targets

Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to

Accrue to the Fund

30% or below

15%

More than 30%

15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the

remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year

immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was
exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue
collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year
as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue
targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR,
and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection

expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and
identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under

this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not
exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of
collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation;
and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent
transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless
the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or
potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however,
That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue
or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities orforce majeure or
economic causes as may be determined by the Board,
termination shall be considered only after careful and proper
review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for
the separation of an official or employee from service under this
Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant
laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and
Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and

employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%)
with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection.
This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
"public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by
the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the
minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the
minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated
by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the
concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken

by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program

objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d)
to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with
increased frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation
of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century,
Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to
the executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus,
uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies
perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x
xxx
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
xxx

xxx

xxx

b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of
looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional

investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power

of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx
xxx
xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative
area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its
veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the
President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations
with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an
agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains
a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of
time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation
in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option
to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on
the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus
explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the
policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices
to say that the complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate

by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards,

leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an
executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves
their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may
not have participated in or agreed with the development of those
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress
proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is
the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing
law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any
post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto
constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto
enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations
allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making
authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals
before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast,
legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress.
They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its
chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to
retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as
declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme

Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case
arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the
executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the
United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the aliens
appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order the aliens
deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2)
unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the
passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in
memorandum decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the
legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this
precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of
both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of
Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35(emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of
congressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of a
constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down
the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not

only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to
review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission
on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a

congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning

delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate
the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for
making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what
is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected
to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal
laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and
the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires
the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one
of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus,
assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative
veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming
that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr.

Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of
bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or
the Senate except for some measures that must originate only in the
former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the
measure and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the
proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for
approval, with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings
are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or
purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is
at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon
and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and
copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third
reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes
and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is
allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where
it will also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between
the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure
that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then
be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress,
thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the
Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.

The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once

approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it
has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the
law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled
by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of
publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may
be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an
appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality
of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the
entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared
invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision

not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and

effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the
following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to
the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of
a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent
of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would
have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional,
or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be
carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void,
in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to
isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the
latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining
provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries
out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days

thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed
valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of
RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant
to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11530

August 12, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of
illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and
plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently,
bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and
import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine
currency; and that, then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together and plotting
among themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other
in the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been
imported, knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally
introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of
law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not
yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the
former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of
the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a

fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has
become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly
multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many propositions
embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these:
The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July
27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant,
Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special
session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February
but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is
not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated
the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and
this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative
journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
These questions will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would
properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16
of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall
be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On
page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary and special sessions of the Third
Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the
Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having
arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine
Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the
Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In
obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was
duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12
o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ...
shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive
evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section
313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .

(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts
may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such
journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a
law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is
that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative
journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute
certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go
behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such
journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to
that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it
is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28,
1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous
evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions,
it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is
understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence the belief
respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of
conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the
appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign
itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of
the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate
and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the
Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination
of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in
order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil
might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to
loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long
centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and
unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must
be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less

certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals
concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.)
Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886,
said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question;
and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go
beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in
each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the
limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless
arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that
the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character.
They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in
the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various
states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to
find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the
legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after
those of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in
that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila
from Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and
consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in
the business of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in
this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio
Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don
Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the
release of the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due
course to the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper
acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of
merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons
whose names were not listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the
merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the
twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the
shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five
barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9.
Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse
and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and
shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one
of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and
returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five
and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle
General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the

place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret service
agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of
Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to
separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the
barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be
found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs
agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano
by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and
here found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well
as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron
hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were
found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the
basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets.
There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was discovered
which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner
and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was
learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced
by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons."
After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty
barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was
found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed.
Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three
barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they
were in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10,
Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under
arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according
to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained,
however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire
importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels were opened
and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the
opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel,
which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195
tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of
opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April 10, following the
instructions given him by Beliso. On being further questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had
been partners in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had
been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and
that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he
had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs agents then went with
Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those
found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first
Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of
Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious
person. But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine
merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a
house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to

Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had
destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why
he insisted, in purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on
the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium
was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the
reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of
the appellant beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the
opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct
part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is
in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO
GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO,
FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA,
JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS,
JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES,
JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the
Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive
Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became
Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of

Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four
Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee
on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The
committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator
Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who
should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments
were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear
in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that
House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached
to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back
to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines,
who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became
Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent
City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the
Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody
the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate
President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the
President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved
by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A
subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the
Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never
been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it
did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing
his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3),
adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City
Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act
4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the
bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the
enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip,
this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the ViceMayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said ViceMayor under any other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of
Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court,
appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the
issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United
States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill"
doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came
up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et
al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the
"enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the
decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity
rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran,
Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which
was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our
government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the
jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges
out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."

Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding
that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in
view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of
Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which
the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or
by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in
the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when
there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by
the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the
approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the
Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for
his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is
considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the
Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving
the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less
reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even
provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign
a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered
as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held
that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution,
is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this
point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President
of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government,
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts
may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the
logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does
not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the
following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of
its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall
be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of
a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that
the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress
and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says
that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in

the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the
proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer
thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there
was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out,
Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit
the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon
the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of
the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire
whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In
the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by
the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No.
4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR
OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965
is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.