56 PHIL 117

G.R. No. 35223

September 17, 1931
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, intervenor-appellant.
Roman J. Lacson for intervenor-appellant.
Mariano Ezpeleta for plaintiff-appellee.
Nolan and Hernaez for defendants-appellees Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and Cesar Ledesma.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This proceeding originated in a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., against the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount P13,850 or promissory notes or
other instruments or credit for that sum payable on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano
Lacson Ledesma; the complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an
accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or
otherwise, and to pay the plaintiff a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the
complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any
amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.
as bonus, because that would be civil fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for
the benefit of the central referred to, and by virtue of a deed of assignment, and praying that said
central be ordered to delivered directly to the intervening bank said sum on account of the latter's
credit against the aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
The corporation Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., answered the complaint stating that of Mariano
Lacson Ledesma's credit, P7,500 belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchased it, and
praying that it be absolved from the complaint and that the proper party be named so that the
remainder might be delivered.
Cesar Ledesma, in turn, claiming to be the owner by purchase in good faith an for a
reconsideration of the P7,500 which is a part of the credit referred to above, answered praying
that he be absolved from the complaint.
The plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., answered the third party claim alleging that its credit
against Mariano Lacson Ledesma was prior and preferential to that of the intervening bank, and
praying that the latter's complaint be dismissed.
At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar
Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed
the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the defendant central to
deliver to him the aforementioned sum of P7,500. And upon conclusion of the hearing, the court
held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02
which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma's bonus, and it ordered the defendant central to deliver said
sum to the plaintiff.
The Philippine National Bank appeals, assigning the following alleged errors as committed by
the trial court:
1. In holding that the bonus which the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., bound itself to pay the
planters who had mortgaged their land to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of
the debt of said central to said bank is not civil fruits of said land.
2. In not holding that said bonus became subject to the mortgage executed by the defendant

Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of his personal
debt to said bank when it fell due.
3. In holding that the assignment (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.) of said bonus made on March 7, 1930, by
Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to be applied to the payment of his
debt to said Philippine National Bank is fraudulent.
4. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co. Inc., in civil case No. 31597 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila levied a valid attachment upon the bonus in question.
5. In admitting and considering the supplementary complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc., alleging as a cause of action the attachment of the bonus in question which said Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., in civil case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila levied after the
filing of the original complaint in this case, and after Mariano Lacson Ledesma in this case had
been declared in default.
6. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., has a preferential right to receive from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 which is in the possession of said
corporation as the bonus to be paid to Mariano Lacson Ledesma, and in ordering the TalisaySilay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said amount to the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
7. In not holding that the Philippine National Bank has a preferential right to receive from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 held by said corporation as Mariano
Lacson Ledesma's bonus, and in not ordering said Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said
amount to the Philippine National Bank.
8. In not holding that the amended complaint and the supplementary complaint of the Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc., do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., and against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., or against the
Philippine National Bank.
The appellant bank bases its preferential right upon the contention that the bonus in question is
civil fruits of the lands which the owners had mortgaged for the benefit of the central giving the
bonus, and that, as civil fruits of said land, said bonus was assigned by Mariano Lacson Ledesma
on March 7, 1930, by virtue of the document Exhibit 9 of said intervening institution, which
admitted in its brief that "if the bonus in question is not civil fruits or rent which became subject
to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank when Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
personal obligation fell due, the assignment of March 7, 1930 (Exhibit 9, P.N.B.), is null and
void, not because it is fraudulent, for there was no intent of fraud in executing the deed, but that
the cause or consideration of the assignment was erroneous, for it was based upon the
proposition that the bonus was civil fruits of the land mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank." (P. 31.)
The fundamental question, then, submitted to our consideration is whether or not the bonus in
question is civil fruits.
This is how the bonus came to be granted: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc., was indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage
their land to the creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were
running with their property under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on
that same date, i.e., December 22, 1923, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus
mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of the debt secured according to
yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to time, as
soon as the central became free of its obligations to the aforesaid bank, and of those contracted

by virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it
obtained from said bank authority to make such payment. (Exhibits 5, 6; P.N.B.)
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings;
second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities,
or other similar sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the
phrase "u otras analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras" and
"analogas" agree with the noun "rentas," as do also the other adjectives"perpetuas" and
"vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and
only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left
to be examined is that of "income."
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in
question is "income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is
derived from the land mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the
benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil
fruits of that land, and the bank's contention is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to
the land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's
land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus
be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from
Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but
certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is
concerned, has nothing to do with it. Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution
of the central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of
the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the
annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred
to.
Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without express finding
as to costs. So ordered.

53 PHIL 356
G.R. No. L-30240 August 23, 1929
AQUILINA TACAS, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EVARISTO TOBON,DefendantAppellant.
Simeon Ramos, Benito Soliven and J. Belmonte for the appellant.
Vicente Paz for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an action to recover from the defendant the ownership and possession of three parcels of
land described in the sketch attached to the complaint, together with the fruits collected by him
during the time he was in possession of said land that is, since January, 1912, it being alleged
that the defendant unlawfully took said parcels upon the death of Francisco Dumadag,
predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs; and that he remained in possession, enjoying the fruits to
the value of P700 annually.
In his answer the defendant alleges that he is the owner of said lands, having purchased from one
Exequiel or Gil Tacas, deceased, about fifteen years before the amended answer dated December
5, 1924.
At the trial the parties adduced their respective evidence, and thereafter the trial court declared it
sufficiently proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the three parcels of land under
discussion, were parts of an estate belonging to Francisco Dumadag, whose title is a possessory
information recorded in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Sur, having inherited them from his
parents (Exhibit H); that during his lifetime, said Francisco Dumadag was in possession of the
land as owner from many years, until his death on November 17, 1911, enjoying its fruits,
consisting in rice, corn, tobacco, and vegetables; that said Francisco Dumadag had filed a
declaration for tax purposes in his own name; that the land tax had been paid by Francisco
Dumadag during the years 1908 and 1911, and in his name in the years from 1912 to 1914
(Exhibits I to P); that in January, 1912, during the season for planting tobacco immediately
following the death of Francisco Dumadag, Evaristo Tobon took possession of the three parcels
of land in question planting them with tobacco; that from 1912 up to the present, the defendant
Evaristo Tobon has been collecting the fruits therefrom, consisting of 300 sheaves of rice and
300 manos of first, second, and third-class tobacco each year, at the approximate rate of P0.30
for each sheaf of rice, and P 3 for eachmano of first-class tobacco, P 2.50 for second-class
tobacco, and P 2 for third-class tobacco. There is no evidence of record regarding the amount and
price of the corn collected by the defendant. And by virtue thereof, the trial court declared the
plaintiffs to be the absolute owners of the three parcels of land in litigation, and ordered the
defendant Evaristo Tobon to deliver said parcels of land to the plaintiffs, together with the fruits
collected each year since 1912 until the complete termination of this case, and in default thereof,
to pay to said plaintiffs the sum of P 11,040, which is the total value of the rice and tobacco from
1912 to 1927, at P 0.30 per sheaf of rice, and P 2 per mano of tobacco. From this judgment, the
defendant duly appealed in time, prosecuting his appeal to this court by the proper bill of
exceptions.
The appellant had made several assignments of error. In the first place, he contends that the
identity of the pieces of land in litigation has not been established. We find no merit in this
contention. It appears from the allegations of the complaint and the answer, that the case refers to
the lands held by defendant and alleged by the latter to have been purchased from one Exequiel
or Gil Tacas, brother to the plaintiff Aquilina Tacas.ibrary

With regard to the probatory value of the documents presented by the parties, to wit, Exhibit H of
the plaintiffs, and Exhibits 1 and 2 of the defendant, it is well to note that Exhibit H is a
possessory information record duly approved on March 22, 1895 and inscribed in the registry of
deeds of Ilocos Sur on November 4, 1917 in favor of Francisco Dumadag, covering some land
situated in the sitio of Sisin, municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur.
On the other hand, Exhibit 1 of the defendant is an instrument executed on January 17, 1905
whereby one Exequiel or Gil Tacas sold three parcels of farm land in the place called Sisin to
Evaristo Tobon for P 300 conan. And Exhibit 2 of the same defendant is another instrument
executed on May 15, 1909 from which it appears that Francisco Dumadag and his brother-in-law,
Gil Tacas, agreed that the three parcels of land belonging to the latter, together with the two
parcels of the former in Anteng, Barrio of Carisquis, would be put in Dumadag's name in the
possessory proceedings.
The court below made a detailed analysis of the signature of Ramon G. Tolentino who, as justice
of the peace, signed the ratification of the document Exhibit 1, comparing it with the
unquestioned signatures of the same person, appearing in Exhibit 2, and concludes that the
instrument Exhibit 1 is false.
It is unnecessary to descend to the discussion of the characteristics of Ramon G. Tolentino's
signature, he being the justice of the peace who ratified the document Exhibit 1, for, even
granting that said instrument is genuine, it appears that Gil or Exequiel Tacas could not validly
convey the lands in question to the defendant Evaristo Tobon, inasmuch as according to the
possessory information, said lands belong to and were in possession of Francisco Dumadag even
before 1895, until his death, which took place in November, 1911.
The document Exhibit 2 argues nothing against our conclusion, for it is a contradiction to hold
that in 1909 Francisco Dumadag agreed with his brother-in-law, Exequiel Tacas, that the three
parcels of land belonging to the latter should be included in the former's possessory proceeding,
considering that the latter had already been approved by this order of March 22, 1895. In the
ordinary course of events, if such an agreement had already been entered into, it should have
been at the time of the institution of the possessory proceeding. Dumadag did not know how to
sign his name, and besides, no one had identified said document, Exhibit 2.
There is another reason why Exhibit 1 cannot prevail over Exhibit H, namely, that supposing that
a sale was made in favor of the defendant in 1905, it was only in 1909 that Exhibit 2 was drawn
in order to legalize the alleged transfer. Besides, despite the transfer of the lands in favor of the
defendant having taken place in 1905, according to Exhibit 1, the defendant did not enter upon
the possession of said lands until after the death of the original owner Francisco Dumadag, which
occurred in November, 1911.
Another error alleged by the appellant is that the trial court ordered him to deliver to the
plaintiffs the fruits of the land from 1912 to 1927, or to pay their value, P 11,040.
The complaint in this case was filed on February 1, 1918. The bill of exceptions does not show
when the defendant was summoned but it does not show that the letter docketed his answer to the
complaint on April 11, 1918.
Evidence being lacking to show that when he entered upon the possession of the lands in
question, he was aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquiring it, he is deemed a possessor
in good faith (article 433, Civil Code), and in accordance with article 451 of the Civil Code, the
fruits of said lands were his, until he was summoned upon the complaint, or until he has filed his
answer thereto. (Saul vs. Hawkins, 1 Phil., 275; Javier vs. Javier, 6 Phil., 493; Cleto vs. Salvador,
11 Phil., 416; Valencia vs. Jimenez and Fuster, 11 Phil., 492; Araujo vs. Celis, 16 Phil., 329;

Alcala and Alviedo vs. Hernandez and Pacleb, 32 Phil., 628; Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil., 126;
Aquino vs. Taedo, 39 Phil., 517; Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 40 Phil.,
717; and Velasquez vs. Teodoro, 46 Phil., 757.)
Art 451 of the same Code provides:
Art. 451. Fruits received by one in possession in good faith before possession is legally
interrupted become his own.s virtual law library
Natural and industrial fruits are deemed to have been received as soon as they are gathered and
harvested.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue from day to day, and belong to the possessor in good faith in
this proportion.
In his comments upon this article of the Civil Code, Manresa, among other things, says:
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad
faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, where he becomes aware
that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support
of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is more
secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes; but when
the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily disappears.
Although he may not have been convinced of it before, the possessor becomes aware that his
possession is unlawful from the time he learns of the complaint, from the time he is summoned
to the trial. It is at this time that his possession is interrupted, according to article 1945, and that
he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first paragraph of article 451. The ruling of the
court retroacts to that time; but shall good faith be deemed to cease then ? Although there is a
great difference between requiring the possessor in good faith to return the fruits he received
from the time when his possession was legally interrupted, and considering him a possessor in
bad faith for all legal purposes from that time, the law had to establish a definite rule in the
matter, which is none other than that deducible from a combination of articles 452, 1945 and
435. Whether or not the defendant be a possessor in bad faith, for there is no doubt that he can
be, and the law makes no attempt to deny it, from the service of judicial summons, there exists
an act that this possessor knows that his right is not secure, that someone disputes it, and that he
may yet lose it; and if the court holds that restitution be made, that time determines all the legal
consequences of the interruption, the time when the possession in good faith ceased to be so
before the law.law library
The decisions of April 27, 1877, April 22, May 10 and June 13, 1878, February 11, and October
5, 1885, March 17, 1891, March 4, and May 17, 1893, held that good faith ceased when the
answer to the complaint was filed, taking this doctrine from the Partidas. By analogy, the service
of the summons, doubtless more certain and more difficult to evade, is now admitted, according
to articles 451 and 1945 of the Code, and it is in this sense that the decisions of the Supreme
Court of January 28, 1896, December 7, 1899, November 23, 1900, and July 11, 1903, must be
understood, all of them holding that even the possessor in good faith must return the fruits
received from the time the answer to the complaint was filed, that is, from the time he became
aware that he was in undue possession. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol.
4, pp. 270, 271.)
By virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed in so far
as it holds that the plaintiffs are the owners of the lands in question, and that the defendant is
bound to return to them the former.
And with regard to the award of damages, said judgment is hereby modified so that the

defendant is only bound to return to the plaintiffs the fruits received from April, 1918 to 1927,
that is, 300 sheaves of rice and 300 manos of tobacco, with the right to deduct the expenses of
planting and harvesting (art. 365 of the Civil Code), which shall be determined by the trial court,
after hearing both parties. virtual law library
The appellant shall pay the costs of this trial. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12439
May 22, 1959
FELICIANO MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
PRUDENCIO MARTIN, LUISA DE LA CRUZ, and IGNACIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
E.L. Peralta for petitioner.
Santiago Ranada for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring intervenorappellee therein Ignacio de la Cruz, owner of the two parcels of land subject of the action, with
the obligation of paying petitioner Feliciano Martin a redemption price of P600, and ordering
Feliciano Martin to deliver the lands to said intervenor-appellee upon the payment by the latter of
the said sum of P600.
The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: On September 12, 1919 Jose Balagui and
Dorotea Balagui, brother and sister, sold the two parcels of land subject of the action, to
Feliciano Martin and Florentino Martin for P1,200. On April 17, 1923, Jose Balagui brought an
action in the Justice of the Peace of Court of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, against said Feliciano and
Florentino Martin for damages arising from failure of the Martins to comply with some
conditions agreed upon in the sale. The said action was terminated by a compromise agreement
between Feliciano Martin, Florentino Martin and Isidro Martin, on the one hand, and the abovenamed spouses, on the other, who were plaintiffs, submitted to and approved by the court. The
agreement is as follows:
Presentes en la Corte las partes despues de llamada la Causa Civil arriba titulada, pidieron que se
terminase al asunto para evitar mayores gastos y las molestias consiguientes entre una y otra
parte, mediante transaccion de dicho asunto en los siguientes terminos:
Primero: Las partes se convienen en dejar sin efecto ni valor en juicio o fuera de el la escritura
publica otorgada en 12 de Septiembre de 1919 por Jose Balagui demandante y la difunta Dorotea
Balagui, madre de la dicha demandante Sixta Lantada a favor de los demandados Florentino
Martin y Feliciano Martin, sobre venta de dos parcelas de terrenos ubicados en Baguiata del
termino Municipal de Piddig en la cantidad de P1,200.00.
Segundo: que en la escritura que se otorgara de conformidad con la extencion del terreno que
resulte de su medicon con levantamiento de croquis para mayor inteligencia de vendedores y
compradores, ha de constarse como uno de los compradores, Isidro Martin en lugar de Florentino
Martin, por no ser este el dueo de los 600.00 mitad del precio.
Tercero: En el entre tanto, el terreno de Baguita que se compone de sementera huerta y cogonal y
de un solo lote y no de dos erroneamente consignos en ella estara a disposicion de los
demandados Feliciano Martin, para que se aprovechen de sus frutos por la cantidad de P1,200.00
sin transmitir definitivamente los demandados el dominio, corriendo a cuenta de Jose Balagui los
derechos del otogamiento de la nueva escritura.
El juzgado no encontrando motivos para no aprobar las estipulaciones arriba mencionadas las
apruebas y queda terminada la Causa sin pronunciamiento en cuento al pago de costas.
The Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the claim of Feliciano Martin that he had not known of

such agreement and did not sign it, found that Feliciano Martin did in fact the sign agreement.
The court also found that the intention of the parties in the execution of the compromise set forth
above, was to transform the original sale made in favor of Feliciano and Florentino Martin on
September 12, 1919, into an equitable mortgage, as contended by the spouses and their
transferees, the defendant Prudencio Martin and intervenor Ignacio de la Cruz. The court also
found that on January 8, 1946, Jose Balagui sold the parcels of land in question to Ignacio de la
Cruz for the sum of P2,500, with the understanding that the purchaser would redeem the lands
from Feliciano Martin and Florentino Martin by paying to them the sum of P1,200.
On the basis of the above findings the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte which had declared the compromise null and void for having been
made before a court which had no competent jurisdiction over the action.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is now the subject of this appeal by certiorari before this
Court, petitioner contending that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the compromise
had the effect of converting the previous contract of sale into one of loan secured by a mortgage;
and on failing to make a finding on the rights and obligations of the petitioner, with respect to the
houses builts on the lands in good faith by the petitioner Feliciano Martin and hi son-in-law and
his daughter. According to the evidence, the house of Feliciano Martin was valued at P3,000, and
that of his son-in-law and daughter, P2,000. The court of Appeals is also alleged to have made an
error in declaring that the compromise was valid even if the court before which it was made had
no jurisdiction over the case brought and in which it was entered into.
We cannot reverse or modify the conclusion made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Feliciano Martin had actually signed the compromise agreement, this being a finding of fact,
which is final and binding upon us. It is apparent also that the conclusion does not depend upon
the question of whether or not the justice of the peace court before whom it was made had
jurisdiction over the main case, is correct, it being a fact that the parties to the compromise
agreement signed and executed the same willingly and voluntarily, and should, therefore, be
bound by its terms. A person cannot repudiate the effects of his voluntary acts simply because it
does not fit him, or simply because the judge before whom he executed the act did not have
jurisdiction of the case. In a regime of law and order, repudiation of an agreement validly entered
into can not be made without any ground or reason in law or in fact for such repudiation. The
conclusion of the trial court in respect to the validity of the compromise agreement and its
binding effect upon Feliciano Martin cannot be questioned.
The last question raised by the petitioner refers to the failure of the Court of Appeals to pass
upon the respective rights of the intervenor-appellant, respondent, respondent herein, and the
plaintiff, petitioner herein, and his son-in-law and daughter, with respect to the houses had been
made by Feliciano Martin and his son-in-law and daughter in bad faith. That said two buildings
actually exist and that one of them is valued at P3,000 and the other , at P2,000, is not denied.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is silent on the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to the said houses. We find merit in the contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
failing to make a specific pronouncement on the rights and obligations of the parties with respect
to the said houses.
The Court of Appeals found that the houses were built after October 31, 1930, after Feliciano
Martin had returned the amount of P600 that Florentino Martin had contributed to the purchase
money. At the time of the construction, therefore, the petitioner had already become the rightful
possessor of the land having, besides, declared them for tax purposes. No claim is made by any
of the parties-respondents that the construction of the houses had been made in bad faith. The

compromise agreement did not specify within what period of time Feliciano Martin was to enjoy
the possession and use of the lands in question. Neither has there any evidence submitted to
show that the building of the houses was prohibited by the original owners of the land or by the
subsequent purchaser. A portion of the land was residential, so its use could only be enjoyed by
the building of a house thereon. So we must find as a fact that the building of the houses was
made in good faith and in the exercise of the rights granted to Feliciano Martin by the
compromise agreement.
The law applicable to petitioner is Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides as
follows:
Art. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built sown, or planted, in good faith,
shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon paying the
indemnification mentioned in Articles 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has built or
planted to pay him the value of the land, and the person who sowed thereon to pay the proper
rent therefor.
We therefore, agree with the petitioner that the court of Appeals erred in not having made an
express provision as to the houses in question and in accordance with the above-quoted provision
of the Civil Code the intervenor Ignacio de la Cruz, who had become the owner by purchase of
the lands in question, should be given, as he is hereby given, the choice either to pay for the
value of the houses, or require the petitioner herein to pay for the value of the land.
The Court of Appeals found that the value of the houses constructed about 29 years ago, were,
P3,000 and P2,000. We take judicial notice of the fact that the said houses must have depreciated.
On the other hand, we can also take judicial notice of the fact that the value of real estate has
greatly increased since 29 years ago. As no evidence was submitted to as the actual value of the
said houses, it seems that it is only just that said values be previously determined before the
choice for the purchase thereof by the owner of the land, the intervenor-appellee, can be
exercised by the latter.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in the sense that the
intervenor-appellee Ignacio de la Cruz is declared to be the owner of the lands subjects of the
action and entitled to the possession thereof upon payment by him of the sum of P600 to
petitioner Feliciano Martin, but the decision is modified by further ordering that the case be
remanded to the court below for determination of the price or the value of the two houses built
on the lands in question, and thereafter for the intervenor-appellee to exercise the option
specified in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-12486

August 31, 1960
LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ,
respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioners.
E.D. Mercado, J.V. Ong and J.T. Gonzales for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba, defendants below and herein petitioners, were on April 13,
1951 sued by Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, respondents herein, before the Court of
First Instance of Agusan, for the recovery of 87 square meters of residential land. After trial, the
court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs, herein respondents, owners of the land in
controversy and ordering petitioners to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a
monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same,
plus attorney's fees and costs. The decision, on appeal, having been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals with the only modification of disallowing the award for attorney's fees, petitioners
brought the case to this Court through the present petition for review.
The record discloses that sometime in 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan, Agusan, was made by
the Bureau of Lands. In that survey, the parcel of land here in question was included as part of
the lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon for which Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on February 12, 1923. On November 25, 1933, this lot
was purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia More, and upon their death, the land
was inherited by the respondents Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, the former being the
daughter of Marcos Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also
by her first marriage.
Petitioners claim that the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to conflicts and
overlapping of boundaries. In that resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre), Gregorio Bongato's lot,
according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo, their
predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. RO72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey
of Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the
latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the land in question is part of the adjoining
land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their predecessor in interest.
Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was
erroneous or that it included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as
part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138). Note that the
difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey plan is
65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the
alleged sketch plan of the resurvey was not presented in evidence.
Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the
Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said
title has not been contested up to the present, and, therefore, has become inconvertible evidence
of the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a Torrens certificate of title
becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be

impugned (Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, likewise, cannot be sustained. The new evidence
sought to be introduced was the sketch plan of the second survey, which, with the employment of
reasonable diligence would have easily been discovered and produced at the trial. Anyway, even
if presented at the result of the case. If a subsequent certificate of title cannot be permitted to
prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes, et al, vs. Borbon, et al.,supra) with more reason
should a resurvey plan not to be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of the
land therein described agree with that given in the plan. (See Government of the Philippines vs.
Arias, 36 Phil., 195).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were
found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith.
Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which
anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own faith shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary
and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to
oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore
the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon
payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on
which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for
respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing
on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable
solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which
was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then
they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot
oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable
rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail
to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).
In this connection, the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay monthly rentals of
P10.00 from the date of filing of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. A builder in
good faith may not be required to pay rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has
built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. (Miranda vs. Fadullon, et
al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., 6226, see also Martinez vs. Baganus, 28 Phil., 500; De Guzman
vs. De la Fuente, 55 Phil., 501; Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, Off. Gaz., Supp., August 16, 1941, p.
247).
Petitioners further contend that he complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an
indispensable party, it being alleged that their mother Maria Cupin, who owns the land in
question as part of her Lot No. 310, has not been made a party defendant in the case. This
contention, which was not raised in the trial court, deserves scant consideration. Petitioners
clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot No. 310 in their answer to
the complaint. They are consequently estopped from alleging otherwise.
As to petitioners' assertion that they should have been awarded damages alleged to have been

suffered by them in their counterclaim, suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that they
suffered any damage at all by reason of the filing of the complaint. Indeed, in the light of the
view we have taken of the case, they could not have substantiated their claim for damages.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are
hereby directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision their option to either buy the
portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land
and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay
reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their choice up to the time
they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the eland is considerably more than the
value of the improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties
shall agree upon the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin is hereby
instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00
monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the curt fixes such
terms.
So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.

76 PHIL 605
G.R. No. L-175
April 30, 1946
DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS IGNACIO, petitioners,
vs.
ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of
First Instance of Pangasinan, respondents.
Leoncio R. Esliza for petitioners.
Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
between the herein respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the
herein petitioners Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the
ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case,
the lower court, presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the
legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and
granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in
accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. The dispositive part of the decision, hub of this
controversy, follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
(1) That the plaintiffs are the owners of the whole property described in transfer certificate of
title No. 12872 (Exhibit A) issued in their name, and entitled to the possession of the same;
(2) That the defendants are entitled to hold the position of the residential lot until after they are
paid the actual market value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs
prefer to sell them said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the plaintiffs the
proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a basis the price paid for the whole land
according to Exhibit B; and
(3) That upon defendant's failure to purchase the residential lot in question, said defendants shall
remove their houses and granaries after this decision becomes final and within the period of sixty
(60) days from the date that the court is informed in writing of the attitude of the parties in this
respect.
No pronouncement is made as to damages and costs.
Once this decision becomes final, the plaintiffs and defendants may appear again before this
court for the purpose of determining their respective rights under article 361 of the Civil Code, if
they cannot come to an extra-judicial settlement with regard to said rights.
Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same Court of First Instance but now presided over by the
herein respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution
alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the
residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense
and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which,
after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants praying for (a)
a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to
compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential
lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon
failure of extra-judicial settlement.
The judgment rendered by Judge Felix is founded on articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code
which are as follows:

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of
the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of
the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence
thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner
of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building
or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse
both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter
chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361
and 453 of the Civil Code.
There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a question of procedure which calls for the
clarification, to avoid uncertainty and delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights
of both parties are well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, but it fails to
determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods
of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars
having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This
procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be made
thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had, the
sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what time may the option be
exercised, and certainly no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve
exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become
final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters
which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.
For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside and the
lower court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices
of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time
within which the plaintiffs-respondents may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings
or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the defendantspetitioners may pay for the land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment
becomes executory or unappealable. After such hearing, the court shall render a final judgment
according to the evidence presented by the parties.
The costs shall be paid by plaintiffs-respondents.

G.R. No. L-48265 January 7, 1987

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL ESTEVEZ DE TUANQUI, respondents.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
46861-R, wherein said court affirmed in toto with costs against appellant Diogenes Tuason the
decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 1851, an action to remove clouds over real property
with damages and preliminary injunction, which dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the estate of Juan Estevez represented by Isabel Estevez de Tuanqui is hereby
declared the owner of Lot No. 109 of the Cadastral Survey of Legazpi and the defendant,
Diogenes Tuazon, is hereby ordered to reconvey the lot embraced in Original Certificate of Title
No. 40 and to purge said title to the lien in the amount of P4,900.00 and, if he fails to do so, a
writ of execution will issue against the defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, for the said amount, and to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P120.00 annually from 1952 until he vacates Lot 109, with costs
against the said defendant.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal)
To have a better grasp of the antecedent facts and issues of the case, quoted hereunder is the
pertinent portion of the assailed decision of the appellate court:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, at Legaspi
City, in Civil Case No. 1851, an action to remove clouds over real property with damages and
preliminary injunction.
The complaint filed by the plaintiff, administratrix of the late Juan Estevez states the following
material averments:
2. That the estate of Juan Estevez, deceased, is the registered owned and the judicial
administratrix has been and still is in the actual possession of the following described real
properties:
(1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390 (RT-343 (755) of the Register of Deeds of Albay. A
parcel of land of No. 1068-A Subdivision plan PSU-1290, being a portion of Lot No. 1068 of the
Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, G.L.R.O. Cad .Records No. 860, with all the buildings and
improvements thereon, situated in Legaspi, Albay. Bounded on the NE by Lot 1068-B of Said
subdivision plan S.E. by Lot 1069 W. by Kapantawan River; and NW. by Calle-Mercado
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED (200) square meters more or less. Technical description
appears fully on the Torrens Title mortgaged to the PNB.
(2) Another parcel of land adjacent to the West of the preceding parcel, Lot 1068-A, situated in
Legaspi, Albay. Bounded on the North, West and South by lands formed by accretion and/or
drying up of the old river bed of the Kapantawan River, and on the East by Lot 1068-A,
containing a total area of one thousand fifty nine (1,059) square meters, more or less.
The first parcel is declared under Tax No. 12375 and assessed at P400.00, while the house
constructed under Tax No. 8975 and valued at P700.00.
3. That the first parcel of land has been registered under Act 496 since 1916, with the
Kapantawan River as the natural boundary to the West but subsequently by accretion thru the
accumulation of alluvial deposits west of Lot 1068-A the parcel of land described in par. 2 of this
complaint was formed. The late Juan Estevez and his heirs after his demise took immediate
possession thereafter and improved the same. A residential house was constructed thereon with

cement footings, which was however destroyed by the Typhoon TRIX in October 1952. Up to
the present the cement footings are still there and a toilet still exists therein used by the lessee of
the plaintiff on Lot 1068-A;
4. That the defendant Diogenes Tuazon present ly pretends certain rights over a portion of the
second parcel of land and is threatening to destroy the toilet of the plaintiff therein constructed.
This defendant further intends to construct a building of permanent nature over the old site of the
building of the plaintiff estate destroyed by the typhoon trix;
5. That the plaintiff is informed and so behevess that the defendant Diogenes Tuazon acquired by
purchase the house of PATRICIO and MARIA ESTEVEZ, contructed partly on Lot 1068-A and
on a part of the second parcel of land. This house an alleged annex is being constructed and/or to
be constructed by the said defendant to eventually occupy the site of the old building of the
plaintiff and the toilet. In a letter dated December 28, 1957,defendant Diogenes Tuazon with
uncalled for audacity sought to compel the plaintiff to remove the said toilet;
6. That the plaintiff is likewise informed and so beheves that defendant Diogenes Tuazon applied
with the defendant Director of Lands for the purchase of lease of the second parcel of land under
the mistaken belief that said land forms part of the public domain, disposable under the public
land law. That the second parcel of land is the private property of the plaintiff estate and the heirs
by right of accretion. The defendant Director of Lands or anyone acting in his behalf may not
dispose of the same. No action so far has been had on the application of the defendant Diogenes
Tuazon;
7. That prior to the filing of this action, defendants tried to make a survey of the second parcel of
land but plaintiff suspended and protested any such survey. Defendant Diogenes Tuazon under
false representations with the Office of the Mayor of Legaspi, Albay, recently secured a building
permit to construct a building on the second parcel of land;
8. That by reason of the hostile acts of the defendant Diogenes Tuazon and the apparent desire of
said defendant to ripen whatever pretensions he has over the second parcel of land into a valid
right by applying for its use and occupation with the defendant Director of Lands a cloud has
been created over the said parcel of land, which need to be removed at once. In the event that
after the service of process, the defendant Director of Lands decide to claim the second parcel of
land as part of the public domain then plaintiff maintains that the said property is a private land
by right of accretion;
9. That even admitting arguendo only that the said strip of land described as parcel (a) of this
complaint forms part of the public land disposable under the public land (which contention is
hardly allowable) yet by reason of priority of possession, improvements, and claim, the plaintiff
is entitled to its adjudication as against the defendant Diogenes Tuazon;
10. That the acts of defendant have been done with the utmost bad faith. He has full knowledge
of the rights of the plaintiff over the property now disputed. Plaintiff has been forced to go to
Court in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff estate resulting in the expense of P1,000.00 for
attorney's fees before this Court alone, plus additional expenses on appeal;
11. That by the unjust acts of usurpation committed and threatened to be done by the defendant
Tuazon, plaintiff is entitled to actual and moral damages in the sum of P2,000.00; partly for
useof land by Tuazon; (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-7)
The plaintiff asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which the lower court
granted and a writ was issued on January 2, 1958, (Ibid., pp. 7-12)
The defendant Diogenes Tuazon filed his answer denying the material averments of the
complaint and as special defenses and counterclaim avers:

AS FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSES:

Defendant alleges:
14. That the land in question was not formed by accretion but by the reclamation project of the
government and the same was recently left dry due to the construction of the culvert for Legaspi
drainage, consequently by the second parcel of land forms part of the public domain;
AS SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSES:
Defendant alleges:
15. That assuming without conceding that the second parcel of land is the private property of the
plaintiff, her rights to recover ownerhip, thereof has prescribed as defendant and his predecessorin-interests has occupied the land openly and adversely for more than ten years;
AS THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSES:
Defendant alleges:
16. That assuming that the land in question was formerly river bed and left dry because it was
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the water, plaintiff, although claiming to
be the adjoining owner, is not the owner thereof for the following reasons,
Firstly, the river bed was abandoned not by natural change but by the reclamation project of the
government and the construction of the culvert for the drainage of Legaspi which made the river
bed higher than its source;
Secondly, assuming that the land in question was formerly river bed of the Kapantawan River
which was abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters, the owners thereof
are those whose land are occupied by the new course of the river and not the plaintiff as the land
in question was left dry on or about the year 1955;
Said defendant Tuazon asks for the amount of P5,000.00 as actual and moral damages including
attorney's fees. (Ibid., pp. 17-19)
The defendant, The Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, denies the material
averments of the complaint and avers:
(5) the fear that the Director of Lands will proceed in adjudicating the disputed parcel of public
lands exist only in the imagination of plaintiff who is not even certain that a public land
application was filed for the land described in the complaint and therefore not a valid ground for
the issuance of injunction, much less an ex-parte injunction.
By way of affirmative defense to this Honorable Court alleges:
That the petition does not show that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some acts in violation of plaintiff's rights, tending to render the
judgment ineffective and therefore fall short of the legal requisites to entitle the petitioner to the
injunction issued. (lbid, pp. 22-23)
After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. (Ibid., pp. 314 1)
On March 14, 1961, the plaintiff, assisted by a new counsel filed a Motion for New Trial based
on newly discovered evidence. The lower court granted the new trial and admitted the newly
discovered evidence (Exhs. "A" and "B") with the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses.
Despite the pendency of the case, in the interim, the Director of Lands on May 18, 1967, issued
to his co-defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 2850 to the land in
question, for which O.C.T. No. 40 of the Register of Deeds of Legaspi City was issued in the
name of the latter. The defendant Tuazon also executed a mortgage over the property in question
to guarantee a loan in the amount of P4,900.00. These facts were brought to the attention of the
lower court by new counsel. (Ibid., pp. 73-77)

On May 29, 1968, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the estate of Juan Estevez represented by Isabel Estevez de Tuanqui is hereby
declared the owner of Lot No. 109 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi and the defendant,
Diogenes Tuazon, is hereby ordered to reconvey the lot embraced in Original Certificate of Title
No. 40 and to purge said title of the lien in the amount of P4,900.00 and, if he fails to do so, a
writ of execution will issue against the defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, for the said amount, and to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P120.00 annually from 1952 until he vacates Lot 109, with costs
against the said defendant.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Legaspi City, Philippines, this May 29, 1968.
(Sgd.) EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp. 84-85)
On August 28, 1968, the decision rendered on May 29, 1968 having become final and executory,
upon motion filed by counsel for the plaintiff, a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of the
judgment was issued. (Ibid., pp. 85-90). The writ of execution issued was however suspended
upon filing on October 21, 1968 by the defendant Diogenes Tuazon of a Petition f'or Relief from
Judgment (Ibid., pp. 92-100).
Upon opposition to the petition for relief from judgment filed by counsel for the plaintiff,
showing indubitably to the court that plaintiff's motion to submit the case for decision, dated
January 10, 1968, including a supplemental motion dated January 11, 1968, was duly served on
defendants' counsel, the petition was denied on December 6, 1968 (Ibid., pp. 105-108).
The defendant Tuazon, upon denial of the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the petition
for relief from judgment appealed to this Court.
The defendant Diogenes Tuazon assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
The lower court erred in holding that the Western boundary of Lot 1068-A was a river on the
basis of alleged newly discovered evidence presented at the new trial disregarding the ocular
findings of the same Court and the admissions of the parties.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
The lower Court erred in holding that Lot 109 was formed by the alluvial accumulation of
deposit through the action of the current of river, despite its own finding that the area of which
Lot 109 was a part was admittedly a swamp.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
The lower Court erred in not holding that appellee's complaint is barred by estoppel in that she
had previously filed an application for sales patent with the government but that it was rejected
in favor of appellant Tuazon.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
The lower Court erred in not giving due course to the petition for relief from judgment when the
facts undisputably show that the judgment was procured thru fraud and/or accident or excusable
negligence, or that proceedings antecedent thereto were had without notice to appellants.
(Tuazon's Brief, pp. 12-1 &)
The defendant Director of Lands alleged the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT NO. 109 "WAS FORMED BY

ALLUVIAL DEPOSIT THROUGH THE ACTION OF THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER"

AND, THEREFORE, BELONGS TO THE ESTATE OF JUAN ESTEVEZ AS OWNER OF
THE MOTHER ESTATE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION WAS AN ACCRETION, THE
LOWER COURT NEVERTHELESS ALSO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF, AS
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JUAN ESTEVEZ, HAD ALREADY
WAIVED AND/OR LOST WHATEVER, RIGHT SHE OR ESTEVEZ ESTATE MIGHT HAVE
HAD OVER SAID LOT IN FAVOR OF THE ESTATE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE LAND IN QUESTION AS PART
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENDANT
DIRECTOR OF LANDS. (Appellant Dir. of Lands' Brief, pp. 1-2)
The simple issue to be resolved in this appeal is the proper application of Article 457 on the New
Civil Code relating to the right of a riparian owner of real properties over the additional estate
formed therein by accretion. (pp. 35-44, Rollo)
In the dispositive portion of its decision, the appellate court affirmed in toto the lower court's
findings, after a careful consideration of all evidences presented.
Both petitioners Diogenes Tuason and Director of Lands filed their separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the appellate court. Hence, petitioners filed separate
petitioners for review on appeal by way of certiorari. The two cases are now consolidated, with
several assignments of error, which can be summarized into two:
1. The Court of Appeals grievously erred in declaring that there was accretion and consequently
in not declaring the same as public land subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands; and
2. The Court of Appeal is grievously erred in not granting petitioner's petition for relief from
judgment.
After a diligent study and examination of the records of the case, find no reason to reverse the
findings of facts or conclusions arrived at by the lower courts. In ruling that there was indeed
accretion, the appellate court declares clearly that:
The records show indubitably the existence of a river west of the titled property of the appellee
(Annexes "A" and "B"). Annex "A" to the motion for new trial is the plan of Lot 1068 showing
that the property of the appellee has as its natural boundary to the west the Kapantawan River.
Annex "B" to the Motion for New Trial is the cadastral plan of Legaspi Port conforming the
existence of said natural boundary to the west as Kapantawan River. This fact which was
established during the previous trial of the case on the testimony of Dr. Estevez was made more
indubitable during the new trial by testimonies of witnesses, Jorge A. Logroo, Soledad
Maristela and Josefa O. Pineda. Logroo was a government official who plotted and relocated on
the ground the development plan of Legaspi and Maristela and Pineda are adjoining property
owners who testified categorically to the existence of the natural boundary to the west of
appellee's property as the Kapantawan River. (pp. 44-45, record)
The lower courts reached such conclusion not whimsically but after painstakingly considering
the attending circumstances and the entire evidence. Worth mentioning also is the fact that the
same trial judge who made the factual finding that Kapantawan River did not exist in the area,
granted a motion for new trial to receive newly discovered evidence. The trial court, in its
amended decision, emphasized:
At the new trial, the plaintiff presented oral and documentary evidence tending to established that

boundary of Lot No. 109 to the West was actually a river. After careful consideration of said
evidence, the Court is convinced that formerly the real boundary of Lot 109 to the West was a
river.
In view of the foregoing finding, it is now clear that Lot 109 was formed by the alluvial
accumulation of deposit through the action of the current of the river. Therefore Article 457 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines applies. Said article reads:
ART. 457. to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
As between the plaintiff and the defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, the former has the right to Lot No.
109. (pp. 83-84, Record on Appeal)
It is argued by petitioner that ocular inspections must be given probative value. Ocular inspection
was indeed made by the trial judge to establish the condition of the area a generation before the
ocular inspection was conducted. Said ocular inspection cannot be given too much probative
value because there might believed physical changes through the passage of the years The cause,
of which cannot easily be determined by said ocular inspection. Moreover, the evidence
submitted by petitioners themselves show that the source of the water in the area in question had
been cut off from the sea even before the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. The evidence for
private respondent shows that subsequent to the year 1916. gradual accumulation of the deposits
covered by the current of the Kapantawan River had already taken place. Also witness for the
petitioner Mr. Juan Firaza, Acting Provincial Land Officer of Albay testified as follows:
Q You have no personal knowledge as to whether Lot 109 in this case existed because of the
drying up of the Tibu River or because it was fined up by the adjacent owner because it was due
to the accumulation of sediment, you do not know that?
A No, sir. (TSN, May 16, 1960, p. 78). (p. 137, record)
On the other hand, there is enough evidence that the land in question was formed by accretion;
thus it belongs to the riparian owner, pursuant to Art. 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Consequently, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over it and any conveyance made by him
of any private land is null and void.
We now come to the second assignment of error. This was touched upon extensively in the ruling
of the trial court and in the ruling of the respondent Appellate Court to the effect that several
notices (re the submission of the case for decision) had been duly sent by registered mail to the
attorneys involved. We fully agree with said finding.
Note further that on appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals, ruled:
The alleged excusable negligence for failure to claim the mail addressed to counsel for the
defendant because of change of address without notification of such change to the parties and to
the Court is not a valid ground or an excuse for failure to appear for the hearing set forth in said
motion, considering the certification of the Acting Mail Operation Chief, Registry Division that
no less than three (3) notices were sent to the addressee therein failed to claim the mail. ...
(Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, Annex "C" of Petition of Diogenes Tuazon, p. 11) (p.
140, records)
In support of their contention, petitioners cite the principles laid down in the case of Vecino v.
Court of Appeals, L-38612, March 29, 1977 (p. 140, Record). Such contention was aptly refuted
by respondents in their memorandum, to wit:
The factual setting of the Vecino case is entirely different from the facts obtaining in this case.
Said case does not involve a situation which obtains in this case, where a counsel transferred
from his office address of record without notifying the court and parties thereof, as he is required

to do under the Rules of Court. He is using his very negligence and admitted violation of the
Rules of Court as a shield to avoid consequences unfavorable to his case. Therefore, there was no
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, upon which a petition for relief from judgment
can only be granted.
More importantly, there is no showing that petitioner Diogenes Tuazon's rights with respect to
the determination of the merits of the case were harmed or adversely affected. Extensive
evidence had been presented by petitioners to support their respective theories as to the cause
how Lot 109 was formed. Furthermore, petitioner Diogenes Tuazon did not state in his motion
for relief from judgment what evidence he will present which, if admitted, will probably change
the decision of the trial court, as he is required to do in the Rules of Court. His petition,
therefore, is pro forma and the only purpose to be achieved by the allowance thereof is the delay
of the disposition of the case. (pp. 140-141, records).lwphl@it
With respect to the denial of the petition for relief filed by petitioner Tuazon insofar as the
decision of the trial court was initially held to be final and executory, this issue was no longer
pressed by the parties inasmuch as said petitioner was subsequently allowed to appeal from the
decision itself. (See petitioner's brief, p. 44). Besides, there was no question about the timeliness
of the appeal from said decision by petitioner Director of Lands.
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforegoing considerations, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

164 SCRA 587

G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOSE H. TECSON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and NILO MADLANGAWA, respondents.
Ceferino V. Argueza for petitioner.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession and damages against the private
respondent, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
of which provides inter alia:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In Civil Case No. 72872, declaring the defendant Nilo Madlangawa as a builder or possessor
in good faith; ordering the plaintiff to recognize the right of said defendant to remain in Lot No.
345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by
the plaintiff the sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 24, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and
upon affirmance by the latter of the decision below, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court.
On July 13, 1977, we issued a resolution dated July 11, 1977 denying the petitioner's petition for
lack of merit. Hence, on August 5, 1977, the petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by
respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a motion for the approval of petitioner's exercise of option and
for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the exercise of
petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent on the
property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in
question to the petitioner.
On October 7, 1977, the respondent judge issued the disputed order, to wit:
Acting on the motion for approval of plaintiffs exercise of option and for satisfaction of
judgment filed by the plaintiff, and the opposition thereto interposed by the defendant, both
through counsels, and after a judicious review of all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this
case, in the light of statutory provisions (Art. 6, New Civil Code) and jurisprudential doctrines
(Vide, Benares v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., L-7330 (Nov. 29, 1960), and considering further the
definitive ruling of our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Jose C. Cristobal v. Alejandro Melchor,
G.R. No. L-43203 promulgated on July 29, 1977, wherein the Court says:
"This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law
but rather its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies of a given problem or
situation in order to grant relief that it will serve the ends of justice."
xxx xxx xxx
the Court is of the considered view that under the peculiar circumstances which supervened after
the institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and
other substantial improvements on the controverted property, the instant motion of the plaintiff is
not well-taken and therefore not legally proper and tenable.

WHEREFORE, and for lack of merit, the instant motion for approval of the plaintiff's fai-rn of
option and for satisfaction of judgment should be, as hereby it is, denied. (pp. 45-46, Rollo)
After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for
mandamus alleging that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to exercise option and for execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option belongs to the owner of the property, who is the
petitioner herein, and that upon finality of judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter
of right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the respondent judge.
On April 15, 1978, the private respondent filed his comment on the petition alleging that the
same has already become moot and academic for two reasons: first, fire gutted not only the
house of the private respondent but the majority of the houses in Tambunting Estate; and second,
as a result of the said fire, the then First Lady and Metro Manila Governor Imelda R. Marcos has
placed the disputed area under her Zonal Improvement Project, thereby allowing the victims of
the fire to put up new structures on the premises, so that the willingness and readiness of the
petitioner to exercise the alleged option can no longer be exercised since the subject-matter
thereof has been extinguished by the fire. Furthermore, the President of the Philippines has
already issued a Presidential Decree for the expropriation of certain estates in Metro Manila
including the Tambunting Estate. Therefore, the beneficient and humanitarian purpose of the
Zonal Improvement Project and the expropriation proceeding would be defeated if petitioner is
allowed to exercise an option which would result in the ejectment of the private respondent.
On December 28, 1980, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1669 was issued providing for the
expropriation of the Tambunting Estate. However, this decree was challenged before this Court
in G.R. No, 55166 entitled The "Elisa R. Manotok, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al."
Hence, we decided to hold the decision on this petition pending the resolution of the above
entitled case.
On May 21, 1987, the Court rendered a decision in the Elisa Manotok case (Manotok v. National
Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89) ruling that P.D. 1669 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause. Thus, since the present petition has not been rendered moot and academic
by the decision in said case, we will now decide on its merits.
As stated earlier, the petitioner argues that since the judgment of the trial court has already
become final, it is entitled to the execution of the same and that moreover, since the house of the
private respondent was gutted by fire, the execution of the decision would now involve the
delivery of possession of the disputed area by the private respondent to the petitioner.
We find merit in these arguments.
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the
respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no
basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of its option to approriate
the improvements made on its property.
In the case of Duenas v. Mandi (151 SCRA 530, 545), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
...Likewise settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made
thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end
to legal processes. (Fabular v. Court of Appeals, 11 9 SCRA 329)
Neither can the respondent judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances
which supervened after the institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain

major repairs of and other substantial improvements..." because the option given by law either to
retain the premises and pay for the improvements thereon or to sell the said premises to the
builder in good faith belongs to the owner of the property. As we have in Quemel v. Olaes (1
SCRA 1159,1163):
xxx xxx xxx
...The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article 448 in connection with
Art. 546, of the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that
they are not applicable to plaintiff's case. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land' belongs to
the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to
reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell
such land to the former. ...
Again, in the recent case of Paz Mercado, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. L44001, June 10, 1988), we said:
... To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on
which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner (Art. 525, Civil Code; Lopez,
Inc. v. Phil. Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348) and that he be unaware 'that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.' (Art. 526, Civil Code; Granados v.
Monton, 86 Phil. 42; Arriola v. Gomez de la Serna, 14 Phil. 627; See also Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
C.A., 134 SCRA 329, citing Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7) It is such a builder in good faith
who is given the 1ight to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has been
reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. (Art. 546,
Civil Code; Policarpio v. CA., 129 SCRA 51; Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 1221; cf, Queto v.
C.A., 122 SCRA 206) ...
Furthermore, the private respondent's good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint below by
the petitioner. In the case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190,196), we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
...Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between
themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was
filed, and consequently the court's declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and
proper . A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not
legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts.
544 and 1123, Civil Code).
Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was
filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the
petitioner's fai-rn of option.
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's
right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there
is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to
herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent
judge is hereby ordered to immediately issue a writ of execution ordering the private respondent
to vacate the disputed premises and deliver possession of the same to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

132 SCRA 514

G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO
REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:+.wph!1
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are
accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their
registration in the names of the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria")
Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots
adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows: t.hqw
Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3
of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along
fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina
Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot
2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by
property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along
line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano
Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of
plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and

on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau
of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only
with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they
belong to the owner of said property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2
situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical
descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and
residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to
Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial,
married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario
C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of
the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: t.hqw
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang
walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage,
Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings
of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil
Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their
dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the
effect that: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at the level
of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about
two (2) arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a
new Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then
converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion
without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was
complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: t.hqw
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered
by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no
evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came
into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the
private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of
their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The
respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness
was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years
before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that year, sheobserved an increase in the area
of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial
and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the
rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The
land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's
current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents'
own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil
facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited
by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may
prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of

Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused
by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged
alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not included
in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey
of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could
not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as
accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names
of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of
their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it
belongs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

168 SCRA 405

G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO,
EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and L P. LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1986, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69942 entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al., PlaintiffsAppellants, versus LEONOR LADRIDO, et. al., Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.
The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and
Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated
in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot contained an area of 154,267 square meters and
was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described
in their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.
On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica
F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica
F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.
Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the
possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.
On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery
of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
9660 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to plead, defendant Ladrido filed his
answer with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another defendant.
Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with
interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Defendant Te filed his
answer to the amended complaint and he counter claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered the
counterclaim.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his
mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar now
appears to be the sole registered owner of this lot.

On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife,
Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and
Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which
used to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay
Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the
cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the
defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the
Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and
that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted.
The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:
1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs
or gradual as contended by the defendants;
2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs are still entitled to Lot "B'
appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half () of Lot "A," also indicated in Exhibit "4;" and
3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar with costs against
them;
2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and
Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan
(Exhs. 'C' as well as '4,' '4-B' and '4-C') situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan
Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 square meters, more or less; and
3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the preceding paragraph, the defendants
are entitled to the possession thereof.
Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.
SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the
following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO
LOT B APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF () OF LOT A IN THE SAID
EXHIBIT "4."
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p. 42,
Rollo).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Plaintiffs (the
petitioners herein) now come to Us claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court on the ground that the change in the course of the Suague

River was gradual and not sudden.

In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:
This appeal is not impressed with merit.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion
and erosion (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the case at bar, the lower court
correctly found that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to show that the change in the course
of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing.
Contrariwise, the lower court found that:
... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion
on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so
that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been
added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1' as well as Exhs. 'C' and '4'). Apropos it should be observed that
the accretion consisted of Lot A with an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B, 11,819 square
meters; and Lot C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C is not involved
in this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)
The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was the Suague River
based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague
River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits
of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No.
7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and
planted the same with coin and tobacco.
The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain
and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. The river bed is definitely
no longer discernible now.
What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the two other
areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.
Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art.
366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v.
Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and
B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4') belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record on Appeal).
We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and conclusion of the lower court.
The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment of error and does not
warrant further discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).
The petition is without merit.
The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the merits in the
Court of First Instance, that is, "whether the change in the course of the Suague River was
sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants," was abandoned
and never raised by them in their appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in
holding that the appeal is without merit, because of the change of the Suague River was gradual
and not sudden, disposed of the appeal on an issue that was never raised and, accordingly, its
decision is void. In support of its contention, petitioners cite the following authorities:

It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to

decide a question not in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the
parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial and invalid ( Salvante vs. Cruz,
88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).
The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the Suague
River was gradual or sudden because the trial court below resolved the same in its decision thus
subjecting the same to review by respondent appellate court. By simply abandoning this issue,
the petitioners cannot hope that the affirmance of the decision wherein this issue was resolved
makes the decision of the Court of Appeals void. In effect, the petitioners are expounding a new
procedural theory that to render a questioned decision void, all that has to be done is to simply
abandon on appeal the pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when its decision is
affirmed on appeal, attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court
of justice has no jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not correct.
Even the authorities cited by the petitioners, more specifically the Salvante and Lazo cases,
supra, do not support their contention. They were heard in the trial court and they cannot
complain that the proceeding below was irregular and hence, invalid.
The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this
finding was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find any valid reason to
disturb this finding of fact.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by
the courts a quoprovides:
Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496
which provides:
SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be
regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all
successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject to the
provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof.
SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the
accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should
not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the
petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the
petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against
the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream is well settled. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We
ruled:
The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Art. 366 of
the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered land. That article provides that "any
accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong
to the owners of the estates bordering thereon." Accretions of that character are natural incidents

to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that
registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a result of
accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land
used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot
preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of
the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art.
457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and
the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.
We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.
As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are
recoverable from them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

196 SCRA 130

[G.R. No. 75389. April 22, 1991.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HERNANDO MANANTAN y
BORJA,Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Benedicto J. Gonzales for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; NOT APPRECIATED
WHERE THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS; CASE AT BAR. Since the Trial Courts theory
that it was Manantans act of "holding his (victims) neck and squeezing it" that had "most likely
weakened" Nabong, and ensured "that the victim would be defenseless," and had consequently
given rise to the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, that theory will have to be rejected in view
of the negation of the factual premise that there had been a "neck-squeezing" and choking of the
deceased. Besides, had there been any such choking, Nabong would certainly have been instantly
put on defense; he would have reacted quickly to relieve the pressure thus exerted on his
windpipe and would have been on guard against any other aggressive acts of Manantan.
2. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NOT APPRECIATED WHERE THE
OCCURRENCE PRESENTED WAS NOT ONLY ILLOGICAL BUT CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE. This is not the case, however, as to the other mitigating
circumstances invoked by Manantan based on the claim sought to be shown by the defense
evidence that he (Manantan) had earlier on that fatal day been manhandled and robbed of
close to a hundred pesos by Nabong and some male companions, and later that day, again
manhandled, stripped of all clothing and compelled to dance by the same persons. After
analysing and assessing the latters proofs, the Trial Court found that no facts had thereby been
established to justify applying the claimed modifying circumstances in reduction of Manantans
criminal liability. According to the Court, apart from the unprepossessing demeanor of the
accused while testifying in his behalf, the version of the occurrence presented by him and his
witnesses was "not only illogical but contrary to human experience. Even a group of hoodlums
would not undress a man to let him dance naked. If the accused were a woman, then this may be
possible but for a man to be undressed to perform a dance act before a group of men, to the mind
of the Court is highly improbable."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
ACCORDED HIGHEST RESPECT ON APPEAL. It is axiomatic that the findings of the
Trial Court on questions of fact are accorded the highest respect on appeal, if not regarded as
conclusive, absent the usual exceptions to this policy. The policy rests on the obvious
opportunity available to the trial court but not the appellate court to observe the witnesses

on the stand and to assess their credibility, not only by the nature of their testimony but also by
their demeanor under questioning.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Hernando Manantan was convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court at Macabebe,
Pampanga, 1 and sentenced "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accessories
provided for by law, . . . to indemnify the heirs of the victim (in) the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for the death of the victim Renato
Nabong and the further sum of FIFTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
AND 90/100 (P56,833.90) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing hospitalization and
medical expenses, as well as funeral and other expenses." 2
The evidence establishes that Renato Nabong was stabbed in the throat in the evening of June 19,
1985; that the stab wound transected the trachea at the level of the thyroid cartilage as well as the
esophagus; and that said wound and the complications resulting therefrom, caused his death
eighteen days later, on July 7, 1985, despite the efforts of the physicians at Masantol, Pampanga,
the Central Luzon General Hospital and the UST Hospital, to save his life. 3
Manantan does not deny having inflicted the fatal knife wound. He claims, however, and would
have this Court rule in the present appeal, that the stabbing was not attended by treachery on his
part, and that the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, 4 as well as sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party 5 and immediate vindication of a grave offense to
the accused, 6 should have been appreciated in his favor.
Concerning the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Trial Court 7 has this to say: 8
"To the mind of the Court, the evidence presented by the prosecution has overwhelmingly and
sufficiently established that the stabbing of the deceased Renato Nabong by the accused
Hernando Manantan was qualified by treachery. The court finds that the deceased Renato
Nabong was stabbed by the accused after the accused held the deceased by the neck and
squeezed it thus preventing the deceased from offering any resistance or defense. The attack to
the victim by the accused appears to be sudden and unexpected. . . . The position of the wound of
the victim further cast very serious doubt on the veracity of the version of the accused when he
testified in Court that the accused and the victim grappled for the possession of the knife and that
after they fell on the ground, the accused saw blood oozing from the neck of the
victim.chanrobles law library : red
". . . In the present case, the evidence shows that the accused held the victim by the neck. In that
position, the victim would not have any means to defend himself. With the accused holding his
neck and squeezing it, the victim was choked and most likely weakened, thereby making it easy

for the accused to stab the victim. . . . The evidence shows that before the accused stabbed the
victim, the accused first held the victim by the neck. The Court feels that with that act of the
accused, he ensures that the victim would be defenseless."cralaw virtua1aw library
These conclusions do not however appear to have any factual foundation. None of the
prosecution witnesses gave evidence of any squeezing by Manantan of Nabongs neck
immediately prior to the stabbing. The conclusions could have been drawn only from the
testimony of Eddie Cabrera, the only eyewitness to the actual stabbing presented by the People,
whose declarations do not however support said conclusions.
Said witness testified that at around 7 oclock in the evening of June 19, 1985, he was buying
cigarettes at the store of Bella Musni in San Francisco, Macabebe, Pampanga, and he saw
Manantan stab Nabong in the neck with a pointed instrument, 9 a weapon he later identified as
the kitchen knife marked in evidence as Exhibit E; 10 that when he first saw them, Nabong and
Manantan were about five meters away, coming towards the store; 11 that at the time, Manantan
"had his left hand . . . over the (left) shoulder of Renato Nabong," and while in that position,
Manantan raised his right hand (which was gripping the knife) and thrust the knife horizontally
towards Nabongs neck; 12 that thereafter, Manantan "returned to the direction where he came
from," and Nabong went "towards his home," 13 "running." 14
Since the Trial Courts theory that it was Manantans act of "holding his (victims) neck and
squeezing it" that had "most likely weakened" Nabong, and ensured "that the victim would be
defenseless," and had consequently given rise to the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, that
theory will have to be rejected in view of the negation of the factual premise that there had been
a "neck-squeezing" and choking of the deceased. Besides, had there been any such choking,
Nabong would certainly have been instantly put on defense; he would have reacted quickly to
relieve the pressure thus exerted on his windpipe and would have been on guard against any
other aggressive acts of Manantan.
As regards the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, there is agreement on all sides
that it should indeed be appreciated in Manantans favor.
This is not the case, however, as to the other mitigating circumstances invoked by Manantan
based on the claim sought to be shown by the defense evidence that he (Manantan) had earlier
on that fatal day been manhandled and robbed of close to a hundred pesos by Nabong and some
male companions, and later that day, again manhandled, stripped of all clothing and compelled to
dance by the same persons. After analysing and assessing the latters proofs, the Trial Court
found that no facts had thereby been established to justify applying the claimed modifying
circumstances in reduction of Manantans criminal liability. According to the Court, apart from
the unprepossessing demeanor of the accused while testifying in his behalf, the version of the
occurrence presented by him and his witnesses was "not only illogical but contrary to human
experience. Even a group of hoodlums would not undress a man to let him dance naked. If the
accused were a woman, then this may be possible but for a man to be undressed to perform a
dance act before a group of men, to the mind of the Court is highly improbable."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Nothing in the record persuades this Court to pronounce erroneous the aforestated conclusion of
the Trial Court as regards the credibility of the appellants evidence of the antecedents of the
slaying. It is axiomatic that the findings of the Trial Court on questions of fact are accorded the
highest respect on appeal, if not regarded as conclusive, absent the usual exceptions to this
policy. The policy rests on the obvious opportunity available to the trial court but not the
appellate court to observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess their credibility, not only
by the nature of their testimony but also by their demeanor under questioning. 15
In fine, Hernando Manantan may be properly convicted, not of murder, but of homicide, for
which the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal. 16 This penalty should be applied in the
minimum period, there being one mitigating circumstance, that of voluntary surrender, which
exists in Manantans favor, not offset by any aggravating circumstance. 17 The duration of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months. From this, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, should be taken
the maximum period of the penalty which should be meted out to Manantan, and the minimum
period, from the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law for the offense, i.e.,
prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in so far as it finds the
appellant Hernando Manantan y Borja guilty of the killing of Renato Nabong and commanding
him to reimburse the latters heirs for hospitalization and medical expenses as well as funeral and
other expenses in the aggregate sum of P56,833.90, but IS MODIFIED as regards the nature of
the crime committed, the penalty to be imposed on account thereof, and the civil indemnity for
the death of the victim, which should be increased to P50,000.00. Accordingly, Hernando
Manantan y Borja is DECLARED GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of homicide
and is HEREBY SENTENCED to an indeterminate sentence of from ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay to the heirs of Renato
Nabong, as indemnity for death, the additional amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED

72 PHIL 437
[G.R. No. 47819. June 20, 1941.]
LEONARDO GUISON, recurrente, contra LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, recurrida.
D. Salvador E. Imperial en representacion del recurrente.
El Fiscal de la Ciudad Sr. Mabanag en representacion de la recurrida.
SYLLABUS
1. DERECHO DE ACCESION; ARTICULO 366 DEL CODIGO CIVIL; CASO DE AUTOS.
No tiene el articulo 366 del Codigo Civil aplicacion al caso de autos, porque el terreno en litigio
no constituye ni puede constituir el acrecentamiento a que el mismo se refiere; en primer lugar,
porque no se formo en la ribera de un rio, sino solamente en un canal de desague; en la ribera de
un rio, sino solamente en un canal de desague; en segundo lugar, porque lo formaron, segun
declaracion del Tribunal de Apelacion, "the garbage and waste material thrown into the channel
and carried and dragged in by the current of the estero caused by the tide" ; en tercer lugar,
porque el recurrente no ha contribuido en lo minimo a la formacion de dicho terreno; y
finalmente, porque como dice el Tribunal con mucha razon, "the reason for the law giving the
riparian owner the right to any land of alluvium deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
loss he suffers because of flood and other damage due to the destructive force of water and
because of the incumbrances and assessments imposed by the law on such riparian property. . . ."

DECISION

DIAZ, M. :

Esta causa es, en un sentido, una continuacion de un Expediente de Registro que, elevado en
grado de apelacion por la recurrida como opositora en el mismo, desde el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila, al Tribunal de Apelacion (expediente de registro No. 635, Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila; G. L. R. O. Record No. 52899), fue resuelto por dicho ultimo
Tribunal en contra del recurrente que lo habia promovido. El Tribunal de Apelacion revoco la
decision del Juzgado de Primera Instancia y declaro que el terreno cuya inscripcion en el
Registro de la Propiedad habia sido solicitado por el recurrente, era parte del canal del estero de
San Lazaro o del estero de Magdalena.
Creyendo el recurrente que el Tribunal de Apelacion incurrio en error y abuso de su discrecion al
resolver el Expediente en el sentido expresado, dejando de aplicar al caso alli tratado, las
disposiciones del articulo 366 del Codigo Civil; y al revocar la decision del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia que conocio originariamente de dicho Expediente, promovio el presente proceso, con el

fin de que su decision sea objeto de una revision.

Los hechos que el Tribunal de Apelacion declaro probados, se desprenden del siguiente pasaje de
su decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After a careful study of the evidence, we are convinced that the tract of land applied for, far
from having been added thru accretion to the original parcel already registered in the name of
Guison in 1914, is still part of the bed or channel of the estero in question. The preponderance of
the evidence shown, and we may even take judicial notice of the fact, that the estero in question.
The preponderance of the evidence shown, and we may even take judicial notice of the fact, that
the esteros in the City of Manila are not streams or rivers having their sources in the mountains
or in higher distant places, flowing into the sea, and having a regular and continuous current that
are liable to deposit alluvium or sediment on their banks before they reach the sea, but rather
they are canals or water passages used as drainage to receive and carry away the rain water from
the streets of the City of Manila; that except after a heavy rain there is no current in these esteros
and that the water they contain is stagnant except when affected by the flow of the tides from
Manila Bay. The evidence further shows that oftentimes the people living on the edges or banks
of these esteros, either from habit or because the garbage trucks do not reach their houses, throw
or dump their garbage trucks do not reach their houses, throw or dump their garbage and other
waste material into these esteros, thereby partially filling up the channel and making it necessary
for the City of Manila to dig and clear these channels periodically in other that they may properly
fulfill their function to drain the rain water from the City of streets. This facts is confirmed by the
very finding of the trial court found on pages 17 and 20 of the Bill of Exceptions which read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Se ha probado por el solicitante que es dueo inscrito de un terreno urbano, mas particularmente
descrito en el plano Exhibit D y en el decreto en el ao 1914, confinaba con el estero de San
Lazaro; que la ribera de este estero por el lado de dicho terreno ha estado creciendo
paulatinamente, desde dicho aos hasta hace poco, por efecto de la corriente de las aguas que
arrastraba las basuras y materiales tirados al estero, en la extension deslindada por el plano
Exhibito A.
Las pruebas del solicitante fueron consistentes respecto al hecho de que desde el ao 1918 hasta
el ao 1936, la ribera del estero de San Lazaro que confinaba con el terreno inscrito de dicho
solicitante ha estado acreciendo paulatinamente por efecto de la corriente causada por el flujo y
reflujo de las aguas del mar que arrastraban las basuras y los materiales tirados al
estero, . . .."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pues ben; el articulo 366 del Codigo Civil invocado por el recurrente, contiene la siguiente
disposicion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pertenece a los dueos de las heredades confinantes con las riberas de los rios el
acrecentamiento que aquellas reciben paulatinamente por efecto de la corriente de las aguas."
(Art. 366 del Codigo Civil).
Se vera que no tiene el referido articulo aplicacion al caso de autos, porque el terreno en litigio

no constituye ni puede constituir el acrecentamiento a que el mismo se refiere; en primer lugar,

porque no se formo en la ribera de un rio, sino solamente en un canal de desague; en segundo
lugar, porque lo formaron, segun declaracion del Tribunal de Apelacion, "the garbage and waste
material thrown into the channel and carried and dragged in by the current for the estero caused
by the tide" ; en tercer lugar, porque el recurrente no ha contribuido en lo minimo a la formacion
de dicho terreno; y finalmente, porque, como dice el Tribunal con mucha razon, "the reason for
the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvium deposited by a river is to
compensate him for the los he suffers because of flood and other damage due to the destructive
force of water and because of the incumbrances and assessments imposed by the law on such
riparian property. Here in the present case, however, the western boundary of the original parcel
registered in the name of the applicant as shown by Exhibit D bordering on the estero in high
protecting wall on which his house stands and is, therefore, subject to no incumbrances or
easement. As already stated, the estero in question has no regular and continuous current that
might damage or destroy said original parcel by its force. What happened in the present case is
that the employees of the City of Manila or the City Prisoner employed for the purpose of
cleaning and clearing the channel of estero, instead of removing all the rubbish and garbage and
mud from the entire channel merely used to dig and clear a narrow passage in or around the
middle of the estero, depositing what they removed therefrom to one side instead of taking it
away entirely. This process clearly would not give the applicant a right or title to this mud,
rubbish and garbage left and deposited in the estero itself however high it may be piled up and
irrespective of the fact that the tides may or may not cover it."
"Por las razones expuestas, y hallando como hallamos arreglado a derecho la decision del
Tribunal de Apelacion, por la presente, la confirmamos en todas sus partes, confenando al
recurrente al pago de las costas. Asi se ordera.
Avancea, Pres., Laurel, Moran y Horrilleno, MM., estan conformes.