People v.

Sasota
REX FRIOLO
Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl. Sasota,
found guilty of the crime because of the victims testimony, now posits that the
testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have been accepted by the court at its full
value.
Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by
the court.
Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons
are to be considered incompetent witnesses. Though formerly, deaf and dump persons
were considered incompetent, experience and observation have shown conclusively that
the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that
he is incompetent as a witness. When such a witness is produced, the court may
ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness
to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he
deems most satisfactory.
An excerpt from the opinion of Justice Moreland, United States v. Estrada, lends
further support to the conclusion reached by us: "The commission of the crime at the
place, at the time, and in the manner charged is not impossible and, although the charge
that it was so committed may be unreasonable, still such unreasonableness may be
overcome by the direct and positive testimony of unimpeachable witnesses. From the
evidence before him the learned trial court found that the witnesses for the prosecution
were telling the truth in their relation of the story of the case and that the facts occurred
substantially as they stated them. We have held on many occasions that 'this court will
not interfere with the intelligent conclusion of a trial court concerning the credibility of
witnesses, the court having seen the witnesses in the act of testifying and having
carefully observed their manner and demeanor as witnesses, unless the record discloses
that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has either been overlooked by
the court or has been misapprehended or misinterpreted." There is no such showing in
this case, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of counsel for appellant to create such an
impression.
Director of Lands v. Abelardo
MALOU MAMAC
Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were
properties subject in a successional litigation. Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are
contesting the ownership of subject properties in Manuel Libunaos possession. They
further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the
case.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to
their being deaf-mutes.
Held: No, they are not. The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be
owned by Manuel Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the
preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2)
the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already prescribed.
Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the
incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in

matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the

running of the prescriptive period.
And we arrive at this conclusion, inasmuch as, even supposing that the evidence of the
appellees in regard to the ownership of the lands did not preponderate (we believe it
does), there is still the prescription in their favor inasmuch as the continued possession
by the appellees of the land in question, which is exclusive as has been seen, not only
because it so appears from the evidence of the appellees, but also because the appellants'
own witness, Julian Ignacio, testified to that effect, operates as an extinguishment of any
right which the appellants may have had to said lands, unless there is another legal
reason to prevent this conclusion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
And this possible reason is merely the alleged incapacity of the appellants, due to their
being deaf-mutes. Such a physical condition is no obstacle to the running of the
prescriptive period; since it has been proved in this case that it was not accompanied by
mental deficiency or any other legal incapacity. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone,
without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered
included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to
incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive periods.
The old doctrine that a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer prevails, and
such persons are now held capable of entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient
mental capacity. (Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich., 36.) chanrobles virtual law library
Where one was born deaf and dumb, but had his intellectual faculties, though these
were not improved by the modern system of education for persons of that class: Held,
that he was not within the exception of the statute of limitations, which only exception
of is non compos mentis. (38 N. C. Ire. Eq., 535. 1)
Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902
IQBAL SINGH
Facts: This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory
legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the
father.
The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making
donations to his second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over
$200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to the management of
his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless
actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common
with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of
attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several
years, that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan,
belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the
father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate,
which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that
the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son,
who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to
render an account of his administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the

costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?
Held: No. Petition dismissed. The acts which constitute prodigality are not
defined
in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying
circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid
state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an
extent
as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their
undisposable part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All
persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the
Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed
upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are
required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary
direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous
impulse of the heart.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased
since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any
perceptible diminution of the defendants property. This can be accounted for only on
the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his
faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the
accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the
plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff
himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to
his father.
Silverio vs. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007
RIZZA ALMIROL
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs.
Republic of the Philippines, respondent
FACTS: On December 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jascinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name to and sex his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 105207,
impleaded the Civil Registrar of Manila as respondent.
The petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is anatomically male
but feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he transform himself to a woman
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that
he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
On June 4 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its

relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
The court rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Petitioners misfortune to be
trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals. It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief (changing his first name and
sex on his birth certificate) asked for.
RULING: On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis.
1. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Under RA 9048, it intent to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rule 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the rules of the court unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname
in the community
3. The change will avoid confusion.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. The
petition in trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register. Under section 2 of RA 9048 which defines
what a clerical or typographical error is, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. To correct simply means to
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to change means to

replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as substitute. The birth certificate of the petitioner contained no error. No correction is
necessary.
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by the petitioner
will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. To
grant the petition will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. Second, there are various laws (Labor Code on employment of
women, etc.) which apply particularly to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that No judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
Therefore, the petition is hereby DENIED.
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
JOY PALMA
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name
from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male.
It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male
and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of
respondent as ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally
defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who
have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed

that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the
order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with
utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term
intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is
undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine
courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant
case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining
respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender.
The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.