Jadwell Parking Systems Corp.

vs Lidua Sr
Facts: Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator
duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City. It
is a city Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the
City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in
a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 20031996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and
carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car
was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading
Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly
forcibly removed with a piece of metal isP26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for
illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid and
again General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini
Street, Baguio City, Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No.
UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally
parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly
removing the clamp, took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell,
its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to Jadewell, the fine
of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid. Because of this
there was two cases issued and they were filed by Jadewell and Balajadia
with the others it was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City on May 23, 2003, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against Jadewell.
Issue: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission
of the offense charged
Held: The offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not
apply because Balajadia and the others were charged with the violation of a
city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming
arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period
of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that,
in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters. Judge

Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also,
Balajadia and the others raise that the other grounds for dismissal they
raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted
no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense,
were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. The resolution of this case
requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any
prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances.
No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does
not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326
as amended does not apply. When the representatives of Jadewell filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period
was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had
two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by
filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The failure of the
prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in
the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the
doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period.
It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll
the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under
the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion
of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem
here sought to be corrected.

Republic vs Cojuangco
Facts: On April 25, 1977, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B.
Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut
Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) with an authorized capital stock of P100 million
divided into one million shares with a par value of P100 per share. The
incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20 million and paid P5
million and then On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization
by (1) increasing its authorized capital stock to three million shares without
par value; (2) converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one million

shares without par value and deemed fully paid for and non-assessable by
applying the P5 million already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the
subscription receivables of P15 million. The Board of Directors of the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) composed of Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan
Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion,
Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco,
Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved
Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut
Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than P500 million
from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
Conjuanco and with the other Board of Directors approved another
amendment to UNICOMs capitalization. This increased its authorized capital
stock to one billion shares divided into 500 million Class A voting common
shares, 400 million Class B voting common shares, and 100 million Class C
non-voting common shares, all with a par value of P1 per share. The paid-up
subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value (consisting of one million
shares for the incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB) were then
converted to 500 million Class A voting common shares at the ratio of 100
Class A voting common shares for every one without par value share. March
1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against the 1979
members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in
UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track
record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares,
the governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which
was credited to UNICOMs incorporators About nine years later or on March
15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
Memorandum, stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already
prescribed. In a Memorandum dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the
Ombudsman approved the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the
complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPBs subscription to the shares of stock
of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the
prescription of the action began to run since the Board of Directors act of
investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said
that the investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the
incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably,
when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not
yet been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided
for prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.

Issue: Whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.

3019 already prescribed.

Held: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its
efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos
and of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel. Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed
under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. Since the
acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A.
3019, as originally enacted. Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year
prescriptive period should be computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act
3326, which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to
UCPBs investment in UNICOM during martial law at the Presidents or
anyone elses instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever
been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of
whatever kind during martial law since even that regime had a stake in
keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of
investments in the Philippines.

Sanrio Co. Ltd vs Lim

Facts: Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright
of various animated characters such as "Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My
Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and "Zashikibuta" among others. While it is not
engaged in business in the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its
exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI). As such exclusive
distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas Creative

Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing

Corporation. Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio
products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market
research. The research's objective was to identify those factories,
department stores and retail outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio
items. After conducting several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA
confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila
was selling imitations of Sanrios products. Consequently, IPMA agents
executed a joint affidavit attesting to the aforementioned facts and
forwarded the same to the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of a SW. A SW being issued, NBI agents searched the premises of R
and were able to seize various Sanrio products. Sanrio then filed a complaintaffidavit with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the
DOJ against R for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 177 and
178) of the IPC. TAPP found that R bought his merchandise from legitimate
sources, as shown by official receipts. Thus, it dismissed the complaint. Lim
asserted in his counter-affidavit that he committed no violation of the
provisions of the IPC because he was only a retailer. Lim neither reproduced
nor manufactured any of Sarios copyrighted item; thus, he did not
transgress the economic rights of Sario. Moreover, he obtained his
merchandise from authorized manufacturers of Sario's products.
Issue: Whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty
Held: Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. As a
general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. For this reason, courts generally
do not interfere with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against Lim. On the merits of
the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for review. To be criminally liable for
violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be
present: possession of the infringing copy and knowledge or suspicion that
the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.

The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
knew that the merchandise he sold was counterfeit. Respondent, on the
other hand, was able to show that he obtained these goods from legitimate
sources.

People vs Galano
Facts: On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the
municipal court of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City)
against the accused-respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito
Limbo Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and
upon his arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused
was thereafter arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the
case was heard on its merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused
jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited and the case against him
archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas. On September 14,
1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-arrested, and the trial
of the said case resumed. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was
pending trial, private respondent Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground that the Batangas court did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was
committed in Manila. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B.
Limbo refiled the same case against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of
Manila. A preliminary investigation was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the
corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397 On November 12, 1975 the accused
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss criminal Case No. 22397 on the
grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. The prosecuting fiscal filed his
opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to which the accused filed a
rejoinder on December 5, 1975. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over by the Honorable Ricardo D.
Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 22397 on the ground
that the offense charged had already prescribed. The prosecution moved for
the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower court by
order of January 7, 1976. ... rom the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of
Manila offenses provides: interposed an appeal by certiorari to this
Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On March 3, 1976, this honorable
Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the Solicitor General
to file the petition for review within fifteen days from receipt The People
avers in the petition that Galano "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite

the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate
that the offense charged has not prescribed" and "in not considering the
prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense charged
Issue: Whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination
or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Held: The dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory
prescriptions, inter alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not
only causes expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to peril, for it
weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of
memory if not to anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that promptitude
should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to
secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. Since the
record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is
complete (and shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to
September 10, 1974 while respondent accused was testifying on the witness
stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974
which granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and
this case had already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence
already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the minutes and
transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the
Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence
of the respondent accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may
have and thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch. The judge's
dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are hereby set
aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides
Branch XIII of the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial
(with reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in Criminal
Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the
directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge
presiding his court is further ordered to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from promulgation of this decision.
In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending, this
decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.

People vs Ocaya
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Guevarra vs Almodovar
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Gonzales vs Abaya
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

People vs Benipayo
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Samson vs Daway
Facts:
Issue:
Held: