A Review of the Application of Common But Differentiated

Responsibilities (CBDR) under the International

Regime on Climate Change

Sylvanus Gbendazhi Barnabas

LL.B (ABU); LL.M in Environmental Law and Policy (Uni. of Kent); Barrister and Solicitor of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria; Associate Attorney at Pitchers and Court, Abuja Nigeria; and currently
research student at Aberystwyth University. This paper is partly gleaned from the authors LL.M thesis.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257342

ABSTRACT
The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) invokes equity and
fairness concerns with regard to the sharing of responsibilities under international environmental law. Its application in the context of climate change throws up a number of challenges
on how to distribute responsibilities for mitigation and adaptation actions among States. This
paper reviews the evolution and application of CBDR under the international regime on climate change. The main argument is that CBDR under the climate change regime is fraught
with ambiguities regarding its meaning, beneficiaries and manner of application. It is not
clear whether the benefits and responsibilities it imposes on States are meant to evolve or not.
The paper contends that though CBDR has enhanced consideration of the equity and fairness
sentiments about how to combat climate change, the lack of clarity about its meaning and the
manner of its application have hindered effective international cooperation in addressing climate change. Hence, there is an urgent need to review CBDR and the manner of its application under the climate change regime. The paper focuses on international climate change instruments like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol as well as a number of United Nations documents, international conferences reports
and declarations.

KEY WORDS
Climate change, Convention, common, developed, developing, differentiated responsibilities,
equity
and
justice,
greenhouse
gases,
international,
Kyoto
Protocol

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257342

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................. i
KEY WORDS .......................................................................................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.

The Origin of CBDR under the International Regime on Climate Change .................................... 3

2.

CBDR under the UNFCCC 1992 .................................................................................................... 6

3.1The Berlin Mandate ..................................................................................................................... 11
2.2

3.

CBDR under a Post-Kyoto Protocol Regime ................................................................................ 15

4.1

4.

CBDR under the Kyoto Protocol .......................................................................................... 12

The Bali Action Plan (BAP) ................................................................................................. 15

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 17

ii

Introduction
While there is no universally accepted definition of the expression common but differentiated responsibility, (hereafter CBDR) it may be described as a non-uniform allocation of responsibilities where the problem sought to be resolved is of common concern to all parties. It
may signify a joint responsibility of parties to a treaty for the protection of the environment
while taking into consideration the particular circumstances of parties.1 It may hold parties to
an international treaty variedly responsible based on their various contributions to an environmental problem and their respective capacities in rectifying such problem.2 It could be
said to represent an attempt to unify States in resolving international environmental problems
in a cooperative spirit.
A broader enunciation of the principle is the one adumbrated by the International Legal Association which describes it as a duty to co-operate in the achievement of global sustainable
development and thereby recognising the special needs and interests of developing countries and of countries with economies in transition, and in particular those countries affected
adversely by environmental, social and developmental considerations.3 Hepburn and Ahmad
suggest that the principle is drawn from the concept of the common heritage of mankind.4
It acknowledges historical differences in the contributions to environmental problems while
recognising varying technical and economic capabilities in tackling them.5 Indeed, irrespective of States common responsibility, justifiable differences may be made in respect of their
responsibility towards addressing environmental problems. CBDR thus consists of two major
components of international cooperation and liability: the concept of common responsibility
of States and the notion of differentiated responsibility.6

See P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd
edition, 2003).
2
P. Cullet, Differentiated Treatment in International Environmental Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Interstate Relations, 10:3 EJIL 549 (1999).
3
International Law Association, New Delhi Declaration on Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable Development (London: ILA, 2002), see Para., 3.1 and 3.3.
4
J. Hepburn and I. Ahmad, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: A Legal Working
Paper in Recent Developments in International Law Related to Sustainable Development Series (Montreal:
CISDL, 2005).
5
Id.
6
See C.D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98:2 American Journal of
International Law 276 (2004), C. Okerke, Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance (London:
Routledge, 2008), P. Sands, note 1 above and L. Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime, RECIEL 9 (2) 120 - 131 (2000).
1

The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (hereafter Stockholm Declaration) 7 appears to be the first international environmental instrument to
apply CBDR, as it requires taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any costs which may emanate from their incorporating
environmental safeguards into their development planning8 However, it is the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (hereafter Rio Declaration) that gave the concept full recognition9 at the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development
(hereafter UNCED). Since then, many post-1992 environmental treaties have referred to it.
CBDR has become a relevant norm of international environmental law and it seems to be
gaining importance in the context of addressing climate change. However, combating climate
change is posing a challenge to the ability of the international community to tackle common
global problems.10 The reasons are not far-fetched: some countries (mostly developed) are
more technologically and economically capable of addressing climate change and have contributed more to causing the problem, while the impacts are more likely to affect the poorest
countries, which are mostly less responsible and least capable of dealing with it.11
No wonder, the international climate change regime has through CBDR sought to be equitable and just in sharing the burdens of addressing climate change. The two current binding instruments- the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereafter UNFCCC) 199212 and the Kyoto Protocol13 both incorporate various notions of equity as they
place the main responsibility of tackling climate change on developed countries14 and on the
basis of CBDR.
The application of CBDR under the Kyoto Protocol enabled the exclusion of developing
countries from greenhouse gases (GHGs) mitigation commitments and this seems to have accounted for the refusal of the United States (US) to become a Party to the Protocol. 15 The US
maintains that developing countries must also make mitigation commitments before it can
participate in any international climate treaty.16 On the other hand, developing countries argue that they are less historically responsible for climate change and their right to economic
development must not be hampered by GHGs mitigation commitments.

Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, UN
Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972) (hereafter Stockholm Declaration).
8
Id., see Principle 12.
9
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, Rio de Janeiro Brazil 3 - 14 June 1992 A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (hereafter Rio Declaration),
see Principles 6 and 7.
10
See J. Ashton and X. Wang, Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the
international effort against climate change (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, December 2003) at 61.
11
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2007).
12
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 29 May 1992, FCCC/INFORMAL/84 GE.0562220 (E) 200705 (hereafter UNFCCC).
13
Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto, 10 December 1997, U.N Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/add.1 (1998).
14
Under the UNFCCC, developed countries are Annex I Parties, namely, most of the Member States of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and countries with economies in transition. The
Annex I Parties are listed at the end of the UNFCCC. Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries are Annex
B Parties who are also Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC. The list is also to be found at the end of the Kyoto
Protocol.
15
See the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, Senate Resolution 98, 105th Congress, 143 Cong. Rec. S8138. Available at:
http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html.
16
Id.
2

The incessant political impasse during international climate change negotiations suggests that
there are challenges in applying CBDR. The reasons for these difficulties are herein identified, by critically analysing relevant international climate change instruments thus drawing
attention to areas where changes could be made.
This paper aims to review the evolution and application of CBDR under international climate
law and policy; while not exhaustive, it offers a possible explanation for the difficulties encountered in the application of this principle. On the basis of such analysis, some recommendations are herein made for review. Following this introduction, the paper will examine the
genesis of CBDR into the international climate change regime, after which it will x-ray its
application and evolution under specific climate change instruments and thereafter conclude
with some recommendations. However, it is important to note that international climate
change law and policy is evolving rapidly and its development is on-going.17
1. The Origin of CBDR under the International Regime on Climate Change
It was the Stockholm Declaration18 that first emphasised the need to be fair in addressing international environmental problems by taking the peculiarities of developing countries into
account.19 It emphasised that their priorities and needs be considered in order to avoid hardship. It also encouraged the provisions of technical and financial assistance to aid them and
expressed the need for international environmental standards to vary in line with the values
and needs of States.
Historically, industrialised countries had an early start in actively engaging with the challenge
posed by climate change.20 By contrast, developing countries have been more concerned
about tackling more immediate problems like poverty and economic development, as to them
climate change is a distant problem.21
There was no application of CBDR in addressing climate change before 1988 when Canada
initiated an international conference in Toronto on the global problem. 22 Although the conference was aimed at reconciling the differences between scientists and policy makers on
climate change,23 it recommended for the establishment of a World Atmosphere Fund to be
partly funded by a tax on the consumption of fossil-fuel from industrialised countries.24 In
addition, there was emphasis on the main responsibility of industrialised countries to take
measures in addressing climate change and for transfer of financial and technological resources from developed to developing countries.25 The conference statement placed the main
responsibility of combating climate change on developed countries.26

17

This paper is current as at 23 March 2012.

Stockholm Declaration, note 7 above.
19
Id., see Principles 12 and 23.
20
D. Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary 18 Y.J. Intl.
L. 451, 463 (1993).
21
Id.
22
See Proceedings of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global SecurityToronto, 27-30 June 1988 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 1989) UNEP, WMO/OMM Doc. 710. (Hereafter the conference)
23
Id., at 65.
24
Id., at 298.
25
Id.
26
Id., at 295.
18

After the Toronto Conference, international efforts at combating climate change began to
take an intergovernmental dimension where negotiations were becoming difficult.27 The US
was the first to emphasise the potential economic implications of addressing climate change
as it began to solicit for further scientific research whereas most developed countries appeared to disregard the economic implications, choosing rather to support immediate response measures to tackle it.28
It was in 1988 that the issue of climate change was raised for the first time before the UN
General Assembly;29 there Malta sought the inclusion of an agenda titled Declaration Proclaiming Climate Change as part of the Common Heritage of Mankind.30 The Maltese request was accepted with an amendment and included in a final resolution recognising the
climate as a common concern of mankind.31
Another significant event was the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change.32 The outcome of the conference- the Noordwijk Declaration33 included a number of paragraphs on the need for international cooperation and the responsibility of industrialised countries to assume a leading role in taking action to address climate
change, including the need for technical and financial assistance to developing countries.34
While the economic and technological differences between the North and South had made it
obvious that the responsibility for addressing climate change were to be differentiated, difficulties as to the immediacy and extent of the responsibility to be borne by the North were also emerging. An example is the disagreements over whether to set quantitative limits for
GHGs emissions at the Noordwijk Conference35 as the Noordwijk Declaration provided that
it was necessary for the industrialised countries to stabilise their GHGs emissions as soon as
possible.36 However, the US, Japan and the then Soviet Union stood against an agreement on
a specific date for stabilisation.37
The Second World Climate Conference (SWCC)38 was another significant event that shed
light on the emergence of CBDR into the climate change regime. This conference provided
developing countries with the opportunity to express their interests including the fact that the
North-South differences were to play a pivotal role in any international framework aimed at
tackling climate change.39

27

D. Bodansky, note 20 above at 463.

Id., at 464.
29
Id., at 465
30
Id., at note 86.
31
See UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53, United Nations General Assembly 70 th plenary meeting 6 December 1988, UN. Doc.A/Res/43/53 (1988).
32
Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, the Netherlands November
1989, attended by representatives of sixty-six countries with representation from both developed and developing
countries.
33
The Noordwijk Declaration on Climate Change / Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change, Ministerial
Conference Noordwijk, the Netherlands, 6th - 7th November 1989.Organised by the Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment of the Netherlands in cooperation with UNEP and WMO.
34
Id., at Paras., 6, 7, 11 and 26.
35
See Bodansky, note 20 above at 465.
36
The Noordwijk Declaration, note 33 above Para., 16.
37
See Bodansky, note 20 above at 368.
38
See J. Jagger and H.L. Ferguson, (eds) Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Policy- Proceedings of the
Second World Climate Conference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
39
See Bodansky, note 20 above at 471.
28

The above development was in line with a general transformation in the development of international environmental law in the 1980s as developing countries were beginning to seek
recognition for the peculiarities they face while addressing environmental problems.40 Thus,
under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer41 developing countries had succeeded in being recognised as needing financial and technological resources before they could participate effectively in the fight to protect the Ozone Layer.
Despite these developments, differences of policy positions on climate change were also
emerging within developing countries. On one hand, the oil-producing States considered any
attempt at fighting climate change as injurious to their economic interest. On the other, the
small island developing States (hereafter SIDS) and low-lying coastal States sought more
immediate and strong responses as they were at the risk of being adversely affected by the
resultant rise in sea levels.42
Thus, in the build-up to the UNCED 1992, the international community was aware that several factors would have to be taken into account in order to secure international cooperation
to combat climate change. It had become obvious also that the problem of climate change and
how to tackle it was closely intertwined with the social and economic behaviour of States.43
It was clear that States would have to bear unequal costs for abating GHGs emissions and adaptation actions, while they would also be impacted differently by climate change. For example, while fossil-fuel producing States were concerned about the effects a limitation on carbon dioxide emissions may have on their economies, the small island States (hereafter SIS) in
the Caribbean and the Pacific were bothered about their very existence owing to the catastrophic consequences of rises in sea levels.44
Recognising climate change as a common concern for mankind is logical, implying equality
of interests in protecting the climate, as all States would be affected by its changes. There is
also equality of causes in the sense that all States are responsible for the emission of GHGs.
Hence, as the climate is of such common concern it follows that there is a common responsibility of all States to protect it.45
However, the bigger question is the extent to which each country is to be held responsible for
addressing climate change, the answer to which some States believe lies in each countrys
historical contribution and the level of its economic and technological development.46 Members of this school of thought would easily make reference to Principle 23 of the Stockholm
Declaration47 which provides that the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid
for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social
cost for developing countries should be avoided.

40

Id.
Montreal Protocol on Substances the Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987 as either
amended or adjusted in London 1990, Copenhagen 1992, Vienna, 1995, Montreal, 1997 and Beijing, 1999.
42
See Bodansky note 20 above at 471.
43
Id., at 475.
44
Id., at 477.
45
See P.G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy,
7 N.Y.U., Envtl. L. J. 27, 31 (1999).
46
Id.
47
Stockholm Declaration note 7 above.
41

The reasoning for the above argument is that although all countries would be affected by climate change, it is likely that poor countries would suffer more owing to their vulnerability in
terms of their geographies as well as economic and technical incapacity. 48 Besides, it is developed countries that have emitted the most GHGs since the beginning of industrial revolution and have benefited disproportionately from the use of the global atmosphere.49 Therefore, although there is equality of causes and impacts in some sense, the responsibility for
tackling climate change ought to be differentiated in the interest of equity and fairness.
In line with the equity and fairness sentiments expressed above, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration50 set out CBDR as a general norm of international environmental law51 and Principle 6
provides that the particular circumstances of developing countries should be given priority.
The Rio Declaration requires that there should be different responsibilities for different States
given their historical and current contributions to a particular environmental problem. It also
provides that the ability to prevent, respond or control an environmental problem be taken
into consideration in responding to it.52
However, a number of other important issues remain unclear. There is no definition of CBDR
as contained in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration and no international environmental agreement before Rio expressly mentions it.53 A related problem is the lack of definition of a developing country or a developed country in the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration.54 Secondly, the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration are both soft law
and ipso facto non-binding. Thus, the sentiments in favour of developing countries together
with the equity and fairness principles underlying Principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration,
and Principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration are not binding under international law.55

2. CBDR under the UNFCCC 1992

Under the UNFCCC it was necessary to accommodate the different needs and interests of developed and developing countries, as well as the various interests within each of these groups.
For instance, SISs like Nauru and Vanuatu had interests56 that were entirely different from
those of OPEC oil producing States like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria57 and indeed these
groups did not have common positions with other developing countries like Brazil, China and
India.58

48

See Harris note 45 above.

Id.
50
Rio Declaration note 9 above.
51
M. Brookman, A Review of the book: Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law, 25
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 369, 370 (2000).
52
D.M. Dreisen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? : The Emission Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention
26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 5(1998).
53
See Stone note 6 above.
54
Remarks by Susan Biniaz, in Common But Differentiated Responsibility 96 Am. SocyIntL.Proc. 358, 362
(2002).
55
See Rajamani note 6 above at 120, 124. For a comprehensive history of the general evolution of international
climate law and policy see Bodansky, n 20 above and J. Gupta, Leadership in the Climate Change Regime:
inspiring the Commitments of Developing Countries in the Post-Kyoto Phase, 7:2 RECIEL 180, 181 (1998).
56
They were more concerned about the likelihood of their disappearing in the event of sea-level rises.
57
These ones bothered more about their income and economies which may be affected with reduction of fossilfuel consumption by developed states.
58
They were only interested in ensuring that the growth in their economies was not hampered.
49

If the interests within developing countries were a problem so were the divisions among developed countries as to the measures to be adopted in addressing climate change. For example, the US is reported to have been opposed to committing itself to any emission reduction
targets or time scale, a development that is said to have led to weaker commitments by some
developed States under the Convention.59
The preamble to an international agreement provides the background including the aim and
context in which an agreement or treaty is made.60 Hence, it is in the preamble to the UNFCCC that the background, purpose and context of the Convention is to be found as it makes
references to a number of existing and emerging norms of international environmental law
including the description of climate change as the common concern of humankind.61 The
Convention recognises climate change as the common responsibility of all States, and that
international cooperation is necessary to protect it.62
Indeed, a number of paragraphs in the preamble express the concerns of developing countries. For example it is noted:
[T]hat the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in
developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and
development needs.63
The expression the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse
gases has originated in developed countries above, indicates the recognition by the Convention that historical responsibility for causing climate change is a relevant issue in determining
the responsibility of each State, especially the particular culpability of developed countries.
On the other hand, the expression that per capita emissions in developing countries are still
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs has two implications. First, it acknowledges that developing countries are less responsible for climate change in comparison to their
developed counterparts. Secondly, the emissions of developing countries will grow along
with their economic development.64

59

Countries like Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the
Nordic states, Switzerland and the UK are said to have earlier committed themselves voluntarily to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
60
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p.
331, see Article 31 (2).
61
UNFCCC note 12 above see preamble para., 1.
62
See Rajamani note 6 above at 125 and Hepburn and Ahmad note 4 above at 6.
63
UNFCCC note 12 above see preamble para,. 3.
64
See Harris note 45 above at 30 - 33.
7

In addition, the preamble emphasises that the measures adopted in responding to climate
change would be based on their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities and their social and economic conditions.65 It is also recognised that standards
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social
costs to other countries in particular developing countries66 while taking into full account
the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustainable economic growth and the eradication of poverty.67
Further emphasis is made on developing countries need to have access to the resources that
they may require to achieve sustainable development.68 Some other relevant paragraphs stress
the relevance of scientific, technical and economic considerations in adopting response
measures.69
The above preambular paragraphs are anchored on the principle of CBDR, as they stipulate
that response to climate change would be based on differential responsibility and capability
of the Parties even though climate change is of common concern. The rationales for this include historical responsibility;70 the need to avoid unnecessary economic and social costs on
other countries especially the developing ones;71 the need for developing countries to focus
on economic development and eradication of poverty;72 and the incapacity of developing
countries due to their low technological and scientific ability.73
The above reasons can be subsumed under the need to ensure equity and justice in addressing
climate change, as applying uniform standards on all States may be unfair thereby imposing
hardship on the less responsible and yet less capable of responding. 74 The Convention relies
on several principles of international environmental law to facilitate the achievement of its
objective,75 but virtually all of them are anchored on CBDR. 76

65

UNFCCC note 12 above at preamble para. 6. Note that the expression differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities is substantiated under Article 4, where distinctions are made between the obligations of
developed and developing country Parties.
66
Id., preamble para. 9.
67
Id., para., 21.
68
Id., para., 22.
69
Id., para., 16.
70
Id., para,. 3.
71
Id., para., 9.
72
Id., para., 21.
73
Id., paras., 16 and 22.
74
Remarks by C.C. Joyner, Common But Differentiated Responsibility 96 Am. SocyIntL. Proc. 358 (2002).
75
That is the stabilisation of the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.
76
UNFCCC note 12 above see Article 3(1) - (5).
8

Just like the preamble,77 Article 3(1) expressly mentions CBDR as the basis upon which the
climate is to be protected and identifies developed countries as the ones to take the lead in
addressing climate change and its effects.78 While Article 3(1) does not specify the reasons
for developed countries to take the lead, when read in conjunction with the preamble79
which states that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse
gases has originated in developed countries, it can be argued that historical contribution, capabilities, as well as the notions of equity and justice were the reasons that informed the leadership.80
Also, Article 3(2) emphasises the need for equity and fairness in relation to developing countries and particularly those that may be vulnerable to the effects of climate change.81 This
builds on the equity and fairness rationale behind CBDR. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell rightly
argue that though this provision is mainly aimed at developing countries, it could be applicable to a developed country like the US, which rely highly on the consumption of fossil-fuel
and may therefore claim special treatment under this provision.82
An important question that arises from Article 3 is this: What is the legal effect of the principle of CBDR as provided thereunder? Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell suggest that with the entire
principles being described as a guide, the principle of CBDR is not legally binding and must
not be complied with, they further maintain that the usage of the word should in virtually all
the paragraphs in this Article buttresses this assertion.83 Nevertheless, Article 3 could be of
considerable legal weight when read in the light of the context set out in the preamble.84
A major weakness is the lack of definition for CBDR as Article 1 which is the definition section does not define the expression common but differentiated responsibilities as contained
in Article 3(1). Following this lack of definition is the problem of beneficiaries, although the
Convention makes mention of developing countries, least developed countries, and countries
particularly vulnerable to climate change, there is no definition for these expressions.85 The
Convention does not define a developing country neither does it define a developed country.86 Although the Convention contains annexes,87 this does not tell when a developing country can be deemed developed and a developed country otherwise.

77

Id., see preamble para., 6.

See Hepburn and Ahmad note 4 above at 6, Stone note 6 above at 280, Harris note 45 above at 30-33 and P.
Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 357-358 (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2009).
79
UNFCCC note 12 above preamble para., 3.
80
See A. Chandani, Distributive Justice and Sustainability as a Viable Foundation for the Future Climate Regime Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 152, 154 (2007), remarks by Joyner note above 54 at 358 and Hepburn and
Ahmad note 4 above at 6.
81
Herpburn and Ahmad, note 4 above at 6, Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, note 78 above at 358 and L. Ringuis, A.
Torvanger, and A. Underdal, Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy, 2:1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1, 13 (2002).
82
Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, note 78 above at 359 notes 121.
83
Id., at note 122, A.M. Halvorssen, Common But differential Commitments in the Future Climate Change Regime - Amending the Kyoto Protocol to include Annex C and Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18 Colorado Journal
of International Environmental Law and Policy 247, 256 (2007) and Rajamani, note 6 above at 124 notes 42.
84
Rajamani, note 55 above at 124.
85
Susan Biniaz, note 54 above.
86
Id.
87
Annex I being a list of developed OECD and former Eastern bloc country Parties, Annex II being a list of
OECD developed countries while non-Annex I Parties are said to be developing countries.
78

CBDR is used to allocate responsibilities under the Convention as Article 4(1) specifies the
obligations of all Parties, that is, the common responsibilities of the Parties while Article 4(2)
sets out the obligations of developed countries of OECD and the former Eastern bloc 88 and
Paragraphs 4(3) 4(4) specifies the obligations for developed OECD countries.89 However,
the extent of commitments by developing countries is subject to the effective implementation
by developed countries of technology and financial transfers to the former. It is also considered that the priorities of developing countries are economic and social development including the eradication of poverty.90
In addition, the implementation of commitments is to be made with full consideration given
to the needs and concerns of developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate change91
including the specific needs and situation of least developed countries.92 This kind of differentiation is reflective of the contributions of developed countries to climate change and it is
an application of equity as it seeks to consider the interests of the poor and vulnerable
States.93 This is also further recognition of the differences that exist between the countries of
the developed and developing world. This is appropriate as justice and equity require that the
application of legal rules should not cause undue hardships and unwarranted costs on the regulated.94
Indeed, the entire Article 4 expressly assume that States (developed) that have greater historical responsibility for GHGs emission should as a matter of fairness also make the most contribution to addressing the problem by showing leadership in adopting measures. 95
On the surface it may appear as if developing countries are the only beneficiaries of CBDR
under Article 4. However, a different dimension of differentiation seems to have been applied
under Article 4(6) where some Eastern European Countries who are considered developed
but undergoing the transition into a market economy are allowed some level of flexibility in
meeting their obligations to address climate change.96
Also, the needs of countries whose economies may be adversely affected by the responses to
climate change are taken into account, particularly those countries with their economies highly dependent on fossil-fuel.97 Thus, Bodansky suggests that the distinctiveness of Article
4(10) lies in its applicability to developed countries that produce fossil-fuel for example US,
Australia and Russia. In this regard, it could potentially be cited by developed States to qualify their commitments under Article 4(2).98 Clearly, developed countries with economies in
transition are also beneficiaries of CBDR under the UNFCCC.99

88

As listed under Annex I.

As listed under Annex II.
90
UNFCCC note 12 above Article 4(7).
91
Id., Article 4 (8) (a) - (i).
92
Id., Article 4 (9).
93
See D. Shelton, Equity in D. Bodansky, J. Brunee and E. Hey Eds, The Oxford Handbook of International
Law, 658 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 2007).
94
See I. H. Rowlands, Atmosphere and Outer Space, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunee, and E. Hey,(Eds), The Oxford
Handbook of International Law, 316, 329-330 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 2007).
95
Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, note 78 above at 359.
96
See Hepburn and Ahmad, note 4 above at 6 and Bodansky, note 20 above at 507.
97
UNFCCC note 12 above Article 4 (10).
98
See Bodansky, note 20 above at 531.
99
For more on how developed countries with economies in transition are beneficiaries of CBDR under the UNFCCC, see Rajamani, note 6 above at 126.
89

10

Similar problems of definition as discussed earlier apply to the allocation of responsibilities

under Article 4. In addition to the lack of definition for developed countries and developing countries, the expression least developed countries is also not defined.100 Additional
uncertainties are that it remains unclear when responsibilities are triggered, as it is not clear
when a Party is obligated to transfer benefits and when a Party is entitled to receive same. 101
Thus, with responsibilities assigned on the basis of CBDR, what mechanism determines the
transition from a beneficiary to a benefactor under the UNFCCC? It would appear that the
UNFCCC leaves it to the discretion of an individual State Party (developing State) to by itself
declare its willingness to graduate into a developed country. 102
The UNFCC utilises CBDR to create a balance between the various competing interests between developed and developing countries as well as the divisions within these groups.103 It
is CBDR that enables the allocation of both general commitments to all Parties and specific
commitment to different Parties in order to make the Convention acceptable to all the categories listed therein in the spirit of international cooperation.104
The preamble, principles and commitments contained in the UNFCCC if viewed from the
perspective of CBDR may lead to the conclusion that whereas mitigation of climate change is
the responsibility (though not exclusively) of developed countries, sustainable development
and adaptation to climate change remain the responsibility (albeit with the assistance of developed countries) of developing countries.105
3.1The Berlin Mandate
One of the purposes of the Berlin Mandate106 was to review the sufficiency of the commitments for Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC as provided under Article 4(2) (a) and (b) and
it seems to have concluded that the commitments were insufficient to achieve the objectives.107 Consequently, it recommended the strengthening of commitments on Annex I Parties
to the UNFCCC by the adoption of either a Protocol or a different instrument.108
CBDR was recognised as the Berlin Mandate expressed the desire to strengthen the commitments of developed countries109 under the Convention towards the reduction of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere; the emphasis on leadership by developed countries under the
Convention was reaffirmed.110

100

See Bodansky note 20 above at 508.

See Susan Biniaz note 54 above at 358 and 362.
102
UNFCCC note 12 above Article 4 (2) (g); See also Rowlands note 94 above at 329.
103
See A. Chandani, Distributive Justice and Sustainability as a Viable Foundation for the Future Climate Regime, Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 152, 158 (2007).
104
See Bodansky note 20 above at 508.
105
See generally, L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006) 236-243.
106
UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its first Session, Berlin 28 March to 7 April 1995 Decision 1/CP.1. The Berlin Mandate: Review of Adequacy of Article 4 paragraph 2 (a) and (b), of the Convention,
including proposals related to a protocol and decision on follow-up, UN. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 6 June
1995.
107
See Rajamani note 6 above at 127.
108
Id.
109
Annex I Parties.
110
The Berlin Mandate note 106 above at para., 1 (1) (a).
101

11

Indeed, the Berlin Mandate emphasised the need for taking into account the differences in
starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain
strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort, when strengthening the commitments of Parties to reduce their
GHGs emissions.111
The Berlin Mandate expressly confirmed that the implementation of the Convention shall be
guided by CBDR.112 It emphasised that the Parties were to take into account the peculiar
needs of developing countries and stressed that:
[T]he largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse
gases has originated in developed countries, that the per capita emissions in
developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and
development needs.113
Therefore, the Berlin Mandate focussed more on mitigation commitments by developed
countries thereby reaffirming that mitigation of GHGs emissions were the primary responsibility of developed countries.114 However, the Berlin Mandate again did not define CBDR
neither did it provide an indication of how commitments were to be triggered. Thus, it remained unclear how the commitments of the Annex I Parties it sought to strengthen will be
triggered. It did not address the question of how a non-Annex I Party may transit into an Annex I Party with responsibilities to undertake the commitments. Although upholding the application of CBDR is justified on reasons of equity and fairness, by not making provisions for
a transitory mechanism, room was being created for controversy.115
2.2 CBDR under the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol116 follows the Berlin Mandate117 and it stipulates commitments on Annex
I Parties to the UNFCCC. The preamble to the Protocol expresses its willingness to conform
to the UNFCCC118 and in particular its desire to be guided by Article 3 of the UNFCCC
which adopts CBDR119 while stating its allegiance to the Berlin Mandate.120

111

Id., para., 2 (a). See also Ringuis, Torvanger, and Underdal, note 81 above at 13.
Id, para., 1 (1) (a), while making reference to Article 3 (1) of the UNFCCC.
113
Id para., 1 (1) (d).
114
See Rajamani note 6 above at 127.
115
Id.
116
Kyoto Protocol note 13 above.
117
The Berlin Mandate note 106 above.
118
Kyoto Protocol note 13 above preamble para., 1.
119
Id., Preamble para., 5.
120
Id., preamble para., 6. See Rajamani note 6 above at 128 - 130.
112

12

In line with the principle of CBDR, the Protocol imposes commitments on Annex I Parties to
the Convention on quantified emission limitation and reduction as provided in Annex B to
the Protocol with a view to reducing their total emissions of GHGs by at least five per cent
below 1990 levels within the commitment period 2008 to 2012.121 It does not require developing countries to undertake commitments to limit their emission of GHGs.122
The Protocol further differentiates among developed countries, as developed countries listed
in Annex I with their economies in transition into a market economy are allowed the flexibility of selecting a base year that may be more convenient than the 1990 base year.123 Indeed,
the responsibilities of countries with their economies in transition differ from other Annex I
Parties. Although they have emission reduction obligations, they are not required to make any
contributions to the financial and technology transfer commitments prescribed by the Protocol.124
The Protocol retains the three-tier form of applying CBDR as in the UNFCCC of developed, developing and developed but with economies in transition.125 The only commitment
under the Protocol for developing countries is in relation with the need for them to enhance
cooperation.126 This is evident from the establishment of the Clean Development Mechanism
(hereafter CDM) which is aimed at enabling joint emission reduction activities between developed and developing countries.
As developing countries enjoy the benefits of emission reduction projects in their countries,
developed countries would benefit from the certified emission reduction units that will accrue
to them for carrying out such projects, and they can utilise this in complying with their commitments for emission reduction.127
Hence, developing countries perform their share of common responsibility by allowing CDM
activities to be carried out, while developed countries fulfil their differentiated responsibilities by complying with both their emission reduction commitments and their obligations for
CDM projects.128 Indeed, CDM is an off-shoot of CBDR as it focuses on enhancing partnership between developed and developing countries while at the same time requiring differential commitments in order to address the global problem of climate change.129
The Protocol indicates that the purpose of CDM is to assist Parties not listed under Annex I
of the UNFCCC to achieve sustainable development and enable Annex I Parties fulfil their
commitments to emission reduction under the Protocol.130
121

Id., Article 3 (1), See also Halvorssen, note 83 above at 256.

See Harris, note 45 above at 35, M. Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility: Differential versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and contribution in the Global Climate
Change Context, 13 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 473, 484 (2002) and
Brookman, note 51 above at 370-371.
123
Kyoto Protocol note 13 above Article 3 (5) - (6). See further Stone, note 6 above at 280.
124
T. Honkonen, The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, 18 (3) RECIEL 257, 259 (2009).
125
See Hepburn and Ahmad, note 4 above at 18 6-7.
126
Rajamani, note 6 above at 130.
127
Kyoto Protocol, note 13 above Article 12 (3).
128
See Rajamani note 6 above at 130. See also Rajamani, note 105 above at 244.
129
See P. Cullet, Equity and Flexibility Mechanisms in the Climate Change Regime: Conceptual and Practical
Issues 8:2 RECIEL 168, 171-172(1999) and M. Rodi, Bridging the Divided in Global Climate Policy - Strategies for Enhanced Participation and Integration Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 164, 166 (2007).
130
Kyoto Protocol, note 13 above Article 12 (1). See Halvorssen, note 83 above at 257 and Ringuis, Torvanger,
and Underdal, note 81 above at 18.
122

13

Like the Convention, the Protocol does not define CBDR but merely adopts it as articulated
under the Convention. It also does not address the question of whether the differentiation of
responsibilities under the Protocol is meant to evolve. When does a developing country qualify to assume the responsibilities of a developed country? Nor does it answer the question of
when a developed country with its economy in transition can assume the commitments of a
developed country without the benefits of choosing a base year that is more convenient than
1990. There is no mechanism to ensure automatic transition from one level of differentiated
responsibilities to another under the Kyoto Protocol.131
While the application of CBDR under the Kyoto Protocol has enabled the consideration of
equity, justice and fairness issues surrounding climate change and how to address it, it has
also been a source of major controversy among negotiators, in most cases resulting in prolonged negotiations.132 For example, the lack of commitments on developing countries under
the Protocol has generated a lot of disaffection from some developed countries notably the
US.133
Those developed countries opposed to the exclusion of developing countries from commitments on GHGs emission reduction maintain that the exclusion of major GHGs emitters like
Brazil, China and India is unacceptable and unfair.134 However, this position negates the equity and fairness considerations surrounding the CBDR principle. CBDR considers not only
the economic and social conditions of countries but also their capabilities to respond and
adapt to climate change.135
The insistence by the US that developing countries take on commitments especially those
with a growing economy and rising GHGs emission assumes that a States economic growth
and increase in GHGs emissions necessarily correlates with the ability to address climate
change or adapt to it, an assumption that may not be correct.136 Besides, CBDR recognises
the right of developing countries to sustainable development.137

131

Remarks by Susan Biniaz, note 54 above.

Id., at 363.
133
Historically, about the largest emitter of GHGs in the world, which refused to sign or ratify the Protocol on
grounds that developing countries must also take on commitments, a development that delayed the coming into
force of the Protocol, the Protocol was adopted in 1997 but only came into force in 2005 following ratification
by Russia.
134
P. Christoff, 'The Bali roadmap: Climate change, COP 13 and beyond', 17: 3 Environmental Politics 467
(2008).
135
Id.
136
Remarks by Edith Brown Weiss, Common But Differentiated Responsibility 96, Am. SocyIntL.Proc. 358,
368 (2002).
137
UNFCCC note 12 above preamble para., 21.
132

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3. CBDR under a Post-Kyoto Protocol Regime

4.1 The Bali Action Plan (BAP)
The UNFCCC COP 13138 provided a platform for governments from around the world including developed and developing countries to agree to step up efforts to combat climate
change. They adopted the Bali Road Map, which consists of a number of decisions that represent the various avenues that are essential to addressing climate change. The Bali Road Map
includes the Bali Action Plan (hereafter BAP),139 which provided the path for a new negotiating process under the UNFCCC - the aim was to complete this by 2009.
The BAP identified CBDR as relevant in achieving international cooperation on a long-term
basis for the reduction of emissions. It sought to enhance the achievement of the UNFCCCs
objective in accordance with the provisions and principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions of States.140 It provided that the allocation of responsibilities should be based on
CBDR and that the differences in national circumstances be given consideration in sharing
the burden.141
In a remarkable departure from previous international instruments on climate change, developing countries are enjoined to consider nationally appropriate mitigation actions but this
has to be done in the context of sustainable development.142 The BAP appears then to be the
first international environmental instrument on climate change to call on both developed and
developing countries to mitigate their emissions of GHGs.143
In spite of this development, developing countries are to mitigate their emissions subject to
their right to develop sustainably144 and their efforts would be supported with the transfer of
technology and finance including the building of capacity.145 In addition, the different circumstances of developed and developing countries are to be taken into account in order to
enable cost-effectiveness in the national and international efforts at mitigating emissions.146

138

Bali Indonesia, 3rd 14th December 2007.

Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session,
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.
140
Id., para., 1 (a). See Honkonen, note 124 above at 263.
141
Id., para., 1 (b) (i).
142
Id para., 1 (b) (ii).
143
D.A. Motaal, The Shift from Low Politics to High Politics: Climate Change 40 2-3 Environmental Policy and Law 98, 103 (2010).
144
BAP note 139 above.
145
Id.
146
Id., para., 1 (b) (v).
139

15

The BAP set the path towards the crucial COP 15 which was held in Copenhagen in 2009 and
it introduced a new dimension to the application of CBDR in the international climate change
regime, as it indicated for the first time that developing countries were to take on commitments to mitigate their GHGs emissions. CBDR was to remain the guiding principle within
which to resolve the problem of sharing responsibilities between developed and developing
countries.147 Most importantly, the recognition is made that climate change requires an international solution and that cooperation regarding technology including significant financial
support for developing countries will be vital in successfully tackling climate change in a
post-2012 scenario.148
So far it is clear that CBDR would remain a relevant norm in a post-Kyoto Protocol regime.
For example under the Cancun Agreements it was agreed that Parties in Annex 1 of the Protocol should continue to take the lead in combating climate change.149 Also the legitimate
needs of developing country Parties for sustained economic growth and the eradication of
poverty have been reaffirmed.150 Indeed, it has also been expressly affirmed that cooperation
will be needed on a long-term basis to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC on the basis of
equity and in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities while taking the different circumstances of Parties into account.151
However, none of these decisions provide an indication as to the willingness to either define
CBDR or give further clarification as to the beneficiaries. They have not resolved the problem of lack of a transitory mechanism to enable Parties move from one category to the other.
Curiously, the Durban conference did not make any reference to CBDR whether expressly or
impliedly for the first time in an international climate change decision or declaration under
the UNFCCC.152 Instead, a process was initiated that will aim to raise the level of ambition
and ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties. 153 Be that as it may, if
CBDR remains the overarching principle under a post-Kyoto regime, it would be necessary to
define it and clarify the problem of beneficiaries to ensure effectiveness under the climate
change regime.

147

P. Christoff note 134 above.

Ott, H.E. Sterk, W. and Watanabe, R. The Bali Road Map: New Horizons for Global Climate Policy 20 Environmental Law and Management 4, 7 (2008). For an understanding of the negotiation process before and during the Bali Conference, see C. Spence, et al., Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change
Negotiation Process 17 (2) RECIEL 142-153 (2008).
149
Decision 1/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session in Report of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sixth session, held in Cancun
from 29 November to 10 December 2010, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 recital 5.
150
See Decision CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sixth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010,FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 recital 7. See also paragraph 9 where it is confirmed that Parties, especially developing country Parties that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the longterm cooperative action under the Convention, should be given full consideration.
151
Id., Para., 1. See also Decision -/CP.15 Copenhagen Accord Conference of the Parties Fifteenth session Copenhagen, 7 to 18 December 2009 Para., 1.
152
See Decision -/CP.17 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November
to 11 December 2011, FCCC/CP/2011/9.
153
Id., see for example Para., 7 where it is decided to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to
identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the
highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties.
148

16

4. CONCLUSION
It is the position of this paper that it has become imperative to amend the UNFCCC in a way
that defines CBDR154 for the benefit of enhancing fairness and effectiveness under the international climate change regime.155 A definition will resolve the problem of ambiguity surrounding its meaning. There is also a need to clarify the problem of beneficiaries. The categorisation of Parties into developed, developing and least developed does not seem to be
sufficiently effective in enhancing international cooperation among States to address climate
change.
The problem of transition from one category to another also needs to be resolved. The example of the Montreal Protocol156 is apposite, as it does not provide a grace-period for developing countries ad infinitum but rather provides that a country can benefit from the grace-period
only if its per capita consumption of ozone-depleting substances is below a specified level.157
Hence, once a country attains a level of development it automatically transits from that category.158
It would also be important to specify when responsibilities should be triggered under any
succeeding instrument to the Kyoto Protocol or through an amendment to the UNFCCC.
There should be clarity on how a benefiting State may trigger the transfer of technology or
funds to it for mitigation and adaptation activities. Conversely, there is need to expressly state
the circumstances under which a State may be required to either transfer technology or make
funds available for climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in vulnerable and poor
countries. Provisions should also be made as to the initiation of infraction proceedings against
a recalcitrant State by an aggrieved State.
The US must realise its insistence that developing countries should take on mitigation commitments is contrary to the objectives of CBDR as provided under the UNFCCC to which it
is a Party, as developing countries have sound reasons for insisting on leadership by their developed counterparts. They are poorer than developed countries; they have played a far
smaller role in creating the climate change problem and their emissions per person remain
much lower than those of developed countries.159
On the other hand, if any developing country is on the basis of any objective criteria capable
economically and technologically, such country could be required to take up mitigation and
adaptation actions.160 The sharing of responsibilities under the international climate change
regime should not be determined by politics. Instead, the principles of equity and justice that
underline CBDR should preponderate over the selfish interests of any State or group of
States.

154

T. Honkonen, note 124 above at 264.

AWG-LCA, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, Submissions from Parties (FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2, 14 August 2008, Submission by France on behalf of the
European Community and its Member States, 5.
156
Montreal Protocol, note 41 above.
157
Id., Article 5. Also see N.E. Bafundo, Compliance with the Ozone Treaty: Weak States and the Principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibility 21 Am. U. Intl L. Rev., 461, 469-470 (2005-2006).
158
Remarks by Susan Biniaz, note 54 above at 353.
159
See Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
2009) available at: http://cait.wri.org/. Also see M.M.Q. Mirza, Climate Change and extreme weather events:
can developing countries adapt? 3; Climate Policy 233 (2003).
160
See Halvorssen, note 83 above at 258-259.
155

17

Perhaps, a key to resolving the disagreements between developed and developing countries
would be the development of a widely accepted burden-sharing criteria founded on CBDR
which would incorporate equity and development as important factors in addressing climate
change.161

161

See J. Cao, Reconciling Human Development and Climate Protection: Perspectives from Developing Countries on Post-2012 International Climate Change Policy in The Harvard Project on International Climate
Agreements Discussion Paper 2008-25, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, December 2008), 7-9. For further discussions on how to apply CBDR equitably, see L. Ringuis, Differentiation, Leaders and fairness: Negotiating Climate Commitments in the European Community, vol. 8CICERO
Report 41-44(1997).

18