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Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC


Posted on September 10, 2012
G.R. No. 177597
July 16, 2008
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district ofMaguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on
October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion
of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of
votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to
one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1.
Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
Ruling:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5
ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU
must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create
LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of
the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria
established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is
complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces
and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least
2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of

Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it


proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution,
it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from
the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in
the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled
to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .


20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list
system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party

x additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b)
of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and
which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents,
as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of

the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then
it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or thePanganiban Formula from the
case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred
that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a partylist, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the partylist election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill
the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall benot more than 250 members of the lower house.
Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from partylist representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number
of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the
lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2%
to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are
given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then
deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to
garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33%
of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and
those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is
that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
694 SCRA 477 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party-List

System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC andBANAT vs
COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the partylist system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral

parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the partylist system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter
3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized
and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent
of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of

professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Aquino III V. Comelec
Apr. 7, 2010
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed
among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul
of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population
standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of
a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC


Jan. 25, 2010
Facts:
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000.

Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000
for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution
Ruling:
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of
Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was
issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection
with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of
Bulacan.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle
of every year.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is
3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the
population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be
based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135,
otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


Facts:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization

under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon
which it was dismissed on moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution,
stating that the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That
the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing,
such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these
are not publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution.
The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,
the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out
of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights
on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including

attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of
the people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election
to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL Case Digest

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS


PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes
IV was charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later,
Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term,
Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator.
The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to
work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape
and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within
the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his
mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does
not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when
the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution
and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24

membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at
the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on
May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007.
In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a
complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on
unending concessions and blanket authorizations

Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:


I.

THE FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City

Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon,
who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or

employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,


including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their
argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he
accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held thatthe
office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes
of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is
elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is
controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector
individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the


Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1,
2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine
National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of


the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to
the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some
provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II.

THE ISSUE
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the

constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.

THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the

Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]


NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it
is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the
case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment,
that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled,
as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A.
No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of
several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that
the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just
in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to
it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its
structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC
that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22,
1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the
1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the
Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to
organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of
July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international humanitarian law and
as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since
it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he
served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private
corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the
issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears
emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an
untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the
image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter
that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED
the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.

G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998


While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could
thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan
comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
number 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure
0
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much
less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by
a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority
is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to
select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system
such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority
party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other

officers as it may deem necessary. To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the
rules of its proceedings. xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing
the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the

Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a
coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To
repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997


Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
whichpetitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation
of
the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made
an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by
then
already
been
declared
by
the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of
the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where
private
rights
are
involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised

repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to
Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmea avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered
in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011 ]
RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO
NOGRALES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1 st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this,
her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her
Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs father. During the pendency of
the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing
declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,

notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a


proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This
is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong
asailed Paras petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the
HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed
with Limkaichong.
Issues:
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines
Held:
1.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Bancher motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the COMELECs Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
2.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time
of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a
proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide
a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latters
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
3.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.
The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore,
correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and
declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished


voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The
case of In re:Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally
elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered
as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935
Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010
Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House
of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.
CODILLA VS DE VENECIA
G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the
proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its
validity
Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating
Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles
owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or
corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so
Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the
Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered
disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for
Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a
Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally
elected Representative

RULING:
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The
said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the
timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used
as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no
jurisdiction in the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not
yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in
his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has
been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction
over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have
been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.

xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin
nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was
qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected
and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in
question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the
subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a
wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the
height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to
unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless
unproclaimed candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be
shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is
no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled
and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only
got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially
ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC
en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the
petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court
by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on
the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010
Abad, J.
FACTS:
In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting percentage
entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr.
is the first nominee of the said party-list group.
Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr. ,ErlindaCadapan,
Antonia Flores, and JoselitoUstarez are members of the other party-list groups filed with the
HRET a petition for quo warrantoagainst Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan. They alleged
that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative because he did not belong to
a marginalized and nderreprsented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over
his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the
House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before
the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner Palparans qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but the HRET
denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
held:
YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse of
Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be elected from legislative districts
and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are
elected into office, not their parties or organizations. Although it is the party-list organization
that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of
the House of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and districts representatives
are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his

qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.


Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected members of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan,
Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No.
189506,. February 11, 2010.
Case Digest: Lokin, Jr. & Planas v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808 : June 26, 2012
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.
SERENO,J.:
FACTS:
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws,
the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the
countrys public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking
and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20
November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the
COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys
acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted
by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vicepresident and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to

CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of
the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of
intent to participate is the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March
2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis
Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her
signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For
Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that
Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted
were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly
authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition,
ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared
respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration
separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions
findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of
Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts,
and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the
COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC
and the COA
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately
succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which
to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule
65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65
provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the
second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by

petitioners on 1 September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three
days it took petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of
27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this
Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the
required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the
COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of
its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The
Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on
Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers
and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of
the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court
also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties.
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their
individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof
state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or
coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a
list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office
or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.
No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election,
and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with
jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications
of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against
Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed
above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance
with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political
party or coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of
the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;

b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/
organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only
an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of
said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing
documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later
than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.
Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC
First Division and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-general was
an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit
any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative
authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court
AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of
Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes
it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test.
Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections,

challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.


Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional
imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test
is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for
Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
(4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
LAMP VS DBM SECRETARY
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for
2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have
banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore,
prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress

in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select
projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less
than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must
not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork
barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met
in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress
is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation
of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say
that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established.
Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves
the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for
rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of
Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to

the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of
the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual
Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process
remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208493);
NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO. 209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representatives district.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise
known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and
realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval
of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also


became involved in project identification.
The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called
Support for Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works
project or hard projects but also covered soft projects such as those which would fall under
education, health and livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel
was revived through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development
Fund.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF
was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing
agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and
congressmen could identify any kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings
and bridges to soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was
also the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of
Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance
and the House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from
the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs:
(i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF
required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds.
PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services
and other personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 20062010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a
provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators
were also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of
funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993.
The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced
from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone
into a dummy NGO.

ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the
re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a)separation of powers, (b) nondelegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners.
The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does
not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering
that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount
public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and
passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court
has the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the
government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue


Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because
the Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the interrelation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of
post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not
only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power
of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot
be exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be
exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on
a procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL


(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative
Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive department.
Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of
powers principle.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in
nature. They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has

been violated

The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to


individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled
in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them
determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of
lump-sum appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress
is incapable of checking itself or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of
the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or
the individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is


executing.

not self-

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties
for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local


autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments
in utilizing public funds for local development.
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents.
The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions
of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated
toassist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL


(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation
laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate
or determinable amount of money and(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount:
a Special Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development]
Board from any and all sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a
determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)

percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if
the aggregate gross earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue
delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
for the use of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since
the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment
Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of
waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in

fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of
the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to
name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from

the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution
to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is

ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner, vs NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INV
Case Digest:

On
April
18,
2008,
the
OSG
filed
respondents
reply,
reiterating
their position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a
conflict
of
legal
rights,
an
assertion
of
opposite
legal
claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic
or
based
on
extra-legal
or
other
similar
considerations
not
cognizable
by
a
court
of
justice.
Contrary
to
petitioners
contentions
that
these
declarations
made
by
officials
belonging
to
the
executive
branch
on
the
Philippine
Governments
decision
not
to
continue
with
the
ZTE-NBN
Project
are
self-serving,
hence,
inadmissible,
the
Court
has
no
alternative
but
to
take
judicial
notice
of
this
official
act
of
the
President
of
the
Philippines.
Section

1,

Rule

129

of

the

Rules

of

Court

provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take


judicial
notice,
without
introduction
of
evidence,
of
the
existence
and
territorial
extent
of
states,
their
political
history,
forms
of
government
and
symbols
of
nationality,
the
law
of
nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the
political
constitution
and
history
of
the
Philippines,
the
official
acts
of
the
legislative,
executive
and
judicial
departments
of
the
Philippines,
the
laws
of
nature,
the
measure
of
time,
and
the
geographical
divisions.
It
is
further
provided
in
the
above-quoted
rule
that
the
court
shall
take
judicial
notice
of
the
foregoing
facts
without
introduction
of
evidence.
Since
we
consider
the
act
of
cancellation
by
President
Macapagal-Arroyo
of
the
proposed
ZTE-NBN
Project
during
the
meeting
of
October
2,
2007
with
the
Chinese
President
in
China
as
an
official
act
of
the
executive
department,
the
Court
must
take
judicial
notice
of
such
official
act
without
need
of
evidence.
Judicial
power
presupposes
actual
controversies,
the
very
antithesis
of
mootness.
In
the
absence
of
actual
justiciable
controversies
or
disputes,
the
Court
generally
opts
to
refrain
from
deciding
moot
issues.
Where
there
is
no
more
live
subject
of
controversy,
the
Court
ceases
to
have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.
The
rule
is
well-settled
that
for
a
court
to
exercise
its
power
of
adjudication,
there
must
be
an
actual
case
or
controversy

one
which
involves
a
conflict
of
legal
rights,
an
assertion
of
opposite
legal
claims
susceptible

of
judicial
resolution;
the
case
must
not
be
moot
or
academic
or
based
on
extra-legal
or
other
similar
considerations
not
cognizable
by
a
court
of
justice.
Where
the
issue
has
become
moot
and
academic,
there
is
no
justiciable
controversy,
and
an
adjudication
thereon
would
be
of
no
practical
use
or
value
as
courts
do
not
sit
to
adjudicate
mere
academic
questions
to
satisfy
scholarly
interest,
however
intellectually
challenging.
Let
it
be
clarified
legislation
cannot
be
a judicial finding of facts.

that
the

the
basis

Senate
investigation
in
of
Our
decision
which

aid
of
requires

BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE


203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in
Aid of Legislation When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may
unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right
to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and
that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights,
and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al
filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive
relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to
the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
ROMERO, II VS ESTRADA
G.R. No. 174105
Promulgated:
April 2, 2009
Petitioners:
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ,
REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME
R. CANLAS
Respondent:
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
Ponente:
VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were
invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid
the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042 other known as the
Migrant Workers Act.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?
HELD
YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 11:55 PM
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995

Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa Rivera, Chief of the Records; Jose T.
Almonte, EIIB Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal Management Division
Chief; Respondent: Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum
was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous
activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum
to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest
of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion,
dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can
be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY


384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.


HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
AKBAYAN VS AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the
sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of
strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up
of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on
investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by
the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by
Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on
the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious
concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in
the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations
with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity
as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of
the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted
from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine
government is justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of
Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The
Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to
compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al
to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation

process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to
the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the
said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court
lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for
access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while
the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the
parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It
is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a
process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of
lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to
protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal
that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of
executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point
that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply
of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by
the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees
and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by
the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate
v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any
way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation
and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive
and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception
only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

SABIO VS GORDON
504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies
and their effective implementation.
Senate v. Executive Secretary Digest

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Facts:

1.

Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by
the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that
said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain
the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations
including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all
classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers
covered by the EO.

2.

The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of


the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging

the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

3.

Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the


hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this
development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved
for defying the Presidents order.

4.

Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group),
for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.

1.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the


Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry
with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on
others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held
in Arnault case.

2.

Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. It is defined by
Schwartz as the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the
courts and the Congress. (e.g. state secret privilege, informers privilege, generic
privilege)

3.

The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under


Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

4.

Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch


whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
That is impermissible.

5.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty
to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6.

A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the
legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of
the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight
function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

7.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the president on whom the executive power is vested,
hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment.
Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of
separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence
of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the


Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be

construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the


question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The
reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted,
as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

9.

Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464,
therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President
has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether
the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It
severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464
is, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means then by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our
legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHL VS QUEZON CITY


G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative Department;
Taxation ]
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks
exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the
land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution.
The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor.
Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under
Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was
likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the
1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.
2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock
corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office

of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The
purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general
including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD
1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of
subsidies granted by the government.
2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes
only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to
be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable
institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt
from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

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