People vs Barasina

A complaint was filed against accused Elias Barasina for violation of P.D. 1866 and
murder. It was around 6:40 in the evening of July 17, 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of
Olongapo City succumbed to a single bullet on his side of his face fired from an
unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while he was walking at the VIP parking lot of the Victory
Liner Compound at Caloocan City. According to the People, it was herein accusedappellant who was accountable therefor, resulting in his being charged with the
separate misdeeds of illegal possession of a firearm and murder. Several witnesses
also attested to the incident that happened. During the said investigation, Norberto
Surara, the Chief of the Homicide Section of the Kalookan City Police Force confirmed
that he assigned Pfc. del Rosario to take the sworn statement of the accused. He also
confirmed that he directed that Atty. Abelardo Torres be fetched to act as counsel of the
accused during the investigation. He introduced Atty. Torres to the accused and after
this, the accused accepted the services of Atty. Torres He executed a sworn statement
on his participation in the execution of the sworn statement of the accused.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial statement cannot be utilized against him for want of
competent, independent counsel of his own choice.
2. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to claim that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?
Held:
1. The claim of herein appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his own choice,
is belied by records. During the custodial investigation, he failed to indicate in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney of his
own preference before speaking or giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing
that he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. We are thus
inclined to agree with the Solicitor General that the hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as
counsel by the appellant after the custodial investigation is an afterthought.

Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense.
2. On the merits of the case, there is no need to re-emphasize accused-appellant's
culpability derived from the positive open court declarations of the People's witnesses
since the details indicating accused-appellant's participation have been sufficiently
demonstrated to such a degree as to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. In the light of the mass of positive evidence adduced by the prosecution
below when juxtaposed with accused-appellant's naked assertion of denial, coupled
with the strange and bizarre behavior of accused-appellant in allegedly picking up a gun
dropped by the imaginary gunman, attempting to return it to said gunman, and when the
killer would not stop, firing a round to call his attention, we have no recourse but to
agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, on account of the
elementary axiom in adjective law that affirmative, and, categorical testimony is stronger
than negative testimony as stated in People vs. Angeles.
The efficacy of accused-appellant's own version that he merely picked up the gun which
supposedly fell from a stranger who bumped appellant, presumably for the purpose of
returning the firearm to its rightful owner had been adequately diminished by Prudencio
Motos who sat on the witness stand to particularly say that nobody bumped accusedappellant near the LRT station at Kalookan City.