COMMONWEALTH ACT No.

63
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR
REACQUIRED
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided,
however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic
of the Philippines is at war with any country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,That
the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only
in connection with his service to said foreign
country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the
armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of
naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.1

The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the

acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino
citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly
democratic Ibero-American countries or from the
United Kingdom shall not produce loss or forfeiture of
his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country
grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had
been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines
and the foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired.2
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.
Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant
possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in
section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and
twenty-seven,3
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air
Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship
by reason of her marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this
Act after the termination of the marital status;4 and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. The procedure prescribed for
naturalization under Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply to
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
naturalization provided for in the next preceding
section: Provided, That the qualifications and special
qualifications prescribed in section three and four of
said Act shall not be required: And provided, further,
(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of
age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least
six months before he applies for naturalization;
(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living; and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his
intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all
faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely
taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth6of the Philippines and registration in
the proper civil registry.
Section 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the
necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of
this Act. Naturalization blanks and other blanks
required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall
be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor General,
subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 21, 1936.

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COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473

3.

Being married to a Filipino woman;

4.

Having been engaged as a teacher in the

Philippines in a public or recognized private
school not established for the exclusive
instruction of children of persons of a particular
nationality or race, in any of the branches of
education or industry for a period of not less
than two years;

5.

Having been born in the Philippines.

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION,
AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR
HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
Section 1. Title of Act. This Act shall be known and
may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of
this Act, any person having the following qualifications
may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age
on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation
with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot

be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a.

Persons opposed to organized government or

affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;

b.

Persons defending or teaching the necessity or

propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;

c.

Polygamists or believers in the practice of

polygamy;

d.

Persons convicted of crimes involving moral

turpitude;

e.

Persons suffering from mental alienation or

incurable contagious diseases;

f.

Persons who, during the period of their

residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;

g.

Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the

United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;

h.

Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other

than the United States 3whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines

worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or
Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of
continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be
understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:
1.

Having honorably held office under the

Government of the Philippines or under that of
any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
political subdivisions thereof;

2.

Having established a new industry or

introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;

Section 5. Declaration of intention. One year prior to

the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall
file with the Bureau of Justice4 a declaration under oath
that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name,
age, occupation, personal description, place of birth,
last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of
arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in
which he came to the Philippines, and the place of
residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful
entry for permanent residence has been established
and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner
of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also
state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in
any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines,

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where Philippine history, government, and civics are

taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each
declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make
a declaration of intention. Persons born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to
any race or nationality, and those who have
resided continuously in the Philippines for a
period of thirty years or more before filing their
application, may be naturalized without having to
make a declaration of intention upon complying with
the other requirements of this Act. To such
requirements shall be added that which
establishes that the applicant has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in the
public schools or in private schools recognized
by the Government and not limited to any race
or nationality. The same shall be understood
applicable with respect to the widow and minor
children of an alien who has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he
is actually naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with
the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner,
setting forth his name and surname; his present and
former places of residence; his occupation; the place
and date of his birth; whether single or married and the
father of children, the name, age, birthplace and
residence of the wife and of each of the children; the
approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines,
the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he
remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came;
a declaration that he has the qualifications required by
this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of
section five of this Act; and that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by
the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported
by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating
that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines
for the period of time required by this Act and a person
of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is
not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this
Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and
post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the
case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of
intention must be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.The Court of First
Instance of the province in which the petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the

filing of the petition shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.Immediately
upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the
clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in
the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of
general circulation in the province where the petitioner
resides, and to have copies of said petition and a
general notice of the hearing posted in a public and
conspicuous place in his office or in the building where
said office is located, setting forth in such notice the
name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the
date and place of his arrival in the Philippines, the
names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes
to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of
the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be
held within ninety days from the date of the last
publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as
possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence,
the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data
to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of
Justice,8 the Provincial Inspector9 of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province and the justice of the
peace10 of the municipality wherein the petitioner
resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.No petition shall
be heard within the thirty days preceding any election.
The hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-General,
either himself or through his delegate or the provincial
fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the
Commonwealth11 of the Philippines at all the
proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing,
the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that
the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and
none of the disqualifications specified in this Act and
has complied with all requisites herein established, it
shall order the proper naturalization certificate to be
issued and the registration of the said naturalization
certificate in the proper civil registry as required in
section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand seven
hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.The final sentence may, at the
instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the
Supreme Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization.If, after the lapse of thirty days from
and after the date on which the parties were notified of
the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal,
the decision of the court has been confirmed by the
Supreme Court,14 and the said decision has become
final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition
shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization certificate
which shall, among other things, state the following:
The file number of the petition, the number of the
naturalization certificate, the signature of the person
naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of the
court, the personal circumstances of the person
naturalized, the dates on which his declaration of
intention and petition were filed, the date of the
decision granting the petition, and the name of the
judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the
petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court

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which granted the petition, must be affixed to the

certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the
petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath:
"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to
the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this time I am a
subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Commonwealth15of the
Philippines; [and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto;16 and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.The clerk of the court
shall keep two books; one in which the petition and
declarations of intention shall be recorded in
chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof from
the filing of the petition to the final issuance of the
naturalization certificate; and another, which shall be a
record of naturalization certificates each page of which
shall have a duplicate which shall be duly attested by
the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.
Section 14. Fees.The clerk of the Court of First
Instance shall charge as fees for recording a petition
for naturalization and for the proceedings in connection
therewith, including the issuance of the certificate, the
sum of thirty pesos.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each
appeal and for the services rendered by him in
connection therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and
children.Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law
who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines
at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a
foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines
at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed
a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when
still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the
naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the
age of majority, he fails to register himself as a

Philippine citizen at the fault of their parents either by

neglecting to support them or by transferring them to
another school or schools. A certified copy of the
decree cancelling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department
of the Interior20 and the Bureau of Justice.
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has
allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.
Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.Any
person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge,
change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the
same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely
making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a
naturalization certificate for the purpose of making use
thereof, or in order that the same may be used by
another person or persons, and any person who shall
purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of the provisions
of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
five thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than five years, or both, and in the case that the
person convicted is a naturalized citizen his certificate
of naturalization and the registration of the same in the
proper civil registry shall be ordered cancelled.
Section 20. Prescription.No person shall be
prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense
implying a violation of the provisions of this Act, unless
the information or complaint is filed within five years
from the detection or discovery of the commission of
said offense.
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.The Secretary of
Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the
proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization
certificate blanks and other blanks required for
carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared
and furnished by the Solicitor-General, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 22. Repealing clause.Act Numbered Twentynine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by Act
Numbered Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled
"The Naturalization Law", is repealed: Provided, That
nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any
prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings brought, or
any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or
existing before the taking effect of this Act, but as to all
such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts,
things, or matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed
or amended by this Act are continued in force and
effect.
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.This
Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, June 17, 1939.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 - AN ACT PROVIDING

FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY

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RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING

COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 18, 1960

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 June 5, 1975

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost
their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is
deemed under the law to have renounced her
Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said Constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended)
allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their
citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only
after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to reacquire Philippine citizenship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested
by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that:
1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying
with the Special Committee on Naturalization created
by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration
and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate
of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the

appropriate forms and the required fees for the

effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

Republic Act 8171

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and naturalborn Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided,
That the applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon
for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral
turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or
incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Signed: October 23, 1995

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139

June 08, 2001

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY

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ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as
"The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall
control and regulate the admission and integration of
aliens into its territory and body politic including the
grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens
born and residing in the Philippines may be granted
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings
subject to certain requirements dictated by national
security and interest.

(a) Those opposed to organized government or

affiliated with any association of group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;

Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of

the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of
the benefits of this Act must meet the following
qualifications:

(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in

the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipinos;

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and

residing therein since birth;

(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at

war, during the period of such war; and

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18)

years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws

do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and

believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her
entire period of residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the duly constituted government as well
as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary
and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution dully recognized by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught
and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and
where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor
children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them
in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she
derives income sufficient for his/her support and if
he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of
his/her family:Provided, however, That this shall not
apply to applicants who are college degree holders but
are unable to practice their profession because they
are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak
Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos
and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not
qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this
Act:

Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person

desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5)
copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and
verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized
photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and
setting forth the following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other
name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of
residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names
and citizenship of his/her parents and their residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or
occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or
his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner shall
state the date and place of his/her marriage, and the
name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and
residence of his/her spouse; and if his marriage is
annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage
and the court which granted the same;
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and
birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under
this Act;

Page | 6

(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a

public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and
honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to
renounce absolutely and forever any prince, potentate,
State or sovereign, and particularly the country of
which the applicant is a citizen or subject.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's birth certificate;
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native
born certificate of residence;
(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death
certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court
decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;
(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth
certificates, alien certificate of registration or native
born certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's minor
children, wherever applicable;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and
sworn statements on the good moral character of the
petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good
reputation in his/her place of residence stating that
they have personally known the petitioner for at least a
period of ten (10) years and that said petitioner has in
their own opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of
prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and
that he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS);
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the
petitioner in the schools he attended in the Philippines.
Should the petitioner have minor children, a
certification that his children are enrolled in a school
where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught and are part of the curriculum; and

Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee

on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has
all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications,
may file an application for naturalization with the
secretariat of the Special Committee on Naturalization,
and a processing fee of Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped
to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding
docket number. Within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine
whether the petition is complete in substance and in
form. If such petition is complete, the Committee shall
immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition
indicating the name, qualifications and other personal
circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in
any public or conspicuous area. The Committee shall
immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar
of the petitioner's place of residence and tile National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and
its supporting documents. These agencies shall have
copies of the petition posted in any public or
conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and
premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a
report stating whether or not petitioner has any
derogatory record on file or any such relevant and
material information which might be adverse to
petitioner's application for citizenship.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting
in substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the
agencies which were furnished a copy of the petition or
the date of the last publication of the petition,
whichever comes in later, the Committee shall consider
and review all relevant and material information it has
received pertaining to the petition, and may, for the
purpose call the petitioner for interview to ascertain
his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its
annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the
statements and declarations made in the petition and
its annexes.

(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the

past three (3) years.

If the Committee shall have received any information

adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the
petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information.

Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. There shall be constituted a Special Committee on

Naturalization herein referred to as the "Committee",
with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, or his representative, and the National
Security Adviser, as members, with the power to
approve, deny or reject applications for naturalization
as provided in this Act.

Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the

facts before it, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required
for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve
the petition and henceforth, notify the petitioner of the
fact of such approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall
disapprove the same.

The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to

consider applications for naturalization. For this
purpose, the chairman and members shall receive an
honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and
One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00),
respectively, per meeting attended.

Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization

Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the notice of the approval of his/her petition,
the applicant shall pay to the Committee a
naturalization fee of One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty

Page | 7

thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the taking of the

oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
forthwith, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued.
Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the
certificate, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment
of the required naturalization processing fee and
certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to
take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said
period of time, the approval of the petition shall be
deemed abandoned.
Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his
oath of allegiance as required in the preceding section,
the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to
the proper local civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall
cancel the alien certificates of registration of the
applicant.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. After the approval of the petition for administrative
naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien
certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife
and minor children may file a petition for cancellation
of their alien certificates of registration with the
Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization
fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as
follows: Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the
approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor
Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the
approval of her petition for administrative
naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her
minor children may file a petition for cancellation of
their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject
to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of
Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel
certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in
the following cases:
(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly
authorized representative made any false statement or
misrepresentation or committed any violation of law,
rules and regulations in connection with the petition for
naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine
citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of
naturalization shall be cancelled;
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his
minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship by virtue
of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years next
following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish
permanent residence in a foreign country, that
individual's certificate of naturalization or acquired
citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's
remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of
origin, or two (2) years in any foreign country, shall be
considered prima facie evidence of intent to
permanently reside therein;

(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with

acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be
used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or
legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a
condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege, the certificate of naturalization
or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked;
and
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with
acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to
national security, the certificate of naturalization or
acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary
title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make
an express renunciation of his title or membership in
this order of nobility before the Special Committee or
its duly authorized representative, and such
renunciation shall be included in the records of his
application for citizenship.
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall
fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or
cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall
purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging,
falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization
certificate issued under this proceeding for the purpose
of making use thereof, or in order that the same may
be used by another person or persons, and any person
who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining
a naturalization certificate in violation of this Act, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment
for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that
the person convicted is a naturalized citizen, his
certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier
cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered
cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her
birth with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
may, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this
Act, file a petition for the acquisition of the Philippine
citizenship:Provided, That the applicant possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under this Act and subject to the requirements of
existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An
amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the
filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant to
Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the
Philippines Law Center and another twenty-five percent
(25%) shall be allotted for the publication of the Journal
of the House of Representatives. Said amount shall be
treated as receipts automatically appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be needed for the proper implementation of the
provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of
existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

Page | 8

Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section

or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not
affected thereby shall continue to be in force and
effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Republic Act No. 9225

August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH
ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that
I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.

political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities

and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage
must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby
shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.

G.R. No. 195649

July 2, 2013

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried

child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y
CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and

Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and

SERENO, J.:

RESOLUTION

Page | 9

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration

filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May
20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local
officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already
ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has
successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion
for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm
the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado
never qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support
his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated
April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his
accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of
Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the
efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship
and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of the United States as having the
effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
and thus claims that he was divested of his American
citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all
the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was
still able to use his US passport after executing his
Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws,1 which must be presented as public
documents2 of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice
for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to
cite any law of the United States "providing that a
person who is divested of American citizenship thru an
Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American
citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation."4

citizenship and who seek elective public office, to

renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to
run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a
foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a
foreign state of the individual as its national even
after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship,
is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority
decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is
a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport
proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to
the Philippines and that he renounced his American
citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing
his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport
at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the
efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that
the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the
oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has
sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do
so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the
act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction.

Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
calls for application in the case before us, given the
fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his
own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the
application of this law and not of any foreign law that
serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run
for any local elective position.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left

Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1 On the
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have
more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say
that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision
merely points out is that he also possessed another
citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy

of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains
to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of

administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence.8 They are accorded not only great respect
but even finality, and are binding upon this Court,

Page | 10

unless it is shown that the administrative body had

arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary
conclusion had such evidence been properly
appreciated.9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC
First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport
at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En
Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S.
passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados
claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those
occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet
issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was
able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for
his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31
January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May
2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates
indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on
23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using
his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated
therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding
these two travel dates to the travel record provided by
the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also
presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure
on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon
departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24
November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the
US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his
use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by
the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport
was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnados
travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport
on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23
March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a
misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his
Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts
contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the
principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual
citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce
their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using
their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively
junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at
issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission
in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only
in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the
armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the
said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled
to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled

Page | 11

to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a

Filipino citizen x x x.

who are from birth with out having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he

reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article
IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his

Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution
dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased
being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire
his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed
the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition
could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a
natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer
be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same
by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927),
and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during
the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left
the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules;
or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of
the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of

Page | 12

initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization

is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17and
none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to
RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had
last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630,
which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at

birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing

that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no
longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform
an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the
term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article
III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be
considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any
act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age
of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and
had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of
the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act
to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as naturalborn. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would
either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests

Page | 13

relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of

the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction
over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In
the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision
of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for
that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did
not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private
Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a naturalborn Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a
member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on
April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino
parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant
to Section 1 (2),1 Article IV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any
act to acquire or perfect the Philippine
citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with
Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent
rendered military service to the United States Marine
Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June
5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in
connection with his US military service. Consequently,
under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private
respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to
regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994,
availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No.
2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by
Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the
Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same
with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an
Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of
his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had
reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen?
I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I
believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery
of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a
person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire"
it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this
method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the
recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of
certain condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition
by describing the ordinary or common usage
ofrepatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of
origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x." 7 In relation to
our subject matter, repatriation, then,
means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of
a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or
original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own
again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US
citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he
"reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule
otherwise that Cruz became a non-natural-born
citizen would not be consistent whit the legal and
ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new
citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the
with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship,
should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x
x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor
of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born
citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private
respondent should be deemed natural-born, because
was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) naturalborn citizens and (2) naturalized citizens.10 While CA 63
provides that citizenship may also be acquired by
direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who
do become citizens through such procedure would
properly fall under the second category (naturalized).11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who
had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early
case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born

Page | 14

citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the

moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the
concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973
Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in
order that a Filipino citizen may be considered "naturalborn": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from
birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to
acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.13 Thus,
under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of
"natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship.14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the
scope of natural-born citizens to include "[t]hose who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those
covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered naturalborn citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent being
clearly and concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does
not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire
theiroriginal classification before the loss of their
Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman
Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he
reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he
regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely
abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is
a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a
member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this
certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to
determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power
to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it
differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot
substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an
independent, constitutional body with its own specific
mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective
Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of Congress "shall
be thesole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications their respective
members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that
the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the
legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their
judgment are beyond judicial interference, unless

rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words
of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of
trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it
has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact
effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the
legal and common definition of repatriation is the
reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can
the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At
best, I can concede that the legal definition is not
judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded o
reason one way or the other cannot be the source of
grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution
or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was
definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the
HRET the power to be the sole judge of the
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent
any clear showing of a manifest violation of the
Constitution or the law or nay judicial decision, this
Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the
HRET in the latter's actions on matters over which full
discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our
fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree
with the conclusion of public respondent, we
cannot ipso factoattribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived
error and grave abuse.21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and
purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision
upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could
not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive.
Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such
exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear
and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot
supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of
Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the
District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and
unequivocally voted for private respondent to
represent them in the House of Representatives. The

Page | 15

votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections

were much more than those of all his opponents
combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible
doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning
candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to
defeat the will of the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine
that in case of doubt, political laws must be so
constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.25 Public
interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be
the paramount considerations in election
controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of
the people's choice than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms.27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote."28
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as
politically, is towards globalization. 29 Protectionist
barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past,
governments frowned upon the opening of their doors
to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as
their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal
perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship
eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to
exploit local resources for themselves. They are now
being considered potential sources of developmental
skills, know-how and capital.1wphi1.nt
More so should our government open its doors to
former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to
rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They
are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are
actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who
want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and
apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of
the great economic or social opportunities there.
Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens
desirous of not simply returning to the country or
regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the
Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino
is private respondent who, in only a year after being
absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years,
was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one

term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to

be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive
and parochial interpretation of the law bar the
sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the
legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of
Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that
private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born
citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a
member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the
rights, privileges and immunities of citizens have
given rise to some of the most disputations and
visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is
taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters
to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio
Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan because he does not
posses the constitutional requirement of being a
natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the
other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to
Congress considering that by repatriation, he reacquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the
Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents,
spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5,
1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces
and served the United States Marine Corps. While in
the service for almost five years, he applied for
naturalization with the US District Court of Northern
District of California and was issued his Certificate of
Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen.
On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged
from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to
the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act
providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service
to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the
United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath
was registered with the Local Civil Registry of

Page | 16

Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he

executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation
of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582)
and issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by
the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the
United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.

citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had

ceased being such in view of the loss and renuciation
of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly
acquire his Philippine citizenship.

In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of

candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He
won and served as mayor for one term.

"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of

Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status."

Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a

seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a
natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of
26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not

respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen of the
Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in

the congressional race in the Second District of
Pangasinan.

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:

Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad

Cautelam with the House of Representative Electoral
not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not
qualified to run as a member of the House of
Representatives. That he should be a natural-born
citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall
be a member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties
of their respective memoranda and supplemental
memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that
Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his
repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected
representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is
DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby
DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory,
let notices and copies thereof be sent to the President
of the Philippines; the House of Representatives,
through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit,
through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was
denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born

"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are

citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing
interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in
the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth"
indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point
and must be continuous, constant and without
interruption. The Constitution does not extend the
privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to
respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss
of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all
the benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural-born"
citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994,
he had to comply with requirements for repatriation,
thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional
definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part,
respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth"
refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic
of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino
from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition
of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born
citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase
"from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was
born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born
Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his
reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been
regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in
its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that
status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In

Page | 17

Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court

traces the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty
of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and
March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of
the former with a proviso which reads:

Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position

when it pronounced that the definition of natural-born
citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers
to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of
the same Article, to wit:

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby

authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of
the United States and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the
United State under the laws of the United State, if
residing therein."

"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

It was further held therein that under the said

provision, "every person born the 11th of April, of
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and
who continued to reside in this country are at the
moment of their birth ipso factocitizens of the
Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President
William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission,
considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental
law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or
"inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of
the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born
citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902.3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of naturalborn, was initially a loose or even non-existent
qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of
certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict
and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the
years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that
Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either
the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens
of the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children
born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized
according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only
later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus
soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its
incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to
those who intended, and actually continued, to belong
to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its
conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom
citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything
to acquire full citizenship.5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was
natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in the
Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically
restored to that status when he subsequently
reacquired his citizenship after losing it.

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above
enumeration, there are only two classes of citizens,
i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent
Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of
the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as " those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION
IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES,
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship be rendering service to, or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he
could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to take
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of
Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his
American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born
citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and
constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the
intention of the framers and of the people who adopted
it. Words appearing in Constitution are used according
to their plain, natural, and usual significance and
import and must be understood in the sense most

Page | 18

obvious to the common understanding of the people at

the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than
what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in
general language which may call for construction of
what the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration,6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of
Constitution begins with the language of the document
itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning, except where technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible, should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the
Constitution must be applied to this petition according
to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship through any of these modes:
(naturalization, repatriation and legislation under
Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of
previous status, either as a natural-born or a
naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends
to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization,
repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can
not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to
perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in
the instant case, concurred in by Justice A.R. Melo:8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the
original nationally upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. While an applicant need not have to
undergo the tedious and time consuming process
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, s
amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make
an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting
his adopted state and reaffirming his total and
exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2,
Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not
have to perform any act at all or go through any
process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to
reacquire his citizenship. willoughby opines that a
natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim
citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of
a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the
term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who
have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of

the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and

those who have been accorded by the 1935
Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the
Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public
office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the
"stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed
as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute
and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall
be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of
the government directly involved and given the
dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first
constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later
adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in
Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those '
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine
citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has
declared that where the laws speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is
only room for application. The phrase 'from birth
indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship
and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and
without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress
as the Constitution requires that a member of the
House of Representative must be a "natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to
provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for
higher elective offices, including that of the office of a
Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have
simply provided that a candidate for such position can
be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of
local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935
Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by
the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United
States) guide and governs the interpretation of
Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and
bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of
natural-born citizenship was applicable to the President
and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a citizen
for only five (5) years could be elected to the National
Assembly.11Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution
was amended did natural-born citizenship become a
requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five
(5) years could still be appointed Justice of the
Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court.14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning
and application of the requirement of being natural-

Page | 19

born have become more narrow and qualified over the

years.

by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for

his return to the United States.

Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members

of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of
the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the
chairmen and members of the Constitutional
Commission and the majority of members of the
cabinet must be natural-born citizens.16 The 1987
Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies
and the members of the Commission on Human Rights
to those who must be natural-born citizens.17

The Facts

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses

the historical trend and clear intendment of the
Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier
approach to the meaning and import of natural born
citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a
doctrine embodied in no less that the
constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and
constitutional definition of a "natural born Filipino
citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished
through a constitutional amendment. Clearly
respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure
whereby his citizenship has been restored. He can run
for public office where natural-born citizenship is not
mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices
which the Constitution has reserved only for naturalborn Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the
petition.1wphi1.nt
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief
Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning
value when he wrote that "it is mans basic right for it
is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person
loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen
fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the
applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be
granted simply based on the vagaries of the former
Filipino citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by
the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano
Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued

The facts as culled by the CA from the records show

that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when
petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo
Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United
States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived
from that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6), petitioner also
acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995,
and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by
agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996,
pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay,
Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID
Detention Center in Manila.7
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty.
Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of
the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa
was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1,
Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge
sheet which alleged:
1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner
herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin
Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy,
informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No.
053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S.
Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an
undocumented and undesirable alien and may be
summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence
Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation
(Exhibit 3). 8
The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S.
passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San
Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie
Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the
Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked
because he is the subject of an outstanding federal
warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He
is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section
12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in
violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9
The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country
of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the
following summary deportation order:

Page | 20

Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F.

Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila,
filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and
deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner
Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for
several federal charges has been issued against him,
and that the respondents Passport No. 053854189 has
been revoked.
By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order
No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the
respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R.
No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461], 30 May
1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign
embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not
reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the
privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office
Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989,
summary deportation proceedings lie where the
passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his
privilege to remain in the country. 10
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas
Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that
he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of
arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration
authorities before a final order of deportation is made;
that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was
made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to
admission or to a change of his immigration status as a
non-quota immigrant because he is married to a
Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old
due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa,
in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already
35 years old. 12
On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent
Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June
3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention,
and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting
him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before
the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both
parties ten (10) days within which to file their
memoranda, after which the case would be considered
submitted for decision. 13Meanwhile, the Commissioner
of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary
release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with
Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he
is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or
detained by the respondent Bureau. 15

The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied

Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally
and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino
citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that
although he became an American citizen by derivative
naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968,
there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine
citizenship "on account of political or economic
necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171
the law governing the repatriation of natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit
does not state that political or economic necessity was
the compelling reason for petitioners parents to give
up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the
court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not
dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the
United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the
various warrants issued for his arrest by the United
States court. The court a quo noted that after
petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29,
1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of
Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13,
1996more than ten months after his arrival in the
country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court
considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch
effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the
United States. The appellate court concluded that his
only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is
to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of
America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against
Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has
validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be
summarily deported for his being an undocumented
alien.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of
persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided
in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Page | 21

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or

propriety of violence, personal assault, or association
for the predominance of their ideas;

"repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA

8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the
time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral

turpitude; or

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who

left the country due to political or economic necessity.
Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation
of law and not due to political or economic exigencies.
It was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization. The decision was his parents and not
his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who
could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign
country due to political and economic reasons, and
extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of
repatriation.

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable

contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino
who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of
political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children
who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under
RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino,
and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to naturalborn Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This
means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic
reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. This includes a situation where a
former Filipino subsequently had children while he was
a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically
vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus
sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the children acquire
the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born
Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the
children must be of minor age at the time the petition
for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because
a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of
civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political
act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the
minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner
was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a
minor, his father was naturalized as an American
citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to
believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as
a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country
due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of

repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly
reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
(Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant
to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of
the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He
has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special
Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was
designated to process petitions for repatriation
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No.
285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
Section 1. Composition.The composition of the
Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor
General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director-General of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall
remain as constituted.
Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating
or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No.
8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on
Naturalization which shall process the same. If their
applications are approved[,] they shall take the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is
hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required
fees for the processing of petitions.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take
effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing
RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999,
applicants for repatriation are required to submit
documents in support of their petition such as their
birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim

Page | 22

to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were

imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications
of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for
the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then,
executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he
registered, together with the certificate of live birth,
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of
such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already
in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995
Memorandum issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN
to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was
issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a
confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat
v. Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed
a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for
repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to
prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his
affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic reasons. It is notable that under the
Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to
set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner
lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in
case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or
economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of
the latter, such political or economic necessity should
be specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in
ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove
that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the
reference to political or economic reasons is "merely
descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted
reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest
intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of
repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens.
The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725
(P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975
amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the
same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to
repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account
of political or economic necessity" in relation to
natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA
8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the
application of the law only to political or economic
migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their
citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more

evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep.

Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin
of RA 8171, to wit:
Ms. Domingo: x x x
From my experience as the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that
there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the
country.
The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who
go abroad to work because there is no work to be
found in the country. Then we have the "political
refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives
because they are not in consonance with the prevailing
policy of government. The third type is those who have
committed crimes and would like to escape from the
punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those
Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby
seeking other citizenship elsewhere.
Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first
two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather
out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a
safer abode for themselves and their families. It is for
these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being
proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxxx
x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short
sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who
leave their country. And the two typesthe economic
and political refugeesare the ones being addressed
by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino
women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We
had a lot of problems with these people who left the
country because of political persecution or because of
pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they
should come back to the country and get back their
citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs
of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to
get their citizenship back because they are treated no
different from any other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the
sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in
crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded
out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned
their country for reasons other than political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his
political or economic reasons since the act of
renouncing allegiance to ones native country
constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of
his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of
Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot
therefore be said to be for any reason other than
political or economic necessity." 27
This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones
native country is necessarily a political act, it does not

Page | 23

follow that the act is inevitably politically or

economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To
reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos
relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship
speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo
illustrates that aside from economic and political
refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country
because they have committed crimes and would like to
escape from punishment, and those who really feel
that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a
better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship
elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA
8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the
satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of
citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit
their Philippine citizenship for political or economic
exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and
thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege
granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987
Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides
that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law. The State has the power to
prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and
requirements for repatriation. It has the power to
determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the
requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of
the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who
can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant,
like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said
requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the
petition for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary
deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he
has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he
is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to
repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that
his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of
the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board
IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in
cases where the charge against the alien is
overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his
government of his passport. In cases involving
overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall
merely require the presentation of the aliens valid
passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the
alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the
alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under
the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann
v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be
86461], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the
privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such

instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue

summary judgment of deportation which shall be
immediately executory. 28
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor
Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the
Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents.
One of these documents is a valid passport. There are,
of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant
refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or
otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the
alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat
people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples.
However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the
Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper
authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the
questioned summary judgment. x x x 29
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after
his admission into the country, became an
undocumented alien who can be summarily deported.
His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such
deportation especially considering that he has no legal
and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED,
and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals isAFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.SO
ORDERED.

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B.

MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO,
ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN,
ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V.
OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D.
NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,
- versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual
citizens, pray that they and others who retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail
themselves of the mechanism provided under
theOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003[1] (R.A.
9189) and that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to
vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of
R.A. 9189.
The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to

Page | 24

such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.

Long before the May 2004 national and local elections,
petitioners sought registration and certification
as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs
dated September 23, 2003[2], they have yet no right to
vote in such elections owing to their lack of the oneyear residence requirement prescribed by the
Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the
different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue
their campaign for voters registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely
certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote
in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida NicolasLewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs.
COMELEC [3] on the residency requirement, the
COMELEC wrote in response:
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that
those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the
right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason
that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as
Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship
on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and
jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular
voters who have to meet the requirements of
residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of
the Constitution. [4]
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in
the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal
to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., [5] filed on April 1,
2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections,
or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment,
[6]
therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may
be expected, petitioners were not able to register let
alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment),
therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right
of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the
petition moot and academic.[7]
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the
OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot
and academic, but insofar only as petitioners
participation in such political exercise is concerned.
The broader and transcendental issue tendered or
subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing
duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in
future elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and
the COMELECs respective formulations of the
issues, the same may be reduced into the question of
whether or not petitioners and others who might have
meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine

citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as

absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative,
and thereby accords merit to the petition.
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at
the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is,
therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the
Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippinesfor at least one year and
in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes
residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for
the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2
authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an
absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may,
as an exception to the residency prescription in the
preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted
R.A. 9189 - the OAVL[8] - identifying in its Section 4 who
can vote under it and in the following section who
cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of
the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age
on the day of elections, may vote for president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be
disqualified from voting under this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Philippine laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their
Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance
to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final
judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, including those who have been found guilty of
Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code, .;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be

Page | 25

the cause for the removal of the name of the

immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously
declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority . (Words in bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail
themselves of the absentee voting mechanism.
However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another
country opens an exception and qualifies the
disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face
a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as
narrated in Macalintal, it - violates Section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an
election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals [9] to support his claim [where] the Court held
that a green card holder immigrant to the [US] is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence
in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise;
that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the
right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which
in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He
claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted
to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket
added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on
the strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized
as such in the host country because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of one's residence in his country of
origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and
permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as
long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of
the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2
of Article V that allcitizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to
exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must
establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if
actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required,
there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the
execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or

enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d)

is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency
in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as
an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct
to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise. [11]
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of
constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the
relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;

Page | 26

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any

public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for
recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189,
petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to
Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent
COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1)
providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an
adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what
at first blush is the clashing provisions of
the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to
repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a
certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino
non-resident absentee voting rights,[12] COMELEC
argues:

as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not

abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission
even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is
in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as
voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the
Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V]
immediately after the residency requirement of Section
1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, , the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided
for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The
same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed
to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A.
No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor,
thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked
into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think
the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is
supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution.

4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/

RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific
requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The duals, upon
renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and
acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and
legally abandoned their domicile and severed their
legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having
subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e.,
Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first
of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile
through positive acts; [13]
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual
citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right
to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that duals are most likely nonresidents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right
of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189
aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote
the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional
Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much

xxx xxx xxx

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall
have resided in the Philippines. They are permanent
immigrants. They have changed residence so they are
barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked
whether this committee amendment which in fact does
not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect
on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this
has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance
with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile
is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact
that a Filipino may have been physically absent
from the Philippines and may be physically a
resident of the United States, for example, but
has a clear intent to return to the Philippines,
will make him qualified as a resident of the
Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional
mandate that we that Congress must provide a
franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage
principle literally as demanding physical
presence, then there is no way we can provide
for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr.
President.

Page | 27

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution

says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is
qualified. In other words, anything that we may
do or say in granting our compatriots abroad
must be anchored on the proposition that they
are qualified. Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says In the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes
in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in
Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote
in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make
the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr.
President. But it is a point already well-debated even in
the constitutional commission of 1986. And the
reason Section 2 of Article V was placed
immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate
unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes
absentee voting is an exception to the sixmonth/one-year residency requirement. That is
the first principle, Mr. President, that one must
remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our
jurisprudence residency has been interpreted as
synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, is, if
we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, th
en it is legally and constitutionally impossible to
give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos
who do not physically live in the country, which
is quite ridiculous
because that is exactly the whole point of this
exercise to enfranchise them and empower them
to vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added;
citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself
admits that the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas
absentee voting.According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of
overseas absentee voting has been consequently

expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also

citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the
strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions
of RA 9225; [15]
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and
R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law
with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible
conclusion is that"duals" may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and
as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the
terms adverted to in the following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise
their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of
the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote
under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is
abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered
herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189
extends also to what might be tag as the next
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in
R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those un
married children below eighteen (18) years of age had
never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of"duals" may nonetheless avail themselves
the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under
Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor
reason why the petitioners and other present
day "duals," provided they meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation
to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an
overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have
plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds
that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system
of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189,
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION

Page | 28

PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission
on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo
R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez,
a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in
the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor
of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
bancdismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis
the impugned resolution shows that respondent was
able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove
her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged
important documents . . . no other evidence substantial
in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and
not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act
No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequence. The
evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition
for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before
the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed
by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision
in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again
raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came

out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply
and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits
trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that
petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No.
95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this
Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in
the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth
any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to
compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of
the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xx
x
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no
new matters and issues tendered, We find no
convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb
and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this
Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This
Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was
denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of
January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition; questioning the
citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office
because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3)
and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as
certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and
(4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in
EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her
a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the
private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with
the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national
and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No.
404695 dated September 19, 1988;

Page | 29

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an

Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on
March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts
and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in
her application for alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or
subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her
Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to
run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private
respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as
certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila,
petitioner argues that the said acts did not
automatically restore the status of private respondent
as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship
she must comply with the mandatory requirements for
repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election
of private respondent to public office did not mean the
restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private
respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with
her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship,
private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public
office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on
Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the
ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship
on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on
May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and
Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country. These were the

Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine

Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to
be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill
of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a
certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

Page | 30

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and
1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption
that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To
buttress this contention, petitioner cited private
respondents application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the
issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3,
1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or
air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation,
such renunciation must be express. Petitioners
contention that the application of private respondent
for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was
put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in
the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC.[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact
that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was
held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport
and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and
do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express. [8] As held
by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does
not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of ones citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport,
as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts
of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most,
private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a
child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country
has not been included as a ground for losing ones
Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not
lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners
claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption
that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still,
she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xx
x
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xx
x
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual

Page | 31

allegiance.[9] Recognizing situations in which a Filipino

citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40
(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled
that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as
a dual citizen.[11] This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto.Such declaration, which is
under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15
1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered
in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia
in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim
that private respondent must go through the whole
process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is
raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing
the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is
concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,
[13]
an exception to this general rule was recognized.
The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present:

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative

took active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case
of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that
reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding, to make the
effort easier or simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears
sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC
92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of
the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced
by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to
show any new evidence or supervening event to
warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However,
the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on
the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and
January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby
adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD
ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on
those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as
an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken
lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it
or by those who dispute it.

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in

a controversy where said person is a party;

Page | 32

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of

which raise a single question of profound importance to
the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate
to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen,
and now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of
the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to
be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,
entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA
No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even
if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of
his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1)
a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records

Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact

that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of
Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and
No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou
and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during
the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No.
04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs.
The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and
the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ
and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel
FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged

Page | 33

misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a

natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code which would authorize "any interested party" to
file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule
64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX,
of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.
R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be
taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and

Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the
petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns
and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress,
on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting
the Election of the President-Elect and the VicePresident-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act
No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now
be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of
the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated
by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include
an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the
registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may
be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the

Page | 34

Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days

after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second
or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette
C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.,"
and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give
a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such persons
who would be adequate in number to achieve a selfsufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one
who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty
could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with
rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to
the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes
over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which
established the rights necessary for individual freedom,
such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.
[9]
Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the
right to participate in the exercise of political power.
[10]
The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so

developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final

stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during
the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply
to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to
the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing
views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees
were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born
in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended
to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the
provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country
was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in
this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out
with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East
to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a
change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation
of all political laws then in force, would have no effect
on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December
1898 between Spain and the United States.[21] Under

Page | 35

Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political

status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded
to the United States would be determined by its
Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in
the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have renounced
it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not
become American citizens, they, however, also ceased
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared
for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in

the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in
the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that
the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about
this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States
made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of
1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of
the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H.
Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other
country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of
Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on
said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some
other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to

Page | 36

any such link with common law, by adopting, once and

for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following

are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution.

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at

the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens

of the Philippines.

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino

mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the

Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution,
taken together with existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as
well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following
are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an
alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3)
thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to
be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary
basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of
San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of
his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of
birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo
Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy
of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe
was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and
a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two
years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The

Page | 37

birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born

on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twentyfour years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on
the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of
his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public
record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was
submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent
as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were
submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which
they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in
relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All
three documents were certified true copies of the
originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their

contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court

provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value
given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed
to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4)
the publicity of record which makes more likely the
prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
[31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate

that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be
assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the
year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not
in the Philippines during the crucial period of from
1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and
Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to
show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during
the same period. In his death certificate, the residence
of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from
1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing
filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child,
FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be
used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day
prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required
to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth,
a will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the

Page | 38

infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the

latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal
in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized
to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,
[34]
the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law
was enacted, the question here really is whether or not
his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may
also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by
both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other
proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document
as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document
pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by
which recognition may be made belongs to the first
class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment
or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary,
legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required
to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of
full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime
of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs

of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,

however, could only be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father. The term would include a public instrument (one
duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules;
Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, [36] the
Court has ruled:

Page | 39

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily

recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according
to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from
the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and
non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor
of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private
and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any,
to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status
of the individual would also affect his political rights or,
in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil
Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of
private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the
mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain,
x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity
of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband
and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing
property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects
of marriage and divorce upon the persons and
properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil
Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,
[39]
such as on successional rights and family relations.

In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be

considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but
such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law[41] and not his political status.
[40]

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against

illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced
to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while
defining proprietary and successional rights of
members of the family, provided distinctions in the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according
to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well
and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that
(a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify,
(b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted
as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with

Page | 40

Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent

FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939

at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

and expertise in using DNA test for identification and

parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

xxxxxxxxx

Petitioners Argument For

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and

became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same
year.

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,

presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare
that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their

first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first
three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II,
and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for
some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were
blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan
Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th
day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a

Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself,
consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child,
FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,
[43]
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs.
Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis
mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting
doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a
mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the

Page | 41

stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The

stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not
about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus
sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated
case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate
son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the
son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded
that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not
Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not
even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin
was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum,
pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and
an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of
a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions
was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy
to elective public service? What possible state interest
can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the

child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the
child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor
rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a
former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane
and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for
the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in
line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child,
not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions,
the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R.
No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack
of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10th May
2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this
Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not

Page | 42

the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him

from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in RomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX

CABILING MA, JR., andVALERIANO
CABILING MA,

G.R. No. 18313

Petitioners,

Present:

CORONA,C.J.,

-versus-

Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*

LEONARDO-DE
PEREZ, JJ.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ,
JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL
B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO
B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA,
in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL,
Respondents.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,

Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs. SO ORDERED.

Promulgated:

July 26, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Page | 43

DECISION

During their age of minority, they secured from

the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs). [5]

PEREZ, J.:

Should children born under the 1935

Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father, who executed an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took their oath of
allegiance to the government upon reaching the
age of majority, but who failed to immediately
file the documents of election with the nearest
civil registry, be considered foreign nationals
subject to deportation as undocumented aliens
for failure to obtain alien certificates of
registration?

Positioned upon the facts of this case, the

question is translated into the inquiry whether
or not the omission negates their rights to
Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino
mother, and erase the years lived and spent as
Filipinos.

The resolution of these questions would

significantly mark a difference in the lives of
herein petitioners.

The Facts

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix

Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma
(Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma
(Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
[1]
a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.[2]
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr.,
Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under
aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the
years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.[3]

Immediately upon reaching the age of twentyone, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that (t)hose
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship are citizens of the
Philippines.Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr.
executed his affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge,
Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty.
Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City,
Surigao del Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took his
oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C.
Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of
which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7
March 2005.[8]
Having taken their oath of allegiance as
Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed
to have the necessary documents registered in
the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing
the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a
Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was
only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30)
years after they elected Philippine citizenship
that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.[9] On the
other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement.

Individual certifications[10] all dated 3 January

2005 issued by the Office of the City Election
Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City,
show that all of them are registered voters
of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A
since June 1997, and that records on previous
registrations are no longer available because of
the mandatory general registration every ten
(10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their
right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the
incumbent Barangay
Kagawads in BarangayWashington, Surigao City.
[11]

They were all raised in the Philippines and have

resided in this country for almost sixty (60)
years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education
in the country; they do not speak nor understand
the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their
father; they have not even traveled abroad; and
they have already raised their respective
families in the Philippines.[4]

Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli

were born also in Surigao City in 1953[12] and
1959,[13] respectively. The Office of the City Civil
Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that
the documents showing that Arceli elected
Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were
registered in its Office on 4 February
1986. However, no other supporting documents
appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained
an ACR nor that she subsequently elected

Page | 44

Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of

majority. Likewise, no document exists that will
provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas
and Isidro.

The Complaint

On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration

received the Complaint-Affidavit[14] of a certain
Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao
Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are
undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral,
however, did not participate in the proceedings,
and the Ma family could not but believe that the
complaint against them was politically motivated
because they strongly supported a candidate
in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local
Elections.[15]

On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of

the Bureau of Immigration charged them for
violation of Sections 37(a)(7)[16] and 45(e)[17] of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. The Charge Sheet[18] docketed as BSID.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416)
reads, in part:

That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals,

failed and continuously failed to present any
valid document to show their respective status
in the Philippines. They likewise failed to
produce documents to show their election
of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence,
undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals
in the country.

That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent

themselves as Philippine citizens in order to
evade the requirements of the immigration laws.

Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of

Immigration

01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001,

respectively.[19]

The Board ruled that since they elected

Philippine citizenship after the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved
on 7 June 1941, they were governed by the
following rules and regulations:

1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,

providing that the election of Philippine
citizenship embodied in a statement sworn
before any officer authorized to administer oaths
and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry;[20] and Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau
of Immigration [BI])Circular dated 12 April 1954,
[21]
detailing the procedural requirements in the
registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.

2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August

1956[22] of the CID, requiring the filing of a
petition for the cancellation of their alien
certificate of registration with the CID, in view of
their election of Philippine citizenship;

3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No.

182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27
March 1985, requiring that the records of the
proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now
the Department) of Justice for final
determination and review.[23]

As regards the documentation of aliens in the

Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the
Bureau of Immigration[24] requires that ACR, Eseries, be issued to foreign nationals who apply
for initial registration, finger printing and
issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien
Registration Act of 1950.[25] According to public
respondents, any foreign national found in
possession of an ACR other than the E-series
shall be considered improperly documented
aliens and may be proceeded against in
accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or
the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.
[26]

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were

afforded the opportunity to refute the
allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board)
of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of
the public respondents, rendered a Judgment
dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and
his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613,
Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI
Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-

Supposedly for failure to comply with the

procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine
citizenship via election proceedings, public
respondents concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo,
Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann
are undocumented and/or improperly
documented aliens.[27]

Page | 45

Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not

submit any document to support their claim that
they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they
present any evidence to show that they are
properly documented aliens. For these reasons,
public respondents likewise deemed
them undocumented and/or improperly
documented aliens.[28]

The dispositive portion[29] of the Judgment of 2

February 2005 reads:
1.
Subject to the submission of appropriate
clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao
Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano
Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and
Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese], under C.A. No.
613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation
to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035
dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively;

2.
Issuance of a warrant of
deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix
Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann
Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under
C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);

3.
Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma,
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro
Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and

4.
Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao
Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano
Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and
Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)
(15). (Emphasis supplied.)

In its Resolution[30] of 8 April 2005, public

respondents partially reconsidered their
Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were
convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g).
[31]
However, they denied the Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the
rest of his children.[32]

On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and

Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They
sought the nullification of the issuances of the
public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment
dated 2 February 2005, ordering the summary
deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a
warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of
their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and
exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines;
and (2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005,
denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals

dismissed the petition[33] after finding that the
petitioners failed to comply with the exacting
standards of the law providing for the procedure
and conditions for their continued stay in
the Philippines either as aliens or as its
nationals.[34]

On 29 May 2008, it issued a

Resolution[35] denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.
To reiterate, a persons continued and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, his being a
registered voter or an elected public official
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the
law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. The
constitutional mandate concerning citizenship
must be adhered to strictly. Philippine
citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude.[36]

Our Ruling

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of

the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate
states:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Page | 46

Section 1. The following are citizens of

the Philippines:
(1) xxx;

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of

the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. [37]

In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was

enacted. It laid down the manner of electing
Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine

citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine

citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of thePhilippines;
and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.

In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine

Bar, Vicente D. Ching,[38] we determined the
meaning of the period of election described by
phrase upon reaching the age of majority. Our
references were the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the
case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice.[39] We
pronounced:

x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625

did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made upon reaching the age
of majority. The age of majority then commenced
upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.[40] In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing
the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935

Constitution. In these decisions, the proper

period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a reasonable time after
attaining the age of majority.[41] The phrase
reasonable time has been interpreted to mean
that the elections should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of majority.
[42]
However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of
Justice,[43] that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to

mean a reasonable time after reaching the age
of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time
to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above,
which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the

extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite.

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born

on February 16, 1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship
was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It
is clear that said election has not been made
upon reaching the age of majority.[44]

We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v.

Ramos,[45] a case in which we adopted the
findings of the appellate court that the father of
the petitioner, whose citizenship was in
question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship
within the reasonable period of three (3) years
upon reaching the age of majority; and that the
belated submission to the local civil registry of
the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x
x x was defective because the affidavit of
election was executed after the oath of
allegiance, and the delay of several years before
their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained.[46]
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners
because they belatedly complied with all the
requirements. The acts of election and their
registration with the nearest civil registry were
all done beyond the reasonable period of three
years upon reaching the age of majority.

Page | 47

The instant case presents a different factual

setting. Petitioners complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that
was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the

petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements
for such election.

Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the

Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions
in In Re:Florencio Mallare,[47] Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
[48]
and Re:Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.[49]

In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of

suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.[50] The Court of Appeals, however,
said that the case cannot support herein
petitioners cause, pointing out that, unlike
petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina,
hence, no other act would be necessary to confer
on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
citizen,[51] and that Esteban was born in
1929[52] prior to the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 625.[53]

In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than

exercise his right of suffrage, as he established
his life here in the Philippines.[54] Again, such
circumstance, while similar to that of herein
petitioners, was not appreciated because it was
ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship
on the part of Ong would have resulted in
absurdity, because the law itself had already
elected Philippine citizenship for him[55] as,
apparently, while he was still a minor, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to his
father.[56]

In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his

application for admission to the Philippine Bar
because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit:
(1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of
the oath with the nearest civil registry were
complied with only fourteen (14) years after he
reached the age of majority. Ching offered no
reason for the late election of Philippine
citizenship.[57]

In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners

argument of good faith and informal election
unacceptable and held:

Their reliance in the ruling contained

in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine
Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1
October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears
emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case,
did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re:
Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court was emphatic in pronouncing that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former
elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.[58]

We are not prepared to state that the mere

exercise of suffrage, being elected public official,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the
place of election of citizenship. What we now say
is that where, as in petitioners case, the election
of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the
documents of election beyond the frame should
be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and
continuously been done. The actual exercise of
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by
the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal
registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.

For what purpose is registration?

In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,[59] we elucidated
the principles of civil law on registration:

Page | 48

To register is to record or annotate. American

and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the
meaning of the term to register as to enter in a
register; to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list.[60] In general,
registration refers to any entry made in the
books of the registry, including both registration
in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In
strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made
in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other
real rights.[61] Simply stated, registration is made
for the purpose of notification.[62]

Actual knowledge may even have the effect of

registration as to the person who has knowledge
thereof. Thus, [i]ts purpose is to give notice
thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a
notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to
others.[63] As pertinent is the holding that
registration neither adds to its validity nor
converts an invalid instrument into a valid one
between the parties.[64] It lays emphasis on the
validity of an unregistered document.

Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.

In a contract of partnership, we said that the

purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties; that failure to register the contract does
not affect the liability of the partnership and of
the partners to third persons; and that neither
does such failure affect the partnerships juridical
personality.[65] An unregistered contract of
partnership is valid as among the partners, so
long as it has the essential requisites, because
the main purpose of registration is to give notice
to third parties, and it can be assumed that the
members themselves knew of the contents of
their contract.[66] The non-registration of a deed
of donation does not also affect its validity.
Registration is not a requirement for the validity
of the contract as between the parties, for the
effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third
persons.[67]

of confirming the fact of its existence with notice

to the world at large.[68]

Registration, then, is the confirmation of the

existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as
such election. It is not the registration of the act
of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is
only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed.

Indeed, we even allow the late registration of

the fact of birth and of marriage.[69] Thus, has it
been admitted through existing rules that the
late registration of the fact of birth of a child
does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of
marriage cannot be declared void solely because
of the failure to have the marriage certificate
registered with the designated government
agency.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of
allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious
undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to
the state coupled with a pledge to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance to any other
state. This was unqualified acceptance of their
identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal
of any other nationality.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in

the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners
can no longer have any national identity except
that which they chose upon reaching the age of
reason.

Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that

registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In
an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed
of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that
registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the

view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
presented by the petitioners are no longer valid
on account of the new requirement to present an
E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly
documented.[70] On the contrary, petitioners
should not be expected to secure E-series ACR
because it would be inconsistent with the
election of citizenship and its constructive
registration through their acts made public,
among others, their exercise of suffrage,
election as public official, and continued and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since
birth. The failure to register as aliens is,
obviously, consistent with petitioners election of
Philippine citizenship.

Registration does not confer ownership. It is not

a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means

The leanings towards recognition of the

citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have

Page | 49

been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence

that liberalized the requirement on time of
election, and recognized positive acts of
Philippine citizenship.

The favor that is given to such children is

likewise evident in the evolution of the
constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.

Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that

children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,
[71]
upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
they automatically become Filipinos[72] and need
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of

the Philippines:

(1)

xxx.

(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are

citizens of the Philippines.[73]

Better than the relaxation of the requirement,

the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as
natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine
citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof
provides:

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who

are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof[74] shall be
deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The constitutional bias is reflected in the

deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.

MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.

xxxx

x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers,

the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the
option to choose Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if
the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the
other hand, under the 1973 Constitution,
children of mixed marriages involving an alien
father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens,
thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in the
1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to
make a declaration of intention upon reaching
the age of majority. I understand that the
committee would further liberalize this provision
of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee
seemingly proposes to further liberalize the
policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those
who became citizens of the Philippines through a
declaration of intention to choose their mothers
citizenship upon reaching the majority age by
declaring that such children are natural-born
citizens of thePhilippines.[75]

xxxx

xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the

provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that
of the 1935? [76]

xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind
the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship
was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a
certain male chauvinism, and it was for the
purpose of remedying that this proposed
provision was put in. The idea was that we
should not penalize the mother of a child simply
because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now,
the question on what citizenship the child would
prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing
the preference of the infant. But if we recognize
the right of the child to choose, then let him
choose when he reaches the age of majority. I
think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on
us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control. But
certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine government to require that [at] a
certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do
not think we should penalize the child before he
is even able to choose. I would, therefore,
support the retention of the modification made
in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935
Constitution.[77]

xxxx

Page | 50

MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who

became a Filipino citizen by election, which the
Committee is now planning to consider a naturalborn citizen, he will be so the moment he opts
for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee
take into account the fact that at the time of
birth, all he had was just an inchoate right to
choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by
subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it
would appear that his choice retroacted to the
date of his birth so much so that under the
Gentlemans proposed amendment, he would be
a natural-born citizen?[78]

FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and

the natural-born who lost his status is that the
natural-born who lost his status, lost it
voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the
situation contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3
never had the chance to choose.[79]

xxxx

[on the period within which to elect Philippine

citizenship]

MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very,

very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him
to run for Congress, to be a Justice of the
Supreme Court x x x.[80]
We are guided by this evolvement from election
of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election
requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these
children as natural-born citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the conclusion that the
omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of
registration of the documents of election should
not result in the obliteration of the right to
Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the

basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected
Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil
registry should not defeat the election and
resultingly negate the permanent fact that they
have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements
may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative

penalties, if any. The documents they submitted

supporting their allegations that they have
already registered with the civil registry,
although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate agency,
in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other
requirements embodied in the administrative
orders and other issuances of the Bureau of
Immigration and the Department of Justice shall
be complied with within a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August

2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February
2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of
the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET
ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo
Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano
Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90)
days from notice within which to COMPLYwith the
requirements of the Bureau of Immigration
embodied in its Judgment of 2 February
2005. The Bureau of Immigration
shall ENSURE that all requirements, including
the payment of their financial obligations to the
state, if any, have been complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate administrative
fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the
petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with
the decision of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183110

October 7, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
wife of one of its citizens could have had no
other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family." 1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the
May 23, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the
January 31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that
granted the Petition for Naturalization5 of
respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
(Azucena).

Page | 51

Factual Antecedents
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition
for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization
Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said
court.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in
her relations with the constituted Government
and with the community in which she is living;
that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos
and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals;
that she has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 (CA473);6 that she is not opposed to
organized government nor is affiliated with any
association or group of persons that uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; that she is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of mens ideas; that
she is neither a polygamist nor believes in
polygamy; that the nation of which she is a
subject is not at war with the Philippines; that
she intends in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of
the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements
mandated by Section 97 of CA 473had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground
that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged
in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon
by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC
denied said Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for
the reception of Azucenas evidence was then
set on May 18, 2004.10
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing.
Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the
evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its
Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive
Azucenas evidence.11 During the November 5,
2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from
the OSG appeared despite due notice.12
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese
parents,13 Azucena has never departed the
Philippines since birth. She has resided in
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942;

in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 19421968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in
Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and,
in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter,
up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan,
and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine
schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary
School in 1955,14 Margosatubig Academy
in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in
1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of
Science in Education. She then practiced her
teaching profession at the Pax High School for
five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two
years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis
Oriental for another two years.17
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago),a natural-born
Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely
Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and
Edsel James.20 All of them studied in Philippine
public and private schools and are all
professionals, three of whom are now working
abroad.21
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena
and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged
in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As
proof of their income, Azucena submitted their
joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from
2000-200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The business
name and the business permits issued to the
spouses store, Azucenas General
Merchandising, are registered in Santiagos
name,24 and he is also the National Food
Authority licensee for their rice and corn
business.25 During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in
Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26
To prove that she has no criminal record,
Azucena submitted clearances issued by the
Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur
Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of
Investigation.27 She also presented her Health
Examination Record28 declaring her as physically
and mentally fit.
To further support Azucenas Petition, Santiago
and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro
testified.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena
has amply supported the allegations in her
Petition. Among these are her lack of a
derogatory record, her support for an organized
government, that she is in perfect health, that
she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and
can speak their language, that she has never
had any transgressions and has been a law
abiding citizen, that she has complied with her

Page | 52

obligations to the government involving her

business operations, and that the business and
real properties she and Santiago own provide
sufficient income for her and her family. Thus,
the RTC ruled:
x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of the
Naturalization Law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.29
In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the
ex-parte presentation of evidence before the
Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA
473,31 as the law mandates public hearing in
naturalization cases.
Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005
Order,32 the RTC held that the public has been
fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings
and was free to intervene. The OSG and its
delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only
officers authorized by law to appear on behalf of
the State, which represents the public. Thus,
when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the
notice of hearing for the reception of evidence
ex-parte, there was already a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of a public
hearing.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the
CA,33 contending that Azucena failed to comply
with the income requirement under CA 473. The
OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed
under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No.
1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the
income requirement. And even if she is allowed,
her business is not a "lucrative trade" within the
contemplation of the law or that which has an
appreciable margin of income over expenses in
order to provide for adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucenas claim
that she owns real property because aliens are
precluded from owning lands in the country.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte
proceeding before the commissioner is not a
"public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually
done in chambers, without the public in
attendance. It claimed that the State was denied
its day in court because the RTC, during the May
18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately allowed the
proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without
even giving the State ample opportunity to be
present.
Azucena countered that although she is a
teacher by profession, she had to quit to help in
the retail business of her husband, and they
were able to send all their children to school.34 It

is highly unlikely that she will become a public

charge as she and her spouse have enough
savings and could even be given sufficient
support by their children. She contended that
the definition of "lucrative trade/income" should
not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and
following Filipino tradition, she should not be
treated like male applicants for naturalization
who are required to have their own "lucrative
trade."
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition
was not made public, as the hearing before the
Clerk of Court was conducted in the courts
session hall. Besides, the OSG cannot claim that
it was denied its day in court as notices have
always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to
attend is not the fault of the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the OSGs appeal,35 the CA found
that Azucenas financial condition permits her
and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living
and consistent with the demands of human
dignity. It said:
Considering the present high cost of living,
which cost of living tends to increase rather than
decrease, and the low purchasing power of the
Philippine currency, petitioner-appellee,
together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless,
was able to send all her children to college,
pursue a lucrative business and maintain a
decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent
decisions, adopted a higher standard in
determining whether a petitioner for Philippine
citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession
that would qualify him/her for admission to
Philippine citizenship and to which petitioner has
successfully convinced this Court of her ability to
provide for herself and avoid becoming a public
charge or a financial burden to her community. x
x x36
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA
held that the RTC had complied with the
mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG
and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled
hearing for the Petition.
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG
recapitulates the same arguments it raised
before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena
to meet the income and public hearing
requirements of CA 473.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire
Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A
third option, called derivative naturalization,

Page | 53

which is available to alien women married to

Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of
CA 473, which provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are
married to Philippine citizens may be deemed
ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time
of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying
from similar laws in the United States which has
since been amended, the Philippine legislature
retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then
reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to
the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.37
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya
Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:38
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions
of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.39
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for
an alien wife to formalize the conferment of
Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order
to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as
follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is
not disqualified from acquiring her husbands
citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any
of the groups disqualified by the cited section
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x,
the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its
order or decision granting or denying the
petition.40
Records however show that in February 1980,
Azucena applied before the then Commission on

Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the

cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. 03070541 by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted
her application. However, the Ministry of Justice
set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no
sufficient evidence that Azucenas husband is a
Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his
citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID,
Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While
this would have been unnecessary if the process
at the CID was granted in her favor, there is
nothing that prevents her from seeking
acquisition of Philippine citizenship through
regular naturalization proceedings available to
all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case,
Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her
application for derivative naturalization under
Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization
under the same law. It is to be remembered that
her application at the CID was denied not
because she was found to be disqualified, but
because her husbands citizenship was not
proven. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization
proceeding, for the courts to determine whether
there are in fact grounds to deny her of
Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial
naturalization proceedings.
As the records before this Court show,
Santiagos Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding,
Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are
Filipinos. He also submitted voters registration,
land titles, and business registrations/licenses,
all of which are public records. He has always
comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an
operative fact that should have enabled Azucena
to avail of Section 15 of CA473. On the submitted
evidence, nothing would show that Azucena
suffers from any of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of the same Act.
However, the case before us is a Petition for
judicial naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the
then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which
heard the petition and received evidence of her
qualifications and absence of disqualifications to
acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the
Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will
not disturb the findings of the lower court which
had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the
evidence presented during the hearings on the
Petition, as well as determine, based on
Azucenas testimony and deportment during the
hearings, that she indeed possesses all the

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qualifications and none of the disqualifications

for acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the
ground that Azucena does not have the
qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA
473 as she does not have any lucrative income,
and that the proceeding in the lower court was
not in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG
had the opportunity to contest the qualifications
of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled
on May 18, 2004.However, the OSG or the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in
said hearing, prompting the lower court to order
ex parte presentation of evidence before the
Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG
was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but
despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG
had raised this same issue at the CA and was
denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We
find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA
on this issue. Neither should this issue further
delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a
woman who was born and lived all her life, in the
Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care
of her Filipino family. She has more than
demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being
a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second
issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that
since the government who has an interest in,
and the only one who can contest, the
citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutors
office, the proceedings have complied with the
public hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as
qualification to become a Philippine citizen:
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has
actually exercised her profession before she had
to quit her teaching job to assume her family
duties and take on her role as joint provider,
together with her husband, in order to support
her family. Together, husband and wife were able
to raise all their five children, provided them
with education, and have all become
professionals and responsible citizens of this
country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wifes lucrative trade. Azucena
herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves
her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee
that she will not be a charge to the only country
she has known since birth.

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished

traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other. Thus,
it cannot be that the husbands interests in
property and business activities reserved by law
to citizens should not form part of the conjugal
partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that
she herself cannot, through her own efforts but
for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the
identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the
instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law.43
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect
that there is no proceeding authorized by the
law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an
individual.44 "Such judicial declaration of
citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to
an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization
proceeding."45
This case however is not a Petition for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a
Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473.
In the first, the petitioner believes he is a
Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or
confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the
second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of be coming a Philippine citizen based
on requirements required under CA 473.Azucena
has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny,
that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way
of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23,
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January
31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the
Petition for Naturalization, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period
and the requirements under Republic Act No.
530which supplements the Revised
Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her
Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main

objective of extending the citizenship privilege
to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of
allegiance among family members, thus:

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