Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183871

February 18, 2010

LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO

CARBONEL, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO
RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO,
CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO,
ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico
Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After
issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred
the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments
contained, in substance, the following allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS,
for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then
attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the
air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded
individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan
ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after
being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset.
After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at
different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in
bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station
commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes daughter,
Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan,

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an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation even after
Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him;
3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave
their house because of the presence of men watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct
against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a
certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at
No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and
harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government
agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men
belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that
unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was addressed to CA
Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino
Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB
(answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint
return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also
denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana,
Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
allegations truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the
following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is
incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their
respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to
undertake regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and
her daughters:

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1. Gen. Esperon attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND)
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all
concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and
the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned. The
Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a
parallel action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to
continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including
military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that
may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look into the matter;5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of the
petition is on-going vis--vis Lourdes abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP
Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and
one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the name of
Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmarias municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon
disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard
a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage
Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person residing in the
apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the
latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated with
the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the best
position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite
sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the petitioners and the
key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to
assist the Court in the implementation of its orders.61avvphi1
3. P/Supt. Roquero stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes complaint, an investigation and
submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her
relatives provided the police with relevant information;
4. P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the
investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and
124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary
investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes kidnapping; that upon
receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal
and administrative complaints were filed.

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Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of
averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also
asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current
address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007. 7 In that setting, petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance
of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations
in the petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition
and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma,
and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition,
petitioners motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence
in this recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as
respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the
tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to
petitioners failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review,
disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the
CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant
petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar
B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the
investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly
update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of
office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the
chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of

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government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his comembers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may
not be sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed
the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. 10 x x
x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential
act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.
This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon,
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being
connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes.
Their names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes
for the respectiveSinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary
Joy.13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory
that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their
subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be
denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not
presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later
threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two
generals, the CAs holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if
the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not
exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes
disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit
there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and
P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the

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assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter
stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under
international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." 14 In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907
adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,15 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates
for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet
formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to
extend concurrence in its ratification.18
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.20
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable
to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.21 Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words,
the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a
crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), 22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide
expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." 23 Of the same tenor,
and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or
extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
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As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures
that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated
earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government
involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the
actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed
part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report,
however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle
allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be
working in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired
which, if taken together, logically point to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes,
such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle
blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could
be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the
Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano 26 and Technical Sergeant John N.
Romano,27officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of
Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any
unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification 28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And
as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information
System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other
alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP.
Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no
effort to confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in
Lourdes abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary
evidence, adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors
to the military or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on crossexamination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent. 29 The Court is, of course, aware of
what was referred to in Razon30 as the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and
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encountered by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the
Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of
evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary
substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a
finding of liability against the person charged; 31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise. 32 Per the CAs evaluation of their
evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other
individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to
them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to
answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts
determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner
Lourdes and the threats to her familys security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon,
per their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in
issuing directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case
and in providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations
have yet to be concluded with some definite findings and recommendation.
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct
or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters.
As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty
that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying
witnesses and obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo
vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and
the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right
to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and onesidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their
jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and
P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners complaint. They could not,
however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and

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her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible
explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "[They] do not trust the government agencies to
protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in extra-judicial
killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it
is understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end.
To repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection
of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of
an investigation are captured in theVelasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
(Emphasis added.)
This brings us to Mary Joys charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the
view we take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joys bare
allegations of harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the
appealed CA decision:
In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret)
committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None "36
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their
complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners
contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the
affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits 38 of the designated investigators,
all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal 39 and
administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively,
against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of
counter-affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of
the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of
respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the
petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened.
And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not

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been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed
CA partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1)
pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2)
outright dismissal of the same petition as to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo
Rule on archiving and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court
with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for
review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the
OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or
personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. 42 It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate
filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or
on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the
impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to
threaten the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences
and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed
to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of
action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding
respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say,
however, that petitioners allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily
contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been
adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case
identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual
respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be
sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision
veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are
amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take
specific measures for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to liberty or security. The
protection came in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring
each of them (1) to ensure that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units,
respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency
to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished
the petitioners, a regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously
go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and

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security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining
to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the
completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Razons imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services,
respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the
amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the
commanding general of the AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this
case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same
acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB,
docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie
case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of
Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing 44 of the OMB complaint
came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal
action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, 46 on the other hand, provides
that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated
with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief
under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the
outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer
technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to
Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has
dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E
named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant
petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and
their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo
petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent
in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an
inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court
hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly
address the situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated:
(1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of
the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the
allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be
furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual
resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent
documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMBP-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the
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consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:
(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability
and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The
dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege
ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the
threats and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of
the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units
on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her
daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 49 of the
Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj.
Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one
Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners,
the CA, and this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota
Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents
Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in
positively identifying and locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and
within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Director-General of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court,
the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.
This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the
actions of the AFP and the PNP.
Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of
the CA.
SO ORDERED.

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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 18387118 February 2010
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13

Facts:On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was
abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in
Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at
the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she
signed a statement that she would be a military asset.Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2
occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and
Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the
Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their
investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men
belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such
information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007,
praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of
petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA)
for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA
granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro,
Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the
case.
On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition
with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.
Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.
Ruling: No.
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings [C]ommand
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all,
bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means
the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the

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14

doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior

accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control
over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that
command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to
have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal
liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the
police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end [T]he right to
security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection
includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats
of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez
case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.
The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons,
free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized
and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions
for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.

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G.R. NO. 183871 February 18, 2010

Rubrico vs. Arroyo
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa
City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean
Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following
them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them
on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments
against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly
reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional

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Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to
allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the
threats and harassment that followed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236
July 5, 2010
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ)
RUBEN N. SALCEDO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo
(complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law in the
handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled "Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn
Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and

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17

Insp. Wylen Rojo."

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of
Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3,
Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a
co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and
registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide
and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R.
Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed
property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of
the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and
threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and
accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and
destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.
The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly
responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around
4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition1 on his behalf
while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing "self-help in preventing squatters from
putting up improvements in their titled property."
Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing of the
petition and how it came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as follows:
1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office regarding the procedure
in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the established procedure is to
assign cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper
motions. But since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling
will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for instruction and
or appropriate action;
2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn
Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma.
Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;
3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);
4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule but if
the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the
petition;

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5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber of
Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped
in the petition;
6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the case
to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon;
7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the information that I was going
to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin. Officer of my
whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent
judge];
8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon to explain
why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction from me;
9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the lawyer was
insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the
novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition
if they still discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon,
referred the case to you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;
10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo nor
was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition conform to a form
acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by Judge Lucagbo;
11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not motivated by
any ill motive or malice.2
Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks
representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23,
2008, directing "the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release
immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr.,
to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku." The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their
verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits, in
conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator.
At six oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty.
Francis Ku.
In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had
been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any
ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when
he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant

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19

also alleges that the respondent judge "accommodated" the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he
and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity.
The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:
(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to
exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioners counsel
is a fraternal brother (Mason);
(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he
deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of Amparo];
(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was immediately assigned to his
sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any
judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec. 3 further states that it can be
filed on any day and at any time;
(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the Agora
Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because
the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a
Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly spend the night
in jail;
(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of the SC Circular
(on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found the petition
sufficient in form and in substance;
(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if
on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioners representative and
their counsel, thus, the following information were elicited:
1) That the property of petitioners family, which is under their possession and Tanmalack registered
under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the area and put up
improvements by constructing "shanties" thereon;
2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated arguments and
altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report the incident and be blottered;
3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008 in
order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of the property;
4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and despite the
protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave the
police station; and,

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20

5) That petitioners counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his client from police
custody but to no avail;
(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in the petition,
respondent Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the same warranted the issuance of
the writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in the area where the
alleged incident happened, so that the statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would
be hearsay;
(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return pursuant to the rules;
during the summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who appeared, the
alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the detention of the petitioner were
absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the following answers:
1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the complaint
considering that the petitioner was already released;
2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to complain, followed
by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict between the petitioner and the other
persons is on a property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in possession; and
3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him but only he could not
release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further evaluation.
(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily armed men with him
when he allegedly harassed the complainant.
[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo have
arrived into an agreement that the writ be considered permanent.]
THE REPORT OF THE OCA
The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8,
2010, signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Raul
Bautista Villanueva. The Report likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.
The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for
lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads:
EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, as in the instant case, or of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the
writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty

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21

and security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights.
Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was attended by
irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Also, the petition was properly filed with the Regional
Trial Court "where the act or omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred."
Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have complied with his
oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination that the
right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing
that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad faith,
ignominy or ill will, thus, herein complainants allegation that respondent Judges act was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves
scant consideration.
This Office agrees with respondent Judges observation that "Rojos declaration not anymore to contest
the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he could not release
the latter for further evaluation because of the complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened
to deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty."
OUR RULING
We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the administrative complaint against the respondent
judge be dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of
Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely,
the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to "extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." 3 The present case involves concerns that are
purely property and commercial in nature concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by
the Writ of Amparo.4 In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,5 we held:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

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(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission,
or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent
a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since
Tanmalacks petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim
of "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof." The petition merely states that
he is "under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely in
custody."6
Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the
present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative.
Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As
a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or
administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do
an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in
the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.7
In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in
the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an
appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,8 we

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23

reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising
from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. We laid down the
rationale for the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,9 viz:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a
motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia
the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for
change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against
Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.1avvphi1
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders,
on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him "undue injury." This is impermissible, as this Court
has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on
the result thereof." Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of
their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that
judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and
that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a
competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the
stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.10
We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the
OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainants allegation that the issuance
was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the
respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove
that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be
proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent

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24

judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of
partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice
according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.11
Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To
hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has never been the
intent of the law; reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what
the law requires.
The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law against
the respondent judge.
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They
must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of
prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great
privilege vested in him.12
We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is
defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of
Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months
(The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent
judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of
Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple,
elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.
More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it
must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive.13 In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent
judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." A
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules;
it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct,
and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to
their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of
law and who discharge their duties in accordance with law.14 We mentioned all these to emphasize to the
respondent judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs
such as the Writ of Amparo.

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25

We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. 15 We cannot give credence to charges based on
mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.16
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative
complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de
Oro City, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182498

December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM,
PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-

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26

Fact,Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009. 2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of
his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this
is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the
Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief,
Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order
his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL.
AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life,
liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to
Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a
way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief AntiTerror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct
organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the courts
directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the

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27

investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that
call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions
and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is
unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. 5 The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of
the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. 10 The petition was directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, AntiTerror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis personal
circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early
lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,

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28

forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his
student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was
surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also
around and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the
room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell
phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported
the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondents] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time

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29

somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners] refusal to help and provide police assistance
in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis
to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects whereabouts,
and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights
and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have
been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these
places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and
relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of
which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her
not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondents] request for help
and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost
two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and
custody of [respondents] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get
the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights,
except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two
(72) hours from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have
any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been

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30

designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE
USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter
alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in
connection to these cases; and gave the following summary:13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on
the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim checkedin at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed around
Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said victim did not
return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted a
thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail.
The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the
whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said
report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on
October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On
October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu
wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 oclock in
the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for
Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 oclock in
the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said
pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension
house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is
now conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr.
Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is being
detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them
before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also
attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the
following:14

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xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group
[CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced
Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October
28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On
October 30, 2007, at around six oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his
student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the
participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul,
Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six oclock in the morning of
even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the
afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for
Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which
presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is
being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic]
alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will
pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER 15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas
affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction
or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact,
nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER
nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was
undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to
have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or

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32

eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society
is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and
charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER
Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the
subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES
JR., to submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with
Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police
Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the
instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the
instant case are brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just
issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also
submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis
disappearance, viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me
through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a
certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the
Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship

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33

coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;

6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction
or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar,
was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the
student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he
immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in
the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 oclock
p.m. and never returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat,
act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to
identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the
cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I
have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
expedite compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives
for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY
Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements regarding the
disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts
to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser
Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph
examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge
or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the
cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of operational

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jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to
PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation
[sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu
PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the
disappearance and the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and
Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our
office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination
for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far
taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE
TAGITIS was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1)
the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to
mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the
Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report
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from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for
Tagitis disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated
January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the
University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the
Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly
taken and carried away more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to
his [personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which
[was] intended for the IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE
TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in
any abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given
specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to,
but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo. 26 In his submitted investigation report dated
January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had
no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced
Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic
Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of
Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might
[sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and
were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said
program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student
scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among
them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their
efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and
investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination
with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our
investigation for the resolution of this case.

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On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds:28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL
GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been
standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to
secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all parts of the
country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO
admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis
by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo
had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered
through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force
Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite
the Task Force Tagitis claim that they already had an "all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on
the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no
clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM
was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated post. Yet, P/Supt
KASIMs subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it
was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioners unofficial source of the military intelligence information
that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close
contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have
ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts subpoena and COL. KASIM could
have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr.
Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went
to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga
holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that
allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition." 29 This friend also
told her that her husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the
assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who
told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis." 31 The respondent
recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
(Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly
confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her
husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or
Jemaah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second wife, and
they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last
communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging;
Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
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37

The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the
time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The respondent explained that it took her a
few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husbands disappearance to
the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her
because his cellular phones battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had
fully-charged his cellular phones battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp
Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely,
Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read
to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent
further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group
and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic
taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to
give him his medication.38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by the
respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of
the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with
Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight
from Davao City is 9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00
oclock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West
Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got
information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all
information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the
subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter
Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the
said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the
mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes last looked
[sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my
husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and
ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and
who held him but he refused.

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38

While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not
give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon
alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of
dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief
of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case
of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis,
yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr.
Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in
Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo,
Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp
Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable
information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that hell do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that
Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different
terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier.
These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP
Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me
that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to
please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic
patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to
corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the
information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when

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she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col.
Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a
report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone, which showed that
Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with
two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col.
Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim
told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col.
Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged
with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was
abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam"
charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it
was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was
being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized
that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, 51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any
accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he
had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the
IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis
personal account.54
On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit
was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that although he
read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of [its] contents."56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the
respondents testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of
either the military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent
in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for
the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the
respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed
abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG
Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in
Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. 59 He also stressed that the information
he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still
needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity.60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to
him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial." 61
Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others. 62
He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her
companions because "it was not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no
importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63He explained that he did not keep the letter because
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it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for
his abduction.64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent
Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents allegation that
Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the
"investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving
violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 66 Col. Pante
further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis
was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis reported
disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no
capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only assigned to investigate matters and to
monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to
the latters disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis disappearance
was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision 71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the
investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified
as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the
respondents testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information
that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis abduction came from no less than
the military an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report"
from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the CIDGs involvement in Tagitis abduction. The CA held that
"raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as
"suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or
the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the
law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student
of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her
stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the
clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who
could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter
divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the
respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or
demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family,
and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis
heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to
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exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the
obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion
in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis
was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and,
generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition
by substantial evidence.74
THE COURTS RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the petitioners
contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the
petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life, liberty and
security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his disappearance,
and the respondents source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the
investigation of Tagitis disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband.
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42

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of
the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or
her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up
by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail
and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the
test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which
Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to
be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of
the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security were violated when
he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents police intelligence operatives
since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about
Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the

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State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual
violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a
cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required
by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to
facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony. 78 This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if
not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need
for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin)
personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and
flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have
been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to
establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation
with the reported disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section 5(d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon
as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the
"ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government
groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint"
with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the
police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged
to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondents
personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities,
and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their
failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be
a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and
conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents
frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are
more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently
complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to "fish" for evidence. 81 The
petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were
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taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead
of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Courts intervention.
We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the
actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondents
petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her
to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early
lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his
student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups;
xxxx

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17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondents] request
and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her
trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from
friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of
which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights,
except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient
in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration
of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an
enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced
disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf
Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reichs Night
and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German
security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to
maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing
information about the fate of these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the
world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
"disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin
America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor 84 and during the Dirty

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War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,
tortured, and killed as part of governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political
brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term
"disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the
"desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones." 87 In general, there are three different
kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents
and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center
or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases
were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained
missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos
term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this
number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records
show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria
M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified
cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced
alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced
or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific
definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can
proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.

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CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and
disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So well have to agree among ourselves about
the nature of killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state
actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors
but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should
these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the
leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in
the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of
the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. 99 The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive
law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power
structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional
mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts," 100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that
the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural
standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only
procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in
the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of
criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires
criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in
determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable
for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for
the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.

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The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require.
The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her
liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully
addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the
production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the
proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the
desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding
the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to
be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept
ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their
detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases
follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising from
"reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and
requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with
a view to making appropriate recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a
global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third
preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in
the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection
of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). 105 The
Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article 2 of the
Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:

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For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be
subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall
be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political
instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an
offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of
relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and
whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. 110 Lastly, it classifies
enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the
fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific
penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned;
underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making
powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on
Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the
various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights.
Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or
religion."112 Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the
Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes
of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and
developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration,
the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence
to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we

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held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
bytransformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 118 The material sources of custom include State practice,
State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law. 121 We note the
following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in
June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the
forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees." 123
One of the key provisions includes the States obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in
their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was
committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged
criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as
establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention. 124 At present,
Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the
Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be
criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with
the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however,
has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by
enforced disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the
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prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to
a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the
protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a violation
of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared after
being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further
found the applicant (the disappeared persons mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a
result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The
ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages,
or condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that
in a related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 130 that the
prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated
on the significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of
member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do
not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is,
according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions
when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty
against non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international
community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down
rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal
Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the
UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has
stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person)
of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity.131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity, 132 i.e.,
crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the
Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome
Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra
Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering

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enforced disappearance.135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced
disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State
practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally
accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and
which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions
that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the
course of a disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

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(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective
remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR
violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those
rights The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law
Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to
investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and
impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element
of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights,
States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as
criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance
(articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of
sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of
the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population,
these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is
a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees

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full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the
bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
[Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only
as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a
positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR
ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be
seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance
and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into
custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court
made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled
through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how,
through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule,
we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases;
these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged

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investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note
that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of
governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are
generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally
directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to
avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to
secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or
other controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to
speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We have had
occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we acknowledged that "where
powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them
comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun.145 The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of
Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the
States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear
attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victims human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to
requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance,
that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or
another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree
and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:

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Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their
claims bysubstantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required
level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of
an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard
of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence
point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and
form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and
prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities
to appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 151 provided the Court its first
opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative
proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this

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and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we
recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly
requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court
must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These
evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the
circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the
realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect
evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made
to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,
because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who
acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the
hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velsquez, the victims sister, who described Manfredos kidnapping on
the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian
clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had

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announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief
of the Armed Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who
asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third
witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission
and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an
effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of
another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider
evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus,
while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the
evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality,
and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all
other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of
the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or
non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective
and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. 158 These
requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions
for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of
this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law."159 Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:160

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(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared
person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand
only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel
desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned
the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her
petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or
arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga
custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga
custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who
occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands.
Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to
establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col.
Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together
with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondents testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my
husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
"parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir.

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Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly
confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That
is a military report, maam.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, maam.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam.162

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xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you
do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista
na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel,
my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa
ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, maam."163
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko
because I know that they would deny it, maam.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her
husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was
with you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?

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A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands.
He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case.
He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he
was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen
under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is
also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked
him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he
also told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it
in the computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but
Im certain that it was typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading
to us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the
"informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody
of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report"
from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.167
To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners
pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her
that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
parang liason ng J.I." The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing certain
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statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the
PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would
certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the
petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the
inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in
so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is
not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various
witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the
informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since
January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he
was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. The respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims
plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of evidence that
supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this letter
effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be
proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim
reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct
evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation,
knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col.
Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The
Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial
investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin
and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively
states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct
evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is
no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow
for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this
intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
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promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international
experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece
of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence
before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with
other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was
reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a
seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to
Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in
the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli,
early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB
scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust,
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited
in Tagitis personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the
records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo
petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no
evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that
Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived in Jolo and was never seen
again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above
aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police
investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into
question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize
the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been
taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on
whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this
conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was
with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on
an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded
ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim
that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party
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holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the abduction came after
Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police
agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which
this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP
Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and
the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial
report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results.
These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General
Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and
departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and
thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its
department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM
Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they
essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force
Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ
were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for
students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge
or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police
unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to
conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task
Force notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his
background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported
sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to
have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the
"assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results
were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the
disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not
attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirims
replacement in the latters last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation even
an internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims "asset" and
what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial
of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to
the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive
trait that runs through these developments is the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance,
starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husbands
disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

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As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the
authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and
reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for
custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the
abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no
record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the
usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive
and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to
search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would
the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny
what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at
least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule
covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173 the evidence at hand and
the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity,
under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will
subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to
those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the
basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap)
was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father
in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention,
including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The
applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a
leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast
Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first
detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although there was no
eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence
corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the
commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's
arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of being a
leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps
enforced disappearance.

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Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo
remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we
believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as
the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and
prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their
prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is
the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 176 Under the
PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication exists in this
case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis
disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in
their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo
remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings
the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG
shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the
detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the
CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to
them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions;
the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its
actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report
due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG
shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack
of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following
terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government
(through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

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d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible
for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with
the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring
of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation,
periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court
of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National
Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when
the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature
of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives particularly, the referral
back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be
applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City,
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief

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Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group

(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM,
PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,Respondent.
Writ of Habeas Corpus / Writ of Amparo
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
Syllabus:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009. This CA decision confirmed the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of
his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this
is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the
Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief,
Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order
his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL.
AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life,
liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to
Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a
way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief AntiTerror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct
organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts
directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
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Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these
cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of
the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not
produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be
identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable information she
received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking
their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not
missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
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refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police
Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National
Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips
exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances,
she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which
are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF
AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two
(72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and
to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in
the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his
statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the
law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student
of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her
stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the
clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who
could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter
divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the
respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or
demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

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Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family,
and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis
heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the
obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion
in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege
of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at
hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the
hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all
concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.

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A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of
the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or
her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up
by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail
and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the
test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the
participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to
provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required
by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to
facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if
not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need
for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin)
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personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and
flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf
Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reichs Night
and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German
security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to
maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing
information about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases
were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained
missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos
term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this
number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records
show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria
M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified
cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced
alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to
carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through
its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities
to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial
intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.
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The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative
to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the
victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in
Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we
held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate
must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form
part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely
arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.

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First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there
are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out
publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victims human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission
of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of crossexamination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would
the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny
what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at
least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule
covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity,
under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will
subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in

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their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation
of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 186640

February 11, 2010

GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN.
VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A.

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78

VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Petitioners,

vs.
CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition
docketed as G.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and
Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On January 2, 2008, the Court1 resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a
verified return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was ordered to hear
and decide the case which was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.
Cleofas amended her petition2 on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-respondent Marciana Medina
(Marciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers 3 including Lt. Ali
Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt. Gil Villalobos4 (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at
around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs
outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next
day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas "wives" Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard
gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day,
Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana
and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to
the barangay officials.
Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006
to the Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied by officials of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),5 they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the
Camp Detachment of the 71st Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos,
San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang
(Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano
Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006,
whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her
their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the victims again on September 24,
2006 and November 1, 2006,6 this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry
Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos.
Respondents filed a case on December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),

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which endorsed7 the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account
of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of
the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps,8 the issuance
of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,10 verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos,
Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as Commander of the Armys 7th Infantry Division, and
Lt. Col. Victor Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the
Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed with the appellate court on January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano
(Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his return from an
official trip abroad.
In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper
remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the
petitions ultimate objective was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly
abducted and illegally detained by military personnel; 11 that the petition failed to indicate the matters
required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, such that the
allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay
evidence, and are, at best, speculative; that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other
competent persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims right
to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them; and that the petition did not allege any specific
action or inaction attributable to the military officers with respect to their duties; or allege that
respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in
order to verify Josephines claim that she saw the victims on two different occasions inside the camps, or
that they took efforts to follow up on the PNP Capas Stations further action on their complaint.12
Denying he violated the victims right to life, liberty and security, Gen. Esperon specifically asserted
that, in compliance with the Defense Secretarys directive in relation to cases of Writ of Amparo against
the AFP, he issued directives to the Nolcom Commander and the Armys Commanding General to
investigate and establish the circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims insofar as the
claim on the possible involvement of the military units was concerned; and undertook to bring any
military personnel involved, when warranted by the evidence, to the bar of justice.13
Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of the victims,
stating that it was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility,14 and that he was away
on official business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.15
Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on September 1, 2007 and thus
had no personal knowledge about the victims alleged disappearance or abduction on September 18,
2006; that he was informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp
as it did not even have detention facilities; and that in compliance with Gen. Esperons directive, their
command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.16

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Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24, 2006, on which date
civilians were not allowed to enter except on official missions or when duly authorized to conduct
transactions inside the camp. He thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen the two
victims inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on
September 24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead recounted that on September 24, 2006, he
spoke for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself as
"Antonina Galang," who informed him about the disappearance of the victims since September 18,
2006. Warning him that these men were members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), she advised him not
to entertain any queries or complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.17
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting
anyone named Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered the camps kitchen to drink water.
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately inquired
on the actions taken on the case. He averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly; or
consented, permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He declared that it had
always been his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who
violated the law before the court of justice.
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited
that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed,
these orders partook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof
must be complied with prior to their issuance. They went on to argue that such request relied solely on
bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in Josephines affidavit, for aside from merely
mentioning that she saw Nicolas and Heherson on board an army truck near the Nolcom gate and, days
later, inside the kitchen of the 71st Infantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while logging
outside said camp, Josephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she
allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson.18
On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the
disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed Decision of
September 17, 2008,19 Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of
evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows:
All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any
direct or indirect link between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas
and Heherson.Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their efforts to
investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of justice.
The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the 7th Infantry Division,
which had jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, should exert
extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson.
The Philippine Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and
the State.

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81

RELIEFS
While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between respondents individual military
officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men
are still missing. Hence, We find it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human
rights and justice as follows:
1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any military
camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, within
reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alert status.
2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine Army
at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay to conduct
their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson and
to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written report to this Court
within three (3) months from notice.
SO ORDERED.20 (underscoring supplied)
The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that since
respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court
should not have granted those reliefs.21
The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009.22
Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,23 Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,24 and Maj. Gen.
Ralph Villanueva25 (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate courts assailed
issuances, faulting it for
. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR
PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING
PETITIONERS TO:
(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO, NORTH LUZON
COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC CITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP
OF THE 7th INFANTRY DIVISION LOCATED IN AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC
CITY; AND.
(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES, FILE CHARGES AGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT
WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM NOTICE. 26 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

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82

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis
of the credibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the following findings:
To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson, petitioners
presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner Cleofas
Sanchez neighbor, who allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson inside Camp Servillano Aquino on
September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major Henry Galang, who is allegedly living
inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw Nicolas and Heherson at Aqua Farm at Hacienda
Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Battalion is located and where Heherson
was seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen cooking, having wounds in their legs near the feet as
if sustained from a gunshot wound; that on November 1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt.
Sumangil to give her a cellfone which Tech. Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas
and Heherson will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two outside getting some woods under the
watchful eye of a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and thereafter, she did not see
the two anymore.
While Josephine Galang Victorias story of how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas and
Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully
destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents.
1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she knows a certain
woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces herself as Antonina Galang, niece through the
cousin of his wife and a long-time resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she lived with her partner
Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or siblings house; that he knows the reputation
of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness and integrity, known to fool
others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before
God and the State.
2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II since
birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang Victoria because she is her niece being the daughter of
her older brother; that she even took care of Antonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the
truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to fool others, a liar and invent [sic] stories for reason of
money.
3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang is a niece
and attested the same negative reputations against Antonina.
It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victorias relatives were never successfully
rebutted by her and the Court gives credence to them. No ill motive [sic] were established against the
said witnesses to testify against Antonina Galang.
Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she first saw
Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because she was visiting her uncle, Major Henry Galang,

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83

allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang was put to doubt. TSG
Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Major Galang was no longer residing
there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of TSG Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of
the other witnesses on Antonina Galangs penchant to invent stories or tell a lie.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang that the two missing
person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino and later, in Aqua Farm, were Nicolas and
Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang never did see the faces of the two but were known to her through
photographs. Certainly, there may be a difference between photographs and the faces in person.
To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they saw
Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in the early morning
of September 18, 2006.27 (underscoring supplied)
NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courts September
17, 2008 Decision.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such
errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counterassignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the
judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo or raised in the
appellants assignment of errors or arguments.28
This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid
ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the
court in making its determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the
court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. He may move for a correction or
clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis
for the Court to skip the rule and excuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of
the remedies in the face of the parties contentions that have remained disputed.29
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the RELIEFS 30 by the
appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to prove
either partys claim, viz:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claim
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

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84

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard
substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since
respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate courts decision is,
insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.
Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every
citizens constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances.31
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of
duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the
petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the
part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to
grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the
courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all
relevant evidence, viz:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court,
justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order
that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a
government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing
their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3 (c) of
this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be

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85

imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may
order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or
operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information,
the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date,
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may
order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form,
which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine
the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the
parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
theamparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the
military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas
and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court
to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the
disappearance of the victims.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by
the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the appellate courts
judgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the

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86

production of logbooks and reports.32

At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of
praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a
party who did not appeal.33
If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court was merely
interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They
could have opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a
prohibited pleading34 under the Amparo Rule, but they did not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March 3,
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

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87

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC

January 22, 2008

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,
the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers
of general circulation.
January
22,
2008.

(Sgd.)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR.
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

HUMAN RIGHTS
(Sgd.)

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J.

Associate Justice

88

(Sgd.)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any
judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner
or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any
justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
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The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The
petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue
the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or,
in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may
deputize any officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than
ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the
writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the
court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or
by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service
shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be
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reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain
the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the
petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information,
and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or
information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent
who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the
public due to its nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;

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(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant
unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous
data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege
of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days
from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the
proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and
articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the
respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of
the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to
the parties and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final
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order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not
preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the
writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas
data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs
in the petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved
party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of
habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three
(3) newspapers of general circulation.
[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182165

November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO

BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ,
MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN
DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos,
challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a

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petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz),
leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the
property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which
intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which
judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the
property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province 2 and the judges who presided over the case. 3
Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of
the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same
RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to
prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent
events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and
executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10,
2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE
PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners
with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this
case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly,REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the
petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of
the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the
issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on
August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction
which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21,

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2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.

On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch
10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on
January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented.
Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents
Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly
represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed
by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza
instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July
19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and
other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10
of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property
with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, 6 and arrested them when
they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the
Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order
of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged
offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings
on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this
Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005
[sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19,
2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of
February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians
proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily
harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises,
on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at
8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to
bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the
martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8

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rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77
for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for
Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the
commitment orders and waivers are herebySET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is
declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 10 of The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the
petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as
the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which
coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of

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data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
libertyand security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof."Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government
and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners
entry into the property.
Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent
a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)

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Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein
branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed land with armed
men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly
be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the
presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18(Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing
threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the
herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of
amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail
for the offenses a day after their arrest.20
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of
amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing
restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their
right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint
Affidavit, viz:
xxxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing
kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17
at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELFHELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan
sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that
petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home
and correspondence.
As for respondents assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent
Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which
respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.22

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Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners
even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of
the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of
amparo andhabeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats
by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency
and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the
legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1
It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory
decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante
delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 24 of the Rules of Court. Validity of
the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during
trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may,
however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Castillo v Cruz (2009) Gr No 182165

J. Morales

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Facts:
Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to
utilize it for local projects.
The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn decided against the spouses.
RTC affirmed the decision.
The spouses didnt vacate and continued to file cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended the
demolition against the property, a determination of the property bounds, and a remanding of the case by
means of a writ of injunction.
The respondents filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another demolition
order.
In order to stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property.
Superintendent Castillo was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession.
Respondents refused. The y filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC
The same people claimed that the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy equipment
and arrested them. RTC ruled in their favor.
Issue: Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?
Held: No. Petition dismissed
Ratio:
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.
As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on Oct.
24, 2007 and the Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power was inherent in the Constitutional grant to
the courts to promulgate rules for human rights.
Definitions of the Writs:
a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity

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b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person.
The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Sec of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There must be a connection
between the acts and effects of the aforementioned rights.
Tapuz v Del Rosario- What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The same case states that the court will only issue the writ after determining the facts existence from
the supportingaffidavits of thNotably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat
to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.
There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners use of force. They were only protecting property
rights. Theiraffidavit said: Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years
naming IN POSSESSION.
Regarding habeas data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement.
The writs cant be used to stall the execution of a property dispute decision.
The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was due to the institution of criminal
proceedings running first. They may avail of the reliefs as a motion.
Obiter:
The filed the writs in the Sandiganbayan, but dismissed for form shopping and insufficiency.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184769

October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA,

Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the
writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer
decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein
imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated
but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO).

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On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as
"A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and
Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive"
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence
in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to
her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged
accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as
you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the
veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently
believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so
to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on
my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for managements initiated
transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor
to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of
the issues she raised.

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No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 213-M-2008.
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure
and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO
purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to
privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance
of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly
received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the
purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified
written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for a
TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia,
resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case
which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot
restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the
issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,

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petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions
of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and
that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in laborrelated cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ
only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and
that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum
to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack
of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario 15 that the writs of amparo
and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. 16 Employment constitutes a property
right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. 17 It is evident that respondents
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and

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conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas
data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable
or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To
argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in
fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of
her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]"
and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan
RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769

J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk.
She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the
premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all. She added, instead of the management supposedly extending
favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one. She asked for
deferment thereafter. Since the company didnt respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the
Bulacan RTC due to meralcos omission of provding her with details about the report ofthe letter. To her,
this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures
for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasnt in

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order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home
Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?
Held: No, petition dismissed
Ratio:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party
Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings
and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one
that can besolved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondents right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were mere
jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to real intent of
management.

MERALCO, Alexander Deyto and Ruben Sapitula vs Rosarion Gopez Lim

GR No 184769

October 5, 2010

Facts:

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Lim is an administrative clerk at MERALCO, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of her assigned office
denouncing respondent. By Memorandum of Alexander (head of MERALCO Human Resource Staffing), he
directed the transfer of respondent to another sector due to the accusations and threats against her from unknown
individuals and which could possible compromise her safety and security.
Lim then requested deferment of his transfer, but due to futility, she filed a TRO for her transfer and a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO commanding MERALCO, to wit:
Full disclosure of a the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by
petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security;
The nature of such data and te purpose of its collection;
The measure taken by MERALCO to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
The currency and accuracy of such data or information;
Issue:
Whether or not habeas data is proper in this case.
Ruling:
No, the writ of habeas data directs the issuance only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person,
family or home and MERALCO is not engage in such activities.
Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy, life, liberty or security

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