Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They

brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law
violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no
ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion
made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect
is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are
VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or

disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform

to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the
established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action
of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has
been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows
and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on
the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.
(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation

between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and

the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that
she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.
She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she
was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.

vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139

August 5, 2014

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC
reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorneys fees

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

ISSUE:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas
a recruitment and placement agency.

Placement

Agency,

Inc.,

is

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year

employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She
alleged that in her employment contract, she agreedto work as quality control
for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her

salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent
of respondents salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation

Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to

warrant a reverse conclusion.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a

law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided
in RepublicAct. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant
us to revisit the precedent.

The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated
in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or
office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent
with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is
a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared

Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools

Osea vs Malaya

Division Superintendent of Iriga City.

G.R. No. 139821 January 30, 2002

In dismissing petitioners protest, the CSC held that Sec.99 of the LGC of

Facts:

1991 contemplates a situation where the DECS issues the appointments,

Petitioner filed a protest with the Civil Service Commission. She averred that

whereas respondents appointment was made by the President, in the

she was appointed as OIC, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of

exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as

Camarines Sur, by then DECS Sec.Ricardo T. Gloria, upon the endorsement

Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as

of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. Despite the

Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of

recommendation of Sec.Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed

reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was

respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines

unnecessary.

Sur. Petitioner averred that respondents appointment was made without prior

Issue:

consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Sec.99 of the

Whether Respondent was merely re-assigned and did not require the

LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that respondents appointment be

mandatory consultation with the Local School Board under Sec.99 of RA

recalled and set aside for being null and void.

7160.

Sec. 99 of RA 7610 provides:

Held:

Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. The provincial, city or

The afore-quoted portion of Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991 applies to

municipal school board shall:

appointments made by the DECS. This is because at the time of the

xxx xxx xxx.

enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local

the DECS to specific divisions or locations.

school boards on the appointment of division superintendents,

In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum

districtsupervisors, school principals, and other school officials.

Circular No.21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division

The CSC dismissed petitioners protest complaint. The CSC found that

superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the

President Ramos appointed respondent without any specific division. Thus,

career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to

respondent performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent in

career executive service positions was transferred from the DECS to the

Iriga City. On November 3, 1997, Sec.Gloria designated respondent as

President.

Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools Division

may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an

Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her

individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed,

designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she

usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for

previously exercised her functions as OIC Schools Division Superintendent,

the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure.

to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Sec. 99 of the LGC of

On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee

1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply. It only

from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency,

refers to appointments made by the DECS. Such is the plain meaning of the

which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not

said law.

require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment

connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.