PEOPLE vs.

SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 27972. October 31, 1927
STREET, J.:

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY MARRIAGE WITH INJURED GIRL;
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE. After the accused had consummated the crime of rape upon a girl of the age of 15,
niece of his deceased wife, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the same day between
himself and the girl, with the evident purpose of extinguishing his criminal liability under the proviso to
section of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission, and without any intention on his part of living
maritally with the girl. Held: That the consent of the girl to the performance of the marriage was vitiated by
duress and that the marriage ceremony had been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape
punishment. Such marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes no obstacle to the prosecution of the accused
for
the
offense.

FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, the appellant Santiago asked Felicita, who was then about 18 years of age, to
accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river together into
the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the accused manifested his desire to have sexual
intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, however, he was able to accomplish his
purpose by force and against her will. After what happened, the appellant led the girl to the house of his
uncle, Agaton Santiago. In the afternoon of that day, Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who
went through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the girl a few
pesos and sent her home.

Issue:
WON the subsequent marriage by the offended party to the accused extinguish the crime of rape?
Ruling:
The Supreme agreed with the decision of the lower court that the offense of rape had been committed and
that the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal
consequences of his act. The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as
before, shows that he had no bonafide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be
considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent,
and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer. The consent of the girl to the
performance of the marriage was vitiated by duress and that the marriage ceremony had been performed as
a mere device of the accused to escape punishment. Such marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes no
obstacle to the prosecution of the accused for the offense.