Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 612
117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2784, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,196
In this action for breach of the duty of fair representation by the plaintiff's
union, the district court entered summary judgment for defendants because
plaintiff had not both filed and served his complaint within the six-month
period required by the applicable statute of limitations, Sec. 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 160(b). We affirm.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), held that the
six-month limitations period in Sec. 10(b) governs claims of this kind against
both employers and unions. The issue on this appeal is whether filing within
the statutory period is sufficient, or whether the complaint must also be served
within that period.
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[N]o
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than
six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made....
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29 U.S.C.A. 160(b).
Since the complaint was not served within the time the six-month period had
concededly expired, the district court properly entered summary judgment for
defendants.
Defendants argue that, in any event, the complaint was not even filed within the
six-month period. They assert that the cause of action accrued on October 16,
1981, and the six-month limitations period expired on April 16, 1982, so that
the action filed April 27, 1982 was untimely. In the absence of fraud or
concealment, Sec. 10(b)'s six-month limitations period starts running when the
claimant "discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the acts constituting the alleged [violation]", N.L.R.B. v. Don
Burgess Construction Co., 596 F.2d 378, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
940, 100 S.Ct. 293, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (brackets in original) (citations
omitted). As stated by this Court, "[f]or the purpose of determining when the
Sec. 10(b) period begins to run, we look to when plaintiffs either were or
should have been aware of the injury itself, not to when plaintiffs' became
aware of one of the injury's many manifestations." Benson v. General Motors
Corp., 716 F.2d 862, 864 (11th Cir.1983). See also, Farr v. H.K. Porter Co.,
727 F.2d 502, 505-06 (5th Cir.1984); N.L.R.B. v. Auto Warehousers, Inc., 571
F.2d 860, 864-65 (5th Cir.1978).
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The parties disagree on the earliest date the plaintiff should be charged with
knowledge of each defendants' alleged breach. The evidence is persuasive that
plaintiff knew of both Lockheed's and the Union's final actions no later than
October 16, 1981. Lockheed informed plaintiff that his grievance had been
denied by Lockheed on July 2, 1981, by a letter dated July 6, 1981. The
Union's Senior Board met on September 22, 1981 and decided in caucus that
plaintiff's grievance was without merit and would not be presented before the
company representatives on the Senior Board. Plaintiff admitted in his own
deposition that he knew his grievance had been withdrawn a few days before he
was laid off on October 16, and there is no question but that he had actual
knowledge of his grievance's denial when he lost his job on that date. The fact
that plaintiff did not receive formal written notice of the Union's September 22
action until the Union belatedly wrote plaintiff on October 28 is not
determinative. Defendants had no contractual duty to provide formal written
notice, and even if the Union were negligent in not providing formal notice
sooner, the failure to give that notice would not mean that the plaintiff did not
have the requisite knowledge. Higdon v. United Steel Workers, 706 F.2d 1561,
1562 (11th Cir.1983); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th
Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980);
Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335, 1341 (6th Cir.1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981, 96 S.Ct. 2188, 48 L.Ed.2d 807 (1976). The plaintiff
was orally informed of his grievance's withdrawal no later than October 16 so
the date he received formal written notice would not control. The summary
judgment could have been based on the ground that the statute of limitations set
forth by Sec. 10(b) expired on April 16, 1982, so that plaintiff's April 27 filing
was not timely.
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AFFIRMED.