1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice
of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters

connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by

maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the

heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.

(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members
of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it
is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that
in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that
work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow

theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic

computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes

offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the

business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more

adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence

governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and

organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,

interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets
of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to
the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)

10

of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared

for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging
in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House
of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state

11

the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments
of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) SubArticle C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last

12

Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any

vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law
for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

13

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits

14

nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of
a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation
or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

15

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum

it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra,
p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al.,
v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

16

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged
in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by
the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."

17

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It
is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a
lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities
in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the
law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but
not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no

18

power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications
in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I
fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in
one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous.
To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he
was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine
Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

19

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

20

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half
a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making
the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said."
When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered:
"Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer
as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on
the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx

21

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has

a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over
the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a
class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at
p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is

22

a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.

Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the
Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which
may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business.
This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA
288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the

23

sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of
a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation
or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general

24

practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra,
p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al.,
v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged

25

in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by

the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws

26

regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It
is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a
lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities
in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the
law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but
not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications
in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

27

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I
fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in
one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous.
To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he
was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine
Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt Member

28

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the

following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

29

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half
a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making
the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said."
When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered:
"Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer
as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on
the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over
the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx

30

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or

employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a
class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at
p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the
Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which

31

may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business.
This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA
288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day,
he
assumed
office
as
Chairman
of
the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C
of
the
1987
Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any

32

elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,

including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates."
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that,
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.

33

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B

34

GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement
at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,

35

property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,

passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first
of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of
acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being

36

offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,

and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as
that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive
of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here
it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as

37

earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing
the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be
prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public
in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both
are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all
of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general
and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of
the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought
to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

38

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed

exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in
a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged
in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal
work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of
law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:

39

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment
of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to
the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of
being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it

40

appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified
to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems
to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law,
(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.

41

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice
of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory
and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided
no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land
to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to
the building code and the like, then an architect who performed
this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important
body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the

42

practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in

employee matters to a management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard
to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger employers
get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right
to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits
the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if
as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of
the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach
a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented
by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the

43

representation of parties before such agency. The State of New

Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or
to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or
by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this
phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a
priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem
is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved
is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic,
renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles

44

or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular

reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is,
the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should
be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and
sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly nondiagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)

45

fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for
the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note
that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases,
we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under

46

the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in

the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized

47

legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings

prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13,
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for
Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of
it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed
up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start
by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And
once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.

48

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care
of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can
take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of
sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required
by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them
to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

49

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted
in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there
are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect
the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed
to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to
render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the
law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as
in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director
of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by
the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among

50

other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must
be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client
as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same

51

definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said
case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our
former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case
at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we
are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not
within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off

52

from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court
(Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law
to appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the
government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138,id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the
purpose of conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, who is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities
where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine
Patent Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark and trade name cases
(Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party
to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its members, provided that
he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(3) he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case
falling under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the
studies of law in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient
qualification for appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917).
See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New
York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.

53

32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.

33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license
promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation
on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941),
241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American
Bar Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil.
968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No.
902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.

223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal Profession
Practice of Law

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the

54

services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal
Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems
in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in
the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic
offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is
not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services
being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by

55

paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards
of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions
of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
1.
2.

Advertisement in a reputable law list

Use of ordinary simple professional card

3.

Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Article 8 Section 5 1987 Constitution

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.

56

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.

RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

57

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America.
Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed
members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in
good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of
office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. Applicants for
admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the
Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court
therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can
show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said
courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been
suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without
examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and
successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence
of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily
completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation
and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All applicants for admission shall file
with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least

58

fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3
and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate
required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license
evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has
not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also
file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission shall be
published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English
and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3
and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law;
Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional
Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public);
Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. Persons taking
the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The
questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish,
shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without
help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that
it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may
allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless
typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent
the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their
names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of the
Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days
to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and
Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon);
Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial
Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted by a committee
of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be
composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be
designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of
this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence any
member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate
with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates
this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination,
and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including
permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in
all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average,
the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15

59

per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. Not later than
February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the
committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers
and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the
parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. Candidates who have failed the
bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination
unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular
fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law
school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule
shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed
the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by
them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An applicant who has passed
the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the
bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a
member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him
by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all
attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he
receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

60

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every
defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An
attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal.
An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to
continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at
any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the
court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the
change shall be given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full
compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions

61

issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice
for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such
attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex
parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that
the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel
are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. Subject to availability of funds as
may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with
section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than
thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50)
in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred
pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500)
in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. Any
official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the
bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his

62

litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of
the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the
Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents
and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the
same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds
to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which
he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the
same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation