PALE CASE DIGEST: LAWYERS DUTIES TO COURT

G.R. No. 80390 March 27, 1998

Held: We take notice of the failure of Atty. Abrogena to inform

the trial court of the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides in part, to wit:

1.
CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL
L. BAUTISTA and ANGELICA M. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTOR
FORTUNADO, respondents.
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of two parcels
of land. Said properties were mortgaged by Arsenio Lopez, Jr.
to the Traders Commercial Bank to secure a loan obligation.
Respondents instituted an action before the Court of First
Instance against Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank, for
annulment of mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondents but the Court of Appeals modified the formers
ruling by eliminating the paragraph declaring the real estate
mortgage null and void. Traders Royal Bank assigned its
rights to the mortgage to petitioner Angel Bautista who
requested to the City Sheriff of Iligan City that the mortgaged
properties be foreclosed for non-payment of the loan
obligation. Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction
against petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondents while the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to
the Supreme Court. Respondents, through counsel Ramon
Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation informing the Court
that the subject real estate mortgage has already been
released by the Traders Royal Bank and that the petitioner
was killed in a robbery in his house. The Court required
petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the
said Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the
Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed
after three notices, with the postmaster's remark "moved." In
view of this development, the Court considered the resolution
as served.
Issue: Should Atty. Abrogena be reprimanded for his failure to
inform the Court of the death of petitioner?

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.

Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure
of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be
a ground for disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court
of his change of address which accounts for his failure to
comment on the manifestation of respondents relative to the
death of petitioner and the release of the subject real estate
mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and
foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are
more significant than those which he owes to his client. His
first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate;
and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics of the profession.
Atty. Abrogena is REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this
Court of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. He is further
warned that a repetition of such omission in the future will be
dealt with severely.
2.

Occena vs. Judge Marquez

In the Testate Estate Proceedings of William Ogan,

petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea,
are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan
Occea. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased
father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter
into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the
total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the
claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his
lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution of the corpus and
income of the estate was made to the heirs in the total
amount of P450,000.00.
On account of their legal services, petitionees filed a Motion
for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees in the amount of
P30,000.00. However, respondent judge issued an order
fixing the total fees of petitioners at P20,000.
Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the
entire attorney's fee.

doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue

any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as
a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his
clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately
made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been
recreant to his oath.
Factual Basis:
1.
To bolster his claim that the executrix, without
approval of the court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc., intervenor submitted as Annex
5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real
Estate Mortgage" which he made to appear was signed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix. The certification
of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows that
what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in
reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed by the
parties.

Issue: WON Atty. Binamira can be held in contempt.

2.
Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition,
also stated that in December, 1965, the executrix, without
the court's approval or of the co-executor's consent, but with
petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc. out of the estate's funds. The
record shows that only P50,000.00 was loaned to the
company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and
that the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed
among others, by intervenor, and approved by the court.

Held: YES. We find no rule of law or of ethics which would

justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or
criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the
court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his
client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with
other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly
make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote
the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the
argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision.
Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the
solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the

3.
To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occea and his wife,
the executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition
to Petition that less than a month after the loan of
P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation
company, petitioner Samuel C. Occea was elected president
by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the
executrix loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The
certification of the corporate secretary of the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states
that petitioner Samuel C. Occea was not the president of
the company at the time, nor did he act as president or
treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de

Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan

estate filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was
granted. Petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for
Contempt
for alleged use of false documents.

la Serna. This last fact is also shown in intervenor's own

Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition.
4.
In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari,
he stated that contrary to the executrix's statement in the
1965 income tax return of the estate that an estate "income
of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there
was in fact no such distribution of income. The executrix's
project of partition (Annex E-Contempt) shows that there was
a distribution of the 1965 income of the estate.
5.
To discredit petitioner and the executrix, intervenor
alleged in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that
petitioners caused to be filed with the court the executrix's
verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the
estate certain loans granted to petitioner Samuel C. Occea
in the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various sums
totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan
to his daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and HContempt), show that the said sums totalling P10,000.00
were in reality partly given to her as a gift and partly for the
payment of certain furniture and equipment.
6.
Intervenor, in Order to further discredit petitioners and
the executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's and
Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration that the
executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all
that he was entitled to under the compromise agreement.
The receipt dated October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor
himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he acknowledged
receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occea, lawyer for the
executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all
claims and fees against the Estate, pursuant to the
Agreement dated October 27, 1965."
7.
In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to
Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged
that he signed Atty. Occea's prepared receipt without
receiving payment, trusting that Atty. Occea would pay the
amount in full, but later Atty. Occea withheld Chartered
Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00 drawn in favor of
intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by

intervenor I. V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he

acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount
of P8,000-00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo ... ." Anent
the sum of P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to
the Opposition for Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by
intervenor with the probate court) shows that intervenor, as
movant, himself had alleged that "no check was issued to
movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included
in purchasing Manager's check No. 55398 for the Clerk of
Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was
voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of
goodwill to form part of the total cash bond of P75,000.00
deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a receipt
signed by Atty. Samuel C. Occea (Annex K-11-Contempt)
which forms part of the record in the court below.
8.
In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition,
intervenor denied the truth of petitioners' claim that
intervenor had voluntarily and willingly extended the sum of
P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of
the P75,000.00-deposit. In the Opposition to Motion of
Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19, 1966,
dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had,
however, admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart ...
in the nature of help," he had "willingly extended as a favor
and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.
9.
To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occea
that he stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to
attend to the affairs of the estate, intervenor, in his
intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said
petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend to the
affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in Silliman
University. The certification of the Director of the personnel
office of Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex
V-Contempt) is, however, to the effect that their "records do
not show that Atty. Samuel C. Occea was teaching at
Silliman University or employed in any other capacity in
1963, or at any time before or after 1963."

Atty. Binamira is held in contempt. As to the issue of

compensation, the probate court was directed to
conduct hearing to determine the proper amount
thereof.

of the appellate court or of this Court in the present appeal

by the attorneys for the parties,

G.R. No. L-28131 February 28, 1972

4.
CHAN KIAN vs. ARSENIO ANGSIN [A. A. Industrial
Chemical Supply]

Held: No. had the counsels, as officers of the courts, but

faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in
truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate
court the above developments, all by June, 1965, which have
made the principal issue at bar moot and academic, this case
would then have been disposed of and need not have been
certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to
the prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have
been thus dissipated.

Facts: Plaintiff's complaint before the CFI of Manila alleges

that on July 23, 1962, he entered into an agreement with
defendant by selling to him, for delivery on August 23, 1962,
400 drums of monosodium glutamate in the amount of
P120,000.00 and that on August 23, 1962, he was ready to
deliver but defendant refused to accept delivery and insisted
on the return of the P120,000.00 because the price of the
said merchandise had already fallen in the local market,
hence said complaint prays that defendant be ordered to
receive from plaintiff 400 drums of monosodium glutamate,
with damages.
Arising from the same transaction is Criminal Case No.
67752, People vs. Chan Kian (herein plaintiff) before the
same court, wherein herein defendant is the complainant,
who accuses herein plaintiff with estafa involving the same
400 drums of monosodium glutamate and the sum of
P120,000.00.
Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said
Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has
shown that the principal issue raised on appeal by herein
plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the
order dismissing his civil complaint against the complainant
in the criminal case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal
case should take precedence over the civil case, has become
moot and academic. None of the above developments of
record in the criminal case has been brought to the attention

Issue: WON the counsels have complied with their duty as

officers of the court

5.
Liberato V. Casals, and Jose T. Sumcad vs. Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. Rebecca T. Palanca And Grecan Co.,
Inc.
FACTS:
December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for
respondents states that while he received notice of the
Court's resolution "no accompanying copy of the petition has
been attached hence the counsel would not be able to
prepare the comments filed his first motion for a ten-day
extension of time to submit respondents' comment. The
Court granted first motion for extension.
December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of
Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents
filed a second motion for extension of ten days to submit
respondents' comment on the ground that Atty. L.C. Delante,
counsel of record, got sick and that Atty. Delante has just
recovered from his ailment.

December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third

motion for "a last extension of fifteen days to submit the
comment, stating the undersigned counsel already
prepared the final draft but due to pressure of work in his
office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the
same has not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy for
filing.
The Court granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five
days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment
notwithstanding the numerous extensions, the Court resolved
to require Atty. Delante to explain and show cause why they
failed to file the required comment.
Atty. Delante in his explanation claimed that in view of his
pressing professional commitments, he requested his clients
to have the answer prepared by another lawyer Atty. Antonio
Fernandez. It was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution
requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez
underwent a surgical operation.
ISSUE

Christmas Season for not having finalized and typed out the
comments in a clean copy.
His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty.
Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was
confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 2326. Hence he had sufficient time and opportunity to submit
the comments by the extended deadline.
He submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing
to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the
required comment, that the required comment was filed
within the last extension secured by him from the Court on
his assurance that the final draft was ready.
His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable
period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition.
His unsatisfactory explanation evinces a willful disregard of
his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a
case "such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts.

Whether the Atty. Delantes explanation deserve credence?

RULING:
NO.
In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his
belated allegation now that another lawyer had been
retained.
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law
office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick.
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante
assured the Court that he has already prepared the final
draft and cited pressure of work in his office and the

Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the

practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal
cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them,
with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in
accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with
the soundest traditions of the profession would require
fidelity on their part.
6.

COMELEC vs. NOYNAY ( 292 SCRA 254 )

Facts: In an Order issued on 25 August 1997,respondent

Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23,
motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the Comelec Law Department to file
the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the
ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as

amended by R.A. no. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no

jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable
penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of
imprisonment.

Issue: (1) Whether or not R.A. No. 7691 has divested

Regional Trial Courts or jurisdiction over election offenses,
which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six
years.
(2) Whether or not petitioners counsel was careless in
the references he made in the motion for
reconsideration.

Held: No. By virtue of the exception provided for in opening

sentence of section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Courts does not cover those criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, election offenses also fall within the exception
provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of Batas
Pambansa 129. Republic Act 7691 can by no means be
considered as a special law on jurisdiction it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and it does not have the
effect of repealing laws vesting upon the Regional trial Courts
or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to heart
and decide the cases therein specified.

Yes. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV

of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for
his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration he
filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial

Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is
already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vsJudge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996,
where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that

pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code,
xxx
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16.
This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto
-vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the
same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and
Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, xxx

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have

known that the correct name of the complainant in the
case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as
indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor
Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO
NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in
volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of

the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in

both the motion for reconsideration and the petition,
Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the
quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a
little differently, our own words. The truth is, the
quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of
the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule
10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in

the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Montecillo vs GICA
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
7.
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR,
petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N.
LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the
Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar,
For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
Bar, respondent.
Facts:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander.
Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he
successfully defended Montecillo in the lower court. Del Mar
was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court

ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.

Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals
where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then
filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled
threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust
decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from
using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second
MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del
Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for
contempt. Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a
copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the
Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA
judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar
then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA
before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually
dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del
Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the
CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice. The issue reached
the SC. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC
denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he
demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who
were the judges who voted against him. The Supreme Court
then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he
should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead
tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been
convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be
fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against
the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated
that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. Del Mar
even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices
but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.

Issue:
WON Atty. Del Mar should be suspended
Held:
The SC ruled in the affirmative. Atty. Del Mar, by his
contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem
and regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice. It is manifest that del Mar has scant
respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the
flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In
short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice,
if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case
of his client. Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely

8.)

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL.

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re:
Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito
M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
January 9, 1970

Sanchez,J.

FACTS:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent
MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our

attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago,

Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar,
with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them.
The following statements are set forth in the memoranda personally signed
by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these
false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the
courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately
called "scattershot desperation"
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners.
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories
not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out,
contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our
upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that
the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect
does precisely that in a most absolute manner.
Further, after judgment herein was rendered, a motion for to inhibit was filed
and it enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, that "unjudicial
prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in
favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the said decision." The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party
who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated
January 31, 1968" As to the Chief Justice, "[t]hat the son of the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in
the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision
of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case."
``````````````````````````````````

A second contempt proceeding arose when, respondent MacArthur, through

new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, lodged a fourth motion for
reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated
previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the aboveentitled case which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who
penned the decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
ISSUE:
Wheter or not the lawyers are guilty of contempt of court
HELD: YES.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the
duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.' It peculiarly makes incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And
more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of
an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "

keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of

justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients,
as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 A judge from the very nature of
his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no
other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position (Malcolm). "It will of course be a trying
ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater
knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides
over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility,
judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and selfrestraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary
for
the
orderly
administration
of
justice.
To add, Atty. Santiagos language is not arguably protected; it is the
surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court
before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were
taken out of context. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's
language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with
which
he
is
charged."

``````````````````````````
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was
necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an
attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always

The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been
made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context.
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted
for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are
members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are
taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or
were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members

present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a
desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission.
A distorted quotation came about when the portion left out was anyway
marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct
with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair
for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."
a)

For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel De Gracia

alleging as a ground that the father of the victim, Gilberto
Valenzuela, died and for this reason the Fiscal will file an
amended information.
Petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus alleging that in spite of his service of
sentence, he was not released from confinement.
On the date where the petition was reset for
hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador Beltran
was present. There was a manifestation though, that
petitioner manifests that he has already been released from
confinement, which renders the petition moot and academic.

For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto YES. Fine of P100.00.

For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates NO. (Took no part)
For Atty. Erlito R. Uy NO. (Took no part)
b) (4th Motion) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00
For Atty. Juanito M. Caling YES. Fine P200.00.
For Mr. Morton F. Meads YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.
HELD:
YES. It appears that with the release of the
petitioner, the petition was moot and academic.
In the case at bar, there was a lapse in judicial
propriety by petitioners counsel who did not even
take the trouble of appearing of the Court on the very
day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse
explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative
inexperience and paucity of practice before this
Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing
by way of guidance for his future actuations as a
member of the bar.

9.
De Gracia vs. Warden of Makati
G.R. L-42032 January 9, 1976
FACTS:
The imprisonment of four months and one day of
arresto mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency was imposed by Judge Reynaldo Honrado upon De
Gracia for the crime of serious physical injury. The period of
confinement was duly served by November 19, 1975, since
he had been under detention since July 18, 1975.
Notwithstanding, he was not set free, the reason being that
on November 19, 1975, Assistant Provincial Marciano Sta.
Ana filed with the same judge in the very same case a Motion

A judge should be courteous to lawyer to merit

respect. He should be civil, for it is unbecoming of a
judge to utter intemperate language during the
hearing of a case.
A.M. No. 491-MJ October 30, 1980
11.
PRIMITIVO SANTOS, ET Al., petitioners,
MUNICIPAL JUDGE ARTURO E. CRUZ, respondent.

vs.

Facts:
ComplainantPrimitivoSantos charged Municipal Judge Arturo
E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with partiality and
conduct unbecoming a judge for having intervened with
and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in the
Municipal Court of Bulacan.
In his comment, the respondent Judge denied the charges.
Issue: Whether respondent judge is guilty of the charges of
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Held: No, A careful review of the records of this case shows
that the investigating Judge correctly found that the
complainant was not able to prove the charges of partiality
and conduct unbecoming a judge.
However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that
during the formal investigation conducted on February 9,
1973 6 the respondent judge, while cross-examining the
witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can
go to hell I don't care or where do you want to go Mr. Cano".
This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal
judge and deserves administrative penalty.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of
the charge of partiality but is found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a judge by uttering intemperate language
during the trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby
imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1) month
salary and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
12.

people

vs.

taneo

FACTS:
Teofilo Taneo was charged and convicted of raping her own
daughter, Mencino Taneo, 17 yrs old, a barrio lass with
physical virginity, by the RTC of CEBU and was sentenced to

suffer death penalty, 50,000 as moral damages and 25,000

as
exemplary
damages.
Mencino, narrated that her father after returning from
carpentry work around 3pm, insisted her mother, to get sack
of corn grits from a store 1km away from their house. In
order to avoid further altercation, her mother agreed and
instructed her to watch over her baby sister. When Mencino
put to sleep her baby sister in a hammock, she also went to
bed. While she was asleep, She was awakened by the pain in
her genetalia and when she opened her eyes, she saw her
father Teofilo Taneo already naked from the waist down and
on top of her. She also noticed that the cycling pants and
black panty she wore before she went to sleep were already
removed, and leaving her half-naked. Her father kept on
inserting his finger into her vagina; his left arm pinned her
down while he was on top of her. She tried to free herself, but
to no avail as persisted in his lustful intention and
overpowered her threatening her with a bolo and told her
not to shout or else her father would kill her and her family.
After a gruesome trial, the RTC ruled that Mencinos
testimony is sufficient to convict the accused of rape.
Teofilos counsel accused the trial court for having a partial
and biased position and having adopted a biased
interpretation of the physical evidence considering that: 1.
the medical records did not show any signs of rape 2. The
court
only
based
its
judgment
on
the
testimony
of
Mencino.
ISSUE: WON the counsel for the accused acted with propriety
towards
the
Court?
HELD:
No. It is unfortunate that cousel for appellant has made hasty
accusation against the trial court for the above
pronouncement as taking a partial and biased position and
having adopted its own biased interpretation of the physical

evidence. We do not find any cogent and valid ground in the

records of this case which could justify such a grave
imputation upon a member of the bench who merely
performed his function and expressed his observation on the
conduct of the examination. Counsel should be reminded of
his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts
of justice and judicial officers. Arguments, written or oral,
should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel
and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman
to
another.
Appellants argument proceeds from a misconception that a
medical certificate is an indespensible element in the
prosecution for rape and runs roughshod over the wellsettled rule that the absence of medical findings by a
medico-legal officer does no disprove the occurrence of rape.
The fact that the medical certificate show no external signs
of physical injuries and spermatozoa on the victim does not
negate the commission of rape for the slightness penetration
of the labia consummates the offense. The medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate,
is merely corroborative in character. What is important is that
the testimony of private complainant about the incident is
clear,
unequivocal
and
credible.
The Court subjected the testimony of the offended girl with
painstaking scrutiny, which was given in a straight-forward
manner, and found it unimpaired by material discrepancies
and contradictions and consistent with ordinary human
experience. Her testimony undoubtedly bears the imprint of
truth
and,
therefore,
must
be
accepted.
It is unthinkable and unbelievable for Mencina to expose
herself to embarrassment by telling very intimate matters
during a public trial, and to destroy the future of the whole
family, just to spite and get even with her father for a trivial
reason. Besides, only a daughter who may have lost her
senses would dare charge falsely her own father of
committing a heinous crime of rape. Perhaps against a

stranger.
A woman does not go around flaunting her having been
raped. There is no evidence presented to show that Mencina
is so desperate and base that she would sacrifice her honor
and that of her father just to satisfy a personal urge for a
petty
vengeance.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, death penalty shall be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed where the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. The imposition of the
death penalty in such instance is mandatory. In the case at
bench, the victim at the commission of the offense on May
23, 1994, was exactly seventeen (17) years, eleven months
(11) and seventeen (17) days old having been born on June
6, 1946, and the offender is the victims own father. The
award for moral and exemplary damages are also proper in
this case as established by jurisprudence.

13.

Urbina

vs

Meceren

Atty. Vedasto B. Gesmundo as sought in respondent's

comment," there were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the
verified motion for suspension filed by complainant
Gaudencio S. Urbina on for allegedly having made through
said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra,
grave threats against complainant's life if he (complainant)
did not withdraw his complaints against respondent.
In respondent's comment of March 8, 1974, he submitted the
ten-page dismissal by the acting provincial fiscal of Laguna of
complainant Urbina's criminal complaint against respondent
for "Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment" wherein the

fiscal correctly ruled that that assuming that he as a mere

fiscal could pass in judgment upon the justness or
unjustness of respondent's decision complained of as unjust
by the losing party (who has appealed the same to a higher
court), there was no basis for concluding that the respondent
judge knew that his judgment was unjust. Not only does he
believe that his judgment is just and correct; his view that a
probate court cannot decide questions involving title or
ownership
of
real
properties.
Respondent convincingly denies the threats that have been
made.Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the
courthouse with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter
should meet his former client (Urbina) who alone filed the
criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent bears no ill will
against him and if he feels aggrieved by the decision why not
limit his action to an ordinary appeal to the higher courts as
he has already done." Respondent categorically denied
having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina.

Held: The Court finds respondent's comment to be

satisfactory and will not subject respondent to further
needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due
course to the complaint-motion, as insisted by complainant in
his
reply
to
comment.
It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the
bar who file administrative complaints against judges of
inferior courts that they should do so after proper
circumspection and without the use of disrespectful language
and offensive personalities, so as not to unduly burden the
Court in the discharge of its function of administrative
supervision over inferior court judges and court personnel.

The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary

measures against erring judges, including dismissal and
suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest
efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers should
also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the courts as well
as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled
litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior
court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate
language as a means of harassing judges whose decisions
have not been to their liking (irrespective of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate
disciplinary
action
as
officers
of
the
Court.
The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held
administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their
rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross
ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice
in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held accountable
where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict
complained of (and now pending review on appeal) is far
from
erroneous.
ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.
G.R. No. L-22536
August 31, 1967
15
DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA v HON. ANTONIO
MASAQUEL, Judge of CFI Pangasinan

C.

FACTS: Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in a Civil Case

against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land
1 at Bayambang and 2 in San Carlos in Pangasinan. After
trial, the Judge declared the plaintiffs as owners of the land
and ordered Bravo to vacate it and pay the plaintiffs
damages only the land at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a

motion for the immediate execution of the judgment which

was granted by the Judge and they were placed in possession
of the lands at San Carlos.
Then Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant of the Judge
when the latter was still in the practice of law before his
appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the
new counsel for Bravo. The defendant, filed a bond to stay
the execution of the judgment which was granted over the
objection of plaintiffs and ordered the sheriff to restore the
possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant. The
petitioner also asked for the appointment of a receiver over
the land at Bayambang which was granted by the Judge.
However it was set aside by the filing of a bod by the
defendant. Moreover, the motion for a new trial made by
Atty. Sicat was granted by the judge.
Before the oepning of the court's session, Atty. Macaraeg,
counsel for the petitioner and his co-palintiffs requested the
Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing the case on the
ground thar Atty. Sicat was his former associate. This was
rejected by the Judge contending that it was not one of the
grounds for disqualification of a judge provided in the Rules
of Court.
When the case was called for hearing, the Judge called on the
petitioner who was present, and inquired from the latter if it
was true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach
the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself
from trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat
was formerly associated with the Judge. Austria answered in
the affirmative. When he was also asked as to whether the
said Domingo Austria has lost faith in the sense of fairness
and justice of the Presiding Judge of this Court simply
because of his former association with the defendant's
lawyer, Austria likewise answered in the affirmative. The
judge declared the petitioner guilty in contempt of court and
made him liable for the penalty of P50(which he paid under
protest). Atty. Macaraeg beg the court's indulgence in
declaring his client in contempt reasoning that it was due to
Bravo's insistence in the town that he will win the said case
because of his new lawyer. The Court sustained the said
order. Hence this petition of certiorari to annul the contempt
order of the Judge.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was guilty of misbehavior in

the presence of the court or judge, as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before it or had committed an act of
disrespect toward the court or judge to warrant the order of
contempt.
RULING: The Court lifted the direct contempt order as well
as the fine and hold that the petitioner made his request
in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less
insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to
the court.
The Court agreed with the Judge that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from
further trying the case that Atty. Sicat was his former
associate in his practice of law is not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of
the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is
true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to
disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his
former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being
tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial,
if he so decides, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 137.
While it is improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in
chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the case
pending in the court of said judge, the Court did not consider
it as an act of contempt of court. It is one thing to act not in
accordance with the rules and another thing to act in a
manner which amounts to a disrespect or an affront to the
dignity of the court or judge. The Court believes that the
circumstances that led the Judge to declare petitioner in
direct contempt do not indicate any deliberate design on
petitioner's part to disrespect the Judge or to cast aspersion
against his integrity as a judge. Hence, while it may be
conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by
reason of his relation with a party or counsel there is some
implication of the probability of his being partial to one side,
the request can not constitute contempt of court if done
honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done by
petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner,
if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request
to respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.

xxx the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or

judicial officer is the impossibility of rendering an impartial
judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, that
due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Moreover, second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner
that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the
integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true
intention of the law stated in general terms that no
judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
In numerous cases there have been where judges, and even
members of this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from
trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a case,
but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if
the grounds upon which they based their motions for
disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It
is only when there was direct imputation of bias or
prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the
judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and
disrespectful manner, that movants were held in
contempt of court. And this liberal attitude of the courts is
in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish for
contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should
the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail." The power to punish for contempt, being
drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice
16

MARTELINO VS ALEJANDRO

This case presents another aspect of the court-martial

proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino,
alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation
of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged
shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then

undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. It

appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the
petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the
President of the general court-martial, following the latter's
admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor
incident. The petitioner contended that the case had received
such an amount of publicity in the press and other news
media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes
in connection with the presidential election on November 11,
1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating,
the military court denied the challenge.In their answer the
respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case
had received, no proof has been presented showing that the
court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have
been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's
own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE: whether the publicity given to the case against the
petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial.
HELD: In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us
did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be
a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by
newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the courtmartial to protect the accused from massive publicity
encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and
"prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not
contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced
but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity,
we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings
has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners'
challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner
until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor
incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now
be resumed in tranquility.

Case 14: VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: In 1955, petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed a replevin suit against
Pastor Ago to recover certain machineries. In 1957, judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of
money. Ago appealed, and in 1961 the Court, affirmed the judgment. After a
remand, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Ago moved for a stay of execution
but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots. The sheriff
then advertised them for auction sale. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in
which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution,
however, his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots to the
highest bidders, the petitioners. Ago failed to redeem, and in 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale.
Joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, Pastor filed a complaint to
annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that his obligation, upon which judgment was
rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that
Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which
were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment. The battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of
the restraining order continued. In 1966, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. After it was denied, the respondents then filed a similar petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, praying for the same preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then
appealed to the Supreme Court. The said court gave due course to the petition and
granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents' lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners
HELD: Yes. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for
fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold
tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). Forgetting
his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

CHAVEZ V VIOLA
Facts:
Complainant Teodoro I. Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other
appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, a member of
the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice.
Respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia
and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with Civil Case
against Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon
dela Cruz and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, respondent alleged,
on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad Alvendia
and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications
covering portions of public land situated in Barrio Baluarte, Municipality
of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and that lease contracts had been
executed in their favor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Respondent prayed in the complaint that his clients (the
Alvendias) be declared "bona fide lessees of the land in
controversy . . . ." The CFI dismissed the complaint.
Respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application for
Original Registration of Title 8 in Land Registration Case ("LRC").
Respondent alleged in the Amended Application that the applicant
Alvendias were the owners of the land, they having acquired the same
from one Teresita Vistan by sale sometime in 1929.
It is petitioners contention that respondent, in filing the Amended
Application for Original Registration of Title, had willingly aided in and
consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and
unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of
office as a member of the Bar.
In his Answer, respondent alleged that the Application for Original
Registration of Title was originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro,
and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance therein, respondent
filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title;

( A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.

Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct or

malpractice

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable. )

Ruling:
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation.
Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it
could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all
times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts,

that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in
rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they
advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he
is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court. 16
In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that
his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later
pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the
same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a
member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to
do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent
upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in
pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other
than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration
proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really
believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their
rights.
It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyers oath
and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated
that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a]
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has
been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the
title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his
overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of
committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the
Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional
Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in
the imposition of a more severe penalty.