Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Banogan v. Zerna
Ledesma v. Climaco
Cui v. Cui
Alawi v. Alauya
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal process.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
11.
12.
13.
14.
In re Tagorda
Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo
Canoy v. Ortiz
Linsangan v. Tolentino
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In re Galang
In re Arthur M. Cuevas
Samaniego v. Ferrer
Arnobit v. Arnobit
St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
Advincula v. Macabata
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Reyes v. Chiong
Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
Alcantara v. Pefianco
Camacho v. Pagulayan
Torres v. Javier
Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
Rivera v. Corral
Johnny Ng v. Alar
Fudot v. Cattleya Land
Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Berbano v. Barcelona
Sebastian v. Bajar
Hegna v. Paderanga
Plus Builders v. Revilla
Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
68.
69.
70.
71.
Overgaard v. Valdez
Angalan v. Delante
Santon-Tan v. Robino
Somosot v. Lara
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
law.
72. Briones v. Jimenez
73. Pena v. Aparicio
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Hilado v. David
Nakpil v. Valdes
Hornilla v. Salunat
Northwestern University v. Arquillo
Quiambao v. Bamba
Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
Licuanan v. Melo
Posidio v. Vitan
Lemoine v. Balon
Re: Atty. Maquera
Reddi v. Sersbio
De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag
Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya
Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
64.
65.
66.
67.
Hernandez v. Go
PANELCO v. Montemayor
Sps. Adecer v. Akut
Belleza v. Macasa
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77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Sesbreno v. CA
Bautista v. Gonzales
Gamilla v. Marino
Pineda v. De Jesus
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA
CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Pfleider v. Palanca
Mercado v. Vitriolo
Genato v. Silapan
Hadjula v. Madianda
Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
Canon 22 A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way
some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to
achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the
same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the
law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express
its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to
circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law
or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before
the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge
denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases.
Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election
registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is
no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The
appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in
fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same
way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community
that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of
his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
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ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated
because
Alawi
had
resorted
to
gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President
of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellorsat-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself
a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar,
can use the title of Attorney
RATIO:
Dishonesty Conduct
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure
to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It
diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was
nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary
funds.
Unlawful conduct
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the
Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers
responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the
law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging
in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not
essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which
specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
CHUA V. MESINA
CANON 1
Facts:
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case
against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found
that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in
the courts safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he
should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho
complied with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his
common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees
money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest
earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept
the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its
report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD:
YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
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Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon
whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building
(Burgos Property) owned by Mesinas family, and another property (Melencio
Property), also owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses constructed their
house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas
mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she
obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina
convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in
consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq.
m.
The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs.
Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was
thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M.
Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the
amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it.
Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment
of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again
appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the
purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
Held:
HELD
(1) Yes.
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
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fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were
void and illegal.
Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire
real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was
alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to
the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for
the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal
in nature.
DE YSASI III V. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in
April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of
daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other
tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on
the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City
with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November,
1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was
confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from
December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took
care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation.
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the
latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the
sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not
he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and
other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification
disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report,
recommended for Balicantas disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors
resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.
HELD: YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought
of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He
started his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board,
Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from
assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered
into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors
reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own
personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
CANONS 2 & 3
CORDON V. BALICANTA
IN RE: TAGORDA
FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her
husband with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to
form a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed,
and the properties were registered in the corp.s name. Atty Balicanta was the one
who single-handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being its Chairman, President,
General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts:
1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to
sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people.
And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts:
1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the
Corps right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral
home of the Cordons and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta
did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the
properties and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were
unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicantas services and filed a complaint for
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Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to
the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing
the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering
services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.).
He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home
municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to
make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including
his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
1
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lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar.
CANOY V. ORTIZ
Facts:
A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing
him for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for
Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty.
Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful
visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000,
Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in
1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.
Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and lowincome clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the
period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his
failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of
Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.
Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes
fidelity to his clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the
relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need
for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for
failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyers duties.
The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as
councilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer
to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office
since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulating of said calling card.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Held:
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Justice Hofilena
Facts:
Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in
turn filed a case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was
handed to Judge Platon following several changes in trial judge and several refusals
by fiscals to prosecute the case.
Issue:
Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?
Held:
Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must
reinvestigate in order to properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in
mind that a prosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only in
the fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to prosecute if the
innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-fold
aim is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty to
strike foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to use
legitimate methods of prosecution.
RAMOS V. IMBANG
FACTS
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the
assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil
and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees
but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled
hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after
several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for
each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status
of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro,
Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never
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After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of
recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
These respondents were represented by Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became
Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza?
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation
of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is
not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court
in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed
more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the
Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was
precluded from taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the
Supreme Court
This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex
Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a
result of hazing.
He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May
1995
May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and
attached to his petition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
law abiding character.
ISSUE
May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character?
HELD
Yes.
Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of
that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the
petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he
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has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has
taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER
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ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT
FACTS
Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband,
respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary
power over him.
Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they
bore 12 children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously
supporting him until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in
1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe
Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was
impelled to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for
adultery.
Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having
cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation
alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge
and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were
conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who
identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he
caused the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who
testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of
their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly
absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek
postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for
abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
3 months. It averred that an indefinite suspension is not recommended
because respondent supports himself through the practice of law and that it
would be cruel deny him of this at this time when he is already advanced in
age.
HELD
The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral
conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
ISSUE
HELD
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly
immoral character.
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Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty.
Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.
IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they
were not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was
of the complainants subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and
Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the
complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that
respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
Relevant Provisions:
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
Facts:
ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO
Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a
complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper
and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This
happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in the PAO office when the
wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the
plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted at
Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would
realize his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this
ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the
PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, Gago ka!
The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8
Held:
Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefiancos meddling in a matter in
which he had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco was
moved by the womans plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him the
right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down.
Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express
his indignation.
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN
Held:
FACTS
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for
expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in
the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled
students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should
not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
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Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreading
reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. With
respect to the atty.s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, did not confront
the issues but mocked and made malicious accusations against his wife.
The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ISSUE
Held:
Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely
privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however
false or malicious they may be (must be material and relevant). This privilege does
not extend to those matters not related to the controversy.
The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but not
those in the Reply. The SC does not countenance Torres incorporation of criticisms
against Javiers wife as past president of UEFA, but this does not justify Javiers
retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies through his teeth).
Canon 8 instructs that a lawyers arguments in his pleadings should be
gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another.
HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law
for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and
effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the
students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty.
Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still
proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least
communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were
being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is
also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel."
TORRES V. JAVIER
Facts:
Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyers oath. This stemmed
from the remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all
funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion to
Expedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft of
UEFAs funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.s fees case, Javier in his Reply
used abusive and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to the
integrity of the profession (not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries asking
their family members to sign for them).
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Issue:
W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
FACTS
Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by
offering, in some instances, a 50K loan.
ISSUE
Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby
violating rule 8.02 which provides that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,?
HELD
Yes.
Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced
fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.
CANON 9
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
advertisements
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service
that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised,
engaged in the practice of law.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise
his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
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only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary,
simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for
the position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by
petitioner Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of
the Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
Despite Cayetanos opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition,
basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsods nomination.
ISSUE
Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?
HELD
YES.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of
law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of
Monsods employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where
he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. His job involved getting
Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed
through with the investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no
private interest affected such that desistance of the complainant will terminate the
proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfit to practice law.
AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION V. CIR
FACTS
This case involves a controversy over Attorneys Fees for legal services in
the CIR.
On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged
a complaint agains Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor
practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act.
On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it
became final on March 1963.
On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to
compute the backwages of the complainant workers
Atty. Fernandez filed a Notice of Atty.s lien amounting to 25% of their
money claim (PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but
Arsenio Reyes requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%.
Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement
entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.s Fees shall be divided
equally by him, Atty. Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNIONs president.
There are other matters in this case regarding Jurisdiction but the one
related to Legal Ethics is on the issue on Atty.s Fees
CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO
ISSUE
FACTS
Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a
disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a
prior existing marriage
Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a
Makati City counselor.
Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him
a senior partner in her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead
which included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an
atty, 3) appearance in court as counsel.
HELD
Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01
Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law
Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the
performance of a task that may only be performed by members of the bar in good
standing
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alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out 10M to JUSTICE
DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case between Fudot
and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna
said that Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to
accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said that the case was prioritized for resolution and
that Mr. Chan had prior knowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision
was promulgated.
However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose
of amicably settling their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in
Bohol. However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so
much money for the Supreme Court
ISSUE
W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD
YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal
profession. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both
its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality,
impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language
in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts
and trust in judicial administration.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP
Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the
amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant, the
Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to
substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND
FACTS
De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the ponente of the decision, received P10
Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna
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another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000. Another
P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daens nephew while Berbano gave
him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could
not secure Atty. Daens because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the
total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance,
Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP.
Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach
of the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and
ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before
the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted
the Commissioners findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice
of law for 6 years.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD
Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and
remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office
have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members
of the bar.
Berbanos Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the
finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona
in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his
contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to
overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01).
Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously
demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of
having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen).
Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation
and Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.).
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has
the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money,
which will allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12).
SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR
FACTS
Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance of the DAR who represented Fernando Tanlioco in
numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco was
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violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
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HELD
ISSUE
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause
not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for
the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable
the latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this
regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts complained of were
committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests
of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication
and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former
lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first
and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their
clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer
gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined
from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.
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HELD
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each
motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of
the Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent
knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his
desperate attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some
other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of
time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will
be granted. Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a
matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on
any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as
possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court.
Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he
will have nobody but himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the
client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to
engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a
solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he
received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent
humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the
case.
CANONS 13 & 14
FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO
FACTS
Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr.
Cordero bought canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver
spread canned good. When Mr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they
found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the canned good was
infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and
Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence
presented was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder.
Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground
that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court).
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the harsh
insinuation of Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate
by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail.
Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40k.
Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of
an article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily,
Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.
In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases
when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judge found
the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt
because it was the only way for the public to know that there are judges displaying
judicial arrogance.
RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article
which degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentations.
Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court,
sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released).
Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan.
In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law
and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the
law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be
held in contempt and be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02).
Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that
he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He
justified his response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple
exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without
malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from
the practice of law for 1 year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was
transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended the
implementation of the RTCs order of suspension.
W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility YES
HELD
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ISSUE
W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and
Mrs. Hilado
HELD
Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado
was to obtain Atty. Franciscos personal service as a lawyer
Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the
purpose is to obtain professional advice or assistance and the attorney
permits, then an attorney-client relationship is established
Formality is not essential
Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorneyclient relationship which precludes accepting opposite partys retainer in the
same litigation regardless of what type of information was received
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance to administration of justice
Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still
considered as professional service, besides an information imparted to a
member of a firm is made available to the entire firm
Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assads counsel
Ratio: Rule 15.02 a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication
in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client
NAKPIL V. VALDES
FACTS
Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the
title issued in his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses
estate. And, Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate.
Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in
Joses inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were
charged under his name.
The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes
family realty corp.
Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also,
handled the claims of Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.
ISSUE
w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the
code of professional ethics
HELD
Yes.
The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.
Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full
disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and
probable adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously
improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against
for the other side.
The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not
supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he
was absent for quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation
of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.
The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the
certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but
as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for
misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character
requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal
profession.
HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
FACTS
Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members
of the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real
properties of PPSTA corporation.
Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of
Directors.
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Justice Hofilena
which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty.
Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by
Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact;
and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh
stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in
the said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and
counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996.
However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that
was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a
consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.
Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging
that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they
were impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an
attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of
his former client, Lydio.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving
Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this case.
Held:
ISSUE
QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA
Facts:
Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing
conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time
representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and
double-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation Bureau (AIB) and its
president and managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of
Quaimbao in an ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the
ejectment case was still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin
case against Quiambao.
Issue:
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Justice Hofilena
HELD
Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may
not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest
that which his duty another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of
such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation
will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
The clients confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment. The protection given to a client is perpetual and does not
cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client.
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Justice Hofilena
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was
advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote
to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer.
-----------I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I
know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you
hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will
sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.
----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire
Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by
you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ---Candy
When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned
P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in
appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas
repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred
her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting
interests.
HELD
Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing
conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from
investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship.
Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of
"friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance
to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had
been referred to her by the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should
have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer
since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot
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Justice Hofilena
The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule
16.03, presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be
charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of his fees, but rather he can file the
necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case,
Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon.
It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a
25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%.
SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and
ordered disbarred.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF
GUAM OF ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA
Facts:
Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward
Benavente who obtained judgment in a civil case. Castros propery was sold at public
auction to satisfy the obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemption over said
property.
In consideration for Maqueras legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered
into an oral agreement that he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera.
Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for
$320,000.
He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21.
Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an
account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount
to Lemoine.
It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when
demanded upon him. Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to
Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the fund.
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May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?
Ruling:
It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence
only.
The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
[]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
Complainant was informed by respondent that he had sold only one lot and
remitted the proceeds to complainant. Respondent further told complainant that the
other lots remained unsold due to the presence of squatters.
After few years, complainant discovered that more than one lot was sold.
Complainant then sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn
over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties. Complainant also averred
that the Special Power of Attorney, which respondent had used to sell the lots is a
forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures
of complainant and her spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr. is guilty of deceit, dishonesty
and gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of
the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers
to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule
1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in
him by the complainant and her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by
respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent, however, taking
advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and
their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter that he had sold only
one. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party to a case without authority to so do.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant de
Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and
gross misconduct.
Complainant and her husband was a resident of USA. They both owned
parcels of land in Quezon City, registered in complainants name. Complainant
authorized respondent Atty. Lumasag [being the 1st cousin of her husband] to sell the
lands.
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Justice Hofilena
The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to the complaint for
disbarment filed by Wong. Atty. Moya filed 3motions for extensions (after the 1 st
motion was granted and the time had elapsed, he filed another one and so on and so
forth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and required him to file an
answer. Atty. Moya filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed
for an extension to file his answer which was granted but with a warning that no
further extension requests will be entertained. When the time to elapse was near he
filed a Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did not
accept this hence he was declared in default after failing to file his answer.
The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their position papers because a
complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years
from the date of the professional misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002 and
that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file any pleadings at all.
The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for 1year. The IBP
Board of Governors modified this and suspended Atty. Moya for 2years.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable?
HELD
1)
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Justice Hofilena
2)
3)
4)
5)
Yes!
Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks. He did not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that the issuance of
worthless checks as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct.
The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing
worthless checks by his dire financial conditions. He should not have contracted
debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial
reverses he should have explained this with particularity and not though
generalized and unsubstantiated allegations.
Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his
client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation
that the same had already been transmitted to the complainant.
His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of
serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several
extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and
belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous
disregard of the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding.
This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member
of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
6)
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal
Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year
suspension. However, in this case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also
seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage
and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its
proceedings.
CANONS 17 & 18
HERNANDEZ V. GO
FACTS
Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in
Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to
pay the creditors
Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged
to creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and
persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said
lots
Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez
In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as
agreed upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had
her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth
millions
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Justice Hofilena
His acts acquiring for himself Hernandezs lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment
Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the
honor of the legal profession
Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence
in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles
and allowed him to sell the same
Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to
Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties
Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how
much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the
practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is
too light
Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.
PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative
I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence.
Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were:
Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief
despite the lapse of the two extensions of time granted, hence the Court of Appeals
considered the appeal Abandoned
The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not
even bother to answer the complaint nor present his defense
Hence, PANELCO I prays that the court impose sanctions on Atty.
Montemayors gross negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the
damage of PANELCO I.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in
mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to
the prejudice of the complainant.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every
remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his
clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until
its final conclusion.He should undertake the task with dedication and care.
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Justice Hofilena
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Justice Hofilena
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right.
Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective,
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving
his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the
cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to
him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ
FACTS
Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez.
They entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would
represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus
case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of the AntiViolation against women and their children act).
Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4
months after, Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of
many phone calls and emails, Valdez couldnt be reached. Hence, Overgaard
inquired on his own, and discovered that Valdez didnt file his entry of appearance in
any of the cases, that a counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the criminal
cases against him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his
arrest. He was constrained to find a new lawyer.
Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return
of documents entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was
heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with the IBP for Valdezs dismissal for
gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct.
The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also
failed to attend the hearing and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing
was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16,
17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he was ordered to return
Overgaards money.
HELD
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the
Samal Tribe against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility
particularly Canons 16 and 17.
The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971,
Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the
loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to
the Spouses Eustaquio.
When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the
Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the
document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed,
was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that
Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his
name.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
recovering their property.
Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property.
Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the
amicable settlement, the complainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as
repurchase price which the spouses accepted.
However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the
property. Respondent Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants
allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover
the property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that
respondent transferred the title of the property to his name.
Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale
prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared
void, (2) title issued in the name of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent
be made to pay damages.
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Justice Hofilena
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of
Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their
knowledge, consent and against their will?
HELD
YES.
The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delantes defenses. Angalan and
complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice about borrowing money
but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property.
3.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the
Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the
recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross
misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct.
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and
who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him
from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO
FACTS
Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly
neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a
bouncing check.
Complainant found out that her case had not progressed and that the only
pleading that respondent had filed was his notice of appearance.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case (NO);
and
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Justice Hofilena
Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be
sent directly to Mrs. Somosot
At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about
the P27,000 in unpaid attys fees
Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office
was locked and according to the security guard, they had moved office
without leaving a forwarding address. Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs
Somosot, but they couldnt be reached
ISSUE
W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services
to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot.
HELD
Yes.
Atty Laras services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the
Interrogatories and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to
rule against Mrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried to address the
Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not.
He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about
the Interrogatories and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he
learned that he had been appointed into a government position.
Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldnt be
a reason for him not to inform his client about the cases development
He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment
in a government office; and two, Somosots refusal to pay his fees. He could have
secured her conformity to the withdrawal of appearance when they talked on
December 2001, but because he failed to do so, he remain as counsel of record.
CANON 19
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is
Atty. Jimenez. Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson
Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order
(2002). The RTC Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the
estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to
the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his
clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of
violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional responsibility by filing the
unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage:
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Justice Hofilena
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case of proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since
no evidence of malice or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the
proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate
delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal
prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to
represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers
performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit
lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of
their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal
in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
PENA V. APARICIO
FACTS
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal
case before the NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio
prayed that his client be given separation pay. Pea rejected the claim. Thereafter,
Pea sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter
reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the
company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple
charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for
the cancellation of the companys business license.
Pea filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the
defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Pea had
allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping.
The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC.
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages
against Pea in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory,
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oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled to recognition as there was a
general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry,
not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the
registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a
pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being
set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may
pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it
would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to
be forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated:
"That the son of applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time
the Lessee of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by him under Pasture
Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled
by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the
improvements and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease
Contract; ... ." There was no denial of such allegation.
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by
him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not.
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SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of
Cebu for reinstatement and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the
employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as attorneys fees and 20% expenses
to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the
employees and fixed Atty. Sesbrenos attorneys fees at 40% of back salaries,
terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total
of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. The court later on modified the attorneys
fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA, which decided that the attorneys
fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty.
Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorneys fees amounting to 50% of
all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being
consistent with prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between
the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount
of attorneys fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for
professional services signed by the client
Held:
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them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the
benefits allotted to faculty members.
Issue:
Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services
rendered by Atty. Marino
Held:
No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of
compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks
union president comprising in all probity the same duties for which he has collected a
hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was lack of notice
and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty
Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money
that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the
details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the
probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for
alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is
not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice
by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of
proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against
respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence,
Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson
Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court
and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated
but they still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson
refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a
total of P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
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recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et
al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm
acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of
the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
partydefendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case #
33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20
other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares
& its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the
holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged
that their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion
that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff.
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance
by Roco of the same conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco
didnt refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the
client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of
the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
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Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established.
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imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and that he was also involved in
bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship.
Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged communication the protection
is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope
of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation
of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapans
rights as they were not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those
information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.
Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case against his former client?
Held:
SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the
communication privilege between an attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to
substantiate Mercados allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged
communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN
Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genatos building. Atty. Silapan
handled some of Genatos cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from
Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to
Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he
alleged that Genato was in the business of buying an selling deficiency taxed
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Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda.
She disclosed confidential information during that period. However, after the
confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another
lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming
the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty.
Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public
documents and immorality using the disclosures as basis for the charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty.
Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the
attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the
Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she
(Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative
sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained
counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorneyclient privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan
claimed that the stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing
because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of
communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the
counsel of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.
CANON 22
Facts:
Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?
Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate bylaws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential
information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by
the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at
least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a
non-stock corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new
by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of
incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be
considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be
considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation
of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented
Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad
is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in
the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any
confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained
counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does
not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
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Issue:
Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?
Held:
Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she
abruptly stopped appearing as complainants counsel even as proceedings were still
pending with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This violated
Canon 22.
Suspended for 5 years.
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of
nullity of certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to
enter his charging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as
atty fees. The court granted and the attys lien was annotated on the TCTs. The
cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus
the Bank now had the TCTs in its name and the attys lien was carried over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC
granted the motion and fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After
judgment was rendered convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion
and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty
disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being
filed out of time and for failure to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and
warrants of arrest were issued.
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Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper
proceedings. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that
the respondents should be made liable for the difference.
Attys act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to
settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien.
Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to
claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability
those who were primarily liable to him.
DORONILLA V. CA
Facts:
Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The
RTC declared that Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs.
Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of
land of the estate which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Is the order of annotation proper?
Held:
No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of
the litigation.
Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty
asked from complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket
fees and that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant
corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal
fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake
xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for
$2.5K.
Issue:
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would
take 30% of whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and
payment of backwages. The employer appealed the decision.
Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they
waived their right to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at
once. The court adopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment
of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of withholding, the employer directly paid
the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employer and
employees.
Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees.
Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the employer liable for the Attys fees?
Held:
No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients
and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the
complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his
differences with them. He maintained the case against employers because,
according to him, the computation of the employees money claims should have been
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Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldnt be dismissed. Administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly
preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa.
Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability
of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS
Facts:
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Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering
that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is
compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender
should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law.
Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender
had pledged to defend and protect his client. He was suspended from the practice
of law for 1 year.
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HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only
after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16
years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
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Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting
the compromise agreement. The camineros moved for execution however, only 45%
of the amount due them was released because the court retained the 55%, holding it
was payment of the lawyers fees pending determination of such amount. However,
instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of
Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorneys Fees against respondents
and his former clients. RTC ruled in favor of Sesbreno. The court further upheld the
petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging
lien. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the
respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment
rendered by this Court.
Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for
attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay
the former thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they
might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed.
Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a
specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use
of the word whatever shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount
that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties
agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed
upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful
disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in
favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but
also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been
retained by the client.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the
lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that
particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed
to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the
services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.
Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.
Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and
considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, SC did
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accused of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of
the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused to execute such waiver. The
prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and a
certification that no preliminary investigation was conducted because accused did not
sign a waiver of the provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however
later filed a motion for release and proper preliminary investigation. After the case
was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initially allowed the release of accused on a
cash bond and issued an order granting the leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the
granting of bail and proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously
opposed this.
Held:
(Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of
Justice Gutierrez)
I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without a preliminary investigation
despite vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that said rights be respected
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been moved by a
desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of
justice. Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about
events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational
publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but
also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR
Facts:
It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge
beyond the 90-day reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the
respondent judge which was described as bereft of any dignity as a court of law has
been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his clerk of court, Atty.
Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the management of the court records.
Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as
acting judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case
was being backed up by someone powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao
through Lipangos wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango because the evidence
of guilt was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found out that
Villamor revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And
finally, when the case was elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he
acquitted Lipango.
Held:
Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2
A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay
but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its
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DIMATULAC V. VILLON
Note: Ill skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjies
40page case. Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon is
related to us). Basically, there was denial of due process.
Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the date of arraignment without
even perusing the records (otherwise he wouldve known among others, that there
was a motion to defer proceedings because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there
was an order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition with the CA, the filing of such
petition, order of the CA directing respondent accused to comment on the petition to
show cause why the application for a write of preliminary injunction should not be
grantedetc.,).
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as
these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should
arraignment be precipitately held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await
the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse
the documents to initially determine if indeed murder was the offense committed; or,
he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal
within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty
and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice
is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must
render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence
reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies
within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but
rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended
party to due process of law.
CANON 2
FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render
judgment in the case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was
transferred, complainant learned he brought the records of the case to his new
station. Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records up and because the
dockets were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family
court in the area. He also failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, he
was able to collect his salary when he claimed in his certification that he had no
pending cases.
Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his
court personnel. Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of
organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the
reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It
must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must be filed before
the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent
Judge should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the
records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his
action with respect thereto.
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Ruling.
Yes.
Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities. He should behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore paramount
that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
In the present case, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of
respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary;
they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large.
His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees. Let it be
remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants,
who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. The Court concludes
with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for
persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.
IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
Facts:
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
magistrate should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities and should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence. Since
appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
functions, the judge -- like Caesars wife -- must not only be
pure, but also be beyond suspicion. the actions of respondent
judge were not free from all appearances of impropriety. His
conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever
mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is
the kind of behavior for which he must be administratively
dealt with, as it erodes public confidence in the judicial
system.
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally
remiss in the performance of her duties. By her own
admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond,
even though she had not been instructed to do so by
respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto
herself. The determination of whether to require a cash
bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the accused,
is purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the
mandated duties of respondent clerk. It has been stressed
that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust and
confidence reposed in a public office. The image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work therein, from
the judge to the lowliest clerk.
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos,
Davao del Sur, charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of
judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a death
certificate even though she was not the attending physician. According to Lachica,
during a party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened to file an
administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.
Issue:
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position
and intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is
convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been
established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases. His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death
Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated demeanor
and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is
reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected to disciplinary action. Respondent
was FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting
presiding judge of the RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in
the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The complaint
was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of
Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City
RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment
in the criminal case, the decision, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having
been rendered only on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision.
Respondent judge was also cited for impropriety by complainant because he was
often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle
respondent judge would even use at times.
Issue:
Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
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relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it
would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical
grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is
empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition.
The exercise of sound discretion mentioned in the rule has reference
exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes
forward with the case.7 For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not
otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not
legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it
has been he has to continue with the case.
A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those
specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly
aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or
prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of
justice.
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and
alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or
make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather
a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens
to complain against him. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as
respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.
In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not
legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition,
prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned
MONTEMAYOR V. BERMEJO
(The RULING portion is kind of lengthy because I think the refutation of the Court for
every misconduct alleged is important. )
Facts:
Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case
within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules of Court).
Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the
instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence
and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two
Motions to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a
Copy of the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of
the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the
appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it
was only after the respondent Judge received the defendants supersedeas bond that
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The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on
December 12, 2002. The fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had
not yet returned at this point would have been cause for apprehension for any
responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any semblance of anxiety.
He did not inquire from, nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the
receipts two months after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he
found the lack of registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.
These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two
things.
One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge
Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd
fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr. Montemayors allegations, the respondent
Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings any evidence of the
existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is
evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism.
A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of
the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.
Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in
which case, he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions
but, worse, bias in favor of the defendant.
Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a
flimsy justification for his inaction on Dr. Montemayors Second Motion for Execution.
According to the respondent Judge, the court was undertaking its semestral inventory
when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to admit the adequacy of this
obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the motion for
hearing on the next motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the
second motion.
Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file
any supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the inferior courts
judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory.
However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays
in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears
reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the
appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of
delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is
also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined
the amount of P10,000.00.
case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule
is intended to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe
and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed,
even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed.
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints,
respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a
warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of
complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication
Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated
in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not
exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case
where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge
from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside
over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer
included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judges subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not
detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in
the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial
of a party of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent
Judge refused to abide by such rule.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch
of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government
owned or controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due
him as of this date.
SANDOVAL V. CA
RULING:
Facts:
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Hon. Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondent justice of the CA issued a
TRO.
So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on
the ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations
during his practice in law and the petitioner in this case is run by a religious
organization.
Respondent denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the
case but he nevertheless inhibited himself.
Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged that Justice still appeared as one
of the signatories of a resolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting the
memorandum of the petitioner school and which deemed the petition as submitted for
resolution.
Complainant alleged that respondent justices actions showed his manifest
bias and prejudice against his client in the case. Respondent Justice however, was
able to show that no document was forwarded to him when he inhibited from the
case. It was also shown that another Justice took over the same. It was also shown
that his inclusion as a signatory was a mere mistake by the stenographer as shown
by the letter of apology.
Held:
Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, burden of
proof is upon complainant. If complainant fails to do so, respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense.
In the present case, the complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of
impropriety and partiality against respondent justice. He failed to present any other
evidence to prove his charges.
A partys remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the
proper reviewing court, not with the office of the court administrator by means of an
administrative complaint. When some other judicial means is available, an
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge
deemed aberrant or irregular.
CANON 4
J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS
Facts:
Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC
presided over by respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application
for writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the
same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said
Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that
the bonding companys Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum
net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house,
respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so that
Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several
stores leasing its building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS
Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other
hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option). MTCC ruled for Centrum,
ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests.
The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the
presiding judge. In that appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC
decision, but respondent refused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to file
their supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but limited the period to
10 days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that
Centrums motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the
tenants a chance to file their memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made).
The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with
different rental rates (higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15.
In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum
charged her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct;
2. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.
Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially
increased, it also disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even
before it was promulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she was
innocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also alleges that the
judge unjustly denied its motion for execution.
Held:
Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is dismissed from
office.
Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a copy of the decision
even before its promulgation, the fact is that a copy was obtained by it and this is
highly irregular. Since the judge is ultimately responsible for the safekeeping of her
papers, the burden of accounting is on her.
(judge claims that her stenographer was at fault)
This was not merely a simple case of breach of confidentiality, but evidence
suggests a scheme to extort money from Centrum.
There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum, as admitted by
the latters counsel. Why Centrum filed this case against the judge appears to be that
the decision, although it was completed as of June 15, was not promulgated until after
nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent judge would welsh on her
undertaking to increase the awards in its favour.
On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law,
the court finds the judges errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge
violated certain provisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectment proceedings.
RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE
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Facts:
Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita AcostaVillarante (respondent) with violation of Canon 4.
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mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting. The
memorandum was thus written as a medium for retaliation against Judge CapcoUmali.
BINALAY V. LELINA, JR.
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case against Judge Lelina,
Jr. for violating Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct (both are with regard to prohibition on judges in the private practice
of law).
Respondent judge is preventively suspended for being charged with rape,
abduction with rape and slight illegal detention. While still under suspension, the
judge filed a manifestation for the court to grant him the permission to practice law
during the remainder of his preventive suspension, or if such cannot be granted, to
consider him resigned from the judiciary.
It turned out, however, that even before he filed this manifestation, he had
already engaged in the private practice of law representing 2 persons in a criminal
case, and one in a civil case, all of which are still pending. All pleadings in those
cases were signed by him, as a partner of the Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing &
Associates Law Offices.
In the meantime, the office of court administrator directed respondent to
desist from engaging in the practice of law pending the courts resolution of his
manifestation.
In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition to engage in practice of
law applies only to judges who are in the active service and should not cover those
under suspension. He also said he was forced to practice law due to his
impoverished life and because of the continuing sufferings of his wife and children.
Held:
Judge is suspended and sternly warned.
By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the prohibition to
practice law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguire debemos. Law does not make a
distinction between a suspended judge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to
secure an authorization to engage in the practice of law only shows that he is aware
of the prohibition.
Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to still carry his name. By
allowing the firm to do so, he held himself in public as a lawyer, in violation of the
rules and norms of judicial ethics.
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE PORNILLOS
(Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending cases before her)
Facts:
Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others, the violation of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct for borrowing money from her staff and lawyers in
amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made
Issue:
W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively liable.
Held:
Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct
(aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions and violation of SC rules). Under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil service, borrowing money by
superior officers from subordinates is a violation punishable by reprimand,
suspension, and dismissal from service. At the very least, she should be admonished
for dealing with her subordinates in an improper manner.
More severely prohibited is borrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in case pending before the court (a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of
ROC). Under Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shall
refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the
courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
Facts:
Held:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the ff. acts:
Threatening her through text message that she would be in trouble (because he
thought she was supporting an applicant for sheriff which he opposed)
Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her
Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore, disgusting, repulsive,
pakialamera, offensive, etc. (in a letter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found
out she ad him blotted with the police because of the text threat)
Publishing such remarks in a newspaper
YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information* acquired by justices and
judges in their official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes
not related to their judicial duties.
*Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge
relating to pending cases.
CANONS 5 & 6
Issue:
REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA
Consolidation of 3 cases against respondent
FACTS
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complained of should be corrupt, or with evident bad faith. Such conduct was not
evident in the case.
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA
FACTS:
Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case in favor of Dee C.
Chuan & Sons Inc. An appeal was filed with Peralta, an RTC Judge.
March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of
writ of execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the
rentals due in accordance with the decision of the MeTC.
March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta required appellants to file their
comment.
August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003: DCCSI filed a
motion to resolve. However, despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent
failed and refused to resolve the pending motions. Complaint thus filed.
When asked by the OCA about the case, Peralta said that it "ha (d) been
resolved by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing" and attached a copy
of his order dated May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the
appellants to file their memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ of execution
in favor of DCCSI. The OCA, in its report, found Peralta indeed failed to resolve
several motions for more than a year and showed indifference in his comment and
recommended that he be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his official
duties and fined in the amount of P11, 000.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision
or order.
HELD:
YES! FINED + Sternly Warned.
RATIO:
Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower
courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted
for decision. Peralta ignored this mandate. Failure to comply within the mandated
period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.
For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve several motions the motion
to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to
resolve, and didnt offer any reason or justification on why it took him more than a
year to resolve the motions. He thus violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. A judges failure to resolve motions and incidents within the
prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency for it undermines the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a personaccused for frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit
evidence that the notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by
such person. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the former why
he should not be cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his
pleadings. No such reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct
contempt for making scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in
one of the latter's Motions, and subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that
such order be set aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that such Decisions are
final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen, denying the
claims against him, and added that Belen was induced by revenge because it was
Baculi who indicted him in a previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a
'power complex'.
ISSUE:
Issue:
BACULI V. BELEN
FACTS:
W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect
contempt.
HELD:
YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and
contumacious statements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt
the administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And
even if such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow
the proper procedure under the Rules of Court. This strengthens the OCA's findings
that Belen is grossly ignorant of basic procedure.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic
procedural rules must be at the palm of his hands. When the law is so elementary,
such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not
know the same, and failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and
the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and
surely not a judge like Belen.
MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL
Facts:
Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, P20K
for violation of Canons 3 & 6 (Code of Judicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of
CPR
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in
settling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. The necessity of promptly
resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by
express provisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 days after receipt of the
affidavits and position period, or expiration of the period for the filing the same
ROC/Rules of Summary Procedure). Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. The justifications advanced by Nacional cannot be accepted
because doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules & diminish
respect for the law. The judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a
case, he should formally request the SC for an extension of the deadline.
Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of
the law and procedure. Lack of malice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional
because the rules violated were basic procedural law. All he had to do was apply
them, but he chose not to. It is settled that one who accepts the position of judge
owes the public and the court the ability o be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain the professional competence at all times. Competence and diligence are
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. (Note: length of service does
not mitigate administrative penalty)
CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ
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6 of Canon 6) wherein the judge himself must observe decorum by acting with dignity
and courtesy to all those present in the courtroom. Judges are demanded to be
always temperate, patient, and courteous both in conduct and in language.
SUAREZ V. DILAG
Facts:
Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and corruption against
Judge Dilag and Court Stenographer Pascua and (b) grave misconduct and
ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag allegedly for collecting P30K from litigants in
consideration of favorable judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriage. Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered
by Judge Dilar (Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were all
previously dismissed but subsequently reopened the case and granted the petition).
After referral to an investigation officer, the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag
liable for (1) gross misconduct for singing conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of
the law and procedure in handling Moreno and Perez cases; and (3) gross negligence
and inefficiency for failing to administer supervision over his staff when a fake registry
return receipt was effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment were effected
in Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was found guilty of graft and corruption.
Issue:
W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable?
Issue:
W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable
Held:
Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a
member of the bench by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the
hearing.
In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is
to hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a
situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each other.
Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to respond to his ruling
instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. Atty. Caneda also
erred when he continued to argue despite Judge Menchavezs ruling. However,
Menchavez should have directed the complainant to wind up his arguments under
pain of direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. Direct contempt is not
enforced by the judges act of bringing out of his weapon and asking counsel the
direct question what do you want? This confrontational manner has no place in our
present justice system. There are agents of the law, officers of the court & the police
who can be called upon to implement contempt orders & restore order as needed.
Judge Menchavezs overreacting by bringing out a gun for everyone present
in the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in court, is
inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the
court. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires a magistrate to maintain
order and decorum in the court, the Code itself sets its limits (as provided for by Sec.
74 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Held:
Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office.
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and
maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep
abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than
a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg. taking cognizance of a second
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when Dilag
had already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties,
issues, and causes of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative
of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed.
Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident
and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, Dilag failed
to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure (During
questioning, Dilag said that re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice.
Also, he deiced a case even before the submission of the City Prosecutor relative to
the investigation to determine collusion between the parties as required under Sec. 9
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages)
75 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena