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113 F.3d 303
In re Abraham SOKOL, Debtor.The STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,v.Abraham SOKOL, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
 No. 31, Dockets 95-5025, 95-5095.
United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.
 Argued Nov. 8, 1996. Decided March 21, 1997.
Elizabeth T. Bogren, Special Assistant Attorney General, New York City(Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Barbara G. Billet, Solicitor General,Thomas D. Hughes, Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.Abraham Sokol, Scarsdale, NY, pro se.Before OAKES, LEVAL and PARKER, Circuit Judges.OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:1The State of New York ("State") appeals from the judgment of March 2, 1995,and the opinion and order dated February 28, 1995, entered in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York, Harold Baer, Jr., Judge,State of New York v. Sokol (In re Sokol), 181 B.R. 27 (S.D.N.Y.1995) ("SokolII"), affirming the August 11, 1994, amended decision and order of the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Court, Stuart M. Bernstein, Judge, State of New York v.Sokol (In re Sokol), 170 B.R. 556 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) ("Sokol I" ), holdingas dischargeable the State's claim against Abraham Sokol for treble damages, but refusing to liquidate that claim. The State asserts error based on the courts'refusal to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and thereby resolve certainissues as a matter of law. First, the State argues that the bankruptcy court'srefusal to liquidate was error because state law provides that a restitution order establishes as a matter of law the minimum amount of the defendant's larceny
 
* Factsand, hence, the State's right to recover a judgment for at least treble therestitution judgment amount. Second, the State asserts error in the districtcourt's findings that, although the restitution judgment was entitled to full faithand credit and was binding on both it and the defendants, it was not conclusiveas to its amount because that issue had not been litigated. The State argues thatthis finding was incorrect because 1) state law governing criminal restitutionorders provides that a hearing to determine the amount of the defendant's gainneed not be granted despite a defendant's request if the record contains adequateinformation to determine the amount; and 2) the sentencing court specificallyheld that the trial record was sufficiently detailed to allow entry of a restitutionorder without a hearing, and expressly made findings as to the defendant's gain based upon trial testimony.2We hold that the bankruptcy court properly refused to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel on the facts of this case. We therefore affirm the districtcourt.34In January, 1994, Abraham Sokol filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition seeking,inter alia, to discharge various debts. In April, 1994, the State commenced anadversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) to determine thedischargeability of two debts Sokol allegedly owed to the State. Those debtsconsisted of a $222,255.38 restitution judgment imposed as part of a criminalsentence, and a civil claim for treble damages brought under N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law§ 145-b (McKinney 1983)
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 pending in state court based on the same conduct.The state court action has been stayed, initially pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L.R. §1311(1)(a) (McKinney Supp.1994), and currently by the filing of Sokol'sChapter 7 petition.5From April, 1987, through June, 1988, Sokol practiced as a radiologist and provided services under New York's Medicaid program. In 1991, Sokol andeight co-defendants were indicted for grand larceny in the first degree for stealing over $1 million from the State's Medicaid program. All of Sokol's co-defendants pled guilty; only Sokol went to a jury trial. The State also brought acivil action that year under § 145-b against Sokol to recover treble damages for injuries it sustained as a result of Sokol's Medicaid fraud.6In July, 1992, a jury convicted Sokol of one count of grand larceny by false pretense in the second degree, which requires proof that the property taken isvalued at over $50,000 and up to and including $1 million.
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 At sentencing,Sokol's counsel requested a hearing to determine the amount of restitution,
 
 pursuant to N.Y.Penal Law § 60.27(2), but the court refused to grant thehearing. Sokol was sentenced to three and one-half to ten and one-half years'imprisonment and ordered to pay $222,255.38 in restitution to the State, as wellas $200 in costs. A direct appeal of Sokol's criminal conviction is still pendingin the Second Department. The restitution judgment has been stayed pendingthe disposition of Sokol's direct criminal appeal.7On August 11, 1994, the bankruptcy court granted the State's motion for summary judgment as to the nondischargeability of the restitution judgment.Sokol I, 170 B.R. at 558. Bankruptcy Judge Bernstein held that Sokol'sconviction and restitution judgment were entitled to full faith and credit, andthat the restitution judgment was nondischargeable as a matter of law under 11U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) because it was imposed as part of a criminal sentence, andtherefore was "penal" despite its compensatory nature. Id. at 559-61 (citing,inter alia, Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216(1986); Thompson v. Virginia (In re Thompson), 16 F.3d 576, 580 (4thCir.1994)).8The bankruptcy court also declared the State's treble damages claimnondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Sokol I, 170 B.R. at 561 (citingState v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 155 B.R. 75, 79 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1993)). JudgeBernstein declined, however, to "decid[e] the amount, if any, of the State'sclaim that is recoverable under Section 145-b," Sokol I, 170 B.R. at 561,explaining that because Sokol had requested, but had not received, a § 60.27(2)restitution hearing in state court, "[i]t is not clear that the parties ever actuallylitigated the amount of the compensatory damages to which the State wasentitled...." Id.9The bankruptcy court entered judgment on August 22, 1994. Sokol filed noticeof appeal but failed to perfect it, and his appeal was thus dismissed on January10, 1995. The State filed a timely notice of cross-appeal in district court onAugust 29, 1994. Sokol II, 181 B.R. at 29. Arguing that the bankruptcy courterred in holding that the treble damages claim could not be liquidated, the Statecontended that the sentencing court's decision as to the amount of the restitution judgment for the larceny conviction determines, as a matter of law, the amountto be trebled as damages for the § 145-b claim. Id. at 29-30.10The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment in its entirety onFebruary 27, 1995. Sokol II, 181 B.R. at 31. Judge Baer rejected the State'sargument that, once a defendant is convicted of larceny, § 145-b treble damagesliability follows as a matter of law. Instead, he noted that § 145-b requires, barring a stipulation, that "the specific amount of the defendant's theft must be

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